公私伙伴关系与地方政府大部制改革

公私伙伴关系是20世纪90年代初诞生于英国的一种公共部门与私人部门合作提供公共物品与公共服务的制度安排,它在历史上有着多种形态。公私伙伴关系经历了几种形态的演变,即传统的公私伙伴关系、经济—财政型公私伙伴关系、管理型公私伙伴关系和行政改革型公私伙伴关系。地方政府大部制改革正面临着来自中央政府的改革决心、官僚制结构弊端、公共利益部门化与部门利益个人化的挑战。对此,应从创新公私伙伴关系的概念外延角度,力图以决策与执行职能的分离及协调职能的良性运转实现地方政府大部制改革。     

公共卫生领域的公私伙伴关系研究综述

近年来广泛的文献研究来对公共卫生领域的公私伙伴关系做了系统的定性分析,其中关于公私伙伴关系的定义、分类、挑战和建议等,可为我国运用公私伙伴关系来实现公共卫生事业的目标提供借鉴参考.     

公共服务领域公私合作关系的契约治理

改革开放以来,我国公共服务供给呈现出政府、NGO和企业共同参与的局面,但囿于"市场–政府"范式,在彼此合作关系的制度安排中,尚未处理好逐利动机与公益目标的关系,也影响了我国事业单位改革路径的正确选择。本文在理论和实践两方面分析出现于上世纪90年代的公私伙伴关系(PPP)的基础上,探讨了我国公私合作关系中存在的主要问题,提出了基于契约治理公私合作关系的重点与基本设想。     

大型机场建设项目公私合作模式运作分析

大型机场建设项目引入PPP模式,可以吸引社会资本的广泛参与,弥补建设资金缺口,提高公共服务效率。从PPP模式下机场运营模式的选择来看,管理型运营模式更适用于大型机场PPP建设项目。在明确运营模式的前提下,公私双方通过建立风险共担机制、明确风险节点、实施动态分担等进行风险控制;在收益分配上按照责权利体现公私双方的正当利益,并结合风险收益对等原则,将投资回报与风险分担相联系。笔者以L机场为例,围绕机场建设的运营结构、融资结构、投资回报等针对PPP模式下大型机场建设和运营进行系统分析,并就管理保障提出相应建议。     

公私合作制中的政府角色冲突及其消解

公私合作制中的政府在三重契约下扮演着多重角色,即显性契约中的政府角色,内在契约中的政府角色和私人部门履约的监管者、私人部门与公众争端的仲裁者。公私合作制中的政府角色冲突表现为:政府多重角色蕴涵着潜在的内在冲突,作为公共利益代表者的公共部门与私人部门在价值指向、组织文化与行为模式方面可能的冲突,政府角色实现中的信息与技术悖论,在维护公私合作稳定与实现社会效益最大化间存在着政府角色的可能冲突。消解公私合作制中政府角色潜在冲突的对策:一是完善相关的法律法规,建立有序的规则体系,明确政府角色,为公私合作建立稳定的制度框架;二是构建科学合理的政府内部的分工协作机制,保证政府角色的适当实现;三是建构科学的、协同的制度体系,通过有关各方的相互制约保证政府角色的实现;四是加强政府人力资源建设,提高政府公私合作能力。     

政企合作下的智慧应急系统建设——以深圳市为例

安全是发展的前提,智慧应急系统建设是推进应急管理现代化的关键举措。深圳市智慧应急系统建设的积极探索,充分展示了通过创新公私伙伴关系提高政府治理现代化能力、纵向有效执行中央和省级地方政府政策的成功实践。聚焦深圳市智慧应急系统建设的典型案例,通过分析其政策响应与决策部署过程、政府和企业的角色分工模式并发展出政府与企业的深度合作模型,总结深圳市在智慧应急系统建设中向上响应与向下落实、政企合作与管运分离、信息数字化与智慧化建设等三个方面的做法和经验,对我国其他省市政府的应急管理建设及数字空间应用建设具有典型示范作用和普遍启示意义。     

论析影响我国体育产业发展的因素及对策

通过对体育产业发展状况的分析,论述体育产业经济发展问题,主要在于:政府对体育投入的总量偏少,体育产业的投入渠道单一;体育产品制造业市场缺乏竞争力;体育产业有形资产的运营效率有待提高;体育产业的无形资产尚待与国际接轨;体育产业法制建设尚不完善。而解决这些问题的对策是:加强政府宏观调控;进一步开拓和发展体育产业市场;强化体育产业市场的内部要素。     

