Heavy Traffic: Trucking Deregulation, Federalism, and Canadian-U.S. Trade

Trucking deregulation, in the interest of competition and efficiency,removes rate controls and grants free entry to the market. Whenthe United States deregulated trucking in 1980, it opened theinterstate market to Canadian carriers. Heavy volumes of tradeby trucking between the two countries make entry conditionsan important bilateral issue. Deregulatory symmetry betweenthe two countries would produce a de facto regime of free tradein trucking services. In 1987 the Canadian federal governmentadopted deregulatory measures similar to those of the UnitedStates, but with more complex and problematic results. The reasons,broadly characteristic of the evolution of Canadian federalism,lie in the ability of the provinces to thwart federal initiatives.Trucking regulation is under provincial control, and to achievea practical effect, the federal government depends upon theprovinces to bring their practices into accord with its policy.Because of differing provincial views about deregulation andpressures from Canadian truckers for continued protection fromAmerican competition, much diversity and contention have delayedand compromised the federal governments purpose. Regulatoryreciprocity is also a question of the provinces and states,with a mixture of strict and easy entry policies complicatingthe achievement of bilateral balance and equity. The largerimplications of deregulation and transborder trucking for Canadalie in the ability of a decentralized federal system to pursuenecessary initiatives coherently.     

Rent-seeking and the behavior of regulators: An empirical analysis

The main contribution of this paper is to describe empirically how the rent-seeking process takes place in a regulated industry through the consistency in Board decisions. Evidence provided by discrete-choice decision models of regulators confirms that the conventional rent-seeking view of regulation is correct, namely to distribute wealth between various groups differently from what market forces would do. First of all, the structure of the rent-seeking activities in the Quebec regulated trucking industry is well explained. There exist behavioral uniformities (Russell and Shelton, 1974) in decisions taken by the Quebec Transport Commission, given its wide range of choice provided by the absence of detailed regulatory standards by the Quebec legislature. Secondly, trucking firms and large shippers are the interest groups seeking to extract artificially contrived rents. The capture theory of regulation is not a dominant political strategy and therefore does not analytically explain various trades taking place among interest groups when a permit authority is requested. So logrolling by regulators is clearly essential to maintain their non-transferable investment of time and talent and protect their political afterlife. Thirdly, large firms are more successful, at the margin, than small firms in their expansion because of their political effectiveness. The regulatory agency gives more rents to those who offer relatively strong electoral support to its party. Finally, appointed regulators do not achieve other positive payoffs from the regulatory process than those which may result from the agency problem. So the regulatory agency does not promote its own policy agenda, but rather that of the elected politicians, given the organizational and control problem between these two.I am indebted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support, to Gérard Bélanger, Jean-Luc Migué for helpful comments and to Sylvain Veillette, Pascal Migué, Marc Leduc for valuable research assistance. I benefitted from useful comments by the editor of this journal. All the remaining errors are mine.     

Federal Preemption and State Regulation of Transportation and Telecommunications

Transportation and telecommunications are two of the most importantinfrastructural industries in the American economy. As theseindustries are so vital and because they exhibit characteristicsthat have frequently rendered them quasi-monopolistic, theirgrowth has been accompanied by state and federal regulation.We document how the imposition of regulation has led to continualconflicts over the extent to which federal regulation shouldtake precedence over state regulation. We illustrate how thejustifications for federal preemption have been applied notonly to the regulation, but also to the recent deregulation,of railroads, trucking, and telecommunications. We contend thatpolitical factors, such as congressional support, precedent-settingcourt rulings, and, most important, political pressure fromaffected interest groups that is related to the revenues stillgenerated within states by these industries, ultimately determinethe form of preemption that emerges from the Congress.     

Broadcasting system in Italy: Evolution and perspectives

Italian public broadcasting service (RAI) has had a monopoly until the middle of the 1970s. The peculiarity of public monopoly in broadcasting is its tendency to secure political rather than economic rents. The dangers that public monopoly causes to consumers (viewers-listeners), has not emerged at least until the mid-seventies for the simple reason that broadcasting has been conceived under the ideological umbrella of public good rather than in terms of opportunity costs. A law limiting monopoly has taken fourteen years to be passed so that the proliferation of private radio and television stations has orgininated the subrogatory intervention by the Constitutional Court. From 1975 to 1989 regulation has tended to perpetuate RAI's monopoly, in a context which was very different from the one in which the RAI was established. It is no wonder, therefore, that reforms have been motivated by RAI's financial crisis in the seventies and eighties, and not by political choices. The 1990 law puts a stop to public monopoly in broadcasting giving rise to what now appears to be a duopoly, but which in 1990 to many seemed to introduce a contestable market able to respond to both consumers' demand and technological innovations more efficiently, so ensuring more freedom of information.     

