The social sub-optimality of competitive elections

One of the common normative assumptions about elections is that competitive elections are inherently good, and non-competitive elections are problematic. This paper challenges that assumption. At the level of individual elections, competitive elections produce either sub-optimal results or trivially optimal results, but competitive elections are never uniquely optimal. In aggregation, competitive elections for a set of offices are inherently sub-optimal. From a procedural perspective, the circumstances in which competitive elections are appropriate are rare, and from a diagnostic perspective, we cannot conclude that there are problems in the electoral system based on a lack of competition. In the context of social choice theory, competitive elections are not inherently good.     

Economic growth and alternative deficit-reducing tax increases and expenditure cuts: A cross-sectional study

This paper assesses empirically the relative desirability of alternative deficit-reducing tax increases and expenditure cuts in terms of their individual impact on economic growth, using cross-sectional data for a sample of 21 developed countries for the period 1972–81.Property taxes are by far superior to deficit financing, and are the best choice for implementing deficit-reducing tax increases. Income taxes and domestic taxes on goods and services, which are as bad for growth as are deficits, rank second with no difference between them. Foreign trade taxes are even worse for growth than are deficits, and are the worst choice for reducing deficits.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

Risk assessment in the policy-making process: environmental health and safety protection

This article examines the extent to which differences exist in the relative degree of discretion permitted by the statutory mandates under which health risk assessments are conducted as a basis for regulatory action. Attention is focused on the Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration, because they are the lead federal regulatory agencies on most environmental health matters. The statutes are found to define risk, consider effects, identify target populations, and use benefit-cost analysis in a flexible way. But the burden of proof of risk typically is assigned in a more direct and stringent fashion. Overall, however, agencies are found to have substantial discretion in the manner in which risk assessments are incorporated into the policy process. A number of examples of efforts to reduce this flexibility are outlined and their implications for the future of the analysis of risks are delineated.     

Friends, Strangers or Countrymen? The Ties between Citizens as Colleagues

Some analogies are better than others for understanding the ties and responsibilities between citizens of a state. Citizens are better understood as particular kinds of colleagues than as either strangers or members of close-knit communities such as family or friends. Colleagues are diverse, separate and relatively distant individuals whose involuntary interdependence as equals in a practice or institution creates common concerns; this entails special responsibilities of communication, consideration and trust, which are capable of extension beyond the immediate group. Citizens likewise are involuntarily interdependent in political practices, and have comparable concerns and obligations that are more substantial than liberal advocates of constitutional patriotism recommend. But these are distinct from and potentially more extensible than those between co-nationals sharing a common culture, which are proposed by nationalists and some communitarians. The relationship of citizens is a more valid ground for associative obligations than others apart from family and friends.     

Demographic,Employment, Expenditure,and Income‐Related Dependency Ratios: Population Aging in the Fifty States

Old‐age dependency ratios (OADR) are frequently used to measure the economic impact of U.S. population aging. However, at the state level youth‐dependence, and the “birth dearth,” are important. While federal expenditures on elder Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are large, state expenditures on dependent youth are much higher than on elders. The states are ranked by the OADR and three other dependency ratios that consider youth and a state's employment, fiscal outlay, and per‐capita income. Very different rankings are found. States with higher OADR ratios had lower total dependency expenditures. Projections for 2030 are compared with 2000 results.     

《政府信息公开条例》的民本思想探微

中国《政府信息公开条例》以法规的形式给予政府信息公开以强制性的规定,并作出了严格的制度安排。浏览其中条款处处彰显民本行政的思想,具体体现在法为民所立、权为民所用、利为民所谋、信为民所取、责为民所负五个方面,本文从以上方面入手探索其精神实质。     

The provision of public services by government funded decentralized agencies

Public services are often provided by lower level agencies that are funded by higher level government. Since markets for such services do not exist, normal pressures to minimize costs do not operate; indeed, usually these costs are unobservable. We study a principal-agent model which emphasizes the distinction between the financing and provision of public services. Two broad situations are analyzed: (i) the agencies are induced to reveal true costs; and (ii) in addition, to minimize costs, agencies must be induced to exert effort. The characteristics of the optimal funding contract and the marginal cost of public funds are derived in each case.     

