The Capability–Capacity Crunch: NATO's New Capacities for Intervention

Abstract

In September 2006 NATO's role in Afghanistan expanded to cover the whole of the country. With 32,000 troops under NATO command Stage 4 of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) represents an open-ended commitment to rebuilding a country long torn by war and instability. The Alliance's showpiece for advanced military transformation, the the NATO Response Force (NRF) represents a down payment on the future of transatlantic military co-operation. Taken together these two developments reflect the reality of NATO's new interventionism of an Alliance that bears little or no resemblance to that which won the Cold War. NATO today is an organisation designed for global reach and global effect, undertaking operations at their most robust. Unfortunately, the re-design of NATO's architecture has not been matched by a parallel development in Alliance military capabilities. NATO's big three, the US, Britain and France, have taken steps to improve their military capabilities. However, the transformation of NATO's other militaries has proved slow and uneven, leaving many members unable to fulfil any meaningful role. Thus, as NATO today plans for both robust advanced expeditionary warfare and stabilisation and reconstruction vital to mission success in complex crisis management environments a gap is emerging. Indeed, in an Alliance in which only the Americans can afford both military capability and capacity most NATO Europeans face a capability–capacity crunch, forced to make a choice between small, lethal and expensive professional military forces or larger, cheaper more ponderous stabilisation and reconstruction forces. This article explores the consequences of the crunch and the implications for NATO's current and future role as the Alliance struggles to find a balance between fighting power and staying power.     

NATO's Response Force: finally getting it right?

Abstract

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) declared the NATO Response Force (NRF) a fully operational capability. Yet only 8 months later – and behind closed doors – the Alliance's military authorities rescinded the declaration as it became increasingly clear that member states were unwilling to make the necessary commitments to the force. To this day, the force has been a qualified failure: while many allies have benefited from participating in the NRF, lack of concrete troop commitments and disagreement as to the force's operational role have largely eroded its credibility. This could change with the allies' recent adoption of a revised NRF-construct. However, as NATO is still in a state of strategic confusion, the NRF is likely to continue to be different things to different nations.     

American security policy and NATO's future

NATO remains the United States’ principal instrument for shaping the security environment in Europe. It acts as a long‐run hedge against a possible resurrected Russian threat to the continent and to dampen the prospects for the renationalization of military and security policies in Europe. The United States faces formidable challenges to ensure the viability of NATO after the Cold War. Washington must be prepared to engage in a grand balancing act on several fronts to perpetuate the Alliance. It must support NATO enlargement to move the Alliance's geopolitical center eastward, but not to territory that would practically indefensible in the event of a resurgent Russia. Out‐of‐area operations will preoccupy Alliance attention in the near‐future, but too great an appetite for undertaking peacekeeping missions might over time substantially erode the Alliance's ability to deter or withstand the political and military pressure from a resurgent Russia or major power or coalition on the outlying areas of the Eurasian landmass.     

NATO Regional peacekeeping center in Central and Eastern Europe: A proposal

Abstract

The article asks what the evolution of NATO–Swedish relations signifies for the understanding of the evolution of security communities. Given the astonishing evolution of NATO and Sweden as a community of practise, it is logical to imagine the two as forming part of the same security community. It could then be argued that common practise can bring about new security communities rather hastily. Analysing NATO's and Sweden's recent discourses on security, the author identifies a significant gap between a principally realist and a predominantly idealist discourse that indicates that the two parties do not share key characteristics of a security community – identities, values and meanings. However, if Libya is the case of the future, the discursive differences may fade and Sweden could more easily pursue its journey towards inclusion in NATO, not as a member of an Alliance, but as a member of NATO as a security community.     

The Common Security and Defence Policy as an act of American hegemony

Abstract

The financial crisis endangers the security of NATO's members and partners. As such, NATO has a formal obligation to mobilize its resources to aid members in overcoming current economic challenges. NATO can play a valuable role on three levels. First, NATO can aid members in rationalizing their military procurement and manpower systems, thus reducing the fiscal burden of maintaining adequate defenses. Second, NATO can press the ECB and the EU to modify arrangements governing the Euro so as to minimize the risk that EMU will collapse. Finally, NATO has a “soft power” role in vigorously defending the liberal economic order and democratic political institutions of the Western Alliance from the ideological attacks that inevitably follow financial crises.     

Regional collective security in Europe: Past patterns and future prospects

NATO's entry into the Balkan war raised salient questions about the alliance's broader mission and, more generally, about Europe's security architecture. This article confronts these questions by revisiting the debate about collective defense versus collective security as organizing principles for alliances. NATO is viewed as serving a hybrid role of promoting collective defense and regional collective security. This latter, under‐valued function relates to NATO's role in promoting internal cohesion among its members and is crucial to understanding the alliance's evolution and its persistance long after the Cold War.     

Does Russia need a general staff?

