Missing the overlap between theory and practice: Patten’s ‘equal recognition’ in the face of the Catalan case

Drawing on the particularities of Catalonia (and related cases), the general point of this contribution is to argue that Patten’s equal recognition theory is modeled upon a too-restricted set of empirical assumptions, a circumstance that might harm its value as a tool for the orientation, evaluation, and reform of public policy. What is absent in Patten’s account – or at least not properly inserted into it – are four built-in modules that we have named ‘history’, ‘democracy’, ‘international relations’, and ‘migration’. When it comes to recognition of minorities, the past matters more often than Patten is willing to accept; democracy can lead to permanent departures from equal recognition on the part of self-governing national minorities; in the recognition game, there are other relevant players than simply states and their minorities; and one of these players, namely immigrant groups, can (albeit involuntarily) distort equal recognition schemes.     

Winner-pay contests

We analyze winner-pay contests in which players select bids, the winner is determined probabilistically through a contest success function, and only the winner must pay her bid. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is unique under weak assumptions on the contest success function. We determine the Nash equilibrium for several examples. We also consider how equilibrium bids are influenced by private information about the value of winning the contest.     

The adult worker model family,gender equality and care: the search for new policy principles and the possibilities and problems of a capabilities approach

There is evidence that policy-makers in most Western welfare states are moving towards a new set of assumptions about the contributions that men and women make to families, based on an adult worker model. This paper first examines this shift in policy assumptions at the EU level and goes on to argue that there are real limits to the pursuit of a full adult worker model based on the commodification of care. In respect of gender equality, this in turn raises the issue of the terms and conditions on which such a shift in policy assumptions are made, particularly about the valuing and sharing of the unpaid work of care. The final part of the paper examines the possibilities offered by the capabilities approach of addressing these issues.     

Steering through Complexity: EU Environmental Regulation in the International Context

The nature of governance in the European Union (EU) and its member states is continuing to evolve as the EU develops. This paper focuses on the challenges to this governance process in the sector of environmental policy, and particularly the role of external organizations and states in providing alternate policy fora. The policy impact of these institutions and organizations leads to more actor participation in a way that EU players may not be able to anticipate or control since the EU is only one of several arenas involved. Both states and non-governmental actors actively seek to shift issues to arenas that provide them advantages. Consequently, developments in other arenas shape and are shaped by EU issues as actors pursue forum shopping. The paper presents two cases, the amendment of the Basel Convention to ban hazardous wastes export and the EU regulation of chemical risk, which demonstrate how external players can shape EU regulation.     

Does the minimum wage affect welfare caseloads?

Although minimum wages are advocated as a policy that will help the poor, few studies have examined their effect on poor families. This paper uses variation in minimum wages across states and over time to estimate the impact of minimum wage legislation on welfare caseloads. We find that the elasticity of the welfare caseload with respect to the minimum wage is between 0.1 and 0.2, but this estimate is sensitive to the sample period and assumptions about state trends. We tentatively conclude that higher minimum wages increase welfare dependence; however, more research is warranted.© 2005 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Municipal Size and Democracy: A Critical Analysis of the Argument of Proximity Based on the Case of Denmark

The Nordic welfare states are based on a unique system of highly decentralized municipalities. However, in Denmark a discussion about merging municipalities has emerged. The discussion has kept within the framework of the classic dichotomy between capacity and proximity, or been limited to considerations of effectiveness versus democracy. The assumptions behind both arguments can be nuanced and problematized, and a new study, based on an extensive set of data, analyses the basic assumptions behind the argument of proximity. In accordance with earlier studies, it finds that participation is higher in small municipalities. However, municipal size does not affect citizens' interest in and knowledge of local politics. Nor does it affect citizens' perception of local politicians and their trust in local political decisions. This is surprising, given previous research in this area.     

Endogenous Beliefs in Models of Politics

In the standard rational choice model, actors have exogenously given beliefs that perfectly match objective probabilities. As such, these beliefs cannot be optimistic or motivated by preferences, even though substantial empirical evidence indicates that human beliefs routinely satisfy neither of these criteria. I present a tractable Endogenous Beliefs Model and apply it to three different political environments from across the subfields of political science. In the model, players form beliefs that maximize a utility function that represents preferences over outcomes and the anticipatory experience of uncertainty. Applications include voter turnout, taxation and collective choice, and crisis bargaining. The model captures the empirical evidence about belief formation much better than the standard model. Moreover, these applications show how rigidly insisting on the standard rational choice model rejects otherwise reasonable explanations by fiat, precisely because of its implausible assumptions about beliefs.     

