European security in the post‐cold war era: The continuing struggle between realism and utopianism

This article looks at ‘the permanent dialogue’ between ‘Realist’ and ‘Utopian’ thinking in the context of the major developments which are taking place in contemporary European security. The author argues that after the dominance of ‘Realism ‘ in both theory and practice during the Cold War, a resurgence of ‘Utopian’ thinking has taken place since the events of 1989, which has had a significant impact on the architecture of European security. The main thrust of the argument, however, is that despite the contradictions between the two approaches, both have a role to play in attempts to build a new European security order.     

The common European security and defence policy and the ‘third‐country’ issue

The Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) of the European Union (EU) was launched in 1999 and has been perceived as a landmark step toward European security cooperation, particularly in the field of crisis management. Still in its early stages, some difficult issues have become apparent. Of these, the so‐called ‘third‐country’ issue may prove to be among the most significant. This problem refers to the necessity of associating states outside the EU with CESDP. In this regard, three states stand out — the United States, Turkey and Russia — and this article considers their concerns and the European response in detail. This is prefaced by a general overview of how the third‐country problem emerged and what the EU has done to address it. It concludes by suggesting that third‐country considerations could well determine where and how EU‐led missions operating under the auspices of CESDP are deployed.     

The EU, the OSCE and the European security architecture: network or labyrinth?

The shake-up of the European security architecture produced by the end of the Cold War has not led to a clear-cut division of labour between the different actors involved. While one organization, the Western European Union (WEU), has all but disappeared, the expansion of the EU and NATO in terms of both competencies and membership and the institutionalization of the OSCE have resulted in an intricate web of functionally and geographically overlapping institutions.Senior research fellow in the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB) in Brussels and professor of European security at Ghent University in Belgium.

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The evolution of the European economy: Implications for Trans‐Atlantic relations

The Russian attitude towards the European Neighbourhood Policy constitutes a serious obstacle to the realisation of the Union's agenda in its neighbourhood. The Russian challenge takes three main forms: 1) with Russia not a part of the EU's overall approach involving the principle of conditionality, the Union's legitimacy and international actorness in general is in danger of being undermined; 2) Russia is increasingly starting to put forward its own model of operation, thus hampering the realisation of the Union's goals in the neighbourhood; 3) Russia is engaging in business activities that are in effect undoing the ENP's energy component. There are no easy fixes to these problems. What the Union must do is believe in its own values and visions: it is only by example that it can promote its ideals outside its institutional boundaries.     

Embracing “embedded security”: the OSCE's understated but significant role in the European security architecture

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is perhaps the world's least-known major security organization. However, the same characteristic which puts the OSCE seemingly continually on the verge of irrelevance with respect to the other actors in European and global security is in fact what has allowed it to endure and is in fact its greatest asset. That is, the OSCE's distinct combination of modern and postmodern characteristics in both its composition and its activities allows it to create what can be called “embedded security”. Tracing the evolution of one particular set of decision-making rules embedded within a normative framework which questioned the fundamental meanings of “security”, and exploring present-day activities, this article reinterprets the OSCE in the light of this new model. In so doing, it re-contextualizes both the OSCE's origins and its contemporary relevance. Instead of a modernist, functional, rule-driven interpretation which situates the OSCE on the periphery in a crowded field, this explanation puts the OSCE at the centre of the postmodern and normative European security architecture.     

Former Yugoslav space: The ‘eastern question’ and European security

This article begins by tracking the footprints left by politicians, statesmen, and diplomats who set out to solve the ‘Eastern Question’ created by the collapse of the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian Empires in southeastern Europe. The analysis focuses on the consequences within former Yugoslav space of outcomes created by competing agendas of these international power brokers and political/military leaders of state‐building nations fighting to gain or expand territorial homelands in the name of historic justice or self‐determination. It concludes by evaluating security policy and options in Kosovo as of January 1999.     

European security and early warning systems: from risks to threats in the European Union’s health security sector

This article critically examines a poorly understood aspect of the European security landscape: early warning systems (EWSs). EWSs are socio-technical systems designed to detect, analyse, and disseminate knowledge on potential security issues in a wide variety of sectors. We first present an empirical overview of more than 80 EWS in the European Union. We then draw on debates in Critical Security Studies to help us make sense of the role of such systems, tapping into conceptual debates on the construction of security issues as either “threat” or “risk” related. Finally, we study one EWS – the Early Warning and Response System for infectious diseases – to understand how it works and how it reconciles risk – versus threat-based security logics. Contrary to assumptions of a clear distinction between risk- and threat-based logics of security, we show that EWSs may serve as a “transmission belt” for the movement of issues from risk into threats.     

The European Union's human security discourse: where are we now?

The language of human security has been prominent in the European Union's (EU) official discourse for a number of years. However, whilst it has been promoted as a new approach for the EU in the development of its security and defence policy, the aim of this article is to assess the extent to which it actually features in the EU's contemporary strategic discourse and practice. It seeks to uncover where and how the concept is spoken within the EU's institutional milieu, how it is understood by the relevant policy-makers in the EU and the implication of this across key areas of human security practice. It is argued in the article that human security has not been embedded as the driving strategic concept for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in an era of crisis and change in Europe and beyond and that the prospects for this materialising in the near future are rather thin.     

‘Walking the tightrope’: The Kosovo conflict and Russia in European security, 1998–August 1999

This article argues that Russia has pursued a policy of inclusive multipolarity towards European security after Primakov's appointment as Foreign Minister in 1996. This policy focused on three dimensions to constrain NATO and ensure a Russian voice in Europe. First, ties with NATO; second, the pursuit of OSCE reform and a European ‘Security Charter'; third, the primacy of the UN Security Council in international affairs. NATO actions in the Kosovo crisis deeply undermined all dimensions of this policy. However, inclusive multipolarity was not discarded by the Russian leadership. The tortuous path of Russian accommodation after May 1999 highlighted Russian attempts to reinstate this policy and restore a Russian voice in European security affairs — with limited success. This article examines the evolution of Russian shifts in this crisis until Vladimir Putin's appointment as Prime Minister in August 1999.