Monopoly rent seeking under conditions of uncertainty

In recent years, economists have come to recognize that the competition to obtain monopoly rents, i.e., rent seeking, may consume resources whose value greatly exceeds that associated with traditionally measured deadweight welfare loss triangles (Tollison, 1982). Early articles by Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), and Posner (1975) all concluded that this competition would exactly dissipate the rents sought. Later articles by Tullock (1980) and Baysinger and Tollison (1980) modified that original conclusion. The present paper develops a model which raises further doubts about the complete transformation of rents into costs. The emphasis of the analytical framework presented is on the implications of the fact that rent seekers may typically be uncertain about being able to maintain a monopoly position even if they are initially successful in attaining one. It is demonstrated that when there is even a moderate level of uncertainty about retention, the likely effect will be a relatively large reduction in the magnitude of resources invested in rent seeking activities. In addition, it is shown that the size of this waste of resources depends somewhat on the extent to which rent seeking opportunities involve once and for all transfers as opposed to flows of rents. Finally, in those cases where a flow of rents is at stake, it is shown that considerable social waste might be eliminated through institutional changes which would reduce the subjective probabilities of potential monopolists retaining their rent streams once attained.     

Agenda‐Setting at the Energy‐Water Nexus: Constructing and Maintaining a Policy Monopoly in U.S. Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation

Despite calls to increase federal oversight of hydraulic fracturing (HF), the U.S. Congress has maintained a regulatory system in which environmental regulatory authority is devolved to the states. We argue that this system is characterized by a long‐standing “policy monopoly”: a form of stability in policy agenda‐setting in which a specific manner of framing and regulating a policy issue becomes hegemonic. Integrating theories on agenda‐setting and environmental discourse analysis, we develop a nuanced conceptualization of policy monopoly that emphasizes the significance of regulatory history, public perceptions, industry–government relations, and environmental “storylines.” We evaluate how a policy monopoly in U.S. HF regulation has been constructed and maintained through a historical analysis of oil and gas regulation and a discourse analysis of eleven select congressional energy committee hearings. This research extends scholarship on agenda‐setting by better illuminating the importance of political economic and geographic factors shaping regulatory agendas and outcomes.     

From subjectivism to constitutionalism: the intellectual journey of James M. Buchanan through his Italian heroes

Quack medicines were prepackaged, commercially marketed medicinal concoctions brewed from “secret recipes” that often contained powerful drugs. Governmental regulation of them in late nineteenth-century England is heralded as a landmark of public health policy. We argue that it’s instead a landmark of medicinal rent-seeking. We develop a theory of quack medicine regulation in Victorian England according to which health professionals faced growing competition from close substitutes: quack medicine vendors. To protect their rents, health professionals organized, lobbied, and won laws granting them a monopoly over the sale of “poisonous” medicaments, most notably, quack medicines.

     

Political competition and economic performance: evidence from the Italian regions

We verify the predictions of the theoretical literature on the relationship between political competition and economic performance, holding that, when the predominance of an ideological dimension creates a political rent, the party exploiting it selects lower quality politicians whose policy choices worsen economic performance. We examine the sample of 15 Italian Regions from 1980 to 2002 that exploits the institutional reforms of 1995 as an exogenous shock to pre-existing rents. We find evidence that higher political competition improves economic performance, through the choice of more efficiency-oriented policies.     

Research,politics, and the dynamics of policy development: A case study of Motor Carrier regulatory reform

This article presents a case study of the role of research in securing passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-296). It highlights the role of research in shaping policymakers' views on the benefits of reduced federal economic regulation of the industry, assesses how political considerations influenced the Department of Transportation's research program, and explores the deficiencies and limitations of the Department's research program.The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the U.S. Senate or the Department of Transportation. We wish to express our appreciation to Leslie Baldwin and Dennis Marvich for their perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this article.     

