Whose legitimacy? The EU and Russia in contest for the eastern neighbourhood

The impact of external actors on political change in the European neighbourhood has mostly been examined through the prism of elite empowerment through externally offered incentives. The legitimacy of external policies has received less scrutiny, both with regard to liberal powers promoting democracy and illiberal powers preventing democracy. This article investigates the conflicting notions of legitimate political governance that underpin the contest between the European Union (EU) and Russia in the Eastern neighbourhood. It proposes four mechanisms of external soft influence that take into account the EU’s and Russia’s actorness and the structural power of their norms of political governance, and consider their effects on domestic actors and societal understandings of appropriate forms of political authority. It finally traces the EU’s and Russia’s soft influence on political governance in Ukraine. It maintains that through shaping the domestic understandings of legitimate political authority and reinforcing the domestic political competition, the EU and Russia have both left a durable imprint on Ukraine’s uneven political path.     

The Four Pillars of Russia’s Power Narrative

The Winter Olympic Games in Sochi and the annexation of Crimea were two major international events in which Russia engaged in early 2014. In spite of all the divergence in the logic underpinning each of them, four concepts strongly resonate in both cases. First, in hosting the Olympics and in appropriating Crimea, Russia was motivated by solidifying its sovereignty as the key concept in its foreign and domestic policies. Second, the scenarios for both Sochi and Crimea were grounded in the idea of strengthening Russia as a political community through mechanisms of domestic consolidation (Sochi) and opposition to unfriendly external forces (the crisis in Ukraine). Third, Sochi and Crimea unveiled two different facets of the logic of normalisation aimed at proving – albeit by different means – Russia’s great power status. Fourth, one of the major drivers of Russian policy in both cases were security concerns in Russia’s southern flanks, though domestic security was also an important part of the agenda.     

乌克兰国家安全危机分析

冷战结束后的相当长时间内,乌克兰在对外战略的抉择中不断陷入困境。在与国际体系的互动过程中,因处于大国地缘竞争的过渡地带,造成自身在领土安全和国家稳定方面的悲剧局面。乌克兰的外交重点处于西方或俄罗斯这两种外交方向的不断转换之中,通过平衡这两种政策的运用来增进国家的实力和利益。与此对应,大国通过遵守规则予以奖励,漠视规则进行遏制与惩罚的方式来应对乌克兰的对外行为。其结果是乌克兰与周边大国的互动逐渐陷入循环往复式的困境,处境变得日益糟糕。乌克兰内部的认同冲突根源于其处于特殊的地缘政治地带之上的历史互动与实践,并最终造就乌克兰的弱国家地位,使得其在国际体系中处于边缘化的角色,国家安全与诉求长期遭到漠视,在内外冲突的互动过程中,乌克兰的国家安全问题不断恶化。     

The unexpected EU leadership on landmines: the influence of the Ottawa Convention on the EU

Abstract

The European Union (EU) has led international politics on antipersonnel landmines (APLs) for a decade now, and its foreign policy in this domain is perceived as a success story. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the negotiations that led to the Ottawa Convention, the EU looked unable to play any relevant part. This article addresses the emergence of the EU's foreign policy on APLs by arguing, in a second image-reversed way, that the corresponding international regime has deeply influenced the EU. It has changed Member States' and EU institutions' preferences, and it has empowered pro-Ottawa and pro-integration actors. This article explores the intra-EU conditions that have facilitated this influence and the way in which the regime itself has shaped them.     

转型后俄乌两国经济联系探析

苏联时期俄罗斯与乌克兰两个加盟共和国间的经济联系是一个有机的整体，苏联解体后，俄乌转变为两个相互间有着内在紧密联系的独立国家。由于乌克兰特殊的地缘经济政治地位，与欧洲经济一体化也同样是乌克兰优先发展的对外政策，在政治因素的影响下两国在能源、农产品和军工领域的合作进程发展缓慢。从长远来看，发展两国间的内在经济联系，促进两国间多领域合作是符合两国经济发展共同利益的方向。     

Liberalism and geopolitics in EU–Russia relations: rereading the “Baltic factor”

