South African foreign policy and China: converging visions,competing interests,contested identities

South Africa's burgeoning relationship with China exposes the increasing complexities of its post-apartheid international relations. On one hand bilateral relations have deepened since 1998, due to the increasing complementarities with South Africa's foreign policy priorities that emphasise developmental pragmatism and a Southward orientation within the broader African context. On the other hand this relationship emphasises the deeper schisms within South African society itself, where divergent and multi-layered perspectives on South Africa's post-apartheid identity and relationship with China, the country's largest trading partner, remains unresolved. This article maps out the nature of China–South Africa relations through a thematic approach. This allows for nuanced consideration of South Africa's contemporary foreign policy, one that remains compressed between a combination of external and domestic factors.     

A battle of principles: South Africa's relations with Iran

This paper provides a detailed case study and theoretical explanation for one of the least appreciated bilateral relationships of democratic South Africa. It analyses South Africa's post-apartheid relations with Iran as a case study to illustrate and discuss the contradictory principles that appear to guide South Africa's foreign policy. South Africa's tempered reaction to Iran's nuclear programme is in contradiction with its non-proliferation stance, but can be understood by looking into the ideology of the ruling African National Congress.     

Third time lucky? Establishing diplomatic relations between Russia and South Africa

Diplomatic relations between Russia and South Africa were established in 1992, before South Africa's transition to democracy was completed. This move was perceived as a betrayal by many in both countries and beyond. For many decades the Soviet Union supported the African National Congress in its fight against the apartheid regime. South Africa's National Party government, in its turn, presented the USSR as the main force behind the ‘total onslaught’ – an all-out war purportedly waged against South Africa by international communism. Yet it was with the National Party government that the Russians established diplomatic relations. This article looks into the reasons for this change of heart in Moscow and Pretoria, discusses the political forces behind the decision to establish diplomatic relations, and analyses the process that led to this event and the results of establishing diplomatic relations the way it happened and at the time it happened for both countries.     

Documents

South Africa's contemporary foreign policy cannot be understood outside an explanation of its post-apartheid political transition. Its actors, the ideas they express, the interests they represent and the institutions they craft are all crucially influenced and impacted upon by the democratic transition and how it has evolved. This democratic transition is defined by two foundational characteristics. First, as one of the last of the ‘anti-colonial’ transitions led by an African nationalist leadership, it is driven with a focus on achieving racial equality in both the domestic and global context. Second, the transition has occurred when a particular configuration of power prevailed in the global order that not only established the parameters which governed its evolution, but also determined which interests prevailed within it. The former's imprint on the foreign policy agenda is manifested in South Africa's prioritisation of Africa, its almost messianic zeal to modernise the continent through a focus on political stability and economic growth, and its desire to reform the global order so as to create an enabling environment for African development. It is also reflected in South Africa's insistence not to be seen to be dictated to by the West, especially in the fashioning of its economic policies and its approach to addressing the Zimbabwean question. The latter manifests itself not only in how corporate interests take centre stage in South Africa's foreign policy interactions, but also in how transnational alliances like India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) are being fashioned to challenge big powers and their interests in global forums and in the international system. These thematic concerns are the subject of investigation in this paper.     

South Africa's financial and economic prospects for the next five years

South African dominance of trade in Africa as well as its position as a regional hegemon was entrenched by the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the European Union in 1999. South Africa's full-blown integration into the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) formation since 2011 has brought new dynamics, however, as South Africa now has a marked BRICS orientation. Although the European Union (EU) as a bloc is still South Africa's largest trading partner, China has become South Africa's largest single-country trading partner. The question arises as to whether this new found loyalty makes sense in terms of South Africa's regional position and its trade prospects. Against the background of more intra-industry trade with the EU and the new and growing inter-industry trade with the other BRICS economies, South Africa's trade share of African trade has been in relative decline. This study uses an international political economy framework to analyse South African trade hegemony based on the TDCA and the possible effects of a shift towards BRICS. The conclusion is that, although the shift towards BRICS can politically be justified, economically it should not be at the expense of the benefits of the more advantageous relationship with the EU.     

