Sharing governmental authority: Blue Cross and hospital planning in New York City.

Hospital planning in New York has been since the 1930s an intensely political process with high stakes. The leaders of Blue Cross and their allies used the hospital planning process in the city and the state as a means to extend and protect corporate authority in what they took to be the public interest. When Blue Cross was established in the 1930s, its leaders used the mechanisms of formal planning as part of their solution to pressing problems in the organization and distribution of hospital services. In the decade after World War II, Blue Cross had an immense impact on hospital planning in New York as a result of its growth and its underwriting policies. Conflicts between Blue Cross and state regulators beginning in the 1950s led to a new formulation of the politics of planning. Blue Cross became a partner with the state in regulating hospitals. The state and Blue Cross behaved as co-regulators until the 1980s. The interpretation in this paper revises the earlier accounts of health politics in New York by Law (1976) and Alford (1975).     

A cure for the Blues: resolving nonprofit Blue Cross conversions

This Article analyzes the issues involved in converting nonprofit Blue Cross organizations to for-profit status. These issues have arisen in the context of litigation regarding the "reorganization" of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri ("BCBSMo"). BCBSMo had reorganized by creating and transferring a majority of its business to a new for-profit subsidiary. Missouri consumer groups and state regulators characterized the "reorganization" as a conversion requiring BCBSMo to transfer its assets to a foundation dedicated to charitable health purposes. BCBSMo, however, denied that it had any obligation to leave behind its assets in the nonprofit sector. The BCBSMo litigation raises issues common to most conversions of nonprofit healthcare organizations, particularly conversions of nonprofit Blue Cross plans. This Article provides a road map for state regulators and the public to follow in ensuring that the public interest is fully protected in such conversions.     

The conversion and settlement of Georgia Blue: are consumer groups still singing the blues?

As more Blue Cross/Blue Shield Organizations employ various means to convert to for-profit status, myriad issues arise concerning the proper treatment of assets that were accumulated during the not-for-profit years of such organizations. Moreover, state officials face pressure from all sides to assure that the conversion process is "fair." In the following Article, the author examines the conversion of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia to demonstrate the various conversion issues that arise under traditional legal principles--as well as the means by which that Blue employed newly enacted legislation to avoid many of the requirements that otherwise would have attended its conversion.     

Blue Cross/Blue Shield-sponsored prepaid individual practice

The HMO is no longer a fledgling idea in the Blue Cross/Blue Shield System. There are 45 Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans throughout the country which sponsor a total of 54 HMO programs with about 1,040,000 members. Among those 54 programs are staff models, group models, Individual Practice Associations (IPAs), and other structures. This analysis is confined to the Minnesota affiliate corporation, "HMO Minnesota."     

Capture and culture: organizational identity in New York Blue Cross.

This article explores the changing corporate culture of New York's Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan in its first fifty years. As the plan grew, corporate culture evolved over four sequential phases: the plan first had the character of an experiment, then that of a movement, a business, and, most recently, a corporate agglomerate. Accompanying this evolution has been an identity crisis, as the need to adapt to a turbulent environment has challenged the plan's settled understanding of its core values, namely, voluntarism, community, and cooperation.     

Seeking common ground: a history of labor and Blue Cross.

In recent years, voluntary health insurance costs have become a major source of friction in labor-management negotiations. What was once a "fringe" has led to job actions, strikes, and intensive bargaining. We examine the history of labor's participation in New York Blue Cross from the 1930s to the recent past and show that labor's participation in the plan was crucial to Blue Cross's success in the plan's early decades. By the late 1950s, serious tensions developed over rate increases and the participation of labor in Blue Cross governance. Ultimately, the issue was one of the control over what was provided by the plans and who would pay for the costs of care. We posit that labor was never able to achieve an important role in the control of the third-party payer, and in the antilabor environment of the 1980s this proved detrimental to labor's interests.     

New York's Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 1934-1990: the complicated politics of nonprofit regulation.

The story of New York Blue Cross is one of complex interaction with state and federal regulators and also with hospitals, the medical profession, commercial insurers, and the public, who make up the regulatory environment. Negotiation, cooperation, and adaptation among parties whose goals and assumptions were partly parallel characterize the relationships. As we can see from New York Blue Cross's origins and its role in the development and administration of certificate-of-need legislation, Medicare, insurance practice and regulation, and hospital rate setting, this story does not represent the capture of government by a special interest, nor the gradual souring of a public interest organization, nor disinterested and distant government regulation.     