The programme to policy linkage: The fulfilment of election pledges on socio–economic policy in The Netherlands, 1986–1998

To what extent are the contents of party election programmes congruent with subsequent government policy actions? Existing research on the fulfilment of pre–election pledges focuses on systems of government in which executives formed by a single parties are the norm. This study extends this research to coalition systems of government. Specific policy proposals made by the main Dutch parties in their recent election programmes are identified and compared with subsequent government policy actions. Hypotheses about the conditions under which pledges are more likely to be acted upon are formulated and tested. Although clear linkages between election programmes and subsequent policies are found, pledges made by prospective coalition parties in the Netherlands are less likely to be acted upon than those made by prospective governing parties in the United Kingdom. Prominent features of cabinet government, such as the allocation of ministerial portfolios and the coalition policy agreement, are found to influence the likelihood of pledges being fulfilled. In addition, consensus between parties is also found to increase the likelihood of government actions responding to election pledges.     

The war of words defining the extreme right party family

This article presents an overview of the writings on the extreme right party family of the third wave (1980–95). First, the prime criterion for the classification of the party family is discussed. Second, the main critiques of, and alternatives to, the term right‐wing extremism are evaluated. Third, the political parties that are generally considered to be members of the party family are identified. Fourth, subgroups within the larger party family are examined. In the conclusion, the various writings are structured on the basis of four theoretical schools within the broader study of right‐wing extremism.     

Political Awareness, Opinion Constraint and the Stability of Ideological Positions

Some studies of public opinion suggest that most people are ignorant about the detail of politics and are simply unable to arrive at a considered vote. They hold that voters are ignorant about the ideological substance of politics, since their opinions do not appear to be constrained by ideas and are unstable over time. However, other studies cast doubt on both the definition of ideology employed in these studies and their operational measures. It is suggested that, once allowance is made for measurement error, the opinions of most voters are constrained and highly stable. This article demonstrates that differences in political awareness result in considerable heterogeneity among the electorate. The opinions of more aware voters are subject to greater constraint and are more stable over time than those of less aware voters. It is therefore suggested that issue-voting models must be applied with caution to less aware voters.     

An Empirical Examination of the Determinants of Insured Municipal Bond Issues

Research demonstrates that there are interest cost savings associated with municipal bond insurance, and yet only half of the bonds are issued with insurance. The theoretical determinants of bond insurance are discussed and evaluated empirically through logistic regression. Statistically significant bond attributes are the underlying credit risk, maturity, par value, and a call option. In addition, regional market characteristics at the time of issue and market segmentations are determinants of bond insurance. These findings strengthen the hypotheses that insurance mitigates market segmentation and that insurers function as delegated monitors of bond quality.     

The programme to policy linkage: The fulfilment of election pledges on socio-economic policy in the Netherlands, 1986–1998

To what extent are the contents of party election programmes congruent with subsequent government policy actions? Existing research on the fulfilment of pre-election pledges focuses on systems of government in which executives formed by a single parties are the norm. This study extends this research to coalition systems of government. Specific policy proposals made by the main Dutch parties in their recent election programmes are identified and compared with subsequent government policy actions. Hypotheses about the conditions under which pledges are more likely to be acted upon are formulated and tested. Although clear linkages between election programmes and subsequent policies are found, pledges made by prospective coalition parties in the Netherlands are less likely to be acted upon than those made by prospective governing parties in the United Kingdom. Prominent features of cabinet government, such as the allocation of ministerial portfolios and the coalition policy agreement, are found to influence the likelihood of pledges being fulfilled. In addition, consensus between parties is also found to increase the likelihood of government actions responding to election pledges.

