Gasoline prices and motor vehicle fatalities

Fatal motor vehicle crashes per capita remained relatively stable over the 1990s, in spite of new traffic safety laws and vehicle innovations. One explanation for this stability is that the price of gasoline declined, which resulted in more vehicle miles traveled and potentially more fatalities. By using 1983–2000 monthly gasoline price and fatality panel data and fixed effects specifications, this study exploits within‐state variation over time in gasoline prices and found that a 10‐cent decrease in gasoline prices increased motor vehicle fatalities by 2.3 percent over a 2‐year period. The effect on higher‐risk younger adults is more than twice as large. The secular decline in real gasoline prices over the 1990s may partially explain why motor vehicle fatalities per capita have not decreased even with the adoption of more stringent state policies. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Does setting limits save lives? The case of 0.08 BAC laws

Nineteen states have established laws that make it illegal per se to drive with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08. The controversy over extending this stricter definition throughout the nation has focused largely on whether the state laws have been effective at saving lives. Prior evidence on this question has been mixed as well as criticized on several methodological grounds. This study presents novel, panel‐based evaluations of 0.08 BAC laws, which address the potential methodological limitations of previous studies. The results of this study indicate that 0.08 BAC laws have been effective in reducing the number of traffic fatalities, particularly among younger adults. These estimates suggest that the nationwide adoption of 0.08 BAC laws would generate substantial gains, reducing the annual count of traffic fatalities by at least 1200. © 2001 by the Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Implications of the ‘bread and peace’ model for the 2008 US presidential election

Presidential election outcomes are well explained by just two objectively measured fundamental determinants: (1) weighted-average growth of per capita real personal disposable income over the term, and (2) cumulative US military fatalities owing to unprovoked, hostile deployments of American armed forces in foreign conflicts. The US economy weakened at the beginning of 2008 and average per capita real income growth probably will be only around 0.75% at Election Day. Moreover cumulative US military fatalities in Iraq will reach 4,300 or more. Given those fundamental conditions, the Bread and Peace model predicts a Republican two-party vote share centered on 48.2%.     

Effect of testing and social distancing measures on COVID-19 deaths in India: Role of pre-existing socio-economic factors

We examine the effect of testing and social distancing measures on the severity of COVID19 across Indian states during the 68th day nationwide lockdown period. We also explore whether pre-existing socio-economic factors such as quality of health care and the ability to practice social distancing influences the effect of these policy measures across states. Using daily level data between April 1 and May 31 for 18 of the major states, we find that both testing and social distancing have a negative effect on COVID-19 fatalities in India. Further, testing is more helpful in reducing CFR for states with lower per capita health expenditure and weaker medical infrastructure. This highlights how ramping up testing can aid states that have a weak health care system through the detection of infection, contact tracing and isolation. In contrast, social distancing measures are more effective in states that are less populous and have lesser people dwelling in single-room houses. Our results confirm the role of pre-existing institutional factors in shaping the effect of policy actions on health outcomes.     

Institutional constraints,annexation and municipal efficiency in the 1960s

A sample of cities from 43 states is used to analyze how changes in institutions influence municipal expenditures and employment. Per capita costs and municipal employment are not found to be significantly influenced by a shift from restrictive to non-restrictive annexation laws. Municipalities operating under municipal-determination annexation laws are not found to experience significantly different growth rates in costs and employment per resident from that of cities operating under annexation laws which imposed a greater number of barriers to annexation.     

Behavioral response to safety regulation

The effectiveness of safety regulation can be enhanced or offset by various forms of behavioral feedback. This study provides estimates of the effectiveness of motorcycle helmet laws in reducing fatalities based on pooled time-series and cross-sectional data for the United States during the years 1975 to 1984. Estimates from the model suggest that the presence of a helmet-wearing law induces a 12 to 22 percent decline in the motorcycle mortality problem. The results are consistent with the view that helmet laws are an effective public health policy, at least in the short run. However, there is also some evidence of gradual risk-compensation behavior: The immediate rise in fatalities following repeal of helmet laws appears to dissipate gradually at a rate of roughly 2.5 percent per year. This result suggests that future studies of safety regulation should consider longrun as well shortrun behavioral responses.     

State government purchases in a federalist economy

This paper empirically examines the impact of state government purchasing preference laws on expenditures and revenue of individual states. Purchasing preferences allow firms located within a state to win state contracts without being the low bidder. We find that states with purchasing preference laws spend 3% more in real terms per capita than other states. Evidence is found indicating that the preferences require revenue increases to fund them (the tax base does not rise sufficiently), and that there is some apparent taxpayer resistance to these preferences. This evidence is consistent with a coalition model of state government behavior because it indicates there is significant redistribution of income between groups within the state.We thank the Center for Public Policy at the University of Houston for financial support. This paper benefitted by comments received from Gordon Tullock and an anonymous referee.     

