The Girl Who Knew Her Brother Would Be Coming Home: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ārṣajñāna</Emphasis> in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Praśastapādabhāṣya</Emphasis>, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nyāyakandalī</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vyomavatī</Emphasis>

Although seldom mentioned in the secondary literature on Vai?e?ika, the cognitive category of ār?ajñāna (??i cognition) is accepted as a distinct category of vidyā (knowledge) within both early and later Vai?e?ika texts. This article deals with how ār?ajñāna is conceptualized in Pra?astapādabhā?ya (PBh), ?rīdhara’s Nyāyakandalī (NK), and Vyoma?iva’s Vyomavatī (Vy). The main focus lies on how ??i cognition is treated in these texts and what terms are used in the process. I aim to clarify the analysis of ??i cognition apparent in the above sources and outline the implications this might have for the somewhat grander objective of a mapping of the semantic landscape of cognition and knowledge in Vai?e?ika texts. The categories of yogic perception (yogipratyak?a) and siddhic vision (siddhadar?ana) are also treated since they are included within a shared discourse.     

Self-Awareness (<Emphasis Type="Italic">svasaṃvedana</Emphasis>) in Dignāga’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pramāṇasamuccaya</Emphasis> and -<Emphasis Type="Italic">vṛtti</Emphasis>: A Close Reading

The concept of “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means of valid cognition and its result (pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣa</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dharma</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣadharma</Emphasis>

This essay asks what the terms mok?a and dharma mean in the anomalous and apparently Mahābhārata-coined compound mok?adharma, which provides the title for the ?āntiparvan’s third and most philosophical anthology; and it further asks what that title itself means. Its route to answering those questions is to look at the last four units of the Mok?adharmaparvan and their three topics—the story of ?uka, the Nārāya?īya, and a gleaner’s subtale—as marking an “artful curvature” that shapes the outcome of King Yudhi??hira’s philosophical inquiries of Bhī?ma into a ”return” to this world to take up the topic of the fourth anthology, a King’s generous giving, in the Anu?āsanaparvan’s Dānadharmaparvan. Usages of the term mok?a in the narratives in these units are considered in the light of The Laws of Manu’s usage of mok?a to define the “renunciatory asceticism of a wandering mendicant” after the fulfillment of one’s debts (Olivelle et al., in Life of the Buddha by A?vagho?a, 2008). Usages of mok?adharma are discussed in conjunction with its overlapping term niv?ittidharma. With the term dharma itself, it is a matter of finding the best contextual translation. A pitch is made that these four units, and particularly the Nārāya?īya, should no longer be thought of as “late” additions.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Anyathākhyāti</Emphasis>: A Critique by Appaya Dīkṣita in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Parimala</Emphasis>

In this paper, the problem of illusory perception, as approached by the Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta schools of philosophy, is discussed from the standpoint of the Parimala. This seminal work belonging to the Bhāmatī tradition of Advaita Vedānta was composed in the sixteenth century by the polymath Appaya Dīk?ita. In the context of discussing various theories of illusion, Dīk?ita dwells upon the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti, and its connection with jñānalak?a?apratyāsatti as a causal factor for perception, and closely examines if such an extraordinary (alaukika) perception is tenable to explain illusory perception. He then proceeds to point out the deficiencies of this model and thereby brings to the fore the anirvacanīyakhyāti of Advaitins as the only theory which stands scrutiny.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cultural Criminology: An Invitation</Emphasis>… to What?

Since the mid 1990s, a strand of criminology emerged that is concerned with the co-constitution of crime and culture under the general rubric of ‘cultural criminology’. In the titles Cultural Criminology Unleashed and Cultural Criminology: An Invitation, criminologists spearheading this brand of criminology make claims for its originality and its status as a subversive alternative to conventional criminological approaches to studies of crime and deviance. The basis for the ‘new’ cultural criminology is its ostensible ability to account for the culture and subcultures of crime, the criminalization of cultural and subcultural activities, and the politics of criminalization. This paper offers a comparison of cultural criminology to 1960s and 1970s labeling theory to assess whether or not cultural criminology has developed a grammar of critique capable of resolving fundamental contradictions that haunt critical criminology and contesting contemporary administrative criminology. Points of comparison are made through ontological categories of power and criminal identity and a consideration of the epistemological categories of the respective bodies of literature.     

Freedom of association in labour relations in the context of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Maqasid</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">al</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Shari’ah</Emphasis> principles

Labour relations are an important chapter in economic and industrial development. Labour relations are divided into personal employer-employer relationship and collective relationship between employer and trade union. The collective relationship forms the core of the employees’ right to freedom of association. This article discusses the right of employees to freedom of association including the right to strike from the Islamic perspective. The Islamic principles applicable in this context are Maqasid-al-Shari’ah (the higher objective of Islamic law), Haqq and Jama’ah (the functional concepts in Islamic law). Freedom of association in labour relations which is basically a western concept suits the three Islamic principles and the Islamic principles are in line with the ILO standards and European law. This article is written by using pure legal research method, i.e. adopting a content analysis approach with the Islamic sources such as the Qur’an and Hadith as a point of reference.     

