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1.
This article argues that regional powers can be distinguished by four pivotal criteria: claim to leadership, power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments, and acceptance of leadership. Applying these criteria to the South African case, the crucial significance of institutional foreign policy instruments for the power over policy outcomes at the regional and global level is demonstrated. But although Pretoria is ready to pay the costs of co-operative hegemony (capacity building for regional institutions and peacekeeping for instance), the regional acceptance of South African leadership is constrained by its historical legacy. Additionally Pretoria's foreign policy is based on ideational resources such as its reputation as an advocate of democracy and human rights and its paradigmatic behaviour as a ‘good global citizen’ with the according legitimacy. The Mbeki presidency was more successful in converting these resources into discursive instruments of interest-assertion in global, than in regional bargains. In effect the regional power's reformist south-oriented multilateralism is challenging some of the guiding principles of the current international system.  相似文献   

2.
Brazilian diplomats and academics alike have long regarded regional leadership as a springboard to global recognition. Yet Brazil's foreign policy has not translated the country's structural and instrumental resources into effective regional leadership. Brazil's potential followers have not aligned with its main goals, such as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and Directorship‐General of the World Trade Organization; some have even challenged its regional influence. Nevertheless, Brazil has been recognized as an emergent global power. This article analyzes the growing mismatch between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy and shows how both theoretical expectations and policy planning were “luckily foiled” by unforeseen developments. It argues that because of regional power rivalries and a relative paucity of resources, Brazil is likely to consolidate itself as a middle global power before gaining acceptance as a leader in its region.  相似文献   

3.
Chapter 7 of the NDP 2030 articulates a foreign policy vision for South Africa over two decades. While the NDP acknowledges the place of ‘soft power’ in realising this vision, it remains doubtful whether South Africa will indeed take advantage of the enormous gains offered by soft power as a foreign policy lever. This paper examines the role of soft power in achieving the foreign policy mandates prescribed in the Plan. It argues that, like other regional powers such as China, South Africa needs to pay more attention to its soft power attributes if it is to fast-track the successful implementation of its foreign policy ambitions for 2030. We conclude that sustaining South Africa’s rising position and influence in the international system and in Africa, will largely depend on its ability to consciously adjust its foreign policy trajectories – in the long term – in tandem with its soft power resources and competences.  相似文献   

4.
Aakriti Tandon 《圆桌》2016,105(1):57-65
Prime Minister Modi’s administration has renewed emphasis on highlighting India’s soft power resources such as yoga, democratic values, spirituality, etc. Modi has also launched an aggressive public relations and marketing campaign to boost India’s economic growth. This article examines the role and importance of soft power resources in Modi’s foreign policy. The author argues that Modi is applying a two-pronged strategy of simultaneously adopting an aggressive sales pitch to boost India’s economic growth and leveraging India’s soft power to mitigate potential threats emanating from the country’s growing hard power. While soft power resources generally supplement a state’s hard power towards achieving foreign policy goals, Modi is using India’s soft power to draw attention away from the state’s rising military power. While India is enhancing its existing military power, Modi is engaging India’s neighbours and other great powers to ensure that its rise is intended to be peaceful, non-threatening and entirely benevolent. This is in stark contrast to how Asian states as well as the world perceive China’s rise. This article also questions the effectiveness of this strategy and predicts that this strategy should bode well for India in maintaining its international reputation and relationships.  相似文献   

5.
Abstract

Rising powers such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) experience two distinct stages of relative capability growth. China is currently in the first stage of growth, which is defined by increasingly rapid expansion and incentives for foreign policy accommodation. As the PRC shifts to the second stage, however, relative growth will slow, and leaders in Beijing will be presented with new incentives for foreign policy confrontation. This article formalizes a two-stage model of relative power growth and argues that China's shift to the second stage of growth will threaten regional and global stability. During this shift, the key to international security will be a coordinated, multilateral effort that responsibly balances China's growing power with a similarly expanded international role for China.  相似文献   

6.
This article assesses the foreign policy and intervention roles of Nigeria and South Africa in Africa, given their status as regional powers, and the regional complexes within which they operate. Drawing references from a plethora of conflicts in which these two states have intervened, this article argues that structural realism, given its emphasis on the material structure of power and the pursuit of relative gains, is useful as a theoretical framework in this assessment. The article makes a contribution to the literature by illustrating the value of structural realism as an international relations (IR) approach within which the intervention behaviour of these two African states can be analysed. The author acknowledges that while structural realism points to the fact that the pursuit of relative gains may be behind the normatively-clad role conceptions of states, foreign policy cannot be reduced to the pursuit of relative power alone.  相似文献   

7.

