H. M. Seervai – Indian Advocate and Great Lawyer of the Commonwealth of Nations*

For much of the second half of the 20th century, H. M. Seervai was a leading advocate of the Bombay High Court. He argued some of the most important constitutional cases decided by the Supreme Court of India and in 1970 he resolved to write his Constitutional Law of India. It became the leading text on Indian constitutional law. It is still in widespread use. Many instances of recent citations are quoted. But Seervai’s book is not the usual commentary on the text of the Indian constitutional and case law. Instead, the book contains a running discussion on the shifts in direction, as well as sharp criticisms, where Seervai felt that the courts had strayed from correct constitutional doctrine. Seervai died in 1996 as the fourth edition was just completed. In this article, originally given as a lecture in Mumbai in 2007 on the centenary of Seervai’s birth, the author questions Seervai’s testamentary prohibition on posthumous editions of his text. He urges that a new edition should be produced to keep Seervai’s legacy alive not only in India but in other constitutional democracies where Indian judicial authority is increasingly cited.     

Constitutional Rights and Democracy in the U.S.A.: The Issue -of Judicial Review

Abstract. The first section takes up some main details of American constitutional history. At the end of that section and in section two, we concentrate on one constitutional doctrine in particular, judicial review. We argue that this doctrine rests, traditionally, on the foundational idea of a permanent tension between democratic institutions and basic rights. In section three, we deal with the problem just raised, by suggesting an alternative view of the relationship that exists between these fundamental constitutional elements. Here we attempt to show that there is an essential principled harmony between basic constitutional rights and democratic majority rule. And we try to locate judicial review within this alternative conception. Then in section four and in the conclusion we discuss the institutional arrangements for the practice of judicial review in the light of this alternative conception.     

权威命题与来源命题——排他性法律实证主义的一种论证理路

来源命题(the sources thesis)指的是法律的存在及内容完全是一个社会事实问题,拉兹用来自权威的论据(即法律必然主张合法性权威)来论证这一命题。同时拉兹也以权威论据批判德沃金的融贯命题和Coleman的道德安置命题(moral incorporation thesis),并最终表明,来源命题是唯一与权威论相符合的理论主张。     

In the Shadow of Judicial Supremacy: Putting the Idea of Judicial Dialogue in Its Place

I aim to shed theoretical light on the meaning of judicial dialogue by comparing its practice in different jurisdictions. I first examine the practice of dialogic judicial review in Westminster democracies and constitutional departmentalism in American constitutional theory, showing the tendency toward judicial supremacy in both cases. Turning finally to continental Europe, I argue that the practice of constitutional dialogue there is reconciled with its postwar tradition of judicial supremacy through the deployment of proportionality analysis‐framed judicial admonition. I conclude that constitutional dialogue may take place amid the judicialization of constitutional politics, albeit in the shadow of judicial supremacy.     

宪政民主还是民主宪政?——试论美国最高法院与民主

宪政和民主是现代政治体制中相辅相成的两个部分,如果说民主是河,宪政则是堤。为了限制民主的冲动性与盲目性,美国人制定了成文宪法,在代表制基础上实现了宪政民主。与国会、总统一样,美国最高法院也是民意代表,只不过更为间接和持久。通过解释宪法,美国最高法院不断修补宪政之堤,在尊重民意的基础上引导民意,将宪政民主转向民主宪政,维护了自身的地位与权威。     

La construcción de una democracia respetuosa de los derechos humanos. reflexiones a partir del modelo constitucional adoptado por la república de timor oriental

This paper proposes to show the benefits of adopting a constitutional model that incorporates fundamental rights and judicial review systems in order to build a democracy respectful of human rights. Such goal will be achieved analyzing the constitutional model adopted by the young republic of East Timor. To that end, first we will explain briefly the political background and the roots of the Constitution of this country. Further on, we will present some of the characteristics of the constitutional model of East Timor. Specifically, we will show that this Constitution: i) it is not made up only of rules, but also includes values and principles which are directly applicable, and works as validity standards for the whole legal system; and ii) it recognizes some legal contents -related to human rights- that limit the rules, decisions and actions made by authorities and citizens. Finally, we will point out some challenges that this constitutional models usually face when reviewing authority decisions.     

Bringing the State into Constitutional Theory: Public Authority and the Constitution

This article brings the state into constitutional theory by presenting a theory of the development of the American state from the late 19th century to the present. The focus of the theory is the ability of the national state to exercise sovereignty or public authority over civil society. The main thesis is that the Constitution did not establish a government with a level of public authority adequate to the requirements of a modem democratic state. The result was a mismatch between the demands of civil society and the competence of state institutions, causing a reorganization of the political institutions of civil society in the early 20th century and a crisis of public authority in the 1960s. The United States continues to experience the consequences of an imbalance between the state institutions established by an 18th-century constitution and 20th-century democratic politics.     