Norm dynamics and international organisations: South Africa in the African Union and International Criminal Court

Over the past two decades, South Africa has sought to perform several roles on the world stage, such as the economic dynamo of Southern Africa, a diplomatic heavyweight representing the African continent, and a norm leader on the world stage as a so-called ‘middle-power’. Although South Africa's evolution and rise as an important player in global affairs has generated a welcome body of critical scholarly literature, comparatively little analysis has been allocated to understanding how norm dynamics and the country's ever-evolving international identities have enabled it to construct and reconstruct its ‘interests’. Social constructivism is best suited for such an analysis because it can operationalise norms, commitments, identities, and interests, and it provides the epistemological tools to map the increasingly multilateral connections between global, regional, and domestic forums. By employing a rationalist approach to constructivism, this paper remedies the aforementioned gap in the literature by illustrating how South Africa constructs and reconstructs its identities and interests in relation to membership in international organisations (IOs). To that end, the paper examines the evolution of South Africa's participation in the African Union (especially ‘peacekeeping’ contributions) and the International Criminal Court. The paper concludes by assessing the theoretical implications and practical ramifications of the norm dynamics involved in South Africa's commitment to these two IOs.     

Hybrid regimes and the challenges of deepening and sustaining democracy in developing countries1

South Africa's history of political domination during apartheid and the tendency of its companies to dominate business development on the continent may undermine the country's aim of being an African powerhouse due to resentment in other African countries. The article argues that South Africa's global ambitions can only be achieved if it is a leader on its own continent.     

Nuclear diplomacy as niche diplomacy: South Africa's post-apartheid relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency

Since the termination of its nuclear weapons programme, commenced in 1989 and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) in 1993, successive South African governments have consistently advocated the country's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. South Africa has secured a niche role through norm construction and state identity for itself through its nuclear diplomacy with the IAEA. The article explores aspects of South Africa's nuclear diplomacy with the IAEA as an example of niche diplomacy. Therefore, it traces South Africa's diplomatic relations with the IAEA, starting with the IAEA's verification process and the implementation of a Safeguards Agreement (1989–1994) through the conversion of South Africa's research nuclear reactor (1991–2005); South Africa's position on greater representation for developing countries on the IAEA's Board of Governors; its ambition to be elected to the position of IAEA Director General (2008–2009); and its refusal to support the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank in Russia under the IAEA's auspices (2009–2010).     

An African response to the new wave of afro‐pessimism

The Afro‐pessimism that has resurfaced in parts of the world has no foundation and has provoked strong objections on several grounds. First, the timing is inappropriate as a number of new development indicators suggest that a good basis is now being laid in Africa for a better future economic performance. Secondly, there is an upsurge of Afro‐optimism among African and world leaders with the advent of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad). But more fundamentally, the growth concept which forms the basis for bleak projections on Africa's ability to reduce poverty, is flawed and the presumed strong growth‐poverty correlation empirically discredited. Additionally, it is a fallacy to assume that the reforms of the past 20 years were consistent with the continent's long‐term development trajectories given that the continent was unresponsive, remaining poor and ‘structurally undevelopable’.

On the contrary, these reforms have been pronounced by a World Bank assessment team as being defective in objectives and design, operationally dysfunctional and an example of massive resource misallocation, all of which have collectively worsened Africa's poverty and income disparity conditions. Particularly ironic is the concept of ‘structural stability’ prescribed in the ‘Memorandum for a New Start for German African Policy’, as it falls short of engaging fully and comprehensively the broader spectrum of structural distortions, weaknesses and rigidities, including the lack of economic structural transformation which is critical for achieving sustained economic growth and significant poverty reduction. The international community will now have to look at channelling resources to reshape, support and refine Africa's own initiative — Nepad.     

From scarcity to security: Water as a potential factor for conflict and cooperation in Southern Africa

The authors argue that South Africa's role as an economic gateway for various African countries primarily depends on geography, that is, on naturally given and man-made structures in geographical space. Hence, they first examine South Africa's location and physio-geographical conditions in Southern Africa in order to show important factors that affect the scope of the South African gateway. Second, they shed light on regional transport infrastructure, revealing how South Africa interlinks its neighbouring countries globally. Thirdly, regional economic interaction is analysed with regard to structural features of South Africa's economy that make it prone to being a gateway. The authors recognise that the impact of all these factors is influenced by strategic decisions taken by politicians and businesspeople. The outlook of the paper therefore addresses policies of the South African government that are often problematic for the country's gateway role. Potential challengers and their competitive advantages are presented, too.     

