Democracy and political corruption: A cross-national comparison

Past research on democracy and politicalcorruption produced mixed results becauseof differences in sampling and analyticalmethods. Moreover, an important shortcominghas been researchers' focus on detectinglinear effects alone. In the current study,I statistically controlled for potentiallyconfounding economic factors and usedhierarchical polynomial regression toevaluate the form of thedemocracy-corruption relationship. Resultsshowed that a cubic function best fittedthe data. Despite eruptions of corruptionamong intermediate democracies, theconsolidation of advanced democraticinstitutions eventually reduced corruption.Ultimately, the initial politicalconditions and the final democraticachievements determined the magnitude ofpolitical corruption in a country.     

From corruption to extortion: Conceptualization of post-communist corruption

Moral outrage and lack of comparison distorts the understanding of the natureand politically determined functions of governmental corruption in post-communist transition. As post-communist societies move towards open market systems and corruption is no longer limited to the public sector, politics is transformed into a potent tool for illegal transactions. The political structureitself creates corrupt practices that become a structural feature of transition societies. This article offers first a critical discussion of both moral theories of corruption and the thesis that posits a link between corruption and democracy deficit in post-communist countries. Subsequently, it sketches a neo-functionalist approach that puts corruption in a specific social context.With respect to East/Central Europe, corruption is presented as a betrayal ofpublic trust that serves specific requirements of an emerging ``extortioniststate.' These requirements relate to the expansion of extortion opportunitiesand their institutionalization into a semblance of a Tule of law system.     

Aid, governance and corruption control: a critical assessment

If the OECD??s Development Co-operation Report for 2009 is correct in its claim that ??The international aid effort now adds up to less than the sum of its parts??, then continued rapid growth in aid transfers is likely to contribute to further aid absorption problems, as well as institutional atrophy and deteriorating governance and corruption control among aid recipients. This article considers aid for good governance and anti-corruption, using Tanzania as an example. ??The supply side of aid?? sketches the bigger picture in which such aid is located, stressing collective action problems facing the aid industry in the current period of growth and diversification. ??The consequences of aid proliferation on corruption control in an aid-dependent state?? provides some empirics from Tanzania. ??Conclusions: whither ??corruption control????? draws some conclusions for the future of aid for governance and corruption control. A key message is that donor-driven governance and corruption control initiatives have failed to address the governance weaknesses that excessive and uncoordinated aid has helped to create.     

Police corruption and psychological testing: a strategy for preemployment screening

The prediction, control, and prevention of police corruption represent pervasive and enduring problems. Researchers have suggested that intervention at the preemployment screening stage may be the best solution. However, investigators have acknowledged that existing assessment practices are flawed. This article proposes a strategy for the preemployment screening of law enforcement personnel. In particular, it examines the utility of the Inwald Personality Inventory and the Revised-NEO Personality Inventory in relation to assessing antisocial behavioral tendencies and conscientious personality traits, respectively, and argues that their combined use, appropriately administered in a testing situation, represents a reliable and valid predictor of good job performance. The article speculatively comments on this strategy for purposes of psychological testing, future research in the field, and law enforcement administration practices.     

Internal strategies against corruption: Guidelines for preventing and combating corruption in police authorities

While corruption is not an entirely new phenomenon in Germany, the number of cases suggests that proactive measures should be taken to strengthen prevention and detection. This article proposes a number of measures which, used separately and in combination, aid prevention and detection. It then proposes a wider management approach to dealing with corruption which ranges from general to specific strategies and actions that are intended to prevent corruption, to design out the circumstances in which it may occur and to provide means of detecting areas of risk and vulnerability. The article particularly focuses on police organisations but has applied relevance to all public sector organisations. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Discretion and corruption: The Chilean judiciary

Corruption in the judiciary and its effects on the budget of that branch of government, the efficiency of justice (prompt or belated) and its quality (biased or impartial) are analyzed. The discretionary powers of the Supreme Court and those granted to judges to manage their courts, calendar and case load, and the hierarchical administrative structures of judiciaries, which function as a queueing system, may be used as a tool to maximize graft. These phenomena reveal links between institutional forms and incentives. Using the case of Chile and the exceptional emergence of corruption within the judiciary during the military dictatorship, the role of democracy as a punishing and preventive mechanism is highlighted.This article was written while the author was a Senior Fellow at the Orville Schell, Center for International Human Rights Law at Yale Law School, and under the auspices of the North-South Center of the University of Miami.     

Whistleblowing and corruption control: The GE case

This paper focuses on the use of the amended False Claims Act to counter defense contract fraud against the U.S. government. The case deals with the scheme of a former Israeli Air Force General and a GE marketing specialist to divert funds, provided by the U.S. to Israel, for unauthorized and private usage, and with the actions of the GE whistleblower, Chester L. Walsh, in bringing suit against GE under FCA. The paper analyzes poses the ethical problem of providing an economic bounty for the whistleblower even while acknowledging the effectiveness of this practice in countering fraud.     

