寻求韩国预防大国在东北亚冲突中的作用

随着中国在地区事务中的作用与责任与日俱增,中国在解决地区安全、贸易及环境问题等方面的合作日益至关重要。美国总统奥巴马曾说,美中关系是美国在国际事务中最重要的关系。但东北亚地区有许多问题会经常引发中美两国产生争议和冲突。本文将论证朝鲜半岛问题本身对这种中美合作关系的负面影响。天安舰事件证明了中美两国合作关系的脆弱性;包括核问题在内旷日持久的＂朝鲜问题＂影响中美关系。美国和中国在如何看待与解决朝鲜问题方面存在分歧。特别是在过去两年内,两个大国之间的分歧已经扩大。因此,本文最后将论述韩国对改善美中关系的作用。为避免冷战格局重现,韩国在朝鲜半岛及东北亚地区应该能够发挥更大的作用。     

奥巴马政府的台海政策及其影响

奥巴马政府基本继承了小布什政府后期的台海政策,同时采取了一些新的做法。当前美国全球战略需要稳定的中美关系,奥巴马政府积极看待两岸关系和平发展,但更强调稳定化。奥巴马政府支持台湾扩大国际空间,将继续对台军售政策,赞成两岸签署经济合作框架协议,加深、扩大美台之间的经济联系。奥巴马政府台海政策的制定受到多种复杂因素的影响,其中包括美国国内战略辩论、国会、军方和军工集团、美国对两岸关系和台湾岛内局势的评估等。     

Strategic Patience in a Turbulent World: The Obama Doctrine and its Approach to the World

The Obama administration is often criticized for not having a strategic vision. After more than six years in office, a high expectation that was widely shared around the globe seems to have nearly evaporated. Many see the “disorder” the world is facing today as partly a result of a lack of vision from the White House. You could make a case that the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and other “violent extremism” in the Middle East and beyond, Russia's aggression in Ukraine, chaos in Syria, China's assertive moves in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and so forth, are results, direct and indirect, of a perceived vacuum created by “American withdrawal.” However, the Obama administration's understanding of the world has been surprisingly positive and constant. This paper will argue that Obama administration in fact has a core world view, based on a new self-image of the United States, and that the issue is not whether the administration lacks a vision; rather the focus should be on the vision itself and the execution of that vision.     

试析美国奥巴马政府的核不扩散政策

奥巴马政府上台后,美国核不扩散政策出现了重要转变。这一转变既是奥巴马政府对布什政府核不扩散政策进行反思的结果,又是修复美国国际形象和维护其世界领导地位的战略需要,更是美国对朝鲜和伊朗的核开发问题施加压力的一种手段。奥巴马政府对美国核不扩散政策的调整,有利于国际核军控工作走上正轨;将对中国产生多重影响;对地区核问题的解决所产生的效果具有不确定性。     

奥巴马政府的二十国集团战略评析

源起于美国的金融危机对于美国政府的内外政策产生了重要影响,推动经济尽快复苏成为奥巴马政府的优先议程。承认二十国集团在世界经济和国际社会的重要地位,与二十国集团合作,是美国化解其金融危机和确保经济复苏的关键战略措施之一。奥巴马政府的二十国集团战略有多重动因,最终目的是利用这一新兴的全球治理平台,维护其在国际金融领域的主导地位,进而维持其在全球的霸权地位。     

作为软实力资源的和平队重受美国政府重视

2011年是美国和平队成立的第50个年头。现任总统奥巴马在2008年的总统竞选中提出将摈弃小布什时代的单边主义,更加重视多边合作,并主张在美国领导世界时,不仅要应用硬实力,而且还应更加重视对软实力的应用。奥巴马总统上任后,大幅增加和平队的预算,并许诺在2011年把和平队的人数翻一番。奥巴马对和平队的鲜明态度,标志着美国政府开始重新重视和平队作为软实力资源在美国外交中的作用。     

AFRICOM: a threat or an opportunity for African security?

