Analysis: (Big) business as usual. Sustainable development,NGOs and UK arms export policy

The UK government claims to exercise a responsible arms export policy and to be committed to considering sustainable development concerns in arms export licensing. Yet in December 2001, it granted BAe Systems a licence for the sale of a £28 million air-traffic-control system to Tanzania, one of the world's poorest countries. This export failed the conditions of UK export guidelines in three major ways. This article explores why the government ignored its commitments, arguing that the relationship between Labour and the arms industry lies at the heart of UK export policy. A critical analysis of the development agenda shows that the issue is not simply to get the government to stick to its declared commitments, difficult as this is, as the neo-liberal development agenda promoted by the Labour government is itself fundamentally flawed. Assessing the effectiveness of NGO activity on UK arms export issues thus requires an interrogation of their vision of sustainable development as well as their critique of government actions.     

CSDP,Strategy and Crisis Management: Out of Area or Out of Business?

The EU's ineffectiveness vis‐à‐vis Libya and the southern Mediterranean crises more broadly is largely explained by the CSDP's narrow mandate centred on crisis management. The EU's emphasis on external crisis management was strategically sound given the geopolitical context of the 1990s. CSDP's quiet drift towards a ‘softer’ kind of crisis management from the middle of the first decade of the 2000s was also instrumental in highlighting the EU's differences from post‐11 September US unilateralism. That said, (soft) crisis management has become progressively obsolete in the light of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment characterised by an overall retreat of Western power globally, a weakening of America's commitment to European security, an increasingly tumultuous European neighbourhood, and Europe's financial troubles. In order to meet the demands of a changing geopolitical environment, CSDP must break away from its distinctively reactive approach to security to include all the functions normally associated with the military including, chiefly, deterrence and prevention. This would allow the EU to actively shape its regional and global milieu.     

Europe's others and the return of geopolitics

In the context of European Union enlargement and the discussions about a European constitution, the question of Europe's identity has once again entered the limelight of political debates. From a poststructuralist perspective, identities are constructed through practices of othering, articulating a difference. In this article, I follow Ole Wæver to argue that for most of the time after the Second World War the most important other in the construction of a European identity has been Europe's own past. This temporal form of othering offered the possibility to form an identity through less antagonistic and exclusionary practices than was common in the modern international society. However, since the 1990s geographic and cultural otherings are on the increase, marking a return of geopolitics in European identity constructions and undermining the notion of European integration as a fundamental challenge to the world of nation‐states.1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the workshop ‘Other Europes’, organised by the Poststructuralism working group of the British International Studies Association, Keele University, England, 16 May 2003. I would like to thank the workshop participants, Alessandra Buonfino, Bahar Rumelili and the three referees of this journal for their critical and constructive comments. View all notes     

Bearing their share of the burden: Europe in Afghanistan

Abstract

This article assesses the relative burden European members of NATO are bearing in the war in Afghanistan. Some argue that the current contribution of European forces is on par with the American contribution. However, current studies do not analyze Europe's ISAF contribution in comparison to some benchmark by which relative burden-sharing can be accurately determined. This article compares Europe's involvement in the war in Afghanistan to past missions, current contributions and in light of the benefits each country is likely to enjoy. The quantitative and qualitative findings show that there is an extensive amount of free-riding occurring both in terms of hard and soft power, although it varies across time and even within NATO Europe. Inadequate forces provided by European NATO countries jeopardize the likelihood of success in Afghanistan.     

Superficial,not Substantial: The Ambiguity of Public Support for Europe's Security and Defence Policy

Abstract

Surveys such as the European Commission's Eurobarometer regularly reveal high levels of public support for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This paper argues, however, that public support for ESDP is only superficial, not substantial. First, there is no homogeneous ‘European’ public support for ESDP. Second, security and defence, as covered by ESDP with its focus on global crisis-management, rank very low among Europeans’ priorities. Third, Europeans are very sceptical about the appropriateness of military means, and hence a core element of ESDP, as a legitimate instrument in international affairs. These reservations are likely to have constraining effects on ESDP's future development. At the same time, there are compelling reasons for the further development of ESDP. Therefore, Europe's political elites should initiate a public diplomacy campaign inside the EU in which the case for Europe's further evolution as a strategic security and defence actor is made. ESDP operations are the most promising starting points as they illustrate both the normative and the ‘realist’ necessities of European engagement in global security affairs.     

Organizing international armaments cooperation: institutional design and path dependencies in Europe

Abstract

Few issues are more important to scholars of Europe's emergence as a foreign policy actor than whether the European Union (EU) can forge a common defense-industrial policy out of 27 states' procurement policies and defense industries. Overlooked in most scholarly analyses of European defense-industrial cooperation, the story of Europe's international armaments organizations stretches back more than six decades. In this article, we examine the impact of past institutional outcomes on the defense-industrial field by applying the concepts and analytic tools of historic institutionalism to European armaments organizations. Because past institutional dynamics have channeled the subsequent development of armaments cooperation, what has emerged is a polycentric governance architecture wherein organizations with transatlantic, pan-European and restrictive-European memberships dominate distinct components of the cooperative process. We demonstrate that this maturing institutional pattern will likely limit the opportunities for the EU – and especially its Commission – to shape the future contours of European defense-industrial cooperation.     

