Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games

This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game. It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always decrease rent-seeking efforts. These conditions hold for any regular contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also prudent. Under n=2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared to risk-neutrality. An intuition for this result is given based on a self-protection model.     

Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games

Axelrod has developed an evolutionary approach to the study of repeated games and applied that approach to the Prisoners' Dilemma. We apply this approach, with some modifications in the treatment of clustering, to a game that has the Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken as special cases, to analyze how the evolution of cooperation differs in the two games. We find that the main barrier to the evolution of cooperation in Chicken is that cooperation may not always be correctly thought of as socially optimal, but that strong forces do push the players toward socially optimal action. We derive some of the results on mixed populations for any game with pairwise interaction.     

Inequity and risk aversion in sequential public good games

Behavioral hypotheses have recently been introduced into public-choice theory (Ostrom in American Political Science Review 92:1–22, 1998). Nevertheless, the individual intrinsic preferences which drive decisions in social dilemmas have not yet been empirically identified. This paper asks whether risk and inequity preferences are behind agents’ behavior in a sequential public good game. The experimental results show that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the contribution decision of first movers. Second movers who are averse to advantageous inequity free-ride less and reciprocate more than do others. Our results emphasize the importance of strategic uncertainty for the correct understanding of which preferences influence cooperation in social dilemmas.     

Third parties in equilibrium: comment and correction

Published in a past issue of this journal, Hug (Public Choice 82:159–180, 1995) studies political competition among three vote-maximizing parties when voters cannot know exactly which policies the parties will adopt when elected. Contrary to what is claimed in Proposition 3, in the generic case the game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In this case, only a local Nash equilibrium (LNE) may exist, but due to an incorrect second order condition, the conditions in Proposition 3 do not characterize this LNE either.     

Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games

We investigate the role of payoff asymmetry in laboratory prisoner’s dilemma games. Symmetric and asymmetric games are examined in simultaneous and sequential settings. In the asymmetric sequential games, we study the impact of having payoff advantaged players moving either first or second. Asymmetry reduces the rates of cooperation in simultaneous games. In sequential games, asymmetry interacts with order of play such that the rate of cooperation is highest when payoff disadvantaged players move first.     

Voter preferences,simple electoral games,and equilibria in two-candidate contests

The fundamental assumption of spatial models of party competition is that voters possess cardinal utility functions defined on all combinations of issue positions which candidates may adopt. Furthermore, spatial theorists usually assume that utility functions have a shape common to all voters and that voters' most preferred positions are distributed in some regular manner. Employing these and attendant assumptions, the spatial theorist seeks to ascertain what deductions can be made about candidate strategies, i.e., the positions which vote or plurality-maximizing candidates should adopt in an election. It has been found that, in many situations, convergence to an opponent's positions and/or adoption of the median/mean of the most preferred positions of all voters is an important candidate strategy. In this context, two main problems have arisen: (1) difficulties of empirical or statistical analysis; (2) the abovementioned candidate strategy is generally not applicable to elections in so-called ‘plural’ societies. One path out of this latter problem has been formulated by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972). This article explores another potential solution by addressing the following question: If voters arenot characterized by cardinal utility functions, but some other type, what are the consequences for candidate strategies? The alternate assumption employed is that voters are characterized bylexicographic utility functions. The consequences for candidate strategies of this assumption are then determined for two plurality-maximizing candidates in some one- and two-dimensional, three-, five-, and seven-voter electoral games.     

The median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension

Two alternative models of legislative outcomes are the minimum winning coalition and the competitive equilibrium (Koford, 1982). In a unidimensional setting, the outcome under the former is the median, while the outcome under the latter is the highest net demand location.This paper describes the competitive equilibrium in a unidimensional model, and shows that under some common conditions it coincides with the median, in particular for pure redistributive issues. However, for distributive issues, the two equilibria will differ. Finally, the comparative statics of the two models are examined; while the winning coalition is sensitive only to changes in the location of the median, for distributive issues the competitive equilibrium has the standard economic comparative statics that the outcome adjusts in the direction of the change in preferences.     

浅析农村成人教育制度的缺陷与完善

新农村建设最终是要把农村的经济搞上去，而农村经济的发展必须是一个循序渐进的过程，即必须先解决农村人口的问题，农民的意识如何提高，完全归结于农村教育制度。农村成人教育面临进程缓慢、教育质量不高、未来规划不合理等缺陷，如何提高农村整体知识结构值得深思。     

Public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model

It is common wisdom that public sector wages are not determined in the same way as private sector wages. At the same time, the empirical evidence available for OECD countries finds a strong positive correlation between public and private sector wages. In this paper, we develop a model that is consistent with a political economy view of the determination of public sector wages and employment, while being consistent with the said empirical evidence. Public finance constraints are crucial: In booms, governments expand employment and wages, while in downturns, lack of tax revenues forces the government to cut back the wage bill.     

