Variations in Regulatory Enforcement Styles

This paper examines intra- and inter-agency variations in the enforcement styles of three regulatory inspectorates in Great Britain. It is argued that the accommodative approach typically associated with regulatory enforcement is not a homogeneous and uniform concept, rather it embraces a range of strategies. These are described and a variety of organisational, social and political factors are considered as explanations of the variations which arise.     

Editor's Introduction: Understanding Regulatory Enforcement

This issue of Law & Policy adds to the growing body of empirical case studies of decision-making and enforcement in regulatory agencies. Summarizing that research, regulatory enforcement styles can be described in terms of two dimensions, one concerning the ways in which regulatory violations are defined and punished, the other concerning outcomes, described in policy-evaluative terms. In explaining variation in enforcement style, existing studies point to three sets of factors: characteristics of the regulatory "legal design"; features of agencies' "task environment"; and the regulatory "political environment." Weighting the relative importance of these factors, however, is difficult because of the number and fluidity of variables and the adaptiveness of regulatory agencies.     

Regulatory Enforcement in Local Government in Japan

The Japanese inspectors usually adopt an "informal measure-oriented" style in enforcing violations of regulatory statutes. They prefer administrative guidance with no legally binding effect to compliance orders or criminal prosecution. These formal measures, they think, would erode the cooperative relationship with the regulatee, which is believed essential for cost-effective enforcement. In contrast to that in the United States, the Japanese enforcement process lacks citizen participation and information disclosure, this enabling the inspectors to deal with violations at their own pace.     

An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies

A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self-regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non-enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self-regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory.     

Dimensions of Enforcement Style: Factoring in Regulatory Autonomy and Capacity

This article explores how the concept of enforcement style can be adapted to be more analytically useful in the study of regulatory behavior and its effects in developing countries. In its first part, the article sets forth a dimensional conception of enforcement style and suggests two new dimensions to incorporate the variations in the autonomy and capacity of regulatory agencies that are so significant in developing countries. In its second part, the article uses this analytical framework to compare the enforcement styles of state environmental agencies in two Brazilian states, São Paulo and Pará.     

Reconsidering the Party Distances and Dimensionality of the Danish Folketing

Using the index of distances and the Optimal Classification method, the party positions and the dimensionality of the Danish Folketing is calculated from 1920 to 2005. The empirical results suggest that a one-dimensional model explains around 85 per cent of the legislative dimensionality in Denmark over time with only a modest presence of two or more dimensions in the 1970s. The rank order of party positions derived through the index of distance has higher face validity than the rankings derived through the Optimal Classification method. The Optimal Classification method produces a dimensionality measure which, when analysed, can be used to explain most of the events in Danish politics over the last 80 years. It is further argued that the shifts in the dimensionality can be explained by the number of parties in parliament and by historical incidents.     

New Institutionalism and Naturalism in Socio‐Legal Analysis: Institutionalist Approaches to Regulatory Decision Making

Through drawing on the work particularly of sociological and organizational theorists socio-legal work has added considerably to an understanding of the uses of law and discretion, and shown the contingency of the operation of law on the economic, political and organizational context. Some important questions still remain unanswered, however. In particular, if in decision making law is not determinative, but rather decisions are shaped by other bureaucratic or organizational norms, political and economic pressures and an individual's own world views and interests, what role does law play? Further, what impact does the decision process, in which different norms or considerations all bear, have on law? In starting to answer these questions the article examines the models of decision processes and decision behavior which underly the different new institutionalist analyses, and suggests that whilst they provide some insights, they have their own limits.     

Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement

This article deals with the question of how a high level of compliance with consumer protection legislation designed to prevent financial losses can be secured. We use a theoretical framework based on economic analysis of law to address some of the key policy options, such as proactive and reactive monitoring, providing officials with postdetection enforcement discretion, administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions, and facilitating actions by victims and third parties. On the basis of our theoretical framework and a classification of jurisdictions into different groups (models of enforcement policy), we identify some key elements of an enforcement regime and indicate in what circumstances a particular solution can be expected to be more or less cost effective.     

Consequences of Tit‐for‐Tat Enforcement: Toward a Hippocratic Principle of Regulatory Implementation

The article discusses when tit‐for‐tat enforcement, an important strategy in responsive regulation theory, may generate intended reactions in communities of regulatees. Combining insights from compliance motivation theory, responsive regulation theory, and ethnographic studies of compliance, I hypothesize that tit‐for‐tat enforcement's probability of success depends on regulators’ institutionalized capacity to promote law–morality correspondence. Building such institutionalized capacity—so‐called “embeddedness”—simultaneously increases requirements for inspectorates’ competence. This article addresses three forms of law–morality correspondence: moral support for the law's content, the legislator's authority, and harmony between legal and moral guilt criteria.     