Europe after the U.S. Pivot

Insofar as Europe's security and cohesion have for decades been premised upon a strong American political and strategic engagement, Washington's intention to “rebalance” to Asia casts a shadow over the sustainability of a stable and coherent geopolitical order on the continent. This article argues that as the United States seeks to rebalance strategically towards the Asia-Pacific region a number of “indigenous” geopolitical trends are becoming increasingly important in Europe: an Anglo-French entente for a “maritime” Europe, a German-French “continental” project of economic and political integration, and Russia's resurgence across Europe's East. The growing prominence of competing geopolitical visions for Europe might even call into question the cohesion and direction of the institutional expressions of the U.S.- engineered Western order in Europe, namely the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Increasing geopolitical and institutional contestation, we contend, pose a number of challenges for both U.S. interests and European security.     

Ideologies of Jihad in Europe

The article explores ideological fault lines among Sunni Muslim militants (jihadists) in Europe since the mid-1990s. It argues there have been disputes among the militants about whether to prioritize local struggles or Al Qaeda's global war, and about the legitimacy of launching terrorist attacks in European states offering political asylum to Muslims. It concludes that Europe's militants have become more ideologically unified in conjunction with the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Mohammed drawings, seeing European countries as legitimate and prioritized targets, and identifying with Al Qaeda.     

NATO Regional peacekeeping center in Central and Eastern Europe: A proposal

Abstract

The article asks what the evolution of NATO–Swedish relations signifies for the understanding of the evolution of security communities. Given the astonishing evolution of NATO and Sweden as a community of practise, it is logical to imagine the two as forming part of the same security community. It could then be argued that common practise can bring about new security communities rather hastily. Analysing NATO's and Sweden's recent discourses on security, the author identifies a significant gap between a principally realist and a predominantly idealist discourse that indicates that the two parties do not share key characteristics of a security community – identities, values and meanings. However, if Libya is the case of the future, the discursive differences may fade and Sweden could more easily pursue its journey towards inclusion in NATO, not as a member of an Alliance, but as a member of NATO as a security community.     

Balancing against threats or bandwagoning with power? Europe and the transatlantic relationship after the Cold War

The United States has played an important role in European security since the early 20^th century. From the time of the end of the Cold War, this role has changed as a consequence of the lack of a common territorial threat and the overwhelming power of the United States relative to Europe. How have European states responded to the challenges of the American world order? Are they adapting their security policies to match the challenges of US security policy and the American world order? What are the implications of the European response for the transatlantic relationship? This article seeks to describe and explain European security behaviour in the American world through the prism of two realist theories: balance of power realism and balance of threat realism. Despite sharing a common starting point in realist assumptions, each theory allows us to tell a different story about Europe's position in the American world order as well as the opportunities and challenges it faces.     

International Administration Between the Wars: A Reappraisal

This article traces the chronology of the interwar decline of European influence and power, arguing that its origins outside Europe are to be found as much in the paradoxical status of international administration of colonial and post-colonial areas as in the direct challenges posed to European stability by revisionist states in the early 1930s. It demonstrates that an inherent ambivalence toward the interwar colonial world and its relationship to Europe presaged and conditioned the collapse of Europe's own balance of power.     

Normative power and organized hypocrisy: European Union member states' arms export to Libya

The 2011 Libyan civil war prompted a reassessment of the normative foundation of the EU's conventional arms export control regime as armaments manufactured in Europe were used by Gaddafi's forces during the war. The EU's foreign policy identity is based, partly, upon a common approach to arms export involving respect for common criteria for export licences. Yet, prior to the civil war, considerable amounts of military equipment had been exported by member states to Libya, notwithstanding grounds for restraint on the basis of several of the criteria. This article traces member states' arms export to Libya during 2005–2010 to explore whether member states favoured restraint or export promotion. It concludes that although aware of the risks of exporting, in a competitive market for military goods, member states sought commercial advantage over restraint, and comprehensively violated export control principles. This casts doubts on assertions of the EU acting as a “normative power”.     

Regional collective security in Europe: Past patterns and future prospects

NATO's entry into the Balkan war raised salient questions about the alliance's broader mission and, more generally, about Europe's security architecture. This article confronts these questions by revisiting the debate about collective defense versus collective security as organizing principles for alliances. NATO is viewed as serving a hybrid role of promoting collective defense and regional collective security. This latter, under‐valued function relates to NATO's role in promoting internal cohesion among its members and is crucial to understanding the alliance's evolution and its persistance long after the Cold War.     