This article argues that in its policies towards the central European countries, unified Germany displayed the characteristics of a civilian power. This was a consequence of the changes the west German state had undergone since its inception, which predisposed it towards a particular foreign policy. The article has three sections. It first sketches the ideal type civilian power, and places its normative commitments in the tradition of international liberalism. The second section illustrates the particular German circumstances that make an inclination towards a civilian foreign policy possible. The third section presents an outline of selected German policies towards the Visegrad countries, namely aid, trade, and institutional extension, and compares the findings with the civilian power ideal type introduced in Part I.  相似文献   

8.
Abstract

European enlargement has often been viewed from an institutional perspective. The academic literature in the field has tended to focus primarily on how the Commission or the Council has addressed the issue of EU expansion. Relatively little attention has been paid to the role of individual member states. This article considers the way in which domestic political concerns and national politics affects the way in which EU members approach enlargement to the Western Balkans. It does this by examining studies conducted on seven countries: Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Hungary, Greece and Cyprus. It shows that there are in fact a wide variety of factors that shape individual member state attitudes towards enlargement. These factors include economic and commercial goals, ties to the region and to individual accession states, concerns over immigration, general foreign policy priorities and national ideological approaches towards the future shape and orientation of the European Union.  相似文献   

9.
This article assesses the prospects for a clearly articulated economic diplomacy approach in South Africa's foreign policy. It argues that while South Africa's foreign policy has been to a considerable extent normatively grounded, it has failed to develop a coherent economic diplomacy that is based on focused and distinctly expressed priorities. This is a crucial gap that limits the country's ability to respond to regional and global changes, in particular those posed by emerging powers. The article identifies a number of gaps in South Africa's foreign policy approach and highlights its oblivion to global developments and geopolitical dynamics in the African continent. It sets out possible policy outlines for developing a clearer and stronger economic diplomacy. The building blocks for such an approach include the identification of strategic foreign policy priorities; greater institutional co-operation among agencies dealing with economic and foreign policy development; synergies between corporate strategies and government's foreign policy objectives; and the need for South Africa to develop a stronger leadership ambition in the African continent, both to contribute to Africa's development and to pursue its own economic interests. This ambition will require awareness of South Africa's own limitations, thus focusing the better part of its foreign policy on a limited set of countries that match strategic priorities.  相似文献   

10.
This article uses the concept of entrepreneurial powers to discuss how and under what circumstances Brazil successfully accomplishes its goals in international crises. The concept of entrepreneurial power focuses on systematic evidence of middle‐power behavior and its relation to foreign policy tools. Brazil resorts to three agency‐based foreign policy tools that are the substance of its entrepreneurial power. These instruments are always mediated by a structural condition, the dominant power pivotal position in the crisis. This study applies qualitative comparative analysis methodology to 32 international crises since the early 1990s in which Brazil played a role. It finds that for regional crises, the use of only one agency‐based tool is sufficient for success, regardless of the dominant power position; and for global crises, the use of only one agency‐based tool is a necessary and sufficient condition for Brazil to accomplish its goals, despite the dominant power position on the issue.  相似文献   

