The Outer Limits of Copyright Law – Where Law Meets Philosophy and Culture

This article engages in a cultural critique of copyright law. The point is to explain how and why this body of law is culturally exclusive, notwithstanding the claims made by judges and others that the law is culturally open and inclusive. This involves a discussion of the relationship between philosophy and law, and of how this nexus has been misrepresented by the courts and in recent writings on the subject. Analysis centres on a discussion of Australian case law involving indigenous claims of communal ownership of copyright and the treatment of technology when it comes to attributing authorship.     

The Advent of Preventive Criminal Law: An Erosion of the Traditional Criminal Law?

Criminal law in contemporary societies is undergoing a transformation or according to some, even a paradigm shift. The reach of criminal law is now extended to terrains that were hitherto immune to criminalization. These new forms of criminalization. in post-heroic risk societies are targeting conduct well before it causes a harm. The prime examples of this preventive criminalization. are pre-inchoate offences, crimes of possession of “innocent” objects and crimes of abstract endangerment. The common trait of these offences is that they enable the so-called preponing criminal liability (Vorverlagerung), through which the earliest of preparatory acts, neutral, everyday activities such as merely standing around or merely possessing may well fall within the reach of criminal law. This phenomenon is now taking place virtually everywhere considered by many as an erosion of the traditional post-enlightenment criminal law model. Yet, proponents of the preventive criminal law are suggesting that such laws are needed in order to avert risks (terrorist attacks, for instance) while they are at preparation phase. There is, therefore, a tension between the traditional criminal law and new security interests that pose new questions which need to be addressed by a meticulous analysis. In this article I shall try to deal with following questions: Whether these preventive offences are inherently incompatible with the rule of law? How far a law-abiding nation can go in criminalizing preparatory acts? Are there any promising constraining constitutional principles or instances that delimit preventive criminalization?     

Beyond the Law?: The Justice of Deconstruction

This paper offers a close reading of Derridas essay Force of Law that emphasises the twin strengths of a deconstructive approach to questions of law and justice -- textual analysis and political context. Derridas interest is in limit or test cases, and so he engages with the fraying edges of the law, its borders, the frontiers that are most heavily policed because they are most fragile, for example capital punishment, genocide, general strikes and terrorism. Derrida undertakes an exploration of violence through a reinterpretation of Walter Benjamins Critique of Violence. At the heart of Derridas difficult argument is a demand for justice that goes beyond the cataloguing of specific injustices, and beyond the terms of Benjamins critique. The utopian impulse that underpins Force of Law is carried over into Specters of Marx, Derridas recent explicit grappling with the legacy of Marxism. The links between these two texts by Derrida implies a sustained politics of radical commitment on the part of deconstruction, a commitment to future forms of legality and egalitarianism, a theory of justice posited upon prescience rather than precedent.     

The Changing Face of Corporate Liability – New Hard Law and the Increasing Influence of Soft Law

The first frameworks defining standards of human rights protection specifically for business enterprises were non-binding “soft law” like the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. In recent times, a “hardening” of corporate human rights law has taken place. Several acts of “hard law” have been implemented at a national and EU level. This article provides an overview of the most important ones. The “hard law” provisions differ in their scope: some obligate companies to report on human rights, others stipulate concrete obligations to conduct human rights due diligence. Another way of tackling the issue of human rights compliance has been demonstrated by the prosecution of companies in the United States. While procedural guidelines abstractly stipulate an effective compliance system to be a mitigating factor, the US Department of Justice regularly defines concrete compliance obligations in deferred or non-prosecution agreements. This development could lead to comprehensive liability for negligence due to organisational and monitoring deficiencies. But who defines the standards? This article examines how the changing practice of human rights compliance may have “feedback effects” on hard law, particularly by changing the scale of negligence. Regarding the lack of effectiveness of some due diligence measures, especially in the “certification industry”, it is then asked how legislation may proactively exert influence by defining effective CSR instruments necessary to prevent civil and criminal liability. Using the example of German law, a proposal is made to implement an obligation of human rights due diligence in “hard law” and, simultaneously, set up an independent expert commission that drafts guidelines specifying the necessary measures for different kinds of companies.     

The Israeli Patient's Rights Law: evidence for deprofessionalization?

In this paper, the Israeli Patient's Rights Law of 1996 is discussed within the framework of Haug's predicted process of deprofessionalization. It is argued that the law reflects global processes such as the diffusion of knowledge, consumerism, and values that emphasize human rights and democracy. By guaranteeing patients' access to medical information, by submitting medical decisions to extra-professional regulation, the law erodes professional power.     