Constitutional democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review

It has long been argued that the institution of judicial review is incompatible with democratic institutions. This criticism usually relies on a procedural conception of democracy, according to which democracy is essentially a form of government defined by equal political rights and majority rule. I argue that if we see democracy not just as a form of government, but more basically as a form of sovereignty, then there is a way to conceive of judicial review as a legitimate democratic institution. The conception of democracy that stems from the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls, is based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and original political jurisdiction of all citizens. Certain equal basic rights, in addition to equal political rights, are a part of democratic sovereignty. In exercising their constituent power at the level of constitutional choice, free and equal persons could choose judicial review as one of the constitutional mechanisms for protecting their equal basic rights. As such, judicial review can be seen as a kind of shared precommitment by sovereign citizens to maintaining their equal status in the exercise of their political rights in ordinary legislative procedures. I discuss the conditions under which judicial review is appropriate in a constitutional democracy. This argument is contrasted with Hamilton's traditional argument for judicial review, based in separation of powers and the nature of judicial authority. I conclude with some remarks on the consequences for constitutional interpretation.I am indebted to John Rawls and Burton Dreben for their helpful advice and their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin's Fallacy?: A Reply to Justice in Robes

In an article entitled ‘Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What thePhilosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law’,I argued that in Law's Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived hisinterpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theoryof meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin's fallacy’.In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that hecommitted the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact thathe considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’,‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—inLaw's Empire. Only the last of these is interpretive, but each,he argues, is compatible with his interpretive theory of meaning,which he describes as the view that ‘the doctrinal conceptof law is an interpretive concept’. In this Reply, I arguethat Dworkin's argument that he does not commit Dworkin's fallacyis itself an example of the fallacy and that Dworkin's fallacypervades Justice in Robes just as much as it did Law's Empire.     

Constitutional Judicial Review in the Russian Federation

The institution of constitutional judicial review has acquired a new legal foundation for its application: the Constitution of the Russian Federation (RF), adopted on 12 December 1993; the federal constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 21 June 1994; and other acts. However, the opportunities for full implementation of this new legislation on constitutional judicial review in the Russian Federation are constrained by problems from the past: first of all, by the problem of depoliticization, which has assumed exaggerated proportions as a result of the lack of practical success that marked the first stage of the Constitutional Court's operation in Russia. The resolution of this problem has become a condition for the viability of specialized constitutional judicial review in the RF. The difficulty of understanding and mastering this problem is further aggravated by the ambiguous nature of the institution of constitutional judicial review, not only in the Russian model but also in the classical model of its organization. For it is indisputable that constitutional judicial review is a component of the mechanism of judicial authority, regardless of where it is situated in the constitutional structure of power. However, constitutional judicial review cannot be wholly equated with traditional judicial functions since it is at the same time also a political activity undertaken through a jurisdictional form.     

The Arendtian Dread: Courts with Power

Hannah Arendt was fearful not only of a populist President speaking in the name of the people and unbound by legality. She was also concerned that popular support could be harnessed by those responsible for limiting it. In other words, she was fearful of the American Supreme Court relying on popular support. This is the meaning of her obscure depiction of the American Supreme Court as “the true seat of authority in the American Republic” but unfit to power. I argue that Arendt's characterization of authority as requiring “neither coercion nor persuasion” means that the Court's source of legitimacy is expertise rather than public support. Yet the current dominant understanding among American Justices as well as scholars is that public support is the source of the Court's authority. In Arendt's mind, such an understanding means that the Court has become the seat of power. The corruption of the Court's authority and constitutional law as a language of expertise capable of resisting public opinion will inevitably follow.     

The Law and the Constitution: Manifesto of the Progressive Party

This paper analyses the argument of Jennings' path-breaking work, The Law and the Constitution , and assesses its importance. The argument of the paper is that a basic tension runs through the evolving work: between celebrating the democratic nature of the contemporary constitution whilst expressing certain concerns about democracy's potential implications. This is a tension that Jennings was never able satisfactorily to resolve. The Law and the Constitution nevertheless remains a landmark text, especially in reminding lawyers of the need to look to the social and economic explanations for constitutional change. Although the constitution Jennings was writing about has altered, his public law method of examining the purpose for which public power is acquired before reflecting on desirable constraints remains of value today.     

Exploring Citizen Assessments of Unilateral Executive Authority

This study investigates the interaction between constitutional considerations and democratic context in evaluations of executive authority. An identical experiment is conducted using undergraduate and Mechanical Turk samples. A hypothetical article raising the question of executive power varies the (1) issue context, (2) expert assessment of constitutional authority, and (3) level of public support for proposed action. Measures of participants’ issue preferences and level of satisfaction with President Obama are also included in the analysis. Results indicate that participants think differently about the desirability and legitimacy of proposed executive action. Constitutional considerations and satisfaction with the President weigh most heavily in assessments of the appropriateness of executive conduct. Differences observed across samples demonstrate that institutional rules have the potential to constrain the influence of political factors in assessments legitimacy, but this is not inevitably the case. Feelings about the President may be especially important where experts agree that he lacks authority to take action. This could indicate that citizens will rally behind presidents they like, and think more critically of those they do not, in times of constitutional crisis.     

