Determinants of policy change: a cross national analysis

Abstract. This study is an attempt to explain redistributive policy changes in democratic political systems. The two major competing paradigms of such determinants are the 'political environments matter' hypothesis and the economic resources model. This study attempts to show that there is an interdependent or exchange relationship between the choices of the policy makers and the policy takers, and that the periodic elections and the parties are important institutional mechanisms which make the exchange relationship possible. Several propositions about the conditions of policy change emerge from the assumptions about the behaviour of the policy makers and the policy takers. These propositions along with those emerging from the socio-economic and the political factors are tested using data from 21 contemporary democratic regimes beteen 1952–1980. The two dependent variables in the model are expenditures on the direct transfers to the households, and revenue from the direct taxes. Multiple regression analyses are utilized in the statistical tests. These analyses confirm the contention that political exchange plays an important part as a determinant of policy outcomes. It explains as much, if not more, variation in the model as the socio-economic or political environment variables.     

Extension of the portfolio allocation model to surplus majority governments: a fuzzy approach

Scholars have long studied the conditions under which the cabinet making process will result in minority, surplus majority, or minimum-winning governing coalitions in parliamentary systems. Since Riker, a good number of these attempts have been based on rational choice assumptions. Among formal approaches in this vein, Laver and Shepsle’s (Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary governments, 1996) portfolio allocation model argues that parties centrally located in policy space have a greater potential for being part of any governing coalition and that parties located at the issue-by-issue median have a high likelihood of forming a minority government. However, the model predicts that surplus majority coalitions will only form when the number of salient policy dimensions in the political system is greater than two. We incorporate fuzzy set theory in the portfolio allocation model, permitting us to model ambiguity in parties’ policy preferences. The reformulated model accounts for the formation of surplus majority coalitions in two-dimensional policy space. We illustrate the model’s conclusions with a case study of the 1996 surplus majority coalition in the Lithuanian Seimas.     

Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments

Abstract. Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on a one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two-dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period.     

Political competition

Abstract Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two-dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period.     

Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia

Across the Muslim world, Islamic political parties and social organizations have capitalized upon economic grievances to win votes and popular support. But existing research has been unable to disentangle the role of Islamic party ideology from programmatic economic appeals and social services in explaining these parties' popular support. We argue that Islamic party platforms function as informational shortcuts to Muslim voters, and only confer a political advantage when voters are uncertain about parties' economic policies. Using a series of experiments embedded in an original nationwide survey in Indonesia, we find that Islamic parties are systematically more popular than otherwise identical non‐Islamic parties only under cases of economic policy uncertainty. When respondents know economic policy platforms, Islamic parties never have an advantage over non‐Islamic parties. Our findings demonstrate that Islam's political advantage is real, but critically circumscribed by parties' economic platforms and voters' knowledge of them.     

The limits and rewards of political opportunism: How electoral timing affects the outcome of currency crises

Politicians are often assumed to be opportunistic. This article examines both whether there is a limit to this opportunism and whether voters reward policy makers for opportunistic behaviour. By looking at currency crisis situations, the article presents a graphic rational opportunistic political business cycle model in which incumbents face a tradeoff between their wish to signal competence and the economic constraints imposed by the crisis. It analyses how electoral incentives affect policy makers' management of currency crises and how this management in turn affects the subsequent election outcome. The empirical results of probit models with selection using a sample of 122 crises in 48 industrial and developing countries between 1983 and 2003 confirm the model's prediction that under certain circumstances some types of policy makers do indeed have incentives to deviate from optimal policy in the run-up to elections – and that voters reward this behaviour by re-electing policy makers who follow such strategies. However, there is a limit to the readiness to manipulate: when speculative pressure is too severe, incumbents no longer manipulate policy but implement the least painful policy option instead.     