企业老年人力资源开发与利用——兼谈金华电业局离退休管理工作

企业离退休人员是企业人力资源的一个组成部分,正确引导离退休人员的发展方向,使其合理运用离退休后的剩余寿命,继续为企业、社区和当地经济建设作出新贡献。     

Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence: existence and characterization

Public Choice - Pure-strategy Nash equilibria almost never exist in spatial majority voting games when the number of positional dimensions is at least two, as the majority core is typically empty...     

Polarization and ideological congruence between parties and supporters in Europe

The relationship between parties and their supporters is central to democracy and ideological representation is among the most important of these linkages. We conduct an investigation of party-supporter congruence in Europe with emphasis on the measurement of ideology and focusing on the role of party system polarization, both as a direct factor in explaining congruence and in modifying the effects of voter sophistication. Understanding this relationship depends in part on how the ideology of parties and supporters is measured. We use Poole’s Blackbox scaling to derive a measure of latent ideology from voter and expert responses to issue scale questions and compare this to a measure based on left–right perceptions. We then examine how variation in the proximity between parties ideological positions and those of their supporters is affected by the polarization of the party system and how this relationship interacts with political sophistication. With the latent ideology measure, we find that polarization decreases party-supporter congruence but increases the effects of respondent education level on congruence. However, we do not find these relationships using the left–right perceptual measure. Our findings underscore important differences between perceptions of left–right labels and the ideological constraint underlying issue positions.     

Rivalry between Taiwan and the PRC in Latin America

Latin America and the Caribbean have been a major battleground of the “foreign policy war” between Taiwan and the PRC over international legitimacy, and recognition. This paper analyzes the growing rivalry between China and Taiwan and its implications. The first part of the paper examines the importance of Latin America and the Caribbean for both Beijing and Taipei. The second section explores political aspects of their involvement in the region. The third part assesses how Beijing and Taipei use economic diplomacy to meet their diplomatic objectives in Latin America. The fourth section examines the implications of the increasing rivalry between Taipei and Beijing in the region. This study is supported by a Fulbright scholarship and a faculty development grant from Merrimack College. The views in the paper are entirely mine and should not be ascribed to the institutions acknowledged above. I would like to express my appreciation to Wang Hsiu-chi at Tamkang University in Taiwan who provided me with excellent facilities during my field trip to Taiwan. Author would like to thank Curtis Martin, Lowell Dittmer, Xiaogang Deng, Antonio Hsiang, Tchen Tchiang, Baohui Zhang, Baogang Guo, Guoli Liu, Ping Li, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the International Symposium on National Identity and the Future Cross-Strait Relations, University of Macau, in December, 2004.     

Visible Muslimness in Scotland: between discrimination and integration

ABSTRACT

Bonino's article casts light on the realities and perceptions of ethno-religious discrimination among Muslims in Scotland, with particular reference to those living in Edinburgh, during both everyday social interaction with the indigenous Scottish community, and contact with police and security officers. Discrimination against ethnic minorities in Scotland can be traced back in history; however, it is its post-9/11 multifaceted form that has particularly targeted Muslims qua Muslims in a global climate of distrust and stigmatization. While publicly available statistics show a decrease in racist incidents in Scotland, findings from other studies illustrate a more complex situation in which prejudice and discrimination intermingle in ways that make it hard to quantify the precise extent of anti-Muslim sentiment. Qualitative data collected specifically in Edinburgh suggest that Muslims’ hyper-visibility has triggered ethno-religious discrimination by some members of the non-Muslim majority. However, the daily experiences of life in Scotland, and the social relations with non-Muslims, are more heterogeneous and nuanced; they include overall positive views of, and a certain engagement with, many non-Muslims in a context of relative harmony. Contact with police and security officers at airports constitutes the main area of concern for Scottish Muslims, whose confidence, sense of equality and feelings of belonging to society are severely undermined by the securitization of their ethno-religious difference. The path towards a pluralistic Scottishness rests on sociopolitical and institutional efforts to reduce the discrimination against visible diversity, especially at loci of security, and to include the symbolic and physical distinctiveness of Muslimness within the porous Scottish cultural boundaries.     

小学生网络成瘾与抑郁关系的研究

目的：了解小学生网络成瘾的发生率与抑郁水平情况,探讨小学生网络成瘾与抑郁的关系。方法：采用网络成瘾损害量表、儿童抑郁量表对小学生进行问卷调查。结果：小学生网络成瘾与抑郁总分及各维度均呈显著正相关。网络成瘾可以正向预测小学生的抑郁水平。结论：小学生网络成瘾程度越严重,抑郁水平越高