Sitting on the Balcony: American Responses,Strategic Dilemmas,and Swedish Criticism of the Vietnam War

Small states often seek power by exercising authority beyond their borders. Sweden, a prominent protagonist of the global projection of moral values, established itself as a champion of humanitarian internationalism in the post-Second World War period, especially during the Vietnam War. By voicing criticism of the American war effort and putting moral purposes beyond itself, Sweden tried to change American policy. Years of vehement criticism provoked strong reactions in the United States, leading to bilateral diplomatic crises and long-lasting political conflicts. Even though part of a wave of international criticism and based on the power of the better argument and conveyed through open advocacy, Sweden's public diplomacy had little bearing. Its confrontational style was counter-productive; its content badly synchronised with the domestic American debate and lacking originality and centrality; and the criticism generally considered irrelevant. Attention fell on Swedish verbal activism when more conspicuous elements of Swedish Vietnam policy were in focus.     

Rationalist state,revolutionist EU and realist war: Austria in international society

This article examines Austria's position as a small, neutral state in the international society as framed by the English School. This examination is chiefly done in the face of the effects of great power conflicts and their impact on Western Europe's society of states. In doing so, the article provides insights to the fundamental puzzles concerning the ways power is managed between states, great and small alike. The article surveys how war (such as in South Ossetia in 2008) and war-like incidents affected Austria's position in the international society and the understanding of its place in great power conflicts between East and West. I argue that neutrality, despite European integration in the context of a peaceful international society, remains a political option for small states such as Austria. This option is especially lively if there is a domestic sentimental attachment to it and sticking to it does not undermine domestic or European and international foreign policy rationale and interests.     

America's Old/New Meets Russia's True/False: The Case of Europe's North

Recent talk about Europe's diminishing importance to America's policymaking is here regarded as unfounded. Europe remains an indispensable signifier tightly embedded in the soul of the US as well as that of Russia. With identity being a relational process and profoundly social in character, both America and Russia employ Europe as the main mirror in which they portray themselves. This article unpacks their respective delineations of Europe: the American old/new as outlined by Donald Rumsfeld, and the Russian true/false, focusing on Europe's North as a region where the two perspectives might potentially clash.     

Policy Lessons from the Eurozone Crisis

The current European crisis has shed light on several weaknesses and the institutional incompleteness characterizing the euro area. The manifestation of Europe's fragility was preceded by a large build-up of debt in the private sector, associated with national current account divergences and the deterioration of competitiveness particularly of the euro periphery countries. With the economic situation deteriorating, private sector debt became less credible, contaminating banks’ balance sheets and placing a heavy burden on governments. A sovereign-bank vicious circle emerged: on the one hand, with banking risk translating into higher sovereign risk because of the governments’ guarantor role and, on the other hand, with the deterioration of government's creditworthiness affecting the banking systems through banks’ sovereign bond holdings. In principle, this negative feedback can be stopped by breaking one of the channels of transmission. A banking union at the European level is proposed as one solution.     

Book reviews and notes

Europe's Gentle Power

Europa, forza gentile / Tommaso Padoa‐Schioppa. ‐ Bologna : il Mulino, 2001. ‐ 192 p. (Contemporanea). ‐ ISBN 88–15–08185 ‐2     

European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?

The European Union has, since 1999, moved deliberately, if slowly, to develop the capability to undertake autonomously a range of demanding political military operations beyond Europe's borders. This effort, the European Security and Defense Policy (esdp), is a puzzle insofar as post-Cold War Europe is very secure, and most European nations are members of an established alliance, the u.s.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. esdp is best explained by the international relations theory known as structural realism, the modern guise of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory is contrasted with balance of threat theory. Though European states are not motivated by a perception of an imminent threat from the United States, they are balancing u.s. power. The concentration of global power in the United States, unipolarity, is uncomfortable even for its friends who fear the abandonment that u.s. freedom of action permits and who wish to influence the global political environment the United States could create.     

Neorealism,Security Cooperation,and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma

Most neorealists argue that relative decline constitutes a systemic incentive for European security cooperation. Although this claim is broadly accepted, I argue that the relationship between relative decline and European security cooperation is complicated by a number of factors. First, European calculations about relative decline bear both a global and a regional (that is, intra-European) component. If a European country is to effectively mitigate relative decline, cooperation is not sufficient. It is just as important that cooperation develops in a way that underscores that country's comparative strengths and minimizes its weaknesses. In this regard, European countries are often in direct competition with each other. Secondly, when Europeans are thinking about their relative power position, some countries matter more than others: a given European country may accept to incur a relative loss vis-à-vis another country (European or otherwise) but not others. These calculations are further complicated by issue linkage. Some countries may accept relative losses on some issues (for example, security) in exchange for gains on others (economic). This article examines how intra-European considerations of relative gains affect the way in which Europe's main powers seek to cope with relative decline and assesses how those considerations affect security cooperation in a European Union (EU) framework. In doing so, it aims to unpack the otherwise vague notions of relative decline and European security cooperation.