Compelled Third‐Party Participation in the Regulatory Process: Legal Duties, Culture, and Noncompliance

This paper focuses on government's enlistment of private entities (industries, businesses, professionals) to help in public enforcement. Despite the popularity of this enforcement strategy, there is little systematic research about the behavior of private enforcers in these systems. This article draws together the widely scattered popular and scholarly literature to examine: (a) the settings in which this strategy occurs, (b) its common features, and (c) the responses of private parties to their compelled participation. I then examine existing explanations for private parties' responses. Very little empirical research has been published. I argue that what exists suggests limitations of a conventional cost‐benefit approach to explaining noncompliance, as well as highlights the need for a broader perspective that considers how cultural factors may influence private enforcers' responses to their mandated duties.     

Enforcement Principles and Environmental Agencies: Principal-Agent Relationships in a Delegated Environmental Program

This article examines whether states shirked enforcement responsibilities in their principal-agent relationship with the federal government when implementing a delegated environmental program. It evaluates determinants of environmental enforcement stringency, particularly whether penalties were less when imposed by states than by the federal government. It analyzes 6,048 hazardous waste administrative penalties across 32 states and all U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Regions over 14 years. It finds that state penalties are typically substantially lower than federal penalties, and that penalty amounts are typically also related to the partisan composition of elected officials and the characteristics of enforcement actions, such as the type, seriousness, and number of violations. Factors such as the influence of organized interest groups, agency sensitivity to economic conditions or the economic importance of regulated industries, and environmentalist preferences of elected officials and the public are typically unrelated to enforcement stringency.     

The "Compliance" Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement

Simple deterrence will often fail to produce compliance commitment because it does not directly address business perceptions of the morality of regulated behavior. Responsive regulation, by contrast, seeks to build moral commitment to compliance with the law. This article shows that a regulator can overcome the deterrence trap to improve compliance commitment with the skillful use of responsive regulatory techniques that "leverage" the deterrence impact of its enforcement strategies with moral judgments. But this leads it into the "compliance trap." The compliance trap occurs where there is a lack of political support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce, such as is the case with cartel enforcement in Australia. In these circumstances, business offenders are likely to interpret the moral leveraging of responsive regulation as unfair or stigmatizing, and business perceptions of regulator unfairness are likely to have a negative influence on long-term compliance with the law. Moreover, big businesses that perceive regulatory enforcement as illegitimate are also likely to actively lobby for the political emasculation of the regulator. In these circumstances, most regulators are likely to avoid conflict by taking the easy option of enforcing the law "softly," and therefore ineffectively.     

断裂与耦合：环境执法语境中的代执行制度与限期治理制度

限期治理制度和代执行制度都是重要的环境法律制度,从制度内涵、内在机理和立法预期上看,二者紧密联系,后者的启动和运作能弥补前者的缺陷,形成一个完整的环境执法制度链条。但在具体环境立法和执法实践中却重视限期治理制度的制定和适用,而忽视代执行制度。限期治理制度在环境执法中存在着很多问题,导致它在治理环境问题时存在着客观不能,在这种情况下,我们更应该重视环境代执行制度的建构和完善。     

智能化环境行政执法探析

适应"互联网+"大数据时代环境法治建设需要,我国智能化环境行政执法迅速发展起来,但是受资金、技术和管理等因素制约,智能化环境行政执法还存在一些问题,如智能化监控设备归属权及定位模糊、监测数据不准确、监控与执法脱节等。为解决这些问题,我国应进一步完善相关的法律法规体系,明确在线监测主体,加大资金及技术投入的规范化管理,完善智能化环境行政执法的公众参与机制,进而解决环境行政执法中企业污染物排放量监控及环境责任承担的问题,使智能化环境行政执法成为大数据时代执法的重要形式。     

Introduction: Problem‐Solving Courts

Problem‐solving courts have become a significant feature of the U.S. justice system, and their popularity appears to be growing internationally with courts under way or in development in countries such as Australia and Great Britain. Drug courts are the most visible type of problem‐solving court, but other varieties are beginning to take hold. Mental health courts, domestic violence courts, and community‐based courts among others are beginning to handle a considerable portion of the legal workload in many jurisdictions. Criminal law violations as well as neighborhood conflicts and interpersonal disputes are increasingly being referred to problem‐solving courts rather than to traditional criminal or civil courts.