Budgeters' Views of State Performance-Budgeting Systems: Distinctions across Branches

Given that a majority of states have had some sort of performance‐budgeting initiative on the books for several years, how has implementation of such reform progressed? To answer this question, we surveyed legislative and executive budgeters from the 50 states, asking them for their impressions of performance‐budgeting implementation in their state. Specifically, we asked these budget officers about the reasons for introducing performance budgeting in their state; the types of activities required of their system; responsible oversight bodies; extent of application across state agencies and departments; and perceived levels of effectiveness and problems experienced with implementation of the budget reform. Our findings indicate that implementation of performance‐based budgeting systems is proceeding slowly. While there are some benefits to highlight, results show that implementing performance budgeting is not without problems—perhaps the greatest being differing perceptions of use and success among budget players, particularly across branches of government.     

The Political Economy of the Sino-Middle Eastern Relations

This paper attempts to understand the Sino-Mideast relations in terms of energy cooperation and the subsequent cooperation in the areas of trade and arms sales. It also examines the political economy of China’s energy policy toward the Middle East. The paper argues that the objective of China’s engagement in the Middle East is energy security rather than undermining the United States’ interests in the region. Contrary to realist assumptions, China is utilizing the existing Western institutions to achieve its goals in the region, a step highly welcomed and encouraged by Middle Eastern states. The paper attempts to develop a tridimensional and triangular approach to the political economy of the region in relation to the rapid pace of China’s involvement in the Middle East. Such involvement is generating substantial intellectual interests and anxiety among major players in the region in terms of its nature, goals and mechanisms. In so doing, China maintains a balance in its relations with protagonists in the region and skillfully navigates its national interest in the region.     

Representation and the democratic deficit

In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue addressed throughout this Special Issue is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union.     

Representation and the democratic deficit

Abstract In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue addressed throughout this Special Issue is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union.     

American Democratic Practice,France, and Russia: Institutions,Values, and Alternative Democratic Experience

The US emphasis on democratic procedures and property rights profoundly distinguishes the American polity from nearly all consolidated and newly emergent democracies; democracies that place stress on more egalitarian notions of social justice. Interrelating institutional arrangements and democratic values through an application of George Tsebelis's veto players theory and Isaiah Berlin's notions of positive and negative liberty, we juxtapose the American and French democracies as we assess Russia's post-Soviet democratic consolidation. We focus on the policy-making proclivities of these three states, and a combined application of the veto players framework and positive-negative liberty dichotomy reveals a US policy bias toward the status quo as contrasted with a French and Russian system bias facilitating more substantial policy change. The 1993–1995 Clinton health-care initiative, the 1997–2002 Jospin-Left program, with attention to the 35-hour workweek and associated policies, and the 2000–2006 Putin policy agenda, with attention to health care and housing measures, serve as national case studies to illuminate our arguments.     

Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests

Using a public-policy application ofTullock's two-player rent-seeking contest,this paper focuses on the relationshipbetween the aggregate expected utility ofthe players and their asymmetricvaluations. In our game these valuationsare the players' payoffs in the twopossible states of nature, namely, theapproval and rejection of the proposedpublic policy. Our main result provides thecondition that ensures that the aggregateexpected payoff of the two contestants (theinterest groups that compete on theapproval of the proposed policy) is positively related to the valuationparameters.     

Constitutional courts as veto players: Lessons from the United States,France and Germany