The Rule of Law in Today’s Africa∗

This article is based on the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in a case involving illness resulting from the consumption of a bottled drink which contained a dead cockroach. The main issues considered were manufacturers' duty of care; the liability of a retailer in negligence; burden of proof; and causation. Evidence showed that the drink manufactured by the second respondent was sold by the first respondent to the appellant in the same condition in which it left the second respondent. The Court held that in the circumstances of the case, only the second respondent was liable to the appellant.     

The Critic’s Love of The Law: Intimate Observations on an Insular Jurisdiction

This article, which should not in any sense be taken to reflect the views of the Editorial Board of Law and Critique, argues that the political project of critical legal studies in England remains overwhelmingly in the future. Lacking academic identity, political purpose and ethical conviction, critical legal scholarship in England has been too insecure in its institutional place and too unconscious of its individual and collective desires to resist absorption into the institution. Critical legal studies – as distinct from feminist legal studies, gay and lesbian studies or critical race theory –has tended to teach and so reproduce the core curriculum in a passive and negative mode. Resistant, ostensibly for historical and political reasons, to self-criticism and indeed to self-reflection upon their institutional practices, critical scholars have ended up repeating the law that they came to critique and overcome. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Reductio Ad Absurdum: The Kapo Trial Judgements’ Contribution To International Criminal Law Jurisprudence And Customary International Law

Several Jewish persons designated as concentration camp guards (Kapos) during the Holocaust were subsequently tried in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s for allegedly committing grave crimes. This article examines these trial judgements and considers their significance to international criminal law jurisprudence and customary international law. First, this article will delineate the trial judgements’ purpose, relevance and previous contribution to customary international law. Secondly, a comparative narrative of the judgements with recent case law from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court will illuminate their potential contribution, specifically to the principles of modes of liability, criminal intent, and the defence of duress. The Kapo trial judgements may therefore continue to offer an extreme case example and a worthy source of common law for international criminal law jurisprudence and customary international law.     

Hybrid Texts and Uniform Law? The Multilingual Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) is shaped by the language in which it is drafted—i.e. French. However, because French is rarely the mother tongue of those drafting that case law, the texts produced are often stilted and awkward. In addition, those drafting such case law are constrained in their use of language and style of writing (owing to pressures of technology and in order to reinforce the rule of law). These factors have led to the development of a ‘Court French’ which necessarily shapes the case law produced and has implications for its development, particularly insofar as it inevitably leads to a type of precedent in that case law. That case law also undergoes many permutations of translation into and out of up to 23 different languages. The resultant texts that make up the case law are hybrid in nature—consisting of a blend of cultural and linguistic patterns, constrained by a rigid formulistic drafting style and put through many permutations of translation. The present paper investigates the production of the Court’s multilingual case law and considers whether the hybrid nature of that case law can actually aid the presentation (and thus the development) of a ‘uniform’ EU case law.     

The Origins of ‘Alien Status’ in the English Common Law

In his 2001 monograph on Aliens in Medieval Law: The Origins of Modern Citizenship, Dr Keechang Kim suggested that there was no evidence before the late fourteenth century that birth beyond the sea made a person an alien. This article discusses a series of cases heard from the mid-thirteenth century onwards in which tenants pleaded the claimant's birth overseas by way of bar to hereditary claims to land and in which it seems to have been treated as a bar in itself, though one to which the king might grant special exemption. This seems to have remained the position until legislation of 1351 (triggered by doubts about the eligibility of two sons of Edward III born overseas to succeed to the throne) which not only confirmed their eligibility but also made the first general extension of the right to inherit to children born overseas to parents in the king's allegiance.     

The Origins of Trade Secrecy Law in England, 1600–1851

This paper examines the origins of trade secrecy law from the beginning of the seventeenth century until Morison v Moat (1851), described by the Oxford History of the Laws of England as ‘foundational’. The paper reveals something of a conundrum. The first part shows that although the prevalence of guild ordinances would have familiarized many with the concept of ‘lawful secrets’, these provisions could no longer be enforced in the guild courts by the late seventeenth century, or within the wider jurisdiction of the courts of the City of London. Instead, as the second half of the paper shows, it was the law courts proper that came to provide succour to those working trade secrets, allowing them to both restrain employees from using secrets for their own benefit and/or to sell secrets to other parties. This was a halting process, but one that had certainly begun prior to Morison.     