Empire and the business of health insurance.

I examine the development of privately provided insurance since World War II, giving special attention to Empire Blue Cross, and argue that the competition between employers and unions for the loyalty of workers after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act helped diffuse private health insurance benefits already favored by federal policies. For-profit insurers did not challenge the privileged status of Blue Cross plans because they recognized the political benefits that the plans offered and because they did not wish to offend the plans' sponsors. A relatively easy and profitable business, health insurance has been greatly disturbed by the system inflation accompanying the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid programs. Now self-insurance and various managed-care schemes are major threats. The future may bring consolidation and the strengthening of pools, just the opposite of today's system fragmentation.     

Special report on liability and insurance. An update on assignment of patient benefits under ERISA

While the holdings in Davidowitz and Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield arose in different contexts, they both reflect the courts' increasing willingness to consider the importance of cost containment in the health insurance arena, even though patient accessibility to health care may be restricted as a result. If the holding in Davidowitz is not successfully appealed, providers may need legislative relief in order to retain their ability to take valid assignments of patient claims for payment from ERISA plans. It is uncertain whether such legislation can be sought at the state level or must instead come from Congress due to ERISA preemption of state legislation. Clearly, the district court decision on remand in Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield will be closely watched for any light it may shed on this question. On a pragmatic note, providers who have not entered into "participation" agreements with insurers or other private payors may now have a greater incentive to do so, and "nonparticipating" providers who continue to obtain assignments from patients in order to collect directly from insurers or other private payors should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the source of the patient's benefits is a group health plan--which is likely to fall under ERISA and may contain nonassignment provisions--or some other form of coverage. For an additional perspective on insurers' responses to copayment waivers, see Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 10, October 1991, at 7.     

The impact of prospective payment: a multi-dimensional analysis of New Jersey's SHARE program

The SHARE program, which set per diem prospective rates for New Jersey hospitals during the period 1975-1982, is evaluated. Analysis suggests that this program did contain hospital cost increase. However, the program threatened the viability of most inner-city hospitals. Indirect evidence suggests that there was cost-shifting in response to this program, which regulated payment for only Blue Cross and Medicaid patients. Structural features of this program and its successor, the New Jersey DRG program, are analyzed; and implications for the Medicare prospective payment system are examined.     

Ball Memorial Hospital: Section 2 Sherman Act analysis in the alternative health care delivery market

In 1986, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Ball Memorial Hospital v. Mutual Hospital Insurance denied an injunction sought under the antitrust laws by the plaintiffs, eighty acute care hospitals, which would have precluded Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Indiana from implementing a Preferred Provider Organization. The Ball court used a conservative economic analysis to deny the injunction and failed to consider many industry-specific factors. This Note examines these factors and challenges the Ball court's position by arguing that antitrust scrutiny of alternative health care delivery markets must go beyond the court's narrow approach.     

Personnel leadership in action: doing something about health care cost containment

It's no secret that health care costs are skyrocketing and will continue to do so unless business, particularly personnel professionals, takes responsibility for containing them. This month, we present a panel report whose participants--ranging from the corporate manager of employee benefits at TRW to the director of public relations at Blue Cross Of Milwaukee--are taking concrete action to improve employee health and company expenses.     

Hospital-sponsored group practice

Henry Ford Hospital, a 1,000-bed institution in central Detroit, is being developed into a "center of excellence" with expansion of ambulatory care to suburban satellite clinics. A hospital-based HMO has been started in an effort to cut costs, decentralize care, and provide an alternative to Blue Cross. It has been successful and is now being considered as a solution to Michigan's Medicaid problems. Background and analysis follow.     

From clinical integration to accountable care

Four key challenges to reforming health care organizations can be addressed by a clinical integration model patterned after Advocate Physician Partners (APP). These challenges are: predominance of small group practices, dominant fee-for-service reimbursement methods, weaknesses of the traditional hospital medical staff structure and a need to partner with commercial insurance companies. APP has demonstrated teamwork between 3800 physicians and hospitals to improve quality, patient safety and cost-effectiveness. Building on this model, an innovative contract with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois serves as a prototype for a commercial Accountable Care Organization. For this contract to succeed, APP must outperform the market competition. To accomplish this, APP has implemented strategies to reduce readmissions, avoid unnecessary admissions and emergency room visits, expand primary care access, and enhance quality and patient safety.     

