The internet and the state: Instrument of social control or subversive tecnology?

Conclusion Technological progress always contains within it the ironic dialectic of liberation and domination. The computer-based information highway is no exception. As a consequence, our own view is that the computer revolution contains the potential for both over-control and subversion of control. Science and technology are not neutral. They are social constructs that exist only within a context of choices of development and application. Therefore, it is not the technology that constrains, or oppresses, or liberates. Rather, the emancipatory potential of this new technology lies in the degree to which those who use it can disseminate it and maintain it as a relatively low-cost communication tool. To date, many of those involved in expanding the Internet frontier have generally been suspicious of and resistant to government intrusion into the Net. While it is often easier to simply dismiss such suspicion as the ranting of conspiracy theorists, history has taught us that such a na?ve faith in the benevolence of the government is unwise. Our intention here has not been to provide a definitive conclusion about the past, present, or future state of technological progress; instead we hope that our discussion will spark further critical analysis of technology and related topics.     

The legal status of the Jews in England 1190–1790∗

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Introduction historique au droit des personnes et de lafamille. ANNE LEFEBVRE‐TEILLARD. Paris: Puf. 1996. 475 pp. FF 149. ISBN 2 13 047891 3.

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Religious Liberty in Western Thought. NOEL B. REYNOLDS and W. COLE DURHAM, JR. (eds.). Atlanta. Scholars Press. 1996. 312 pp. ISBN 0 7885 0319 7/0 7885 0320 0.

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Crime and Punishment in American Society. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN. Basic Books. 1993. viii + 577. pp. (incl. Index). ISBN 0 456 01487 9.

Bound by our Constitution: Women, Workers, and the Minimum Wage. VIVIEN HART. Princeton University Press. 1994. xv + 255 pp. (incl. Index). £24.95 pb. ISBN 0 691 03480 X.     

The concept of exceptionality: a legal farce?

How do we decide which treatments should be offered by the National Health Service (NHS) when we cannot afford to fund them all? In the absence of a positive appraisal by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), which mandates the provision of a treatment by the NHS, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) are free to decide whether to provide a particular drug to some, or all, of their population. However, as public bodies, it is a well-established principle of Administrative Law that PCTs are not at liberty to fetter the exercise of their own discretion. They must recognise the possibility that some patients will have exceptional circumstances, and as a consequence, any general policy prohibiting the funding of a drug cannot be absolute. In the absence of statutory guidance on what might constitute exceptional, clinicians are left guessing as to whether their patients might be eligible for funding on the grounds of exceptionality. Using the context of expensive cancer drugs, I will examine the concept of exceptionality from clinical, moral, and legal perspectives, focussing particularly on the role of social factors in determining exceptionality. I will review the cases where PCTs' decisions not to fund cancer drugs were subject to legal action and argue that the courts have provided little guidance on interpreting the term exceptional, and that the concept has a limited role to play in the allocation of scarce health resources at a local level.     

Protecting mental health clients' dignity — The importance of legal control

Protecting human beings' dignity is a fundamental value underlying the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as several recommendations and conventions derived from this, among them the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), a declaration that also takes precedence over Norwegian legislation. Still, clients' stories inform us that their dignity is not always protected in the mental health service systems.The aim of the study has been to investigate violations of dignity considered from the clients' points of view, and to suggest actions that may ensure that practice is brought in line with human rights values.The method used has been a qualitative content analysis of 335 client narratives.The conclusion is that mental health clients experience infringements that cannot be explained without reference to their status as clients in a system which, based on judgments from medical experts, has a legitimate right to ignore clients' voices as well as their fundamental human rights. The main focus of this discussion is the role of the ECHR and the European Court of Human Rights as instruments for protecting mental health clients' human rights. To bring about changes, recommendations and practices should be harmonized with the new UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). Under this convention, the European Court of Human Rights has support for the application of the ECHR without exemptions for special groups of people.     