Das <Emphasis Type="Italic">Coase</Emphasis>-Theorem und politische Märkte

Basierend auf neuester Literatur auf dem Gebiet der Public Choice Theorie (Neue Politische Ökonomie), nimmt dieser Artikel die Diskussion um Politik-Markt Analogien wieder auf. Nach der Identifikation einiger Unterscheidungsmerkmale zwischen Märkten und Politik, beschäftigt sich der Artikel mit der Rolle von Stimmentausch in der politischen Vertretung. Dabei werden einige Anforderungen an die Charakteristika eines hypothetischen Marktes für politischen Konsens formuliert. Diese Überlegungen sollen dazu dienen, die Einschätzung der normativen Implikationen der Kommodifizierung von politischem Konsens zu vereinfachen.     

Sovereignty Without Sovereignty: Derrida’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Declarations Of Independence</Emphasis>

This article questions the common assumptions in legal theory regarding Derrida’s well-known Declarations of Independence. Through a close reading of this text, well-known ground such as the relation between speech and writing, the notion of representation, speech act theory, the signature, and the proper name is covered. The contribution that this analysis makes in the present context lies in the additional ‘step’ that it takes. The article seeks to give an explanation of the laws at work in Derrida’s thinking in the above respects and to explain more specifically how they find expression in Declarations of Independence. The article in this regard also investigates the importance and role of the ‘notions’ of death, loss of meaning, loss of ownership, and loss of sovereignty in Derrida’s thinking. The contention is that if we take account of Derrida’s reading in Declarations of Independence, it is possible to view constitutions in a very different way, more specifically their ‘origins’, with inevitable implications for constitutional interpretation.

Derrida’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Purveyor of Truth</Emphasis> and Constitutional Reading

In this article the author explores Jacques Derrida’s reading in The Purveyor of Truth of Edgar Allan Poe’s The Purloined Letter. In his essay, Derrida proposes a reading which differs markedly from the interpretation proposed by Lacan in his Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’. To appreciate Derrida’s reading, which is not hermeneutic-semantic in nature like that of Lacan, it is necessary to look at the relation of Derrida’s essay to his other texts on psychoanalysis, more specifically insofar as the Freudian death drive is concerned. The present article explores this ‘notion’ as elaborated on by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle as well as Derrida’s reading of this text. It also investigates the importance of the ‘notion’ of the death drive as well as the significance of Derrida’s reading of The Purloined Letter for constitutional interpretation. This is a modified version of a paper presented at the Critical Legal Conference, 14–16 September 2007 at Birkbeck Law School, University of London.

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Some Reflections on the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sautrāntika</Emphasis> in Vinaya Context: <Emphasis Type="Italic">vinayadharaḥ sautrāntikaḥ</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra</Emphasis>

The word sautrāntika is known to designate one of the philosophical schools in later documents, but its earlier phase remains uncertain. The discovery of this term in the Mahāparinirvā?a-mahāsūtra thus brings forward new evidence essential for solving the problem of sautrāntika. In this paper, I will attempt to establish the interpretation of the context, in which the phrase vinayadhara? sautrāntika? appears.     

‘Those Chosen by the Planet’: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Final Fantasy VII</Emphasis> and Earth Jurisprudence

This article allies the 1997 PlayStation video game Final Fantasy VII with Slavoj ?i?ek’s writings on ecology to critique the area of legal philosophy known as ‘earth jurisprudence’. Earth jurisprudents argue that law bears a large part of the responsibility for humanity’s exploitation of the environment, as law helps to bar nature from subjectivity. However, as ?i?ek warns—and as FFVII illustrates—the desire for meaning incites people to manufacture a harmonious vision of nature that obscures the chaotic forces at work in the environment and ultimately absolves humanity of responsibility towards the world. Therefore, earth jurisprudence’s program of using legal rights to limit human intervention should be rejected in favour of an approach that enables people to take an active role in addressing the ecological crisis.     

Psychiatric Patients’ Comprehension of <Emphasis Type=\"Italic\">Miranda</Emphasis> Rights

Seventy-five psychiatric inpatients were evaluated with respect to their Miranda-related abilities using Grisso’s (1998, Instruments for assessing understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights. Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press) instruments and Goldstein’s (2002, Revised instruments for assessing understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights) revision to determine: whether different versions of Miranda warnings translate into differences in understanding; the influence of psychiatric symptoms, diagnostic categories, and IQ upon Miranda comprehension; and the relative performance of persons with psychiatric impairment on Miranda-relevant abilities. Results indicated that although the Miranda language used in Goldstein’s revision generally showed lower grade reading levels and higher reading ease scores than Grisso’s original instruments, this did not translate into improved understanding. In addition, psychiatric symptoms were negatively correlated with Miranda comprehension, even after controlling for IQ. Finally, results revealed that psychiatric patients’ understanding and appreciation was substantially impaired compared to Grisso’s adult validation samples, and was roughly comparable to Grisso’s juvenile validation sample. Implications of these results for policy reform are discussed.