Hard responses to corruption: Penal standards and the repression of corruption in Britain, France and Portugal

Despite its difficulties and inconsistencies in framing those practices andconducts recently unveiled by the press and judicial investigations whichhave caused considerable public discontent, the penal definition ofcorruption still highlights an interesting conceptual diversity across spaceand time that should not be overlooked. Most official discussions about andreferences to corruption and its volume are still framed within these hardparameters. It is, therefore, important to look at the intricacies ofcorruption as a crime in order to understand the virtues and failures ofnational repressive efforts. While crime statistics are of limited use for itsmeasurement, they can nevertheless help to interpret the way corruptionhas been treated through repressive instruments cross-nationally over aperiod of time.The aim of this paper is to assess the dynamics of the various processes ofsetting and revising penal standards to the conduct of office holders and theresults observable from the application of corruption and related offencesacross countries with different legal traditions.     

Governmental corruption in Africa: Sierra Leone as a case study

This paper examines the definition and context of official corruption in the emerging African nation of Sierra Leone. Historical, legal and sociological studies of the development of Sierra Leone and corruption within that nation are reviewed, as well as the content of official ljudicial inquiries into administrative corruption. These investigations and studies are supplemented with data from the primary author's experiences as a prosecutor and judge in Sierra Leone. Predisposing factors which facilitate corruption are identified and a variety of policies aimed at reform are discussed. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Dealing with corruption: the next steps

The 1997 White Paper from the British Government's Department for International Development (DFID) was specific in identifying the role of governance now being addressed by international and national donors: “improving governance can ... improve the lives of poor people directly. It is also essential for creating the environment for faster economic growth. Both aspects can be compromised by corruption, which all governments must address. In developing countries it is the poor who bear proportionally the heaviest cost“ (DFID, 1997, p. 30). Dealing with corruption is thus a priority both in terms of who it most affects and in terms of which objectives of governance — including participatory and responsive government and economic growth — it constrains. Although it has long held a specialist academic interest, corruption has become the subject of growing practitioner attention which means that the focus on corruption is beginning to move significantly from theory to practice and the practical. While there is substance to the belief that fire-engines cannot be designed without a thorough understanding of the fire they are intended to put out, there is also a sense in which the pervasiveness and tenacity of the current fires of corruption are such that action rather than refining theories and processes is what is now required. To paraphrase an analogy made by a senior British civil servant about the general issue of identifying policy — that corruption “is rather like the elephant — you recognise it when you see it but cannot easily define it” (quoted in Hill, 1997, p. 6) — is also to suggest that, while theorising may help draw up longer-term approaches to dealing with corruption, there is enough information and experience to develop best practice proposals for more immediate implementation and for developmental strategies that link to the longer-term approaches. This article addresses some of the issues of this agenda which seeks to develop, for those actively involved in anti-corruption initiatives, frameworks within which to consider realisable and cost-effective shorter-term anti-corruption strategies. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Combatting institutional corruption: The policy-centered approach

How can institutional corruption be combatted? While recent years have seen a growth in anti-corruption literature, examples of countries rooting out systemic corruption remain few. The lack of success stories has sparked an academic debate about the theoretical foundations of anti-corruption frameworks: primarily between proponents of the principal-agent framework and those seeing systemic corruption as the result of collective-action problems. Through an analysis of current principal-agent and collective action anti-corruption literature, this article adds two additional arguments to the debate: (a) the need to specify what one talks about when talking about systemic corruption and (b) the necessity to move beyond the principal-agent versus collective action frameworks dichotomy towards a policy-centered approach for how to combat institutional corruption. Having outlined how institutional corruption can be seen as one type of systemic corruption, this article shows how a policy-centered approach such as strengthening the appearance standard through an independent public commission can address theoretical mechanisms emphasized in each anti-corruption framework–thus arguing that the frameworks complement rather than rival each other. The article ends by arguing for an anti-corruption discourse acknowledging that a multifaceted problem such as corruption requires multiple frameworks rather than attempts for silver-bullet explanations.

     

Cadre recruitment and corruption: what goes wrong?

Why do so many corrupt officials rise up in the Chinese official hierarchy in the first place? This paper addresses this question by looking at corruption in the cadre recruitment system as a source of the problem. It attempts to show that despite meaningful reforms to improve cadre recruitment, especially through greater input and supervision from below, these reforms have not succeeded in fundamentally reshaping cadre incentives in the direction of accountability towards the below. Rather, the reforms have in many ways exacerbated incentives for opportunism and maneuvering on the part of individual officials. In explaining the new problems and failures in personnel matters, the paper places blame on incentive and structural distortions in the recruitment while also taking into consideration the realities of China’s vast local variance that combine to affect enforcement and incentives for compliance.     

Filing for corruption: Transparency, openness and record-keeping

The rhetoric of the new development agenda is shaped by democratisation,decentralisation and accountability. The intention is to reassert the role ofthe state but only within the context of involving and working for thepeople. Multilateral and bilateral donor statements are replete withreferences to openness, transparency, accountability and combatingcorruption. This article discusses the rhetoric of such language but then askshow they are to be implemented.What is at issue is that such terms are crucial development goals but,without greater attention to concrete outcomes and processes, may remainrhetoric.