     

Persuasion and Resistance: Race and the Death Penalty in America

Although there exists a large and well-documented "race gap" between whites and blacks in their support for the death penalty, we know relatively little about the nature of these differences and how the races respond to various arguments against the penalty. To explore such differences, we embedded an experiment in a national survey in which respondents are randomly assigned to one of several argument conditions. We find that African Americans are more responsive to argument frames that are both racial (i.e., the death penalty is unfair because most of the people who are executed are black) and nonracial (i.e., too many innocent people are being executed) than are whites, who are highly resistant to persuasion and, in the case of the racial argument, actually become more supportive of the death penalty upon learning that it discriminates against blacks. These interracial differences in response to the framing of arguments against the death penalty can be explained, in part, by the degree to which people attribute the causes of black criminality to either dispositional or systemic forces (i.e., the racial biases of the criminal justice system) .     

Patterns of Disagreement in Democratic Politics: Comparing Germany, Japan, and the United States

An important ingredient in democratic politics is the experience of disagreement through social communication and political discussion. If people fail to encounter contrary viewpoints, their own views are never challenged, they are never forced to reconsider initially held opinions, and they are effectively excluded from democratic deliberation. This article examines patterns of political agreement and disagreement within the communication networks of citizens in Germany, Japan, and the United States. Several questions are addressed. Are there cross‐national differences in patterns of agreement and disagreement among citizens? To what extent are these patterns subject to individual attitudes, to the structure of communication networks, and to levels of aggregate support for particular preferences and opinions? Finally, what are the implications of disagreement for civic capacity and political engagement? Empirical analyses are based on cooperative election surveys conducted in each country during the early 1990s.     

Modern Management Tools in State Agencies: The Case of Norway

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the broad package of modern management tools that are used by Norwegian state agencies. These tools are regarded as forms of regulation inside government as well as a “shopping basket.” We describe the range of different tools and look at how intensively they are used and how they are interrelated. We also examine variations in use of these tools by different agencies. The empirical basis is a survey addressed to all organizations in the Norwegian civil service, apart from the ministries, in 2004. Our theoretical approach is primarily based on neo-institutional organization theory. Our main empirical findings are that the use of modern management tools is widespread; that some are very common while others are more marginal; that there are different families of tools that supplement each other; that there is significant variation in the use of different tools; and that size is the most important independent variable in explaining the use of different tools. Neo-institutional considerations, particularly normative isomorphism as a source of legitimacy, do not appear to be a major explanation for tool adoption.     

Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a cross-section of 98 countries. Our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption are used. Employing an index of corruption based on a structural model, however, corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income, but not in high income countries.     

Region, Local Context, and Voting at the 1997 General Election in England

There has been considerable debate in recent work on voting patterns in Great Britain regarding the importance of regional effects: are these “real” or are they simply statistical artifacts of decision‐making processes at smaller spatial scales which are aggregated up to the regional scale if not incorporated directly into any modeling? Using a multilevel model design, this article reports on analyses of survey data for the 1997 general election in England which allows tests of whether regional variations are no more than aggregation effects. Individual voters are nested within households, neighborhoods, constituencies, and regions and when all of the smaller‐scale spatial levels are included in the model, the observed regional effects are statistically insignificant. At the 1997 general election, at least, regional variations within England in support for the three main parties—basically, a north‐south divide—are aggregation effects.     

Privatization as institutional choice

A model based upon the common concept of rent-seeking behavior avoids an exclusive focus on the pecuniary motive in private institutions and the power motive in public institutions. Using this model, the case for privatization ranges from very strong to unpersuasive, with some fascinating intermediate cases. Where purchases are frequent, information is abundant, costs of a bad decision are small, externalities are minimal, and competition is the norm, privatization ought to be pursued. At the other extreme, in situations where externalities and collective interests abound, natural monopolies are dominant, distributional goals are important, or debate and experience will alter preferences, governmental determination of service levels and public provision should continue. Intermediate situations such as those involving education, health, and some aspects of enterprise development provide the most interesting and hotly debated areas. These intermediate situations have both private and collective characteristics, choices are made infrequently with little information, have monumental consequences, distributional considerations are critical, and public debate about the level and type of service substantially affects individual behavior.