Certificate-of-need in an antitrust context

Recent cases such as National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City have found that certificate-of-need (CON) legislation did not intend to remove antitrust considerations. This note discusses the exemptions from antitrust provided by the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown as well as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, both of which appear to protect provider input into the CON process. Providing information that assists decision-making must be carefully distinguished from providing data that serve the interests of physicians and hospitals.     

Examining exclusionary conduct of HMOs and PPOs: a case comment on Northwest Medical Laboratories v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oregon.

As the climate of the health care industry has changed to one of cost-containment and competition through the growth of HMOs and PPOs, health care providers have become the subjects of antitrust litigation. One such case, Northwest Medical Laboratories v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oregon, involved a medical laboratory and a radiology center who claimed that they were victims of an illegal group boycott after defendant's pre-paid health plan denied them preferred provider status. The Oregon Court of Appeals, using the traditional antitrust analysis applied to other industries for decades, failed to consider the intricacies that exist within the health care industry. This result led to an inaccurate market share computation and an inadequate rule of reason analysis. This Comment examines the shortcomings of the Northwest Medical opinion and argues that, in applying the antitrust laws to the health care industry, courts in future cases must recognize and respect the unique features of the business of providing health care.     

Hospital utilization review: past experience, future directions

Utilization review (UR) programs seek to determine whether specific services are medically necessary and whether they are delivered at an appropriate level of intensity and cost. Although UR programs have been operating for more than 40 years, they have changed dramatically during the past two decades. Today, many health care providers, analysts, and policymakers view UR as a possible solution to hospital inpatient cost and quality problems. This paper addresses how UR has evolved, how UR is used today by different delivery mechanisms (i.e., Medicare, health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, Blue Cross, and commercial insurers), the cost effects of various UR approaches, and how UR will be used in the future.     

Bad debts and hospital rate-setting

This paper examines the economic foundations for mandatory discounts for insurers based on differences in bad debts experience. It considers critically the arguments Blue Cross plans use in several states. On both equity and efficiency grounds, discounts for actual bad debts are shown to be inappropriate. In contrast, it is shown that there are equity and efficiency reasons to grant a discount for insurance policies which avert bad debt, but that the appropriate discount is less than the amount of bad debt averted. The appropriate discount depends on the size of the subsidy needed to bring about purchase of debt-averting coverage. In some circumstances, this subsidy equals the underwriting loss on the coverage minus any tax subsidy the insurer receives.     

PPS waivers: implications for Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial insurers

This paper compares the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) to four all-payer rate-setting systems that operated under HCFA waiver authority. The study examines the experience of Medicare, Medicaid, and commercial insurers under the two approaches. Data from several American Hospital Association surveys and from Medicaid 2082 report forms are analyzed. The paper concludes that the all-payer waiver programs have been as successful as PPS in controlling the rate of growth in Medicare costs. In addition, Medicaid programs are more successful in controlling their outlays in all-payer rate-setting environments than when they "go alone." Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that hospitals can increase charges in response to greater financial need under either PPS or the state waivers. Nevertheless, it appears that commercial insurers are better able to compete with Blue Cross plans in all-payer rate-setting states than elsewhere.     

Cross-subsidies and payment for hospital care

This study uses hospital data from the 1979 American Hospital Association Reimbursement Survey in a multivariate framework to assess the impact of discounts and third-party reimbursement on hospital costs and profitability. Three central issues are addressed: (1) Is a differential payment justified for Medicare, Medicaid, and/or Blue Cross on the basis of differential costs? (2) Have the cost-containment efforts of the dominant payers reduced total payments to hospitals? and (3) What part of the overall savings in payments to hospitals is in the form of reduced costs rather than reduced profits? On the basis of the evidence in this study, we find (1) that the differential payment is not justified; (2) that the cost-containment efforts of the dominant payers have reduced total payments to hospitals somewhat, but a substantial amount of cost-shifting remains; and (3) that the savings is in profits, rather than in costs.