The institutional arrangements and mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts will determine the future of European security and the balance of power in a wider Europe. Russian policy and Russia‐NATO relations are anaylsed within the context of the ongoing changes at Russia's southern periphery. The embryos of three distinct security systems are developing ‐ a Russia‐led, a NATO‐led and one led by the international community. The article suggests that instability in the southern periphery in the future will require security cooperation and a joint approach by Russia and NATO countries.     

Interregional relations and legitimacy in global governance: the EU in ASEM

This article explores the ramifications of the European Union’s (EU) internal legitimacy debate for its external relations. It applies the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) as a case study to examine the EU’s attempts to promote legitimacy in global governance, more specifically in interregional institutions. The article’s theoretical framework draws from the EU’s legitimacy debate. It identifies three key sources of legitimacy, namely, (i) input legitimacy or democratic control and accountability, (ii) output legitimacy or performance and achievement of core purposes, and (iii) the degree of common identity as externalised through collective representation and the articulation of shared norms and values. The empirical analysis thereafter leads to three observations. First, the EU’s presence has contributed to an increased democratic involvement by ASEM’s different stakeholders including parliaments and civil society. Second, purely from an institutional legitimacy perspective ASEM achieves its purpose as a forum to ‘constructively engage’ with Asian countries and address issues relating to global governance. Third, ASEM reveals the EU’s dual identity as an intergovernmental grouping and an organisation with a gradually increasing capacity of collective representation. However, the advancement of the EU’s normative objectives through ASEM has been problematic, leading to a more interest-based and pragmatic policy path. The article concludes that the EU’s legitimacy debate has had a bearing on relations with Asia and, in particular, with ASEM. Importantly, and given the EU’s setbacks, some elements of the ‘EU’s way’ have proven successful in promoting democratic notions of legitimacy beyond the state.     

Still focused on the Atlantic: accounting for the limited Europeanization of Portuguese security policy

This article examines the limited Europeanization of contemporary Portuguese security policy and highlights how the persistence of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the emergence of the Lusophone world have shaped Portuguese participation in the European Union's (EU's) Common Foreign and Security Policy in recent years, particularly in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Africa and in the European Defence Agency's co-operation activities. Europeanization's conceptual weaknesses, combined with the mutually reinforcing nature of transatlantic, EU and Lusophone security co-operation, have reinforced the ambiguous nature of what a “Europeanized” vision for European security might look like, especially given long-standing loyalties to NATO. This affords states considerable margin for manoeuvrability in defining their security priorities, so long as they are seen as being broadly consistent. This article reassesses the appropriateness of the Europeanization concept and shows how Portugal has approached this strategic balancing act, supporting the development of the EU's CSDP whilst remaining loyal to NATO and seeking to develop security relations in the Lusophone world, achieving legitimacy by stressing complementarity and multilateralization in security co-operation.     

Nato Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations

The second enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the end of the cold war fueled an ongoing debate over whether the alliance contributes to democratization in Europe. In the 1990s, critics warned that the 1999 NATO enlargement would cultivate a new cold war and prove irrelevant to democratic consolidation in central Europe. Events have not borne out these forecasts, however. In Poland, not only did NATO build a civilian consensus in favor of democratic control over the armed forces corresponding to NATO norms, but it also delegitimized Polish arguments for defense self-sufficiency that had derived their credibility from Poland's experience of military vulnerability and foreign domination. Such democratizing and denationalizing trends have contributed to stability in postcommunist Europe. An assessment of the seven states that joined in 2004 similarly reveals some scope for NATO's influence in all cases. The alliance's access to domestic reform processes, however, will be uneven across cases in ways largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework in this article.

     

The Balkans and the enlargement of NATO: A sceptical view

Throughout the Cold War, NATO and the USA worked hard to consolidate their strategic presence in Europe, while at the same time containing the Soviet threat. But the road taken by NATO in its effort to reform itself after the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, has not been a royal path, smooth and free of risk. NATO's geopolitical and selective way of eastward expansion encourages the creation of new ‘enemy blocs’ with Russia at their epicentre. The clash between NATO and the European Union over defence and security issues becomes all the more obvious. The humanitarian war over Kosovo was a risky affair whose spillover effects are badly felt today with the uprising of Albanian Macedonians; The Kosovo war, moreover, created a unique precedent in the conduct of foreign policy and clearly bordered on ‘double standard’ politics. Last but not least, the wider implications of Turkey's entry into the European Union may not be, in the long run, as positive for NATO as initially thought they would be.

This article offers a critical overview of NATO's reform process in the 1990s and argues that its transformation from a military defence pact into a political organisation upholding and selectively implementing liberal‐democratic principles may lead the alliance into serious political deadlocks in the years to come.     

The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?