责任分担与共享单车治理

正共享单车作为城市基础设施建设领域中的重要组成部分,在借助互联网技术发力的同时,也不断完善着城市慢行交通系统;而作为"互联网+"背景下出现的新兴事物,共享单车的快速发展也面临着诸多现实困境。着眼于公私关系的PPP模式为共享单车治理提供了思路,其中的责任最优分担具有很强的针对性。一、责任分担是PPP模式的核心要件早在《民营化与公私部门的伙伴关系》一书中,美国学者E.S.萨瓦斯就分别从三种意义上对公私伙     

利益相关者视角下PPP项目主体分析——以“北京地铁4号线”为例

在宏观经济发展不景气,地方政府财力紧张的现实背景下,PPP项目成为基础设施建设和公共服务供给的最优选择之一。作为一种公私伙伴关系,PPP项目必然涉及到不同的利益主体,能否满足多样化的利益主体所具有的差异化的利益诉求直接关系到PPP项目的成败。因此,有必要运用利益相关者理论对具体PPP项目中的利益主体进行准确的识别和分类,是科学规划PPP项目,制定合理化利益分配和风险共担等机制的基础前提。     

公私伙伴关系绩效的关键影响因素——基于若干转型国家的经验研究

公私伙伴关系（PPP）已经成为政府提供公共服务的重要方式。转型国家发展PPP的潜力巨大，但面临很多困难和挑战，需要在制度环境、治理机制和政府能力等方面不断改革和完善。本研究在文献回顾和深度访谈的基础上，识别出17个PPP绩效影响因素指标和11个PPP绩效评价指标，制作成问卷，在中国、俄罗斯和波兰等多个国家进行调查并获取资料。通过因子分析得到了PPP绩效影响因素的7个维度：知识获取、代理成本、决策参与、不确定性、政府信用、政府能力和融资成本，和PPP绩效评价的4个维度：经济、环境、安全和社会。分别采用OLS和Logistic回归研究了影响转型国家PPP绩效的关键因素，发现知识获取、决策参与、代理成本、不确定性和政府信用显著影响PPP绩效，并对促进目前中国PPP的发展提出了相应政策建议。     

地方政府医药价格改革的时空演进机理——以政策创新扩散为视角

在我国单一制政体和复杂的府际关系下,社会政策的创新与扩散是一个涉面广泛、多元博弈的复杂政治过程。基于政策创新扩散理论,对中央、23个省级政府和4个直辖市的医药价格改革制度进行了案例追踪和文本比较分析。研究发现,地方医药价格改革政策扩散效应显著,随时间进程扩散呈现全国互动模型下的"S"型曲线;空间维度上,整体表现为由经济发达的东部沿海地区先行,逐步向中部、西部等其他地区推进;区域扩散和邻近效应显著,扩散存在势能差且具有一定的梯度性,沿动力源向周围政策势能低的省份扩散,呈现等级制模型;垂直影响和层级效应明显,体现政策变迁的互动性、动态性与复杂性;扩散内容以跟风模仿为主,学习性与创新能力不足。为提高地方政府政策持续创新力,中央政府应完善顶层设计并适当放权,拓展地方政府创新空间;地方政府应审时度势,积极提升再创新能力,发挥垂直影响的积极作用,加快政策扩散进程。     

领导干部提拔模式对地方政府权力运行方向的影响

利用实证调查数据,通过交叉表分析,发现在提拔领导干部时,存在侧重考察"工作能力"与侧重考察"社会活动能力"两种模式,并且这两种模式对地方政府权力运行的集体决策的程度、为亲友用权、政府工作取向、决策偏好、政策执行取向有显著影响;通过探索性要素分析发现,领导干部提拔模式对政府权力运行方向的影响可以简化为"权力为整体利益服务"和"权力为小团体服务"两个方面;通过综合性结构方程模型分析验证了探索性分析的结论,表明领导干部选拔模式确实会对政府权力运行方向产生显著影响。同时发现:在提拔领导干部时,若强调后备人选的"能力和工作业绩"及"口碑",政府权力将更多地偏向于为公共利益服务;若"背景和关系"、"跑官买官"因素发生关键影响,政府权力则容易演变成为小团体牟利的工具。     

我国城市公交服务治理模式与运营效率研究——以长三角城市群公交服务为例

城市公交服务运营效率评价是政府选择治理模式的前提与依据,而明晰运营效率与其影响因素间的关系则是政府深化公交治理模式的理论依据。在比较政府经营模式和市场主导模式差异及探讨效率影响因素的基础上,以长三角城市群公交服务为研究样本,应用DEA方法测算城市间服务效率的差异,发现市场主导模式效率要优于政府经营模式,但各自的综合效率、技术效率和规模效率均值都不高。为剖析造成这种现象的原因,对公交服务效率的影响因素进行Tobit回归,结果表明市场竞争、企业规模与运营效率显著正相关,且市场竞争与运营效率间存在"倒U型"关系。因此,我国城市公交服务的改革应坚持市场化为导向,引入民营资本构建公有有限公司形式的国有民营模式,扩大企业规模和充分利用竞争手段,以提高企业运营效率。     