China fuels its future with Africa's riches

There have been mixed reactions to China's aggressive pursuit of Africa's energy resources both within African countries and in the international community, for a range of different reasons. The extent of the Chinese penetration means Africans need to look at how to best exploit the situation for sustainable development, rather than for short‐term gain.     

The African renaissance and the Caribbean

In May 2010 South African President Jacob Zuma will have been in office for one year. During this time, the Zuma administration has been far less ambitious in its foreign policy than previous administrations. However, South Africa is not in a position where it is able to withdraw from foreign engagement, as regional issues — such as Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Swaziland — continue to demand attention. The Zuma administration's approach in the future, in terms of both substance and style, will need to be informed by lessons from past engagement, including South African peacekeeping efforts in countries such as the DRC and Burundi, and South African mediation efforts in countries such as Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and the Comoros. Certainly, South Africa's record of success in taking on international responsibilities over the past 10 years has been mixed, but there is scope for past experience to shape future engagement positively. Indications of this can be seen, for example, in Zuma's efforts to redress former President Thabo Mbeki's clumsy mediation efforts in Angola by deciding to make his first state visit as South Africa's president to Luanda. Zuma's approach to Zimbabwe could build on the foundation set by Mbeki's long engagement with that country.     

SADC and the GCC: Shared regional challenges and potential links

This article assesses the prospects for a clearly articulated economic diplomacy approach in South Africa's foreign policy. It argues that while South Africa's foreign policy has been to a considerable extent normatively grounded, it has failed to develop a coherent economic diplomacy that is based on focused and distinctly expressed priorities. This is a crucial gap that limits the country's ability to respond to regional and global changes, in particular those posed by emerging powers. The article identifies a number of gaps in South Africa's foreign policy approach and highlights its oblivion to global developments and geopolitical dynamics in the African continent. It sets out possible policy outlines for developing a clearer and stronger economic diplomacy. The building blocks for such an approach include the identification of strategic foreign policy priorities; greater institutional co-operation among agencies dealing with economic and foreign policy development; synergies between corporate strategies and government's foreign policy objectives; and the need for South Africa to develop a stronger leadership ambition in the African continent, both to contribute to Africa's development and to pursue its own economic interests. This ambition will require awareness of South Africa's own limitations, thus focusing the better part of its foreign policy on a limited set of countries that match strategic priorities.     

Africa's indigenous languages as the cornerstone of the African Renaissance

Abstract

This article explores and emphasises the crucial link between the African Renaissance and Africa's indigenous languages. It sheds light on the impact of colonial languages on Africa's colonial state. Indigenous African languages, Ndhlovu (2008, 42) says ‘are essential for the decolonisation of African minds and for the African Renaissance’. However, the finding was that the promotion of colonial languages at the expense of indigenous African languages is characteristic of the colonial state of Africa. The argument is, therefore, in favour of the consideration of indigenous African languages in the promotion of African Renaissance.     

African modernities and the critical reappropriation of indigenous knowledges: Towards a polycentric global epistemology

ABSTRACT

While the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (AU/NEPAD) strives for both plurilateralism and regionalism, there are ideological and practical conditions that challenge the feasibility of a fully fledged regional integration institution in Africa. This article examines the AU/NEPAD in relation to Africa's ideological back-loading, while it explores how the programme reconciles Western-dominated economic plurilateralism with Africa's developmental regionalism. It highlights the ideological changes that helped with the modernisation of Western countries and how these developments become a challenge to Africa's economic development efforts. Africa has always been an ideological back-loader and a delayed integrator into global interdependence. During the mid-20^th century, at the time Western countries (in particular Western European countries) were adopting regionalism, Africa was engaged in the same phenomenon for political and economic independence. While the economic crisis of the mid-20^th century following the Second World War (WW2) enabled the industrialised countries to adopt embedded liberalism for socioeconomic development, at decolonisation Africa sought to espouse what turned out to be the dependency paradigm as the economic development strategy for Africa. In the 21st century, developed regions are transcending regionalism and gearing towards plurilateralism while most African leaders remain fixated in traditional regional integration on the continent. As the neoliberal ideology dominates the contemporary international political economy of the 21^st century, albeit questionably, Africa's politico-socioeconomic realities are also premised on the same embedded liberalism. However, economic plurilateralism by industrialised countries with Africa challenges efforts towards regional integration on the continent. It would seem that the AU/NEPAD provides a viable compromise between developmental regionalism and economic plurilateralism on the continent.     