The establishment of an African military command by the United States reflects the growing focus of the United States on Africa in the US National Security Strategy, which appears to be continuing under new US President Barack Obama. This article deals with several questions. What is the stated US National Security Strategy pertaining to Africa? What national interests does the United States have in Africa? What is the United States officially saying about its objectives in Africa and what has it actually been doing to date? And what are other opinion makers saying about US military involvement in Africa? Finally, it looks at the question of US perceptions of possible rivals in Africa and at potential scenarios for conflict before making a series of conclusions about the threats and opportunities posed by AFRICOM for Africa, and recommendations for a response to AFRICOM on the part of policymakers in South Africa.     

大国博弈、双层均势的亚洲时刻--俄罗斯智库对中美经贸摩擦的认知与政策立场

俄罗斯智库对中美经贸摩擦有着独特的认知和期待,并与克里姆林宫的官方立场互为表里。总体上,俄方智库的观点是,在经贸摩擦的背后,是中美两国对军事、政治、科技、地区和全球领导权的竞争;两国的国内议程和对外政策,将因此受到深远影响并产生溢出效应--在亚洲区域内形成两极结构。即使两国会因国内和国际政治因素,在经贸问题上达成妥协,但中方不会放弃获得世界科技领导者的雄心,美方也不会打消遏制中国发展动能的战略意图。俄罗斯应与中国继续保持经济与军事合作,避免与美国和西方关系的继续恶化,并在亚太地区推动"大欧亚伙伴关系"倡议。俄罗斯政策分析界基于自身利益的演绎,将中美经贸摩擦定性为大国博弈,相应的政策建议反映出俄罗斯以在全球和亚洲分别制衡美中为目标的双层均势策略。俄罗斯将在有亚洲其他国家参与的情景下扮演战略平衡手角色,借中美全面对抗之势,在中美俄三边关系之外扭转不利的外部发展环境。俄罗斯对亚太国际局势的盘活作用,将催生双边和三边竞合新模式的建立。     

Two postscripts to the McCarran hearings

Abstract

For nearly three decades following World War II Japan was officially considered to be America's newly befriended and unthreatening client in East Asia. Today that is no longer entirely true. A major change is underway in the justifying ideology and the imagery surrounding the US relationship with Japan. Bureaucrats, businessmen, journalists, and academics now portray Japan provocatively to the American public as a direct threat to the viability of America's key economic institutions. To understand why this shift in the official perception and evaluation of Japan is occurring, and what a change in the dominant ideological teaching about postwar Japan portends, I will focus first on two successive periods—the 1970s and the early 1980s—during which the US-Japan bilateral relationship reflected important changes in the world economy and the US position within it. Then, after having described the environment within which US-Japan frictions have been working themselves out, I shall argue that influential ruling elites in the United States are now coming around to the view that the new challenge confronting US global hegemony is the narrowing technological gap between the US and its main industrial competitors. This will lead me to say a few words about the different forces acting to shape science and technology in the United States and Japan. Finally, I shall conclude by recommending what may be a more rational approach for Japan to take in the international arena if it still wishes to preserve its “peace constitution” into the next century.     

The Pivot between Containment,Engagement, and Restraint: President Obama’s Conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia

This article examines the formulation and implementation of American grand strategy under the Obama administration, and how the “pivot to Asia” functions within this strategic context. It argues that President Obama attempts to secure continued American hegemony through a combination of cooperative engagement and restraint. This exposes a fundamental dilemma at the heart of America’s rebalancing: increased engagement with US allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific is fueling political, economic, and military competition with China. Sequestration and questions over American strategic coherence and consistency are simultaneously undermining the credibility of the pivot, both at home and abroad. The article concludes that this dilemma makes it unlikely for the pivot to succeed in its stated aims, unless the United States re-emphasizes cooperative engagement with China.     