The role of inspection sequence in compliance with the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) standards: Interpretations and implications

We examined the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) inspections in the US to identify the effects of repeated inspections and the time between inspections on non-compliance. Our sample included 549,398 inspections conducted from 1972 through 2006 in manufacturing plants in the 29 states where federal OSHA enforces the law. We controlled for inspection type, industry, establishment size, and year. The number of total violations cited fell by 28%–48% from the first to the second inspection; after that, the numbers declined much more slowly. These effects were found in every one of the four sub-periods examined. The number of violations cited increased with each additional year since the prior inspection after controlling for other variables; however, the increases were small, totaling approximately 15% over five years. OSHA should probably give higher priority to first time inspections than to repeated inspections. The current requirement that at least two years elapse between planned inspections should probably be lengthened.     

Some evidence of congressional political markets in DOD personnel allocations across states

An empirical analysis of the distribution of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel (both military and civilian) across states is developed with a commonly used Public Choice model of resource allocation in a legislative setting. The model specification employs Congressional seniority, Congressional committee representation, Presidential electoral votes, and the per capita dollar value of prime defense contract awards to explain the variation of DOD personnel across states over time. The empirical analysis is performed over the last three decades, and the results indicate that this particular Public Choice legislative model performs well in explaining the variation in DOD personnel allocations across states. The results also provide some limited evidence of a possible political market between the states for DOD personnel allocations. This analysis has implications for future testing of whether the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (established in 1988 under President Reagan), and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission of 1990 (under President Bush) were effective in significantly decreasing the legislative politics involved in the selection and approval process for base closure and realignment.     

Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal equalization across the north-eastern states of India: Evidence from panel data

While numerous studies have tried to analyze the impact of intergovernmental transfers in fostering fiscal equalization in India, there need to be more studies in the context of north-eastern (NE) states. Situating in a geographically isolated and economically backward region, the states of NE India depend heavily on central fiscal transfers to meet expenditures and to promote various economic activities in the region. One of the essential objectives of these transfers is to achieve fiscal equity. Hence, the study attempts to analyze the fiscal equalizing nature of the intergovernmental transfers across NE India during 1991–2019. The coefficient of variation (CV) analysis results indicates that although fiscal transfers reduced the magnitude of disparity in the own-source revenue across the NE states, a significant amount of disparity still exists in the resource base across these states. The regression analysis findings suggest that the transfers across these states need to be more fiscal equalizing. The per capita gross state domestic product emerges as a positive and significant in predicting per capita transfers, and hence it questions the progressivity of central transfers. When assigning the interstate share of transfers, more weight should be placed on fiscal equalizing factors such as per capita income. The Finance Commission of India should emphasize fiscal equalizing criteria when allocating weights and recommending transfers to the NE States. Additionally, states with low incomes should be recognized in plan schemes.     

Earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorism: do natural disasters incite terror?

A novel and important issue in contemporary security policy is the impact of natural disasters on terrorism. Natural disasters can strain a society and its government, creating vulnerabilities which terrorist groups might exploit. Using a structured methodology and detailed data on terrorism, disasters, and other relevant controls for 167 countries between 1970 and 2007, we find a strong positive impact of disaster-related deaths on subsequent terrorism incidence and fatalities. Furthermore, the effects differ by disaster type and GDP per capita. The results consistently are significant and robust across a multitude of disaster and terrorism measures for a diverse set of model specifications.     

Interstate migration,income and public school expenditures: An update of an experiment

This article re-examines the relative importance of per capita income and net out-migration (Weisbrod's welfare-maximization hypothesis) as determinants of expenditures for public primary and secondary education. A repetition of Weisbrod's experiment shows that the existence of a high correlation between per capita income and migration in the 1950s would have made it difficult to distinguish between their relative importance. An update of the experiment yields results contrary to the hypothesis that communities (states) are welfare maximizers. They support the contention that per capita income is a primary determinate of educational expenditures.     

The effect of bicycle helmet legislation on bicycling fatalities

A number of states passed legislation in the 1990s requiring youths to wear helmets when riding bicycles. The effect of this legislation on bicycling fatalities is examined by subjecting data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System to a panel analysis, using a control‐group methodology. A helmet law reduces fatalities by about 15 percent in the long run, less in the short run. There is no evidence of spillover effects (to adults) or substitution effects (youths choosing other methods of transportation) associated with implementation of a helmet law. Through 2000, existing helmet laws have saved 130 lives. If all states had adopted helmet laws in 1975, more than 1500 lives would have been saved. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Economic determinants of presidential elections: The fair model

Ray Fair has constructed a model explaining the incumbent share of the two-party presidential popular vote for the elections of 1916-1984. The economic measures of the growth rate of real per capita GNP and the absolute value of the rate of inflation are singled out as important. In addition, a time trend favoring Democrats and whether an incumbent is seeking reelection are included.I argue that the Fair model is misspecified. Including the rate of growth in the Dow Jones Industrial Averages significantly improves the fit of the model, eliminates the trend as significant, reduces the income parameter, and strengthens the inflation parameter. In addition, the model remains stable when including the 1908 and 1912 elections, and up-dating to include the 1988 election strengthens the results.The explanatory power of the model is impressive with only one missed election outcome (1976) between 1908 and 1988, and this miss is easily explained by the impact of Watergate on the Republican candidate, President Ford.     