党政联合发文的备案审查问题

党政联合发文在我国国家治理中发挥着重要作用。近年来,党政联合发文数量日益增长,兼具党的文件与行政规范性文件"双重属性"的党政联合发文的备案审查问题日益凸显。实践中,党政联合发文存在法律性质不易界定、备案审查标准难以统一、备案审查主体不明、备案审查能力不足等问题。当前,可以从联合发文的属性识别机制、备案审查标准、备案审查主体、备案审查能力等方面予以完善。     

How much income redistribution? An?explanation based on?vote-buying and?corruption

This paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture. A?model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters. In equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption. When rich voters can bribe the government, an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible. The link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data; the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model.     

A Method of Automated Nonparametric Content Analysis for Social Science

The increasing availability of digitized text presents enormous opportunities for social scientists. Yet hand coding many blogs, speeches, government records, newspapers, or other sources of unstructured text is infeasible. Although computer scientists have methods for automated content analysis, most are optimized to classify individual documents, whereas social scientists instead want generalizations about the population of documents, such as the proportion in a given category. Unfortunately, even a method with a high percent of individual documents correctly classified can be hugely biased when estimating category proportions. By directly optimizing for this social science goal, we develop a method that gives approximately unbiased estimates of category proportions even when the optimal classifier performs poorly. We illustrate with diverse data sets, including the daily expressed opinions of thousands of people about the U.S. presidency. We also make available software that implements our methods and large corpora of text for further analysis.     

Democratic Government,Institutional Autonomy and the Dynamics of Change

Against the backdrop of decades of public sector reforms in Europe, this essay aims to make sense of the processes through which institutions, democratic government included, achieve and lose autonomy or primacy and why it is difficult to find a state of equilibrium between democratic government and institutional autonomy. The analytical value of ‘autonomy’ as detachment-from-politics and the apolitical dynamics of change assumed by NPM reformers are challenged. In contrast, the interplay between democratic government and institutional autonomy is interpreted as an artefact of partly de-coupled inter-institutional processes involving struggle for power and status among interdependent and co-evolving institutions that are carriers of competing yet legitimate values, interests and behavioural logics. The problem of finding a stable equilibrium between democratic government, autonomous agencies and non-majoritarian institutions is illustrated by the cases of public administration and the public university.     

Equilibrium Party Government

In this article, I present an equilibrium model of party government within a two-party legislature. The theory is predicated upon members of the majority party having potentially conflicting individual and collective interests. In response to this potential conflict, the members of the majority party endogenously choose a degree of control to grant to their leadership. The equilibrium level of party strength is decreasing in the size of the majority party and increasing in the strength of opposition among members of the minority party. The theory implies that the average performance of W-Nominate estimates of majority party members' ideal points will be a decreasing function of the size of the majority party while the performance of these estimates for members of the minority party will not be affected by the size of the majority party. Using data from the U.S. House and Senate between 1866 and 2004, the theory's predictions are largely consistent with roll-call voting in both chambers.     

Financial Reporting by Australian Nonprofit Organisations: Dilemmas Posed by Government Funders

Nonprofit organisations comprise a growing and important sector of the Australian economy. This sector is being used by governments to an increasing extent for the delivery of services. The most common manner in which nonprofit organisations are funded by government is through the provision of grants, contracts or service agreements. Nonprofits discharge their accountability for these funds through reporting guidelines issued by the government funders. This article examines the financial accountability requirements of government funders, in one jurisdiction in Australia to support the central argument that the emphasis on ‘upward and external’ accountabilities serve as a functional and control tool on the sector. This emphasis detracts from the development of the ‘downward and internal’ mechanisms of accountability which are the essential building blocks for the strategic development of the capacity of the sector to respond to calls for greater accountability.     

Punctuations and agendas: A new look at local government budget expenditures

Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) is an agenda‐based theory that offers a theoretical foundation for large budget shifts. PET emphasizes that the static, incremental nature of agendas is occasionally interrupted by punctuations. These punctuations indicate shifts in priority among the agenda items, and with those agenda shifts come trade‐offs. This article expands the discussion of punctuated budgets to the level of local government by determining that local government expenditures have the characteristics espoused by the punctuated equilibrium theory. The article also determines the frequency of punctuations and the probability for future punctuations. The findings show that some budget functions and policy types are more prone to punctuations and, therefore, have a less stable agenda. The practical significance of extending PET to local government budgeting is the implication on planning, forecasting, and the agenda‐setting process. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.