11.
Hong Zhao 《East Asia》2007,24(4):399-415
Oil has long been viewed as a strategic resource for nations. China is now the world’s second largest oil-consuming country after the U.S.. Its global efforts to secure oil imports to meet increasing domestic demand have profound implications for international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s rising oil demand and its external quest for oil have thus generated much attention. As China’s overseas oil quest intensifies, will China clash with the U.S. and other western countries’ interests in Africa, and how dose it look at this rivalry? Will China disrupt the U.S. and its allies’ foreign policy and the world order? This article tries to provide an overview of China’s initiatives in developing oil in Africa. It examines factors for Chinese oil companies going to Africa and China’s oil strategy there. Finally, it argues that even though China’s practices of energy diplomacy in Africa seem to undermine U.S. goals of isolating or punishing “rogue states”, contrary to those pessimistic views, China has largely accommodated the U.S. and is willing to forge joint efforts with the U.S. in energy exploration in Africa.  相似文献   

12.
13.
During the nineteenth century, the Caribbean was the stage for a complex geopolitical confrontation involving the United States, Spain, Great Britain, and France. The precarious balance of powers in that region was upset by the outbreak of the Cuban crisis in 1868 and by the dawn of the period of severe instability in Spain following the overthrow of Isabel II and the onset of the reformist period characterised by the Sexenio Revolucionario. The Cuban crisis strongly constrained the foreign policy of the new regime in Spain and turned the Caribbean Basin into a zone of vital interest for Spanish diplomacy.  相似文献   

14.
While this article broadly agrees with Peter Gowan's concern about the new militarism of the United States and the appalling consequences that have emerged as a result of U.S. preemption in Iraq, it questions the extent to which his portrait of U.S. hegemony addresses all the relevant issues as they affect the Asian region. Given the numerical dominance of Asia in world population and the rising power of China and India, how Gowan's “American Grand Strategy” applies to this part of the world is of fundamental importance to the relevance and sustainability of his argument. Part 1 on U.S. economic hegemony argues that U.S. capital has not been an unmitigated evil for India and where U.S. interests have been damaging they are not uniquely so: the European Union's economic policies have also been deeply damaging even though Europe is not a hegemon. Part 2 on U.S. political hegemony argues that bringing Pakistan and India into the U.S. alliance system has been beneficial for regional security and domestic political-ethnic stability. Part 3 considers responses to U.S. hegemony, arguing that this supremacy is more fragile than Gowan assumes because new powers, such as China and India, have long-term strategies to reduce their dependency. The conclusion suggests that despite widespread criticism and dissatisfaction with the nature of U.S. engagement in Asia, the dominant view in the region is one that sees the United States as a useful wedge between the emerging interests of China, India, and Japan. In short, the “American Grand Strategy” is not as negative, overwhelming, or as unpopular as Gowan suggests.  相似文献   

15.
Great-power competition has once again assumed primacy in the international arena. Facing a rising China and a resurgent Russia, the United States formally reoriented its National Security Strategy in 2017 to place more emphasis on the return of great-power politics and global multipolarity. With the resumption of such competition, the Middle East has rightfully been noted as a regional theater where Russia and China have sought to exploit US policy blunders and retrenchment (real or perceived) to push for increased regional multipolarity. Although the Middle East has been recognized as a prime theater for great-power competition, the approaches adopted by most existing studies are primarily one-sided: they examine great-power competition in the region from the outside, stressing how global powers are manipulating affairs in the Middle East in order to advance their own interests. Often missing from this conversation is how external engagement in the Middle East is being exploited and shaped by regional powers and endogenous developments. This study seeks to fill this gap by using the conceptual lens of omnialignment to examine how regional powers are manipulating the return of great-power competition to advance their own strategic imperatives, both at home and abroad.  相似文献   

16.
Looking at German foreign policy and transatlantic relations since unification, this article argues that fundamental views and principles about Germany's role in Europe and the world have endured. The integrationist impulse remains strong. As shown by Kosovo, Germans have put this multilateralism above qualms about the use of military force. This has also left Berlin and Washington continuing to share many objectives, not only traditional ones about power and peace in Europe, but also on a whole host of challenges that have come with globalisation, both in the wider world and in the multiplicity of commercial and civil relationships across the Atlantic.  相似文献   

