Duverger's concept: Semi-presidential government revisited

Abstract The article attempts to follow up the fate of the concept Maurice Duverger created to explain the regime of the French Fifth Republic: semi–presidential government. Duverger expounded the concept in his fundamental book Échec au roi in 1978, trying to illustrate the fact that regimes of this type worked quite differently in the seven Western and Northern European countries that institutionalized it. 'Semi–presidentialism' is now widely, but very often controversially, used. The recent appearance of such regimes in newly democratizing states points to the fact that this form of government is often the preferred solution in times of transition. A critical review of Duverger's concept seems expedient as the diversification of these regimes raises new and perhaps intriguing questions. Due to the rejection of Duverger's concept or its ignorance in parts of the European scientific community, it is necessary to defend it as an important tool for political analysis. Moreover, it opens the opportunity for the examination of fundamental problems in political science.     

Fragmentation and the growth of local government

An assumption of the post-World War II metropolitan reform movement was that fragmentation of metropolitan regions into multiple local governments was wasteful and inefficient, increasing the cost and size of government. More recently, ‘polycentrists’ have argued that the competition between multiple governments in metropolitan regions can in factreduce the growth in government by providing a competitive check on the excessive demands of local bureaucrats for more resources. In this article, I explore the effects of fragmentation on growth in the size of suburban municipal government budgets and in the number of services offered. Competition inherent in more fragmented metropolitan regions is shown to slow the expansion in local government expenditures and service levels.     

Duverger's concept: Semi–presidential government revisited

The article attempts to follow up the fate of the concept Maurice Duverger created to explain the regime of the French Fifth Republic: semi–presidential government. Duverger expounded the concept in his fundamental book Échec au roi in 1978, trying to illustrate the fact that regimes of this type worked quite differently in the seven Western and Northern European countries that institutionalized it. 'Semi–presidentialism' is now widely, but very often controversially, used. The recent appearance of such regimes in newly democratizing states points to the fact that this form of government is often the preferred solution in times of transition. A critical review of Duverger's concept seems expedient as the diversification of these regimes raises new and perhaps intriguing questions. Due to the rejection of Duverger's concept or its ignorance in parts of the European scientific community, it is necessary to defend it as an important tool for political analysis. Moreover, it opens the opportunity for the examination of fundamental problems in political science.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

Federalism and the shadow economy

This paper analyzes the relationships between federalism and the shadow economy. The theoretical analysis leads to the conclusion that the shadow economy is smaller in federal countries than in unitary states. The mobility of individuals among competing jurisdictions leads policy makers to adopt policies that are more efficient in terms of taxation and public good provision. This increases the return for activities in the formal sector relative to those in the informal one, thus reducing activity in the shadow economy. A cross-sectional empirical analysis of a sample of 73 countries confirms this theoretical prediction.     

Federalism and the European Parliament

The European Parliament has been a source of controversy sinceits inception. Its direct election was seen as endorsing a federalstructure and political future for the European Community (laterEuropean Union). Changes in its authority and legislative powerswere seen as symptomatic of creeping federalism and the emasculationof member states' national sovereignty. The European Parliament'sconscious contribution to developing federalism and constructinga federal Europe relate to its direct election, its powers,and its proposals to hold a constitutional convention. The Anglo-Saxonmisconception of federalism is analyzed, the role of a billof rights examined, and the failures of democratic legitimacyexposed with a view to see what contribution federal bargainsmay make to close the democratic deficit and to impel a reviewof the current institutional arrangements.     

A distributional theory of government growth

This article presents a closed form solution for time-consistent taxation and public spending in a dynamic game between government and median voter. Extending Meltzer and Richard’s static analysis of government size the article offers a theory of growth of government. At low stages of economic development the median voter, identified as a relatively poor worker, prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings. Through this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage. At higher stages of development, however, when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller, the incentive to tax and redistribute income rises. Yet, in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times. Hence, government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state.     

Federalism and Consociational Regimes

Federalism and consociationalism are useful means of understandingpolitical systems. Federalism and consociationalism are bothbased on compound majoritarianism rather than simple majoritarianism,and both represent modern attempts to accommodate democraticcomplexity and pluralism, but the two systems are not quitesymmetrical, and territorial organization is not the only characteristicthat differentiates them. Instead, it can be said that federalismrelates to the form of a polity, while consociationalism relatesto the character of a regime. To the extent that federalismmay also function as the character of a regime, then federalismand consociationalism may be more symmetrical. One of the ambiguitiesof federalism is that it is often both form and regime. Consociationalism,however, relates only to regime.     

Water and Federalism in the 1990s

Federalism has always been an issue in water management. Thephasing out of grants for the construction of sewage treatmentplants, the reduction of the federal contribution for constructionof water development projects, the decrease in federal expendituresfor basic water data collection, and the lack of federal fundsfor state dam-safety programs have all had an impact on watermanagement and intergovernmental relations. This article summarizescontemporary issues in intergovernmental relations and waterpolicy. First, the relationship between water, environmentalprotection, and federalism is examined. Then, the shifting financialresponsibility for water pollution control from the federalto state and local governments is reviewed.     

