The impact of the Iraqi Crisis on the transatlantic link. A summary of views on the US–EU and US–NATO relationship

Lithuania's security orientation has evolved significantly since 1991. It has moved from prioritising Baltic and, then, Nordic, cooperation to focusing on partnership with Poland, and seeking NATO and European Union membership. Initially re‐buffed by both, Lithuania has gradually sought to strengthen its de facto ties with NATO and WEU, and to build up its economic ties with the EU and its member states, in the belief that this provided a form of ‘soft’ security, and prepared the way for eventual membership of NATO and the EU.     

Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A decade of transformation in the Baltic states

In an incredibly short period of time the Baltic States transformed themselves from former 'Soviet republics' into potential EU member states. This article attempts to interpret foreign and security policies of the Baltic States as an embodiment of their emerging political identity. The focus is mainly on the issue of how 'Europe' is being integrated into the national identities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the Baltic States' political identity is constituted mainly within the framework of the meanings of nation-state discourse characterised by the East-West opposition. However, their participation in the EU integration process weakens the symbolic link between the state and the nation and creates tensions between the demands of identity and the actual practices of integration. This might be a hindrance to the Europeanisation of the Baltic States' identity and their international socialisation.     

Liberalism and geopolitics in EU–Russia relations: rereading the “Baltic factor”

Contrary to some expectations, the Baltic states’ accession to the EU in 2004 was not followed by an improvement in their relations with Russia. Instead, the Baltic states became known as the “troublemakers” of EU–Russia relations. This was commonly explained by their history and national identity, which contributed to an understanding of the Baltic concerns as marginal. The Ukraine crisis brought a reaction of “I told you so” by the Baltic states that for many years had been warning the West about Russia’s expansionist ambitions. This article explores the ideational underpinnings of the gap between the Baltic states’ perceptions of and relations with Russia on the one hand and mainstream views in Europe on the other. It identifies liberal interdependence, democratic peace, and realist geopolitics as key ideas that have framed the EU’s and Baltic states’ perceptions of Russia. In the vein of constructivist foreign policy analysis, these ideational structures are seen to condition the EU’s and Baltic states’ interests and policies vis-à-vis Russia. An analysis of the “Baltic factor” helps to illuminate the contradictions and shortcomings in the EU’s Russia policy and review its ideational basis which is now in need of a strategic rethink.     

艰难的睦邻之路——苏联解体以来的俄罗斯与波罗的海三国

苏联解体至今,随着政治经济转轨的完成和双方国家利益与外交政策的磨合,俄罗斯与波罗的海三国走出了"文明离婚"的困境,步入了务实合作的道路,但是还没有建立起睦邻友好关系.俄罗斯对波罗的海三国政策缺乏连贯性和协调性,受到北约因素和欧盟因素的深刻影响,具有政治导向性.影响俄罗斯与渡罗的海三国关系发展的不利因素包括讲俄语居民地位问题、三国的历史记忆和民族情感、三国的反俄政治势力;有利因素包括俄罗斯同欧洲长期合作的政策取向、三国与俄罗斯发展经贸合作的互利性.在未来相当长的时期内,俄罗斯与波罗的海三国难以建立真正的睦邻友好关系.     

波罗的海三国独立与美苏交涉(1991)

1991年1月,波罗的海地区矛盾激化,先后发生了维尔纽斯事件和里加事件,三国独立运动开始升级。在当时的国际背景和美苏关系的大框架下,美苏两国政府围绕波罗的海问题进行了一系列交涉。八一九事件后,三国先后宣布独立。美国最终先于苏联政府承认了三国的独立。苏联解体的第一步开始迈出。     

NATO expansion to Northern Europe

Finland and Sweden have been in the forefront of bilateral aid efforts to the neighbouring Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) especially in the promotion of economic and regional integration. Although Finland and Sweden have refused to contemplate NATO membership themselves, their neighbours are all seeking to enhance their security through NATO membership. It is unlikely that the Baltic States will become part of the Alliance in the short‐term, but new forms of military co‐operation between NATO and its former adversaries are taking place. With the regional security situation in greater flux than at any time during the post‐World War II period, Finland and Sweden are thus being asked to reevaluate their traditional policies of neutrality and non‐alignment. This article seeks to show some of the contemporary security problems facing Finland and Sweden and the range of policies which both Finland and Sweden can pursue.     