How the East Asian Crisis Will Change International Relations

We may expect regional response to the tension and conflict in Asia begun by China in 2009 gradually to transform the international order in that region, where the United States has been the active great power. Today the United States is so overextended in commitments and so lacking in force structure (and political will) that she can no longer play that role. Nor, however, has China succeeded in her initial assumption that regional powers would defer to her vastly increased military power. Unless China finds a way to extricate herself, we may expect regional powers, each strengthening herself, to grow closer together as a group in which Tokyo plays an unaccustomed central role, both in diplomacy and arms supply, although in coordination with the United States. North Korea is also highly dangerous. The likely outcome is greater military strength generally, with South Korea and Japan nuclear powers.     

New Security Dimensions in the Asia–Pacific

The rise of China provides a major challenge to the United States, the undisputed hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region since the second world war. This development provides regional states with an opportunity to shape the regional security architecture by adopting an inclusive approach to China. The role of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) tends to be under-estimated by Western scholars who often see the European model as the only approach to regional integration. This paper discusses the significant achievements of ASEAN in serving as a catalyst for the establishment of regional institutions. Such institutions could serve as instruments for the management of China's relations with Japan and India. It is contended that the emergence of Asian powers, especially China, will result in a challenge to the Washington Consensus of Western norms and values focusing on individual rights which have governed international institutions. The rise of China is likely to see the application of a Beijing Consensus emphasising the balance between individual rights and social obligations, which would resonate positively in the region. In the twenty-first century, global institutions will need to reflect the norms, values and practices of global society and not just Atlantic perspectives.     

朴槿惠政府东北亚和平合作构想的具体化和改进方向

2013年2月上台的朴槿惠政府提出了一项新的外交政策,即"东北亚和平合作构想",并在国内外进行广泛宣传和研究。"东北亚和平合作构想"为了解决包括区域外国家美国在内的,东北亚区域内各国间的"亚洲悖论",以非传统安全领域的"软安全"问题为中心,开展多边对话机制,并致力于最终形成一个东北亚安全共同体。但该构想尚处于理论起步阶段,对合作(安全)议题、区域范围(参与对象国)、行为主体、国际机制(制度化)、推进战略等问题没有具体界定,距离政策化也还有一段距离。其间朴槿惠总统(政府)向美国和中国介绍了"东北亚和平合作构想",但仅得到美国的消极理解和中国原则上的支持,并没有得到对该构想的实质和具体内容的理解和支持。"东北亚和平合作构想"应要进一步具体化、理论化,以此来得到东北亚各国一致认同且可实践的国际合作体制。     

Peter Gowan's “American grand strategy”

While this article broadly agrees with Peter Gowan's concern about the new militarism of the United States and the appalling consequences that have emerged as a result of U.S. preemption in Iraq, it questions the extent to which his portrait of U.S. hegemony addresses all the relevant issues as they affect the Asian region. Given the numerical dominance of Asia in world population and the rising power of China and India, how Gowan's “American Grand Strategy” applies to this part of the world is of fundamental importance to the relevance and sustainability of his argument. Part 1 on U.S. economic hegemony argues that U.S. capital has not been an unmitigated evil for India and where U.S. interests have been damaging they are not uniquely so: the European Union's economic policies have also been deeply damaging even though Europe is not a hegemon. Part 2 on U.S. political hegemony argues that bringing Pakistan and India into the U.S. alliance system has been beneficial for regional security and domestic political-ethnic stability. Part 3 considers responses to U.S. hegemony, arguing that this supremacy is more fragile than Gowan assumes because new powers, such as China and India, have long-term strategies to reduce their dependency. The conclusion suggests that despite widespread criticism and dissatisfaction with the nature of U.S. engagement in Asia, the dominant view in the region is one that sees the United States as a useful wedge between the emerging interests of China, India, and Japan. In short, the “American Grand Strategy” is not as negative, overwhelming, or as unpopular as Gowan suggests.     