Adorno,Freedom and Criminal Law: The ‘Determinist Challenge’ Revitalised

This article argues—against the present compatibilist orthodoxy in the philosophy of criminal law—for the contemporary relevance of a kind of critique of criminal law known as the ‘determinist challenge’, through a reconstruction of Theodor Adorno’s thought on freedom and determinism. The article begins by considering traditional forms of the determinist challenge, which expressed a widespread intuition that it is irrational or inappropriate for the criminal law to hold people responsible for actions that are causally determined by social and psychological forces in such a way that they cannot be said to have acted freely. Yet as traditionally presented it was possible for its opponents to interpret this challenge as an incompatibilist position within the traditional free will/determinism debate, and to present compatibilist arguments against it—in particular, that the determinist challenge is unmotivated and has implausible implications. It is argued that these compatibilist objections hold only on a certain interpretation of the determinist challenge, but that this interpretation is not the only one available. Adorno’s distinctive position on freedom and determinism is presented as an alternative version of the challenge, which cannot be assimilated to the terms of the traditional compatibilist/incompatibilist disputes. This novel, ‘metacritical’ version of the determinist challenge is essentially a social–historical, not metaphysical, thesis about the moral significance of the freedom-undermining effects of modern social forms. As such, it is argued, it is invulnerable to the usual compatibilist objections, and presents a serious challenge to our criminal legal institutions.     

A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO Diversity Convention and International Trade Law

The adoption, on 20 October 2005, of the Convention on the Protectionand Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (DiversityConvention) has returned the limelight to the suitability ofWorld Trade Organization (WTO) rules for cultural products.This article shows that the Diversity Convention, while an importantstep towards the recognition of cultural diversity as an internationallyrecognized public choice of states, does not affect the rightsand obligations of WTO Members as such. The original purposeof the Convention was to create a safe haven for cultural policiesand protect them from WTO disciplines. However, the centraloperative provision for bringing about the desired shieldingeffect for domestic policies safeguarding national culturalindustries against foreign competition, its now-article 20,while making a general claim to non-subordination in paragraph1, modifies this broad statement in paragraph 2 so as to onlyapply to treaties concluded at the same time or later. The articleexplores how to avoid or minimize an undesirable incongruencebetween liberal trade rules and the right of states to protectshelf-space for domestically produced cultural products.     

What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice

In this paper I discuss the proposal that the law of torts exists to do justice, more specifically corrective justice, between the parties to a tort case. My aims include clarifying the proposal and defending it against some objections (as well as saving it from some defences that it could do without). Gradually the paper turns to a discussion of the rationale for doing corrective justice. I defend what I call the ‘continuity thesis’ according to which at least part of the rationale for doing corrective justice is to mitigate one’s wrongs, including one’s torts. I try to show how much of the law of torts this thesis helps to explain, but also what it leaves unexplained. In the process I show (what I will discuss in a later companion paper) that ‘corrective justice’ cannot be a complete answer to the question of what tort law is for.     

Liberal Rights versus Islamic Law? The Construction of a Binary in Malaysian Politics

Why are liberal rights and Islamic law understood in binary and exclusivist terms at some moments, but not others? In this study, I trace when, why, and how an Islamic law versus liberal rights binary emerged in Malaysian political discourse and popular legal consciousness. I find that Malaysian legal institutions were hardwired to produce vexing legal questions, which competing groups of activists transformed into compelling narratives of injustice. By tracing the development of this spectacle in the courtroom and beyond, I show how the dueling binaries of liberal rights versus Islamic law, individual rights versus collective rights, and secularism versus religion were contingent on institutional design and political agency, rather than irreconcilable tensions between liberal rights and the Islamic legal tradition in some intrinsic sense. More broadly, the research contributes to our understanding of how popular legal consciousness is shaped by legal mobilization and countermobilization beyond the court of law.     

Justice ‘Under’ Law: The Bodily Incarnation of Legal Conceptions Over Time

The article uses embodiment and the experiential basis of conceptual metaphor to argue for the metaphorical essence of abstract legal thought. Abstract concepts like ‘law’ and ‘justice’ need to borrow from a spatial, bodily, or physical prototype in order to be conceptualised, seen, for example, in the fact that justice preferably is found ‘under’ law. Three conceptual categories of how law is conceptualised is examined: law as an object, law as a vertical relation, and law as an area. The Google Ngram Viewer, based on the massive library of books that Google has scanned, has been used to study legally relevant conceptions over time within each of these three categories, from 1800 to 2000. In addition, the article suggests a type of analytical method of ‘metaphor triangulation,’ that is, the replacement of prevailing metaphors with unusual ones in order to increase the level of awareness of what conceptual content the prevailing metaphors involve.