From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA, and OSH Act

This article examines the experiences of three important partial-preemptionprograms—the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Actof 1977 (SMCRA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970(OSH Act), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of1976 (RCRA)—over the last two decades to improve our understandingof how federal-state interactions have shaped the regulatorypartnership. The evidence we gather suggests that the controlof regulatory programs has shifted over time back and forthbetween the federal government and the states. In the initialyears of these programs, what the Congress intended to be aregulatory partnership was, in effect, almost total federalpreemption of state authority. Under the Ronald Reagan administration,the opposite occurred; federal regulation in many cases becamede facto state regulation as federal officials essentially abdicatedtheir oversight responsibility. By the end of the 1980s, thefederal government began again to assert greater control overintergovernmental regulatory programs. The regulatory relationshipthat emerged is one in which the federal government and thestates share responsibility and authority for the implementationof these programs.     

Ideology in Policy Debates: Congress and the S&Ls in the 1980s

Is a national value such as free enterprise relevant to congressional debates of important economic policy bills? This question was examined using debates of three reform bills that dealt with savings and loan industry problems in the 1980s. To employ free enterprise concepts in justifying policy stands challenged legislators because industry problems contrasted sharply in the early 1980s (overregulation) and later (excesses under deregulation). Research demonstrated, however, that free enterprise concepts dominated the earlier discussions and, intriguingly, were at the center of the 1989 debate about bailing out the industry and reforming it. The conclusion elaborates free enterprise's role and speculates about the influence of another national value on the S & L discussions. Enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery Enforcement Act of 1989¹ capped a decade of congressional struggle with the question of how to treat the problems of federal savings and loan institutions. Popularly known as “thrifts” or “S & Ls,” their status became a matter of increasing concern to Congress as the 1980s unfolded and public indignation over a prospective government bailout of unprecedented proportions mounted. This article focuses on an aspect of this struggle that has a larger significance, namely, the place of national values2 in the genesis of important economic policy statutes. Given the predilections of American society, the value that tends to loom largest in major economic policy debates is popularly know as “free enterprise” or “the market economy.” One may reasonably object that U.S. capitalism operates under a “mixed economy” whose features include enterprises owned or sponsored by the federal government as well as government subsidies and regulation of private businesses. The short answer to this objection is that the term free enterprise is used here in a mythic sense and “myths are an essential starting place for insights into how values shape policy…” (de Neufville and Barton, 1987). In essence, this article examines the following questions: (1) Did congressional debates on proposed statutes relate provisions of the 1980, 1982, and 1989 bills to free enterprise concepts? (2) If so, what adjustments were made in these concepts for the sharply contrasting circumstances encountered by S & Ls in the course of the decade? and (3) How was the peculiar relationship of government deposit insurance of S & L accounts to free enterprise treated in the bills? Two background sections introduce the discussion.     

Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam,a Survey Experiment

Prevailing work argues that foreign investment reduces corruption, either by competing down monopoly rents or diffusing best practices of corporate governance. We argue that the mechanisms generating this relationship are not clear because the extant empirical work is too heavily drawn from aggregations of total foreign investment entering an economy. Alternatively, we suggest that openness to foreign investment has differential effects on corruption even within the same country and under the same domestic institutions over time. We argue that foreign firms use bribes to enter protected industries in search of rents, and therefore we expect variation in bribe propensity across sectors according to expected profitability. We test this effect using a list experiment embedded in three waves of a nationally representative survey of 20,000 foreign and domestic businesses in Vietnam, finding that the effect of economic openness on the probability to engage in bribes is conditional on policies that restrict investment.     