The world economic pattern in the 1990s and Asia-Pacific economic cooperation

The world economic pattern of the 1990s will have many characteristics. For example: 1) the world economy will tend to move further toward multipolarization and several fairly large regional economic blocs will be formed with these polars as their center; 2) the United States, Japan, and Europe will play a dominant role in the new world economic pattern; and 3) the Asia-Pacific economies will be the most vigorous part of the world economy. Since the 1980s, with the development of the internationalization of the world economy and regional integration, Asia-Pacific economic cooperation has entered into a new period. However, it is very difficult to form a close entity of economic cooperation (such as the EC) including the whole Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it is more practical to found a subregional economic cooperative body, such as a “Northeast Asian economic sphere,” in the near future. This article was originally prepared for a roundtable conference on “Economic Issues in the Northwest Pacific: Perspectives in a Dramatically Changing World,” held December 14–16, 1990, in Oiso, Japan. The cosponsors of the conference were Taisho Research Institute, the Japan Economic Foundation, and The American Council on Asian and Pacific Affairs.     

Prospects for cooperative security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region

The concept of multilateral dialogue on Asia-Pacific security is attracting increasing support. This results from the improvement of relations among most of the major powers, the growing awareness of the problems that can best be addressed through cooperation, and the development of more realistic proposals for multilateral dialogue. The best approach to cooperative security is to utilize a combination of channels, including the ASEAN Regional Forum for discussion of region-wide and Southeast Asian issues, a parallel forum for dialogue on Northeast Asia, consideration of some security problems in APEC, and a recognized unofficial dialogue on regional strategic questions. In Spring 1994, he was a visiting professor of East Asian studies at The George Washington University and as of January 1995 he will be the new dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at GWU. He is the author ofA Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Brookings, 1992).     

Beijing’s perception of the international system and foreign policy adjustment in the post-cold war world

This study, applying an international system-centered approach, represents a modest attempt to analyze Beijing’s official perception of the change in the international system from the Cold War bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union to a new post-cold war multipolar world, and to examine China’s foreign policy adjustment in recent years. It argues that Beijing’s perception of a multipolar system is a matter of normative truth rather than an empirical or analytical assessment. Because the multipolar system is its goal, Beijing “perceives” it. While working hard to encourage a multipolarity, Beijing in fact finds a unipolar reality in the post-Cold War era and has accommodated to it through its foreign policy adjustment. He will join the faculty of Colby College at Maine in the fall of 1993.     

Great Power War: Historical Inevitability or Deterrable Choice?

Proponents of a wide range of power transition theories suggest that conflict between the United States and China is inevitable. History indicates that is not true and conflict can be deterred. A key element to that deterrence is an effective Alliance strategy. While the Obama Administration has outlined an effective deterrent national strategy, it has not provided any military strategy. Some have proposed Air Sea Battle can be that strategy. For a variety of reasons, ASB will not work. This article proposes the Alliance adopt Offshore Control as a military strategy to deter China and assure allies and friends in the region. It is based on the concept of defending the first island chain, denying China use of the seas inside the first island chain and dominating the seas outside it. Its deterrent power is enhanced because Offshore Control is affordable, politically feasible, and can be executed today.     

简论美国实力地位的变化

金融危机对美国实力造成重创,美国的经济实力、国际地位都有一定程度的下降,陷入暂时的衰退。但美国的实力地位不会就此衰落,它的一系列国家机制能够保障美国最终摆脱衰退,重新焕发活力。金融危机对美国的影响也是有限的,美国的全球主导地位并没有发生根本动摇,而且还将维持相当长的一段时期。     

America's Rebalance to Asia and its Implications for Japan-US-Australia Security Cooperation

How does America's greater focus on Asia impact the security policies of Japan and Australia? How does it change the nature of the Japan-US-Australia security partnership? This paper attempts to answer these questions by looking at Japanese and Australian responses to the Obama Administration's new security policy toward Asia called “rebalancing.” After examining them, it argues that the regional allied response to America's new security posture has generated greater momentum for both allies to collaborate in wider areas in a more timely and effective way than before. It concludes asserting that, in the era of rebalance, Japan, the United States, and Australia have not only deepened their existing cooperation, but also have expanded potential areas of cooperation toward a more “dynamic” partnership.