The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

Preventing construction deaths: The role of public policies

Are stronger direct financial incentives or regulatory enforcement effective in reducing fatalities in the construction industry? We examine two important policies—state workers' compensation (WC) programs and federal and state Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) activities—which embody those strategies. We examine their impact by looking at state-level fatality rates in the construction industry from 1992 to 2016. Setting aside highway crashes and violence, the majority of employee deaths occur in construction. We find that states which exempt small firms from the requirement to buy WC insurance have higher fatality rates. When eligibility for compensation is restricted by longer waiting periods, fatality rates are substantially higher. More frequent federal or state OSHA inspections and, especially, consultation visits are associated with lower fatality rates, but higher average penalties are not. Limited variation in these policies over our sample period, especially for WC, makes these results suggestive rather than definitively causal.     

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHILD SAFETY SEAT LAWS IN THE FIFTY STATES

This study evaluates the effectiveness of state child safety seat laws in the United States. Data for all fifty states for the period 1975 to 1994 are used. Pooled time series analysis is employed to estimate a model of the rate of fatalities suffered by children ages 0–5 years as occupants in automobile crashes. The occupant fatality rate for children 6–11 years of age is used as a comparison group to control for other trends not introduced in the estimated models. The results show that child safety seat policies have significantly reduced fatality rates among children 0–5 years of age. For each additional year of age covered by a state statute, this fatality rate drops 4.8%. A similar reduction in the fatality rate of the older age cohort (6–11 years old) was not observed.     

The Political Economy of Automobile Safety Inspections

Studies of traffic safety typically assumethat policies are adopted to further thepublic interest, thereby ignoring thepolitical motives for policy. Sincepolitical motives can influence the designor enforcement of policies, accounting forpolitical motives has relevance forevaluating policy effectiveness. Weexamine the political motives concerning afrequently-studied traffic safety policy: state-mandated vehicle safety inspection. We distinguish between public interest andspecial interest explanations for safetyinspection. Our econometric models examinethe incidence of inspection across states,and determinants of regulated inspectionfees. The evidence strongly rejects apublic interest explanation, but specialinterest hypotheses also do not proveentirely satisfactory. Since recentstudies find that inspections fail toimprove highway safety, we attribute thecontinued existence of inspection programsto political transaction costs rather thanto the demands of interest groups.     

The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level

It has been shown that states with higher per capita senate representation have higher federal spending per capita (Atlas, C. M., Gilligan, T. A., Hendershott, R. J. and Zupan, M. A. (1995). American Economic Review 85: 624–629). With a more recent data sample, more highly disaggregated data and a different set of political control variables, we are able to confirm the main result of Atlas et al. that per capita senate representation is positively related to federal expenditure. This effect is strongest for procurement expenditures. By contrast, we do not find support for their result that spending increases with per capita representation in the House of Representatives. Several other political variables are found to be significant in a subset of the expenditure equations.     

Terrorism and pork-barrel spending

The horrifying, tragic events of 9/11 made Americans aware of their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and triggered the creation of the Department of Homeland Security along with a substantial increase in federal spending to both thwart terrorist attacks and to increase our ability to respond to such emergencies. Much of this large increase in spending was in the form of direct transfers to states and cities through several grant programs. Homeland Security grants may be used for protection against terrorist activities, thereby enhancing public interests, or as wealth transfers to state and local governments, enhancing the reelection efforts of incumbents, and thus, private interests. Using 2004 per capita Homeland Security grant funding to states and their cities, we find that the funding formula used for some of the grant programs, which allocates almost 40% of the funds in some grant programs through a minimum percent to each state with the rest allocated based on population, means that per capita funding is related to electoral votes per capita, i.e., to the politics of Presidential re-election. However, the funding in other grant programs is also related to some of the dangers and vulnerabilities faced by states and their cities. Some of the variation in per capita grant allocations is also explained by the amount of airport traffic in the state and the state's population density, which are variables closely linked to the state's vulnerability to attack. Per capita Homeland Security grant allocations, however, do not seem to be related to the closeness of the 2000 presidential race.