Power and agency in the human security framework

The concept of human security is arguably a progressive move away from the narrow conceptions of military and territorial security that have traditionally dominated international relations. The human security framework is argued to have the potential to empower and emancipate individuals by putting them at the centre of policy, analysis and debate and addressing the problems they face in their daily lives. In this paper I will argue that the human security framework cannot live up to its promises to empower the citizens of poor and developing countries. Whilst the human security framework problematizes the relationship between the state and its citizens, the framework replaces this relationship with relationships with other states or international agencies that lack accountability, effectively further disempowering citizens in weak or unstable states. The human security framework serves to reinforce international power inequalities and renders criteria for intervention by powerful states and international institutions less transparent and less accountable.     

The Nordic–Baltic Area: Divisive Geopolitics at Work

States in the Nordic–Baltic area reacted heterogeneously to the Iraq War operation: Denmark chose to participate; Iceland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania supported the operation diplomatically or materially; whereas Norway, Finland and Sweden were negative. The research tool used to explain this pattern is the parsimonious theory of ‘past and present geopolitics’, taking issue with systemic neorealism, primarily. In spite of official rhetoric emphasizing Baghdad or New York (the UN), states’ driving forces were mainly found in their different salient environments. The primary explanation, proximate power balancing, was at work regarding Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Iceland, with no big neighbour, could enjoy profit bandwagoning, while Sweden and Finland followed ‘standard operating procedures’. A minor aberration from expectations is noted regarding Finland: its EU balancing rather than US balancing of Russia. The Norwegian ‘no’ and Danish warfare were both an expression of geopolitical freedom of manoeuvre.     

2011年中亚战略形势评估

2011年是中亚国家取得主权独立、推进社会转型的第20个年头,也是各国应对各种挑战,努力维稳定、促发展的关键一年。政治上,各国政局均未出现大动荡,但经过独立20年的发展,中亚各国大多接近历史变革临界点,大多数国家均出现自上而下的政治体制改良趋势。经济上,各国逐渐摆脱金融危机影响,实现不同程度增长,但经济危机并未改变中亚经济的增长模式和基本布局,各国发展差距进一步拉大。安全领域,涉恐等恶性案件未显著减少,极端宗教思潮利用各种渠道加紧渗透,中亚安全风险上升值得关注。外交上,中亚各国平衡外交理念更加清晰,手段更加纯熟,但中亚地区的大国博弈有所加剧,俄美两国均提出自己的新中亚战略,日本、韩国等积极介入中亚事务。与此同时,中亚各国与中国关系稳步发展,安全与务实合作得以深化。     

Managing Soft Security Threats: Current Progress and Future Prospects

This concluding essay explores the development of the concept of security since the end of the Cold War, in a world characterized by failing states, and the rise of non-state actors. It revisits the competing paradigms of ‘The End of History’ and ‘The Clash of Civilisations’ within globalization trends as a whole, and security in particular. Post September 11, 2001, the boundaries between hard and soft security have been blurred as the relationship between terrorism and illegal trade have become apparent.

The paper highlights three challenging processes of particular relevance for soft security: the still growing gap between rich and poor; the technological revolution; and the changing role of and attitudes to military force. Environmental, economic and population pressures elsewhere fuel the soft security threats in Europe, and the problems cannot be solved by improved policing or border mechanisms alone. Rather, the solution lies in treating them at a global level.     

Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia

International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behavior of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have given added impetus to the Eurasian inter-state cooperation in confronting non-traditional threats and challenges from non-state actors. Bearing in mind the theory of collective security, this article analyzes threats posed by non-state actors with respect to Eurasian collective security organizations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that the effectiveness of these organizations at achieving stated objectives depends upon their capacity to adopt new criteria of effectiveness.     

世界政治“平靖进程”的技术变迁支撑

二战后,世界政治经历了"平靖进程",具体体现为:"大国罕有战事""国家罕有消亡"。本文融合国际政治经济学与国际安全研究,展示二战后的技术变迁改变了大国的"意愿"与"能力",支撑了世界政治新变化。在马尔萨斯时代,由于技术水平低下,生存物资稀缺,生存保障匮乏,人类面临持续的安全难题。二战后,技术发展影响了当代大国的"意愿"与"能力",让世界政治呈现新变化。技术变迁给大国提供了更为丰富的选择,让大国使用武力征服的意愿降低;同时,随着技术变迁,尤其是在"核革命"后,大国确保自身安全的能力更强,使得"大国罕有战事"。得益于技术变迁,大国利益半径扩大,即便距离遥远地域的变化也与自身息息相关,大国保障遥远海外利益的意愿提升;同时,技术变迁扩大了大国的权力投射,让世界各国,尤其是大国保障体系稳定的能力更强,致使"国家罕见消亡"。随着技术变迁,世界政治已呈现出很多与传统智慧不同的方面,孕育国际交往的新理念。     

Acting small in a large state's world: Russia and the Baltic states

The interest in small states ebbs and flows as important international affairs include small states. Russia's actions and policies vis-à-vis Ukraine, and the resultant intensified apprehension among Russia's smaller neighbours, aim the proverbial microscope at the size and power discrepancies between states. Russia, by most metrics, is a large state and the Baltic states, by those same metrics, are small states. Small-state scholars expect large and small states to act differently. However, the case of Russia and the Baltic states indicates that large and small states do not, in fact, act all that different. This being the case, this article calls into question many of the assumptions made by small-state scholars about the difference between large- and small-state action and argues for changes within small-state studies as a subdiscipline of the larger international relations discipline.     

Identity and democracy in the Baltics

The purpose of this essay is to consider the probable impact of issues related to ethnic and cultural identity on democratization in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Particular attention will be given to the demographic make‐up of the Baltic states, which are home to a high percentage of Slavs (mostly Russians but also Belarusians, Poles, and Ukrainians), and to those factors which affect how these Slavs and the majority Baits: (1) identify themselves; and (2) identify with the new states in which they find themselves. The key question is the degree to which civic democracy can prosper in a newly emerging multi‐ethnic state. The answer is important not only for the Baltic states but also for the other new multinational states that have emerged from the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe in the past few years.     

国家安全领导体制的变革与东北亚地区安全

以国家安全委员会为代表的国家安全领导体制是现代国家安全决策、协调和咨询的最核心机构。从理论上讲,国家安全领导体制关系到国家安全战略的每个环节,可以结合外交政策分析的不同视角,同时又具有比较政治研究的重大意义。从实践上来看,美国、英国、法国等世界上主要大国都已建立起较为完善的国家安全领导体系,而东北亚中、日、韩三国从2013年开始也相继进行了国家安全领导体制的变革,建立了国家安全委员会及其常设机构。尽管从人员构成、战略目标、运行模式等方面来看,三国变革后的国家安全领导体制还有差异,但是国家安全领导体制的变化对东北亚局势还是造成了深远影响。中日关系、朝鲜半岛问题、东北亚地区的安全架构都出现了新的变化;同时,各国国内安全问题,特别是非传统安全问题已成为新的国家安全领导体制的主要涉及领域。东北亚地区国家安全领导体制改革是全球范围内国家安全转化和重构的一部分,未来的国家安全领导体制建设要从理论上探讨如何规避其中的官僚政治特别是小集团思维因素,在理念上要与国家安全观紧密结合起来,在实践上要充分考虑其长期性、复杂性,并为体制变革提供强有力的法律保障。     