Contrary to some expectations, the Baltic states’ accession to the EU in 2004 was not followed by an improvement in their relations with Russia. Instead, the Baltic states became known as the “troublemakers” of EU–Russia relations. This was commonly explained by their history and national identity, which contributed to an understanding of the Baltic concerns as marginal. The Ukraine crisis brought a reaction of “I told you so” by the Baltic states that for many years had been warning the West about Russia’s expansionist ambitions. This article explores the ideational underpinnings of the gap between the Baltic states’ perceptions of and relations with Russia on the one hand and mainstream views in Europe on the other. It identifies liberal interdependence, democratic peace, and realist geopolitics as key ideas that have framed the EU’s and Baltic states’ perceptions of Russia. In the vein of constructivist foreign policy analysis, these ideational structures are seen to condition the EU’s and Baltic states’ interests and policies vis-à-vis Russia. An analysis of the “Baltic factor” helps to illuminate the contradictions and shortcomings in the EU’s Russia policy and review its ideational basis which is now in need of a strategic rethink.     

Spoiler or facilitator of democratization?: Russia's role in Georgia and Ukraine

In the post-Soviet space, Georgia and Ukraine are broadly perceived as exceptions to the growing authoritarianism in the region owing to the far-reaching political changes triggered by the so-called Colour Revolutions a decade ago. This article examines Russia's reaction to political changes in Georgia and Ukraine in light of the interplay between the democracy-promotion policies implemented by the EU and US and domestic patterns of democratization. We argue that despite the relatively weak impact of EU and US policies vis-à-vis domestic structures, Russia has responded harshly to (what it perceives as) a Western expansionist agenda in pursuit of reasserting its own hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space. However, coercive pressure from Russia has also unintended, counterproductive effects. We argue that the pressure has actually made Georgia and Ukraine more determined to pursue their pro-Western orientation and has spawned democratization, thereby supporting the objectives of the Western democracy promoters.     

Russia as a ‘virtual great power’: Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security

Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia's domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid‐ and long‐term strategic trends and the consequences of Russia's decline for European and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long‐term socio‐economic decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a Great Power or even Superpower in the mid‐term future even of its economy and military power improve rapidly and substantially. Against this background, two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the EU and China will surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the coming decades with far‐reaching consequences for the international system and Russia's security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well a East Asia. In this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the Russian Federation, the future of Russia's military reform policies (including Russia's draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications for Russia's future foreign and security policies.     

The Fundamental Role of International (Criminal) Law in the War in Ukraine

The repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are reverberating around the world. The multilateral and coordinated response of the international community to Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine was immediate and has been waged on multiple fronts. While the world’s major powers are focused on the best strategies to face the ongoing conflict, international humanitarian law and human rights law are violated every day in Ukraine. Innocent civilians are tortured, killed, or obliged to leave their city or country to avoid the worst atrocities, while civilian buildings and infrastructure are destroyed. This article examines the most relevant decisions adopted at the international level and identifies possible solutions to prosecute and punish international crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. International (criminal) law and cooperation between states and international organizations will play a crucial role in the fight against impunity for those responsible for the worst atrocities against the Ukrainian population.     

Ukraine,Russia and the strategic partnership dynamics in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood: recalibrating the EU’s ‘self’, ‘we’ and ‘other’

The present contribution explores the changing relationship between the European Union (EU) and the two largest countries in its eastern neighbourhood, namely Ukraine and Russia, between 1991 and 2014. Taking the differential between the existence of the EU Strategic Partnership (SP) with Russia and the absence of such an arrangement in the relationship with Ukraine as a point of departure, it investigates how the EU has dealt with different aspirations and challenges stemming from its two largest eastern neighbours. Adopting the Social Identity Theory perspective, the contribution analyses the interrelationship between the evolution of the EU’s SP approach towards the eastern neighbours and the development of (particular dimensions of) the EU’s identity. It demonstrates how the process of categorization relating to the ideational ‘self’, ‘we’ and ‘other’ took place; and how only the EU’s relationship with Russia and not that with Ukraine has accumulated the discursive markers of a strategic partnership. The contribution, furthermore, analyses the challenges to the EU changing approach stemming from the 2013–2014 Ukraine crisis.     

Democracy promotion between the “political” and the “developmental” approach: US and German policies towards Belarus

Following the end of the East–West conflict, the global spread of liberal democracy became an important strategic objective in world politics. Primarily, the foreign policy of the US and EU (states) demonstrated the relevance of democracy promotion abroad. While Western democracies' policy objectives regarding democracy promotion go well together, an obvious difference between their approaches in this area has often been shown: a largely “political” approach of the US vs a “developmental” one of European states. Accordingly, this article focuses on recent tendencies in democracy promotion by comparing US and German policies in the European post-Soviet space in order to investigate the expression of both approaches in a strategically important region. It thereby analyses the pivotal case of Belarus, which presents a great challenge to democracy promoters. The study concludes that external democracy promotion in that part of the world does not show a clear differentiation between the two approaches, and suggests a few potential explanations to be explored in future research.     

