Foreword: can Glucksberg survive Lawrence? Another look at the end of life and personal autonomy

In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court declined to find a right to physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") in the Constitution. Not a single Justice dissented. One would expect such a ruling to be quite secure. But Lawrence v. Texas, holding that a state cannot make consensual homosexual conduct a crime, is not easy to reconcile with Glucksberg. Lawrence certainly takes a much more expansive view of substantive due process than did Glucksberg. It is conceivable that the five Justices who made up the Lawrence majority--all of whom still sit on the Court--might overrule Glucksberg. For various reasons, however, this seems improbable. Unlike the situation with respect to the pre-Lawrence era, Glucksberg does not stigmatize any politically vulnerable group. When there is no democratic defect in the political process, there is much to be said for courts deferring to reasonable legislative judgments. Moreover, unlike the developments preceding Lawrence, there has been no emerging awareness of a right or liberty to enlist the assistance of a physician in committing suicide. No state supreme court has found a right to PAS in its own state constitution. Nor, in the decade since Glucksberg, has any state legislature legalized PAS. And attempts have been made to do so in some twenty states. In addition, various considerations might cause a court to balk at constitutionalizing PAS for the terminally ill. Such a right is not easily cabined. If personal autonomy extends to the time and manner of one's death, why doesn't it also apply whenever a competent person believes that death is better than continued life? Once the right to PAS is grounded on self-determination or personal autonomy in controlling ones own life and death, it no longer seems plausible to limit it to the terminally ill. Why should people who have to endure pain, suffering, or indignity for a much longer time than the terminally ill (often defined as those with six months or less to live) be denied this right? The argument made by many proponents of PAS that the right to forgo medical treatment and the right to PAS are merely subcategories of the same broad right is not convincing. Most of the two million people who die every year in this country do so in hospitals and long-term care institutions and do so after a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment has been made. If medical treatment could not be rejected, vast numbers of patients would be at the mercy of every technological advance. (For example, Nancy Cruzan could have been kept alive in her persistent vegetative state for thirty years.) Allowing a patient to die at some point is a practical condition upon the successful operation of medicine. The same can hardly be said of PAS.     

The prosecutor and human rights – from the general to the particular

It is not unusual that one or all parties commit a genuine mistake when making contracts. While there is the strict general duty under the law to respect agreements, there equally exists the duty for courts and tribunals to be fair and to render commercial justice in the factual matrix of cases before them. In national legal systems and transnational law regimes, rescission for mistake on economically efficient and just terms is embedded in contractual obligations. The Solle v Butcher (1950) doctrine, which represented the English law approach, was rejected in The Great Peace (2002). Potential conflicts and crises now exist in commercial relations and international dispute resolution when ‘English law’ is the applicable law. This extends to jurisdictions where English decisions are highly persuasive. This article examines the correctness and effect of The Great Peace decision on the doctrine of equitable rescission for genuine mistake as propounded in Solle v Butcher, and possible clarifications needed after the complications brought by The Great Peace. It analyses the conceptual importance of the remedy of equitable rescission for mistake in commercial transactions, and identifies serious substantive errors of law by The Great Peace court. Finally, it provides other effective, fair and efficient legal methods that remain available to avoid the weaknesses of the decisions.     

Information rights and donor conception: lessons from adoption?

This article reviews the Australian experience in providing information rights for people separated through adoption, and considers its relevance in adjusting the competing interests of those involved in donor conception. The Australian laws, which differ from State to State, create information rights for adults who have been adopted, and also--with more qualifications--for other family members, such as birth parents and siblings. Some laws also seek to protect privacy, notably by use of the "contact veto". The author argues that the review of the Australian laws provides strong support for the rights of donor offspring, when adult, to information about their genetic origins. It also raises important questions about the rights and interests of other family members involved in donor conception, and how they might be accommodated.     

The applicability of riparian rights doctrine in Botswana: the judicial refusal to depart from the common law principles?

At independence, a semi-dessert Botswana did not have developed water law besides the common law. The newly independent state of Botswana passed the first post-colonial water legislation a year after gaining independence. This article argues that even though the Water Act grants ownership of water sources to the State, the common law riparian rights remain intact. This article argues that the courts of Botswana are reluctant to depart from the common principles of land and water law derived from South Africa notwithstanding a change of water law in that jurisdiction.     

Is the Constitution the Trap? Decryption and Revolution in Chile

Law and Critique - We will examine the revolts, begun in October of 2019, and currently developing in Chile under three conjoined parts. First, we will not try to theoretically ‘tame’...     

Balancing autonomy and risk: a failure of nerve in England and Wales?

Specialised mental health legislation typically provides for the hospitalisation and treatment of those with mental disorders in the absence of their consent. The article examines the possible justifications for the existence of these special powers and argues that two of the most common justifications, the protection of the patient and the protection of others, do discriminate against those with a mental, as opposed to a physical, disorder. The relationship between mental health and mental capacity, or guardianship, legislation is then considered and possible ways forward are discussed with particular reference to the current reform debate in England and Wales.     

Rethinking the notion of hosting in the aftermath of Delfi: Shifting from liability to responsibility?

Liability of Internet intermediaries for a third-party content is a complex topic, especially with regards to the storage of illegal or harmful postings offered by portals. The E-Commerce Directive offered a liberal framework for handling such cases, provided that a hosting service provider has not played an active role in content management. Being passive turned out to be the key precondition for immunity under safe harbour provisions. Yet, after the Delfi ruling the legal landscape has changed radically. Although the judgment of the Strasbourg tribunal has been dismissed in some jurisdictions as an error or one-off case, the truth is that it took into account acquis communautaire and imposed liability on the news portal, which followed the guidelines of Google France and eBay rulings. Given the lack of predictability of the current legal framework, the aim of this contribution is to offer a deep-dive into the notion of hosting from a technical perspective in order to better understand why Articles 14–15 of the E-Commerce Directive may require a re-examination. It is also submitted that portals and other online service providers relying on a broad construction of safe harbours should be entitled to Good Samaritan protection akin to section 230 of the American Communications Decency Act in order not to hold them liable for being active in fighting hate speech and other forms of illegal and harmful conduct.     

End of life decisions and pregnant women: do pregnant women have the right to refuse life preserving medical treatment? A comparative study

In this article the practice of end of life decisions is applied to pregnant women. This is not an easy task as shown by the extensive case law and literature on the subject. The main conclusion of the article is that the pregnant woman's wishes should always be respected whatever the consequences for the foetus may be. Another position would unjustly sacrifice the woman's fundamental rights to bodily integrity and self-determination for the benefit of a non-person. The result is repeated in the situation where the woman is found to be incompetent or brain dead.