威尔逊的规制政治理论述评

20世纪80年代,美国学者詹姆斯.威尔逊对经济学界的规制理论,尤其是对规制俘虏理论的普适性提出了质疑。为了弥补经济理论的不足,威尔逊以规制成本与收益的分布为主要依据,将规制政治分为四种类型,并提出了影响规制过程的内外变量。威尔逊认为,在规制研究中经济利益和理念都是不可或缺的变量,因为它们都会直接影响规制政策的形成。威尔逊的规制政治理论为解释多种规制政策的形成提供了有效的分析工具,但其理论中的制度制约等部分内容有待进一步补充和完善。     

Deregulation and the Racial Composition of Airlines

Economic theory suggests that the enhanced product market competition of deregulation reduces employers' ability to discriminate when hiring. Recent studies of the effect of deregulation on racial employment in the naturally competitive trucking industry find that deregulation increased minority employment. This study examines the effect of deregulation on racial employment in the airline industry. Because deregulation transformed airlines from wasteful service competition to rigorous price competition, deregulation's effect on racial hiring in this continuously competitive industry is not apparent. This study finds that deregulation only modestly changed the racial composition of major airline occupations, which suggests that the change in market structure as a result of deregulation may largely determine the effect of regulatory reform on the racial composition of an industry. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Deregulation despite transitional gains

Acemoglu and Robinson (in The American Economic Review 90(2):126–130, 2000) argue that historically economic rents have been less of a barrier to regulatory reform and innovation than political rents. Contrary to this conclusion, I argue that the important margin of distinction for factors preventing deregulation is not whether rents are economic or political, but rather what alternative profit opportunities are available and how innovation has changed the entrepreneurial opportunity set. Using the example of medieval Cologne, I show that the transitional gains trap framework, as developed by Tullock (in The Bell Journal of Economics 6(2):671–678, 1975), applies in a static environment and can successfully prevent reform over long periods of time, but that neither political nor economic entrepreneurs will ignore an opportunity for increased profitability in the long run. In addition, the organization of the political unit to which the regulation applies can determine the persistence of said regulation.     

The Politics of Federal Technology Policy: 1980–1988

This paper examines the politics of federal initiatives in technology during the period 1980–1988 that promote economic competitiveness. It finds that the ideological consistency of these new initiatives with the prevailing political climate, and the presence of business constituencies for technology are key to the adoption of new technology initiatives. In the absence of a strong business interest, agency politics and efforts dealing with the budget deficit dominate. Progress by new technology policy initiativesfbunders m is incremental at best. This paper also discusses the trend toward "industry-led" technology policy.     

Regulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?

This article examines several of the key hypotheses suggested by the race to the bottom theory in environmental regulation. The research studies annual state-level enforcement of federal air, water, and hazardous waste pollution control regulation, covering the period from 1985 to 2000. Specifically, the study estimates a series of strategic interaction models to examine whether a state's environmental regulatory behavior is influenced by the regulatory behavior of the states with which it competes for economic investment. While there is clear evidence of strategic interaction in state environmental regulatory behavior, states do not respond in the asymmetric manner suggested by the race to the bottom theory.     

Unintended consequences: Regulating the quality of subsidized day care

Advocates for the poor frequently support uniform, high federal standards for subsidized social services. While such standards may improve the quality of services for those who qualify, they can also have unintended but important side effects. Stringent regulations may actually curtail the supply of services, promote segregation, and expand the role of large subsidized for-profit firms. All these possibilities are illustrated by the history of federal regulation in subsidizing child day care. The federal government's retreat from regulation in 1980 and 1981 may have had results that—even if unintended—were in many ways salutary.     

Trust,regulation, and market efficiency

Building from the interest-group theory of regulation, we posit that trust alters the payoff from regulatory rent-seeking relative to profit-seeking. Trust reduces the costs of productive economic exchange by lowering transaction costs, thus raising the cost of rent-seeking behavior. In addition, trust increases political accountability, discouraging politicians from creating regulatory rents. We therefore hypothesize that trust reduces the extent of business regulation while simultaneously facilitating market efficiency. To test that hypothesis, we construct an overall business regulation index measuring procedures, time, and cost along eight dimensions of doing business in a country. The empirical results reveal that trust negatively relates to business regulation but positively relates to market efficiency. Interaction and split-sample results further indicate that trust and business regulation are substitutes. Collectively, the findings reported herein suggest that business regulation itself is not the root cause of market inefficiency, but rather lack of trust is the dominant factor.

     

Bureaucracy,inefficiency, and time

This paper examines the bureaucrat's choice between devoting resources to economic rents (organizational slack) and maximizing the budget of the agency. A new model of bureaucracy is developed using utility rather than a demand function as its foundation. It is shown that increases in income alter the slack-budget constraint to favor organizational slack over budget-maximization. Modern federal bureaucracies in the U.S. are predicted to be slack-maximizing and X-inefficient.