17.
This article argues that the rise of China and the changing North-east Asian balance of power are creating the classical adjustment problems of Great Power international relations historically associated with power transitions and that three types of misperceptions across five important issues in the Sino-American security relationship are interfering with the prospects of achieving the systemic adjustments required for long-term stability. Power transition and the rise of China are seen as potentially undermining stability in four ways: (1) by generating security dilemmas and arms races, (2) by contributing to increased incidence of conflicting security interests, (3) by aggravating South china Sea maritime disputes, and (4) by undermining Chinese domestic stability in a manner which potentially results in a hostile regime that adopts an aggressive foreign policy coming to power at some point in the future. Systemic adjustment is defined as the process by which major powers peacefully reconcile their opposing interests and is viewed as being an essential feature of stability over the long term. The article argues that three types of misperceptions concerning: (1) salient issues, (2) security interests, and (3) the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy are manifesting themselves in misunderstandings of five security issues that are impeding the systemic adjustment process. These five issues are: (1) the nature of post-cold war Sino-American security relations and international politics, (2) the role of democracy and U.S. human rights in foreign policy, (3) the significance of China’s South China Sea policy, (4) Middle East diplomacy and arms sales, and (5) nuclear weapons and arms control policy. The article concludes with a discussion of policy implications that stresses the importance of consultation and dialogue to reduce misperceptions.  相似文献   

18.
In the past year, the Ukrainian crisis has generated an international discussion about a ‘new Cold War’. This article looks into the likelihood of such a scenario and makes suggestions of how it may be precluded. The course of events depends on whether the current model of globalization can be reversed. This would mean not only a change in the current structure of the global economy, but its dismantling. However, it is obvious that for most European and other states, the risks associated with such a policy outweigh potential geopolitical and economic benefits. The international order is in a state of flux. High risks are unacceptable when governments or nations pursue their interests in a stable environment. But when the balance of power shifts substantially, as it has now, the perception of risk threshold also begins to change. European history has shown that large-scale transformations in international relations in most cases triggered tension and violence, caused by rising demands of ascending powers and by resistance of those who were challenged. In the twenty-first century, the polycentric structure of the world provides an opportunity to achieve a new lasting global settlement, and to put an end to the current period of increasing tension.  相似文献   

19.
What happens when established states and rising powers meet on the world stage? Is conflict inevitable, or can adroit foreign policies produce peaceful accommodation between jostling Great Powers? Traditional power-transition theory tends to predict conflictual outcomes of shifting power, but this finding does not square with either the historical record or public policy-maker’s own intuitions about how international politics works. In this article, I exegete a central weakness of extant power-transition theory—that is, its reliance on vanishing disparities in national power as an explanatory factor—in order to understand where the theory is failing and how best to proceed with a view to generating greater understanding of geopolitical shifts. Beginning from the starting point that social science theory should generate useful implications for ‘real world’ social and political actors, I argue that power-transition theory’s monocausal vanishing disparities thesis is problematic in three respects: practical, theoretical and empirical.  相似文献   

20.
It is almost a conventional wisdom now that the centre of gravity of global politics has shifted from Europe to the Asia–Pacific in recent years with the rise of China and India, gradual assertion by Japan of its military profile, and a significant shift in the US global force posture in favour of Asia–Pacific. The debate now is whether Asia–Pacific will witness rising tensions and conflicts in the coming years with various powers jockeying for influence in the region or whether the forces of economic globalization and multilateralism will lead to peace and stability. Some have asked the question more directly: Will Asia's future resemble Europe's past?1 1See Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe's Past be Asia's Future?” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 147–159. View all notes It is, of course, difficult to answer this question as of now when major powers in Asia–Pacific such as China, India and Japan are still rising and grappling with a plethora of issues that confront any rising power in the international system. But what is clear is that all major powers are now re-evaluating their policy options vis-à-vis the Pacific.

This paper examines India's foreign policy in the Pacific as it has emerged on the last few years. First, the emerging balance of power in Asia–Pacific will be examined in light of the theoretical debate on the issue followed by a broad assessment of the role that India envisages for itself in the region. Subsequently, India's relationship with the three major powers in Asia–Pacific—China, Japan, and the US is analysed. Finally, some observations will be made about the future trajectory of Indian foreign policy in the region.  相似文献   


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