俄罗斯对美国战略认知的演变及其政策效应

俄罗斯对美国战略认知的演变过程分为友好合作、竞争凸显和激烈对抗三个阶段。俄罗斯的强势外交和安全政策,表现为俄罗斯对美国和北约的强硬战略姿态以及追求超出自身相对实力的外交和安全目标。俄罗斯战略认知的演变与俄美两国的利益冲突之间有着相互塑造的关系,但是俄罗斯战略认知的变化并不仅仅取决于利益考量。俄罗斯之所以把北约东扩、乌克兰走向、叙利亚局势等看得如此重要,不惜投入大量资源,这是与塑造俄罗斯战略认知的历史和心理因素是分不开的。美国采取的许多对俄政策和行为,正是因为忽略了这些因素,才被俄罗斯看作是“侮辱性”和“威胁性”的,从而导致了双方敌意的螺旋式上升。由于俄罗斯独特的历史记忆和大国情结,俄罗斯对俄美两国的利益冲突作出了激烈的回应,这些回应虽然不利于俄罗斯的国家实力和整体利益,但却是可以理解的。随着俄罗斯对美战略认知的逐步定型,俄美关系在短期内很难实现所谓的“重启”。从俄罗斯对美战略认知的案例分析可以看出,战略认知自身有其相对的独立性,在受到利益冲突影响的同时,也受到社会文化因素的深刻影响,从而使得国家的外交与安全政策未必完全遵循理性主义的路径。     

The EU’s Energy Union: A Sustainable Path to Energy Security?

The Ukraine crisis and subsequent tensions in relations with Russia urged the European Union to diversify its energy suppliers and integrate the energy markets of member states. However, the EU does not seem to have a clear strategy to strengthen its energy security. Member states are reluctant to relinquish control over their energy policy. Moreover, the diversification of fossil fuel suppliers may lead to new dependencies on authoritarian states, while the emphasis on unconventional energy sources may delay the development of renewables. A coordinated focus on renewable energy, coupled with investments in energy efficiency, appears to be the most forward-looking and climate-friendly way of reducing external dependencies.     

Ukraine's relations with the West since the Orange Revolution

Abstract

This article argues that many of Ukraine's problems are long-standing and remain unresolved because government policies are virtual (i.e. do not conform to official documents or statements) thereby reducing the effectiveness of the West's (here understood primarily as NATO and the EU) engagement with Ukraine and the ability of Kyiv to pursue its declared foreign policy objectives. The article discusses Ukraine's relations with the West through cycles of Disinterest, Partnership and Disillusionment. Under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma three cycles equated to Kravchuk's presidency (Disinterest, 1991–94), Kuchma's first term (Partnership, 1994–99) and second term (Disillusionment, 2000–04). Three cycles partially repeated itself during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency with Partnership (2005–06) after the Orange Revolution followed by Disillusionment (2007–09), often described as ‘Ukraine fatigue’. US Disinterest in Ukraine from 2009 is an outgrowth of the Barrack Obama administrations ‘re-set’ policies with Russia resembling the ‘Russia-first’ policies of the early 1990s George W. Bush administration. US Disinterest covers the late Yushchenko era and continued into the Yanukovych presidency. The West held out a hope of Partnership for Viktor Yanukovych following his February 2010 election after taking at face value his claim of becoming a more democratic leader, compared with during the 2004 elections, coupled with an expectation he would bring political stability to Ukraine. Partnership quickly evaporated into Disillusionment the following year.     

Responsibility to Protect: Russia’s Approaches

Abstract

Russia’s predominantly suspicious and even negative attitudes toward R2P are closely related to its traditional attachment to the notion of sovereignty, but its reluctance to ‘bless’ the use of force with R2P also serves as a pretext to cover various instrumental goals. Russia’s more assertive foreign policy has exacerbated this trend. Disagreements stem from differences between Russia and the West both in their conceptual approaches to security and in their assessments of specific cases. In particular, Russia has an existential concern over possible application of R2P by extra-regional actors in its immediate post-Soviet vicinity. However, in the conflicts around South Ossetia (2008) and Crimea / Southeastern Ukraine (2014-), there was a noticeable trend to refocus R2P-related arguments in support of Russia’s own actions. By and large, R2P continues to be perceived as a Western attempt to establish certain rules of behaviour which require caution and prudence. Nevertheless, more positive attitudes do not seem impossible. To play a prominent role in the evolving international system, Russia will have to make the R2P segment of its foreign policy more salient and overcome the lag in promoting this concept as a working tool indispensable for cooperative and responsible leadership.     