Islam in Southeast Asia: The Challenge of Radical Interpretations

This article addresses three questions. The rise of radical Islamic movements in Southeast Asia, the links between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaeda, and the challenge to Southeast Asian states from JI. Desker gives an overview of radical Islamic organisations in Southeast Asia resorting to violence, and their reciprocal connections and ties to the global al-Qaeda network. These organisations and their actions draw attention to the interplay between transnational non-state actors, postcolonial states and regional integration processes in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Desker points out the fragility of postcolonial states challenged by religious, ethnic and linguistic groups promoting separatist or transnational agendas. As new states protective of their sovereignty and the primacy of their national identities, the ASEAN members generally have pursued individual national interests in confronting such transnational actors. As such the ASEAN member-states have not relied on their multilateral relationships, highlighting the erosion of the ASEAN security community after the Cold War. The original version of this paper was prepared for the Regional Outlook Forum organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore on 7 January 2003.     

Two-Level Security Management and the Prospects for New Democracies: A Simulation Analysis

Most new democracies face serious internal, ethnic/separatist conflicts; in addition, some face international threats. The literature on the growth of democracy in the global system and its impact on world politics does not fully account for the dual threats all states must address in managing their security. Based on theoretical work by Starr (1994) which describes the "common logic" of conflict processes in war and revolution, we outline a model of how states respond to security threats from both external and internal sources. Using computer simulation, we analyze the model and evaluate the relative importance for state security of factors such as system size, numbers of democracies in the system, extraction/allocation strategy pursued by new democracies, and government legitimacy level. Our results show that new democracies thrive in systems that are predominantly democratic. Also, ally support can provide crucial resources for new democracies facing internal threats. Finally, "endangered" democracies can recover security by attempting to buy off domestic threats rather than deter them, and by improving legitimacy.     

A defence model for the Baltic states

It is often argued that the Baltic states should not be accepted in NATO because they are not defensible and NATO forces would not be able to intervene in time if they were attacked. This article presents a possible Baltic defence concept which appears to be well adapted to Baltic terrain and Baltic material and manpower resources, and which should at the very least impose significant delay (weeks) and heavy losses on a massive attack. Friendly intervention could be in the form of air strikes against aggressor columns blocked on the roads.     

Sovereignty at Sea: States and Security in the Maritime Domain

The oceans present a variety of perils to both states and private actors, ranging from smuggling to direct attacks on vessels. Yet, a disconnect exists between states’ maritime power and sovereign fleets due to the emergence of open shipping registries in the 20th century. How have great powers like the United States responded to threats generated by transit of the oceans for legitimate and illicit purposes? The nature of peacetime security threats that states confront at sea has shaped divergent responses. The main maritime powers draw a distinction between threats aimed at states and threats to commerce. Where perceived threats to the state are concerned, great powers have sought to revise understandings of the protections sovereignty provides—specifically, by seeking expanded interdiction rights—to further their own security goals. When maritime powers perceive that international commerce is under threat, they delegate the sovereign protection function both upward to internationally sanctioned maritime coalitions and outward to private security firms. These policies are responses to the security challenges that result from the decoupling of sovereign power and the merchant fleet that followed the emergence of open shipping registries.     

Reshaping Cultural Heritage Protection Policies at a Time of Securitisation: France,Italy, and the United Kingdom

In the context of the increasing securitisation of cultural heritage, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have reacted differently to the recent wave of iconoclasm perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and similar radical groups and terrorist organisations. With cultural heritage now discursively identified as a security concern, the three states enacted security practices to deal with the newly emerged security threats. All three cases show a tight association between the protection of cultural heritage, development and security policies. State-driven cultural heritage protection policies continue to be designed around the notion of multilateral cooperation, although innovative forms of public-private multilateralism and civil-military cooperation are increasingly being introduced.