Relationships between government size and economic growth: Japan's government reforms and evidence from OECD

This paper examines the relationship between government size and economic growth of 21 industrialized countries. Government size is measured by government final consumption expenditures and transfer payments. The relationship between government consumption is expected to increase GDP growth for developing countries, and reduce it for industrialized countries. Government consumption can contribute to increased economic growth. However, government consumption is likely to expand beyond an efficient level in industrialized countries. In contrast, transfer payments, and social welfare programs are likely to reduce economic growth for most countries. These programs reduce work incentives and encourage tax avoidance activities. Work disincentives and tax avoidance reduce economic growth. These expected relationships are consistent with economic performance and government size for the countries considered here. Inefficiency and excessive government growth are checked by voter feedback as tax burdens exceed the associated benefits. Unfortunately, government program costs and benefits are asymmetrically distributed. The resulting tendency is to expand government programs, particularly programs that benefit a majority of voters at the expense of a minority. This tendency becomes even more acute as the tax system becomes more progressive (i.e., tax burdens become concentrated. Reductions in government size are more likely with stagnant or declining economic growth, and in government programs whose costs are widely shared, compared to programs with widely shared benefits and narrowly shared costs.     

Tolerance and economic growth revisited: a note

Berggren and Elinder (BE) in this journal write on the relationship between the degree of tolerance in a nation and its rate of economic growth. They are disturbed to find in their cross sections that faster economic growth statistically goes together with intolerance of homosexuals. In this comment, we revisit the issue and demonstrate that the concern expressed by BE is unwarranted if we properly account for ??conditional convergence?? in the regressions for economic growth. Other things being equal, a country grows faster if it starts from a poorer initial position. In the BE dataset, China since the Deng reforms is a prime example. At about the same time, another group of countries managed to accelerate their economic growth after a long period of stagnation: the ex-communist countries in central and Eastern Europe. Many of these nations also grew exceptionally fast for a number of years, once freedom had been regained and the initial chaos overcome. With simple modeling of these historical initial conditions, we find no statistical pattern that associates bias against homosexuals with weaker economic growth. Our results are robust under alternative specifications.     

American Federalism on the Horizon

The American federal system took some unpredictable twists andturns during the twentieth century. As a new century—indeed,a new millennium—begins, which trends are likely to continue,which are likely to dissipate? What issues pose the greatestchallenges for the intergovernmental system? This article plotsseveral possible paths along which the federal system couldtravel over the next decade. The fundamental issue in Americanfederalism is a perennial one: How will the balance of powerbetween the federal government and the states change? Otherkey issues facing American federalism are identified and theirlikely impacts examined. The article concludes with an assessmentthat the next decade in American federalism may be surprisinglyrobust.     

The State of American Federalism, 2005: Federalism Resurfaces in the Political Debate

After several years during which federalism was rarely a prominentor explicit issue in political debates, it was in several waysthrust into the public consciousness in 2005. It was not thatthe president or Congress ceased sacrificing state and localinterests to substantive policy goals, as shown by the costlyREAL ID Act, stringent new federal requirements in the TemporaryAid to Needy Families reauthorization, and congressional interventionin the Terri Schiavo case. However, Hurricane Katrina, and particularlythe delayed and ineffective intergovernmental response, generatedsubstantial debate about the appropriate federal role in disasterrelief. In addition, state and local governmental oppositionto the No Child Left Behind Act intensified and generated significantattention during the year, particularly as a result of a Utahstatute asserting the precedence of state over federal law anda Connecticut lawsuit against the act. Meanwhile, state governmentscontinued to address a number of policy problems that federalofficials were unable or unwilling to confront, especially regardingenvironmental, health-care, and labor issues. Finally, althoughthe Supreme Court in 2005 continued its recent (2003–2004)trend of pulling back somewhat from its late-1990s Congress-curbingdecisions, federalism issues figured quite prominently in thesenate confirmation hearings for Chief Justice John Robertsand Justice Samuel Alito.     

Federalism and Segmented Communication in the USSR

Federalism in Soviet state structure, granting nominal equalityin political rights to major nationality groups residing indefined ethnoterritories, perserves to some extent, the culturalidentity of communities defined by common national or religiousheritage. Centralism in party ideological work seeks to integratea heterogeneous population by inculcating loyalty to a transcendentSoviet identity and to prevent mobilization along nationality(or other) social cleavages. Party personnel policy gives mobilityopportunities to national elites within, but rarely across,national republics, while reinforcing Moscow's domination ofparty and government relations with individual republics. Allpublicly disseminated information is subject to party ideologicalcontrols, but communications channels based in federal ethnoterritories,using native-language media, foreign radio broadcasts, and word-of-mouthchannels tend to strengthen the identity of nationality andreligious groups. Religious ties and contacts with members ofthe nationality abroad also counteract ideological centralization.However, segmented communication helps in turn to reinforcepolitical centralism and Russian dominance.