Climate change: Double-edged sword for African trade and development

Abstract

African governments face increasing pressure from major export destinations, primarily former colonial and slave-owning countries, to be climate change compliant. This will certainly be on display at the upcoming December 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, which will seek to strengthen climate change rules agreed on in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997, and adopt new protocols on global climate change regulation. Climate change is a double-edged sword: on one side it is hitting Africa's agricultural sector with increased droughts, floods, extreme frost and wildfires; and on the other, African governments are being forced to respond to stringent regulatory regimes imposed by international export destinations. Currently, the per capita greenhouse gas emissions from the highly industrialised nations – the North – is estimated to be four times that of Africa and the rest of the developing world. Twin research questions were investigated in this article: (1) to what extent does climate change impact on African trade and development, and (2) how can African governments stay on a path of sustained trade and development in this era of climate change? The article argues that Africa's survival in these times of climate change compliance rests on a shift to greater intra-African trade, as individual nations move towards cleaner and more organic technologies to become full-fledged partners in the international climate change regulatory regime.     

Understanding institutional change: Fiscal management in Local China

As China's economy continues to grow, it wants to expand its markets and secure reliable supplies of resources in support of its economic development. Resource diplomacy therefore becomes a prominent feature of its modernisation diplomacy. In turn, many African governments perceive political and economic ties with China to be an important asset, which strengthens their international bargaining power, especially vis-à-vis Western governments. African countries are also depicted as China's reliable political and economic partners, though one can hardly afford to be optimistic regarding Africa's peace and development in the future. Many small African governments have been switching diplomatic recognition between Taipei and Beijing for economic assistance too. Chinese leaders have no intention of engaging in diplomatic and strategic competition with the USA and the European Union in Africa, but they certainly will not co-operate with Western governments in helping Africa because they want to push for multipolarity.     

Russia,NMD and the ABM treaty: The dangers of American unilateralism

In order to consolidate its strategic bilateral relations developed in Africa over the past 14 years, South Africa must choose five key ‘hubs’ (regional powers) in each of Africa's five sub-regions. In addition, South Africa should pick two additional ‘spokes’ (influential actors) in each sub-region. These 15 strategic partners can increase South Africa's engagement on the continent in the areas of diplomacy, conflict management, and trade relations. South Africa's bilateral relations would thus resemble a gigantic bicycle, with five hubs and ten spokes. The five hubs are Mozambique, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, and Algeria. The ten spokes would be Zimbabwe, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Tanzania, Egypt and Libya. It is around these countries that South Africa can build solid strategic bilateral relationships in Africa.     

Contextualising NEPAD: regionalism,plurilateralism and multilateralism

There is a dearth of literature on the nature and scope of the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (AU/NEPAD) in relation to trends in the international trade system. Available literature concentrates on the neoliberal character of the programme and views it as exposing the uncompetitive African economies to the hostile international economic environment. Contrary to this view, this article argues that AU/NEPAD, because of its three-part approach within contemporary trade trends, could be a viable strategy to promote economic development in the continent. Firstly, AU/NEPAD promotes reformed developmental regionalism, since it combines collective self-reliance of member states with ‘strategic linking’ into the global market. Secondly, it connects strategic linking to new partnerships through plurilateralism, as depicted by the G8 Africa Action Plan. Finally, AU/NEPAD promotes multilateralism through engagements with the World Trade Organisation, the UN and the World Bank.     

Kuwait's economy,the economic status of the GCC in general and bilateral relations between the GCC and SADC

Focusing more on South Africa's international cultural‐political‐economic strengths and weaknesses than on current domestic affairs, as it moves away from apartheid, this article examines the new South Africa's chances for ascent (development) or descent (underdevelopment) within the world system. Politically, the State will remain weak by international standards. Economically, it is in decline, largely because it is uncompetitive internationally; and these negative trends well pre‐date the unrest and sanctions of the mid‐1980s. It is concluded that the new South Africa will be fortunate to maintain its present position in the medium‐term.