Recently there has been a trend towards the development of two rival sets of alliances in Eurasia: in effect, one Western‐oriented alignment led by the United States and Turkey, including Israel, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, a group of states resisting American and Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is developing, led by Russia and Iran, including Syria and Armenia. One of the most important questions for the development of these alignments is their expansion into Central Asia; in this context Uzbekistan's role is crucial. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in its relations with both its neighbors and great powers. Tashkent has developed close military and security relations with NATO and for a time seemed to hedge its bets on US support, but has lately shown signs of turning back toward increasing security cooperation with Russia and China. Given the strategic value of Uzbekistan and its role as a regional player in its own right, the future course of the country's policies is of great importance to the security of Eurasia.     

Security and governance in an uncertain world

This special issue has its origins in series of discussions within the Governance Research Centre, University of Bristol concerning the changing nature of conflict, security and development and debates about different conceptual lenses for explaining and understanding these changes. Our interest is in the relevance and the extent to which the multifaceted concept of governance explains security challenges in a world in which many previous certainties appear far less certain. Following a call for papers in 2003, we held a two-day workshop in December 2004 sponsored by NATO Public Diplomacy Programme and the International Policy Institute, King's College London to present and debate drafts of the papers, which were peer reviewed and revised for this special issue.     

A tale of a decade: European security governance and Russia

In the decade since the fall of the Berlin Wall the governance of European security has undergone a profound transformation. The beginning of this decade witnessed the end of the Cold War and, in parallel, the establishment of relatively inclusive mechanisms for addressing security‐related issues. While these mechanisms have largely endured (and, indeed, have been complemented by other types of interaction) they have not prevented the emergence of forms of exclusion on the continent. This is a condition of particular significance to Russia. Compared with its Soviet predecessor, it now enjoys far less influence in European security. Its exclusion, however, is only relative. Russia has retained a meaningful role and ‐ recent controversies over NATO enlargement and Kosovo notwithstanding ‐ the bases of its accommodation with the West still remain in place.     

Military professionalism in post‐communist Hungary and Poland: An analysis and assessment

Abstract

This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic ‘reset’, meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO–Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.     

The impact of the Iraqi Crisis on the transatlantic link. A summary of views on the US–EU and US–NATO relationship

Lithuania's security orientation has evolved significantly since 1991. It has moved from prioritising Baltic and, then, Nordic, cooperation to focusing on partnership with Poland, and seeking NATO and European Union membership. Initially re‐buffed by both, Lithuania has gradually sought to strengthen its de facto ties with NATO and WEU, and to build up its economic ties with the EU and its member states, in the belief that this provided a form of ‘soft’ security, and prepared the way for eventual membership of NATO and the EU.     

Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Pan-European Expectations

After the dissolution of the USSR, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sought to contribute to the transformation of Russia into a democratic state abiding by the rule of law and by international law. The Yeltsin administration concurred and adopted a generally cooperative posture within the CSCE. However, when Moscow suggested (as a counter-move against NATO's enlargement projects) the elaboration of a legal pan-European security system, the CSCE—now rebaptised OSCE—responded by means of the Istanbul Charter for European Security (1999), an empty text by Russian standards. Feeling that its interests were no longer served, the Putin administration warned that without drastic reforms the Organisation would be ‘doomed to extinction’. In order to defuse the crisis, the OSCE adopted a number of reform measures. Overall, however, the reform process brought very little to a Russia whose obsession with equality of status is now better addressed through bilateral institutional channels with NATO and the EU. In the present circumstances, the fate of the OSCE depends on the political value that the West attaches to this organisation, as well as Russia's wisdom not to break the single European security organisation where its place and role are fully legitimate.     

Norway and a major international crisis: Suez ‐ the very difficult case

This article reviews Norway's policy during the Suez crisis in 1956, how the policy was formed and how it can be explained. Emphasis is put on the decision‐making process and on the role of the powerful Norwegian Shipowners’ Association. It also discusses Norway's most important interests and considerations in policy formation, and how they were balanced. Norway's Suez policy is seen in connection with the close relations with Israel, which could be viewed as in conflict with the protection of Norway's NATO membership and vital economic interests, represented by the powerful shipowners. In the end, Norway's Suez policy is put in the context of the change in Norwegian foreign and security policy in general, a shift in emphasis from being Britain's close ally and friend to being under the protective umbrella of the US, the new superpower.     

Making sense of EU comprehensive security towards conceptual and analytical clarity

Abstract

European leaders frequently vaunt the European Union's distinctiveness in adopting and pursuing a comprehensive approach to security. The EU's profile as an international actor is designed to span across all dimensions of security. As a result, its security policy portfolio involves a large number of institutional actors and policies that need to be coordinated. The ambition of the EU to provide security in a comprehensive manner raises challenges at the politico–strategic level, at the level of operational and policy planning and in day-to-day implementation. So far, the field is lacking an inclusive analytical framework for the analysis of providing security through a distinctively comprehensive civil–military, economic and political organisation. This article seeks to close this gap by providing suggestions for how the wide range of issues related to comprehensive security could be structured, and by framing the matter theoretically and with reference to existing conceptual work and empirical research.