Strong Rights and Disobedience: From Here to Integrity

In Taking Rights Seriously Dworkin claimed that people had strong rights to disobey the law so that the government would be wrong to punish anyone who exercised them. This claim raises fundamental questions about the source of obligation and the limits of legitimacy. These questions of political theory have been given surprisingly little attention by him or his critics. I examine whether strong rights make any sense and conclude that his political theory cannot even generate the minimal prima facie obligation necessary to justify coercion, and hence, law. My solution is to interpret justice in the same way as law. Dworkin resists what I call Justice as Integrity because of concerns about ethical relativism. By considering his more recent works on objectivity and moral truth, I attempt to show that Dworkin's aversion to Moral Constructivism is based on an undue fear of the uncertainty of social practices and an undue faith in the certainty of empirical observation. By reconstructing the interpretive derivations of justice I offer a method to make the idea of obligation, strong rights, and hence, law as integrity, more viable.     

修宪权正当程序控制论

为防范修宪权的滥用，必须对其施加程序控制。正当的修宪程序不仅具有工具性价值，而且还具有促进民主性、提升民族理性和树立宪法权威性等独立价值。正当的修宪程序应该遵循平等参与、刚性、修宪权能适度分散行使和效率等原则。考察各国修宪权程序控制模式，发现大多数国家的宪法往往会将修宪动议主体与修宪议案决定主体结合起来考虑，使二者能够起到既相互制约又互为补充的作用。我国的修宪程序在参与性、刚性和权能分散性方面存在明显的不足。应当赋予国务院和最高人民法院修宪动议权，规定人民的讨论权，修宪议案的决定应该采取代表与人民分享部分内容的共决型模式，即某些宪法条款全国人大就有权决定修改，而另外一些宪法条款则只有人民以全民公决的方式才能决定是否修改。     

A coup d'état in law's empire: Dworkin's Hercules meets Atlas

In Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin advances two incompatible versions of law as integrity. On the strong thesis, political integrity understood as coherence in fundamental moral principles constitutes an overriding constraint on justice, fairness and due process. On the weak thesis, political integrity, while a value, is not to be privileged over justice, fairness, and due process, but to be weighed along with them. I argue that the weak thesis is superior on both of Dworkin's criteria: fit and justifiability. However, the weak thesis must be amended to allow for coherence in policies as well as in principles: the social consequences of legal decisions must be taken into account.I would like to thank Kenneth Kiprnis for his helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Reflections on Punishment from a Global Perspective: An Exploration of Chehtman’s The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment

In this review essay, I offer reflections on three themes. I begin by exploring Alejandro Chehtman’s expressed methodological commitments. I argue that his views move him closer to Lon Fuller and away from the thin accounts offered by HLA Hart and Joseph Raz. Moreover, to make sense of his views, he must offer a more normatively robust theory of law. Second, I turn to his use of Raz’s theory of authority. I argue that Chehtman fails to distinguish between Raz’s views and his own, but more importantly, I maintain that his discussion of Raz is superfluous: in the course of “unpacking” Raz’s views, he leads us back to his own core theses. Finally, I explore Chehtman’s ability to deal with perennial worries that plague any attempt to offer a justification for International Criminal Law in general, and the International Criminal Court in particular (i.e., “victor’s justice”, “show trials”, “peace vs. justice”). I argue that unless Chehtman is able to demonstrate that the enforcement of International Criminal Law is able to impart dignity and security on the most vulnerable, his account will be significantly weakened.     

美国总统眼中的宪法及其启示（下）——以美国总统就职演说为分析范本

美国总统在就职演说中所体现出来的宪法观能给我们多方面启示,最重要的是必须更加注重并想方设法在全社会培养宪法信仰。因为美国总统的宪法观,最集中地说明了他们普遍具有宪法信仰,而这又在根本上受到美国社会宪法文化的深刻熏陶,是美国社会普遍具有宪法信仰的一个缩影。借鉴美国总统具有宪法信仰的表现与原因,在我国全社会培养宪法信仰,既要格外重视宪法,又要维护宪法权威,还要加强宪法教育。     

The Political Rights of Anti-Liberal-Democratic Groups

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether it is permissible for a liberal democratic state to deny anti-liberal-democratic citizens and groups the right to run for parliament. My answer to this question is twofold. On the one hand, I will argue that it is, in principle, permissible for liberal democratic states to deny anti-liberal-democratic citizens and groups the right to run for parliament. On the other hand, I will argue that it is rarely wise (or prudent) for ripe democracies to exclude anti-liberal-democrats from parliamentary elections. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is related to the inherent stability of just institutions. The second is that exclusion can lead to group polarization and enclave deliberation that can engender political extremism and impair processes of interpersonal and intrapersonal deliberation in liberal democracies.     

The Dilemmas of Constitutional Courts and the Case for a New Design of Kelsenian Institutions

Law and Philosophy - Legal and political controversies persist about the performance of Kelsenian-type constitutional courts in democratic systems. One of the reasons is that the design of these...