Budget Process Reform: Waiting for Godot

The unraveling of the budget process described by Irene Rubin will have extraordinary consequences for the long-term budget outlook facing the nation. The retirement of the baby boom generation will prompt unprecedented and unsustainable structural fiscal imbalances for decades to come. Early policy action on the spending and revenue sides of the budget is critical to avert fiscal and economic crisis and to phase in changes in order to avoid precipitous and politically perilous actions in the future. Yet such actions constitute what amounts to a politically unnatural act, as one generation of political leaders is asked to make sacrifices in current policies benefiting future generations. Budget process reforms can serve to highlight the salience of these issues and help deal with the significant political hurdles faced by decision makers in making these intertemporal budgeting trade-offs. Ironically, the need for budget rules and processes has intensified as policy makers have become more vulnerable to polarized political parties, ever more watchful media, and mobilized interest groups. Budget rules and processes can help policy makers cope by protecting their ability to make the hard choices that will be necessary. The pressures for budget process reform will accelerate as the current financial crisis increases near-term budgetary pressures, promoting greater alignment between near-term and long-term fiscal problems.     

Political Competition and Voter Mobility

The existing model of political competition is extended to allow voters to live in different regions and to migrate between regions in response to an inter-regional transfer policy. We then show that regions have a different ``weight'' in the expected vote function of political parties. This gives parties an incentive to bias the transfer policy in favour of relatively high weight regions, with potentially adverse efficiency and equity effects. However, we then show that parties always propose efficient and equitable regional transfers, regardless of whether regions have different weights, if there is some mobility of citizens across regions. Mobility constrains parties to act efficiently and equitably even though they face an incentive to act otherwise. However, when voters are immobile political competition leads to inequitable though efficient outcomes.     

Unarmed Utopia Revisited: The Resurgence of Left-of-Centre Politics in Latin America

This paper seeks to examine the extent to which left-wing forces are making a comeback in Latin America and to draw out the political implications of their political ascendancy. It argues that while left-of-centre parties have developed a persuasive critique of the failures of liberal democracy and economic neoliberalism in the region, there is as yet no conceptual clarity or distinct policy initiatives materialising from the left's promises of deepening democracy and implementing an alternative economic model. When in power, left-of-centre parties have followed a strategy of 'bending and moulding' existing political institutions and the free-market economic model rather than attempting radical political and economic reforms. This paper concludes that left-of-centre parties are right in accepting that there is little room in the region for an anti-systemic model and that instead the emphasis should be placed on making states, markets and democracy work better to secure development, address social demands and attack the root causes of discrimination and inequality. But leaving behind old certainties and adapting to the new political and economic environment has come at the cost of a loss of intellectual confidence, ideological clarity and weakened identities.     

Income inequality and party (de)polarisation

Scholars of US politics report a strong connection between income inequality and party polarisation. This study evaluates this relationship comparatively, and finds that the opposite association holds outside the United States, namely, that increasing inequality depolarises political parties’ economic positions. High levels of inequality change the composition of the core constituencies on the left and depress the participation of low-income voters, leaving left-wing parties with less support when they adopt distinct leftward positions. At the same time, inequality does not create strong incentives for right-wing parties to move further rightward. Therefore, income inequality leads to party systems that are depolarised on economic issues. The results have implications for our understanding of political representation, economic inequality, and political polarisation.     

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.     

Policy beliefs,policy learning,and risk perception: Exploring the formation of local creative Placemaking-catalyzed policy network

This article studies the formation of a local Creative Placemaking (CPM) policy network based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and social capital perspective of policy networks. This article hypothesizes that policy beliefs, policy learning, social capital, and the perceived risks induced by defections, as well as macro-level changes in the broader political and socio-economic system, influence partner selection in the local CPM policy networks. The study collected survey data from policy actors participating in the Franklinton CPM-catalyzed revitalization project in Columbus, Ohio. An exponential random graph model (ERGM) was applied to test the hypotheses. The findings partially support the hypotheses: policy learning, certain secondary policy beliefs, and risk perceptions of changes in economic and political factors are correlated with tie formation. The reciprocity-driven bonding structure underlies the Franklinton CPM policy network, suggesting that policy actors perceive the Franklinton CPM policy network as a high-defection-risk network. This study has implications for policy makers in designing engagement strategies to better involve stakeholders holding different beliefs and occupying different network positions.     

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Abstract. The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.     

Dealing with unfinished Indigenous business: The need for historical reflection

The commitment by both major political parties to the abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission symbolises profound problems that continue to bedevil movement towards meaningful reconciliation in Australia.
Unlike Australia, long-established treaties in Canada, the United States and New Zealand as well as greater theoretical clarity in identifying the process of colonization and its ill-effects on Indigenous peoples have provided stronger foundations for policy and more positive outcomes.
This article provides a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of colonisation in Australia, and policy prerequisites for redressing its damaging effects. These include a treaty, improved economic resources and stronger political, intellectual and property rights.     