"Braxton Hick's" or the birth of a new era? Tracing the development of Ireland's abortion laws in respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence

In Ireland, Article 40.3.3 degrees of Bunreacht na hEireann (the Irish Constitution) guarantees the right to life of the unborn child and the equal right to life of the mother. Abortion in Ireland is permissible only where there is a real and substantial risk to the mother's own life. Since Ireland became a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950,2 there have been concerns that it could result in Ireland being compelled to introduce a right to abortion. This article commences with a review of the extant law on abortion in Ireland, tracing the Constitutional protection afforded to the unborn child. The article will discuss the impact of the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence in regard to access to abortion and to information on abortion services in Ireland in an effort to ascertain if it really has resulted in a radical change to Irish abortion laws. As such, it will also be necessary to examine the more recent decisions of the ECtHR such as Tysiac v. Poland, and A, B, and C v. Ireland, to determine both the approach of the ECtHR to access to abortion in general and also to consider if it has resulted in a liberalisation of abortion law in Ireland.     

Empathy: an essential element of legal practice or ‘never the twain shall meet’?

In a climate where the work of the legal profession is changing and evolving rapidly, this article considers the potential for empathy to be incorporated as an essential element of legal practice. This challenges the conceptions of legal practice held by many legal professionals and law students but draws on increasing scientific evidence demonstrating the interaction between cognition and affect and reflects the emotional realities of life in practice. This article will consider the different definitions of empathy and argue that it is necessary for it to be conceptualised in a way which draws upon both cognitive and affective elements. When empathy is interpreted in this way it can provide both a more effective form of practice and a deeper appreciation of ethics and values. This article will argue that to incorporate empathy in this way requires a richer, more nuanced consideration of the benefits and challenges involved in its use. However, embedding it throughout legal education, training and legal practice would more than reward such a careful evaluation of its role.     

Criminal liability of physicians: an encroachment on the abortion right?

The Supreme Court in 1973 in Roe v. Wade established that decision of first trimester abortion is left to the physician, exercising his best medical judgment, in consultation with the patient. During this period the state may not regulate abortion determination since there is no compelling state interest; therefore a physician performing abortion will be precluded from civil or criminal liability. In second trimester abortion the state has a compelling interest in the health of the mother and may regulate the procedure to protect maternal health; although a previable fetus may be able to survive the abortion, Roe v. Danforth definitively places the woman's right to an abortion above the life of the fetus during the previable stage; therefore the state cannot seek to safeguard the life or health of the fetus during the abortion. Third trimester abortion implies a viable fetus; thus, a compelling state interest in the potential life arises and the state may regulate and proscribe abortion except when necessary for the life and health of the mother. The determination of when viability has been achieved is a matter of judgment resting with the physician who has the choice of techniques and operating procedures which may or may not be fatal to the unborn. It is a question of either termination of pregnancy or destruction of the fetus. In this last case the legal responsibility placed upon the physician is very serious, and involving a risk of civil and criminal liability. Uncertainties as to the boundaries of legal abortion and the threat of criminal liability can only result in a reluctance among physicians to perform second and third trimester abortions, which is against the fundamental right to abortion guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme Court will have to elaborate upon the scope of the abortion right, whether it encompasses fetal destruction or only termination of pregnancy, because it directly affects the extent and quality of maternal and fetal care that must be rendered by a physician. If only termination of pregnancy is included the Court must resolve whether the woman's health interests predominate, or whether the physician can be required to enhance fetal survival. Physicians have a right to know the full extent of legal ramifications and implications of legally induced abortion.     

The importance of ethics in the law curriculum: essential or incidental?

Recently, the debate as to whether ethics should be a compulsory requirement of a law degree was refuelled when the English and Welsh Legal Education Training Review (LETR) recommended that professional ethics should be primarily addressed in vocational Legal Services and Education Training programmes and that learning outcomes in the academic curriculum should include reference to morality and the law, the values supporting the legal system and their connection to the role of lawyers. This debate is also occurring in other jurisdictions. In Australia the debate is focused on the proposal that ethics be removed as a compulsory subject in the law degree. This proposal has raised a concern that law students will be denied the opportunity to develop as ethically competent lawyers. This paper argues for the continuation of ethics as a core component of a law degree and evidences the model used for the teaching of ethics in the law degree at the University of Technology Sydney in support of our argument. The background to the model is examined to highlight the significance of student feedback and ongoing curriculum review, including the alignment of parallel pedagogical factors. This model serves as an example of not only why ethics should be core to a law degree but, in order to provide graduates who are ethical and reflective practitioners, why ethics should be pervasively taught throughout the degree and supported by an introductory and capstone presence.