CORPORATE MAKAHIKI: THE GOVERNING TELOS OF PEACE

Lono presided over the annual makahiki celebrations, which where held on the island for four consecutive months, usually from October or November through February or March. This was a time of ritual, sports competition, offerings to the chiefs, divination of the fruitfulness of the coming year, and much feasting and hula. During the makahiki war was forbidden, people did little work and enjoyed themselves. ¹     

THE HARMONIZATION PRINCIPLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN CHINA

The agency theory has laid a foundation of knowledge for the review and design of corporate governance in large public corporations, but they are never exclusively symbiotic. Another insight to observe corporate governance is the adaptive efficiency demonstrated by the level of development of venture capital. Therefore, any proposal for corporate governance reform in large public corporations must be based on perspectives of both the agency theory and the adaptive efficiency theory. Otherwise, it is likely that improvements to one value (i.e. improvements by means of agency) will be at the expense of the other (i.e. improvements by means of adaptive efficiency). This theory is termed as the “harmonization principle.” Taking the Chinese State-Controlled Listed Companies (SCLCs) for example, the harmonization principle is applied to testing the reform measures for its corporate governance. With this demonstration, it intends to show the normative implication of the harmonization principle in the overhaul of corporate governance of large public corporations worldwide.     

“企业社会责任”国际研讨会综述

<正>2006年1月13日至14日,"企业社会责任"国际研讨会在北京大学法学院模拟法庭隆重召开。本次会议由北京大学法学院、劳动法与社会保障法研究所主办。中华全国总工会书记处书记张鸣起先生、北京大学常务副校长陈文申教授、中国企业联合会副理事长陈英女士、中国劳动法学研究会会长郑东亮先生、北京大学法学院党委书记张守文教授出席了开幕式并做了热情洋溢的致辞,开幕式由北京大学法学院叶静漪教授主持。前美国劳动关系委员会主席、美国斯坦福大学法学院Willian B.Gould教授,北京大学法学院劳动法与社会保障法研究所所长贾俊玲教授做了会议总结发言。     

CORPORATE SELF‐POLICING AND THE ENVIRONMENT*

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Self‐Policing Policy (more commonly referred to as the Audit Policy) waives or reduces penalties when regulated entities voluntarily discover, disclose, and correct environmental violations. This study draws upon a rational choice model of corporate crime to determine if traditional regulatory efforts such as inspections and enforcement actions are associated with the odds of disclosing an environmental violation under the Audit Policy. A case control design is used to compare companies that self‐police to companies that do not self‐police. The event group consists of all 551 companies that disclosed at least one environmental violation under the Audit Policy between October 1, 1998 and September 30, 2000. The control group consists of a simple random sample of 551 companies that did not use the Audit Policy but were discovered to have violated at least one environmental law during the same time period as the event group. There is no evidence that inspections and enforcement increase Audit Policy use. However, the results do suggest, first, that the Audit Policy is more likely to be used by large companies than by small companies and, second, that it is likely to be used for reporting violations as opposed to more serious emissions or permit violations. In terms of public policy these findings suggest that regulatory agencies such as the EPA can do relatively little to increase the self‐policing of environmental violations.     

DISTRICT ATTORNEYS AND CORPORATE CRIME: SURVEYING THE PROSECUTORIAL GATEKEEPERS

A mail survey of California district attorneys regarding corporate crime focused on the recent experiences of the prosecutors with such crimes and on factors that limit the likelihood of their prosecuting corporate offenders. A significant majority of the district attorneys had prosecuted a variety of corporate crimes, and a sizable minority anticipated devoting more resources to corporate crime prosecutions in the future. There was a strong consensus among the district attorneys that the primary obstacle to corporate crime prosecutions is not political but practical and inheres in the level of resources available to them. Prosecutors in small districts were more constrained by the potential impact that a corporate prosecution might have on the local economy than their counterparts in large districts. This finding suggests that community context may influence social control responses to corporate lawbreakers.     

CONTROLLING CORPORATE DEVIANCE

The effectiveness of sanctions applied to corporate offenders has not been adequately studied, in part because of the absence of any appropriate research strategy. This absence stems from the tendency. since Sutherland, to conceptualize corporate crime as individual rather than organizational behavior. This article outlines a research procedure based on the organizational nature of corporate crime and uses it to evaluate the impact of prosecutions under Australia's Trade Practices Act. The article concludes that the sanctions applied have considerably reduced the likelihood of corporate recidivism.