Voters' Perceptions of Policy Convergence and the Short‐term Opportunities of Anti‐immigrant Parties: Examples from Sweden

In contrast to previous studies on the political opportunity structures of anti‐immigrant parties, this article argues that voters’ perceptions of policy convergence between mainstream alternatives affect their short‐term propensity for supporting such partisan challengers. Drawing upon leading research in the field, two hypotheses about voters’ perceptions of policy convergence, in two policy areas (economic redistribution and immigration), are presented. The main findings in the article suggest that policy convergence between mainstream parties has a more immediate impact on the electorate than commonly recognised. Using unique data from Sweden, the article shows that perceived convergence between Swedish mainstream parties in the field of immigration policy increases potential support for the anti‐immigrant party, the Sweden Democrats (SD). Yet the results are the opposite when it comes to perceptions of convergence in the field of economic‐distributive policies. In contrast to widespread assumptions, the article thus finds that policy convergence between mainstream parties only appears to create short‐term opportunities for anti‐immigrant parties if it takes place on their own policy turf. These results indicate, in other words, that the potential electorate of the SD – which is a wider group than hard‐core xenophobes – is largely driven by preferences about immigration policy, rather than the short‐term urge to protest against mainstream parties. The article, therefore, concludes that the cordon sanitaire to isolate the SD in Sweden – which is underpinned by de facto convergence between mainstream parties on immigration policy – could improve, and is unlikely to curb, the short‐term electoral opportunities of this party.     

Europe as a Beacon of Democracy? Citizenship Policies Relating to Youth and Migrants in Portugal

Abstract

This article aims to compare discourses about national and European policies on active citizenship and democratic participation, with a particular focus on youth and migrants. For this purpose we analysed official documents of public institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in order to assess how the process of Europeanization has influenced national policies with regard to increasing political participation and citizens' civic awareness. Additionally, we conducted interviews with policy makers and NGO leaders in order to integrate and compare different levels of discourse and thus identify potential dissonances. Analysis of the documents shows that there is a strong concern to match national policy priorities with those established by international organizations. Notwithstanding positive perceptions, NGO leaders and policy makers criticize the ways policies have been implemented, stressing the need to adopt a strategy that bridges the gap between the prescribed and the real, as well as the importance of overcoming the hegemony of economic factors in policy decisions. In this regard, NGO leaders criticize the cynicism of political leaders and policies motivated by demographic and economic concerns. In relation to European identity and integration, NGO leaders argue that Europe must be collectively constructed; yet, policy makers stress that the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 resulted from a deficit in the negotiation process. In sum, this article suggests that it is necessary to promote greater involvement of civil society in the design and implementation of policies which, in turn, may contribute to the strengthening of shared democratic principles.     

Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median,Ministerial Autonomy,and the Coalition Compromise

In parliamentary democracies, governments are typically composed of multiple political parties working together in a coalition. Such governments must confront a fundamental challenge in policymaking—the preferences of coalition parties often diverge significantly, but the government can adopt only one common policy on any specific issue. This fact raises a critical question that has far‐reaching implications for the quality of democratic representation: Whose preferences are ultimately reflected in coalition policy choices? In this study, we explore three competing answers to this question derived from the theoretical literature on multiparty governance and parliamentary institutions. Our findings, based on an analysis of the legislative history of more than 1,000 government bills from three parliamentary democracies, strongly suggest that coalition policies reflect a compromise between government parties rather than the preferences of the ministers proposing them or the preferences of the median party in the legislature.     

More Money,Fewer Problems? Cross-Level Effects of Economic Deprivation on Political Representation

While equal political representation of all citizens is a fundamental democratic goal, it is hampered empirically in a multitude of ways. This study examines how the societal level of economic inequality affects the representation of relatively poor citizens by parties and governments. Using CSES survey data for citizens’ policy preferences and expert placements of political parties, empirical evidence is found that in economically more unequal societies, the party system represents the preferences of relatively poor citizens worse than in more equal societies. This moderating effect of economic equality is also found for policy congruence between citizens and governments, albeit slightly less clear-cut.