The number of constitutional courts and supreme courts with constitutional review rights has strongly increased with the third wave of democratisation across the world as an important element of the new constitutionalism. These courts play an important role in day‐to‐day politics as they can nullify acts of parliament and thus prevent or reverse a change in the status quo. In macro‐concepts of comparative politics, their role is unclear. Either they are integrated as counter‐majoritarian institutional features of a political system or they are entirely ignored: some authors do not discuss their potential impact at all, while others dismiss them because they believe their preferences as veto players are entirely absorbed by other actors in the political system. However, we know little about the conditions and variables that determine them as being counter‐majoritarian or veto players. This article employs the concept of Tsebelis’ veto player theory to analyse the question. It focuses on the spatial configuration of veto players in the legislative process and then adds the court as an additional player to find out if it is absorbed in the pareto‐efficient set of the existing players or not. A court which is absorbed by other veto players should not in theory veto new legislation. It is argued in this article that courts are conditional veto players. Their veto is dependent on three variables: the ideological composition of the court; the pattern of government control; and the legislative procedures. To empirically support the analysis, data from the United States, France and Germany from 1974 to 2009 is used. This case selection increases variance with regard to system types and court types. The main finding is that courts are not always absorbed as veto players: during the period of analysis, absorption varies between 11 and 71 per cent in the three systems. Furthermore, the pattern of absorption is specific in each country due to government control, court majority and legislative procedure. Therefore, it can be concluded that they are conditional veto players. The findings have at least two implications. First, constitutional courts and supreme courts with judicial review rights should be systematically included in veto player analysis of political systems and not left aside. Any concept ignoring such courts may lead to invalid results, and any concept that counts such courts merely as an institutional feature may lead to distorted results that over‐ or under‐estimate their impact. Second, the findings also have implications for the study of judicial politics. The main bulk of literature in this area is concerned with auto‐limitation, the so‐called ‘self‐restraint’ of the government to avoid defeat at the court. This auto‐limitation, however, should only occur if a court is not absorbed. However, vetoes observed when the court is absorbed might be explained by strategic behaviour among judges engaging in selective defection.     

Elinor Ostrom: uncommon

The placement of various tee boxes on golf courses subsidizes the first shot of each hole for certain players. McCormick and Tollison find that this subsidy is statistically larger (other factors equal) in the southern US states and that it has been decreasing over time. These findings illustrate more general issues of chivalry, gender, age, and opportunity costs. The economics profession will undoubtedly continue to use sports data to better understand the behavior and interactions of people and firms in the economy.     

Revisiting the Income Tax Effects of Legalizing Same‐Sex Marriages

In this paper we estimate the impacts on income tax collections of legalizing same‐sex marriage. We utilize new individual‐level data sources to estimate the federal income tax consequences of legalizing same‐sex marriages. These data sources also allow us to estimate the impact of legalization on state income tax collections. We find that 23 states would realize a net fiscal benefit from legalization, while 21 states would experience a decline in revenue. The potential (annual) changes in state tax revenue range from negative $29 million in California to positive $16 million in New York. At the federal level, our estimates suggest an overall reduction in revenues, ranging from a potential loss of $187 million to $580 million. Overall, we find that the federal and state impacts are quite modest. We also find that our estimates are only marginally affected by alternative assumptions about how many same‐sex couples will choose to marry and which partner will claim any children for tax deduction purposes.     

Public choice theory and petroleum policies in Canada, Britain and Norway

Abstract. It is assumed that the development of an economically promising resource such as petroleum would be amenable to analysis from an economic viewpoint, and that government initiatives in this area might reveal the essential economic interests of the state. If governments are assumed to have similar economic and political objectives (i.e., to attain the greatest revenues possible from the exploitation of a depleting natural resource and to maintain public office), then it is to be expected that the petroleum policy outputs in various states would likewise be similar. Such differences as do exist should be amenable to explanation by examining the differences in the political constraints and economic situations of the states in question. The study models petroleum policy in four areas: state participation, pricing, depletion (including exploration and production policies), and fiscal arrangements, based on assumptions central to public choice theory. A comparison of policy outputs in the three case states illustrates the usefulness of the public choice approach to comparative policy analysis.     

The alternative vote and interethnic moderation: A reply to Fraenkel and Grofman

The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman have modeled the likely effects of AV in severely divided societies, in order to impugn AV as a tool of interethnic accommodation. In this response, I show that Fraenkel and Grofman’s model is based on extreme assumptions that bear no relation to party and voter behavior in such societies. Models based on realistic assumptions about strategic behavior and cross-national experience with AV both demonstrate that AV generally provides centripetal incentives that can contribute to interethnic coalition-building and accommodation.     

Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements

Do national legislatures constitute a mechanism by which commitments to international human rights treaties can be made credible? Treaty ratification can activate domestic mechanisms that make repression more costly, and the legislative opposition can enhance these mechanisms. Legislative veto players raise the cost of formalistic repressive strategies by declining to consent to legislation. Executives can still choose to rely on more costly, extralegal strategies, but these could result in severe penalties for the leader and require the leader to expend resources to hide. Especially in treaty member‐states, legislatures can use other powers to also increase the cost of extralegal violations, which can further reduce repression. By using an empirical strategy that attempts to address the selection effects in treaty commitment decisions, I show that positive effects of human rights treaties increase when there are more legislative veto players.