Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent

In The Calculus of Consent (1962: 235) Buchanan and Tullock assert: (1)?ceteris paribus, while a coalition controlling less than a majority of voters may control in either chamber, the greater the difference in the bases of representation in the two houses, the less likely is any given coalition of voters to control a majority of the seats in both chambers; (2)?the potential of cross-chamber logrolls (on issues of unequal intensity) increases the likelihood that a minority may effectively control policy making. We link these ideas to social theory approaches to bicameralism and for the empirical study of legislatures.     

With consent of the governed: SEC's formative years

The Securities and Exchange Commission, established in 1934, has achieved a uniquely high reputation for effective regulation. The SEC succeeded in large measure because of the initial strategy developed by its founders. Led by Joseph P. Kennedy, James M. Landis, and William O. Douglas, the SEC sought to restore public confidence in the capital markets and induce regulated interests to help enforce public policy. These interests included the accounting profession, the organized securities exchanges, and the brokers and dealers operating in the over-the-counter market. In each case, the SEC encouraged the strengthening of regulatory structures within the private sector, using its power and influence to promote what later came to be called the “public use of private interest”.     

The calculus of voting: An empirical test

Abstract. According to the rational choice model, the calculus of voting takes the form of the equation R = BP − C, where the net rewards for voting (R) are a function of the instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome compared to others (B) and the probability (P) of casting the decisive vote that secures these benefits, minus the costs of becoming informed and going to the polls (C). Here, we provide a systematic test of this model. The analysis relies on two surveys, conducted during the 1995 Quebec referendum and the 1996 British Columbia provincial election, in which very specific questions measured each element of the model. As well, this study incorporates two other factors that can affect the propensity to vote — Respondents' level of political interest and their sense of duty. We find that B, P, and C each matter, but only among those with a relatively weak sense of duty. The feeling that one has a moral obligation to vote is the most powerful motivation to go to the polls. We conclude that the rational choice model is useful, but only in explaining behaviour at the margins of this important norm.     

Cost and the calculus of voting

Downs's (1957) theory of voting maintains that individuals balance the costs of voting against anticipated benefits in deciding whether to vote. However, most empirical tests of his theory have concluded that costs play little role in individuals' decisions to vote or abstain, and that benefits are the determining factor. Unfortunately, the existing empirical tests of the theory have been inadequate, especially in regard to the measurement of the cost of voting. Using data from the Comparative State Elections Project, we develop an improved indicator of the cost of voting. When this measure of cost is used in a test of Down's theory, we find, contrary to most earlier research, that the cost of voting seems to be a more important determinant of participation than the factors associated with voting benefits in Downs's model.The authors shared equally in the research reported; the order in which they are listed was determined randomly.     

The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years

VP-functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables. Most studies analyze macro time series. We also cover studies of individual voters, socio-economic groups and regional cross-sections. The theory starts from the Responsibility Hypothesis: voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions. It works in two party/block systems, but not else. Voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic. Egotropic voting also occurs. Voters' myopia is well established. Voting is retrospective as expectations are static. It costs the average government almost 2% of the vote to rule.     

Britain and the Korean war after 50 years: The slow emergence of an intelligence dimension

Anthony Farrar‐Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War. Volume I: A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990). Pp.xxii + 512, illus., bibliog., index. ISBN 0–11–630953–9.

Volume II: An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1995). Pp.xx + 534, illus., bibliog., index. £90. ISBN 0–11–630–958‐X.

Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993; distributed in UK by Cambridge University Press, 1995). Pp.xvi + 393. £15.95, bibliog., index. ISBN 0–8047–2521–7.

Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in Asia: British policies towards Japan, China and Korea, 1945–1953 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997). Pp.xii + 288, bibliog., index. £45. ISBN 0–7190–2508–7.

H. J. Yasamee and K. A. Hamilton (ed.), Documents on British Policy Overseas. Series II Volume IV: The Korean War, June 1950–June 1951 (London: HMSO, 1991). Pp.liv + 460, index. £47. ISBN 0–11–591695–4.     

Organizing consent: The role of procedural fairness in political trust and compliance

Abstract.  Political theory often attributes democratic legitimacy to the fairness of the processes by which collective decisions are taken; empirical research by contrast has primarily investigated whether citizens' approval of democratic institutions derives from satisfaction with the substantive output of those institutions. This article examines whether assessments of decision-making processes shape public willingness to consent to authority. The role of procedural fairness in institutional legitimacy has previously only been investigated in the context of the United States, and has fallen short of demonstrating that procedural assessments actually have a causal effect on institutional legitimacy. Panel survey data of attitudes in a large-scale land use issue provide the empirical base of the analysis. The results indicate that assessments of procedural fairness have a bearing on two conceptualizations of subjective legitimacy: respondents' trust for the authority and their willingness to accept a decision outcome.