Germany and European security governance: how well does the Birmingham model perform?

Abstract

The expansion of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War, propelled by the blowback of 11 September 2001, raises questions about the German ability and willingness to contribute to the regional and global security governance tasks facing Europe and Germany's continuing fidelity to its post-war European avocation. It also calls for a reconsideration of the Birmingham model of foreign policy analysis, particularly its emphasis on (and interpretation of) the ideational and institutional factors defining the German foreign policy agenda and shaping German foreign policy behaviour, at least with respect to the implementation (rather than formulation) of European Union security policies. Towards assessing the continuing utility of the Birmingham model, this article proceeds in three steps: the presentation of the Birmingham model and its restatement as six conjectures; a discussion of the security governance functions undertaken by the EU and the collective action problem facing Europe (and Germany) in executing them; and an empirical investigation of Germany's contribution to the EU as a security actor since 1990.     

The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad

Russia's recent actions in its neighbourhood have not only upset Western policies but have also reinvigorated arguments that Russia may be promoting autocracy to counteract democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States. They have also underlined a broader problem: that of how illiberal powers may react to democracy promotion, especially when their strategic interests are at stake. This article investigates these issues by studying Russia's interactions with the countries in its neighbourhood and democracy promoters. First, the article argues that even if Russia has contributed to the stagnation of democratization and ineffectiveness of democracy promotion in its neighbourhood, its actions do not constitute autocracy promotion and largely lack ideological underpinnings. Second, Russia's counteraction to democracy promotion stems from its ambitions of restoring its great power status, maintaining its regional influence, and perceiving Western policies as a threat to its interests. Third, when it considers its strategic interests undermined, Russia employs economic and military threats (sometimes incentives) against its neighbourhood countries to make the compliance with Western policies less preferable.     

The narratives behind the EU's external perceptions: how civil society and elites in Ukraine,Israel and Palestine “learn” EU norms

ABSTRACT

The EU's normative promotion is a keystone in the arch of its Foreign and Security Policy, reflected in establishing a “ring of friends” in its neighbourhood. However, the EU's normative impact in these countries is often hindered by domestic constraints. Conversely, deeper socialisation through persuasion and “learning” may advance towards the promotion of EU norms better. By tracing the “learning” component of the EU's external perceptions in its Eastern (Ukraine) and Southern (Israel and Palestine) neighbourhoods, this paper elaborates upon the receptiveness of EU norms. Considering the specific attention that the ENP draws towards the support of civil society, this paper focuses on “learning” narratives of EU norms among civil society elites in Ukraine, Israel and Palestine as the key targets of EU assistance – with a particular focus on various conceptualisations of learning in the learning process. Notwithstanding perceptions of the EU as a normative power, we find that the learning processes remain too complex to be captured within a single theoretical framework. Whereas communicative rationality implies learning about each other's identities through rational arguing, our analysis demonstrates that identity performance is one of the most emotive and crucial factors in perceptions of learning.     

Bush: The Sequel

This article examines the likely foreign policy initiatives of the U.S. under the leadership of George W. Bush. The new president has outlined a fairly thorough critique of America's international behavior in the 1990s. Because a leader's public statements arguably serve to persuade various audiences and to build support for policy change, the article takes Bush's words quite seriously—along with those spoken or written by his closest foreign affairs advisors. Bush intends to abandon the so-called Clinton Doctrine and deploy national missile defenses. He is critical of American policies toward China and Russia, but has not presented bold new initiatives toward those powers. Under the rubric of "compassionate conservatism," Bush may alter U.S. relations toward the Global South in some interesting ways. The president and his advisors often purport to be realists, but the article demonstrates that their own words belie this claim as they often justify policies based on ideals rather than the pursuit of power.     

NATO: The View from the East

Abstract

Relations between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and NATO have placed more emphasis on cooperation than confrontation since the Cold War, and Ukraine has begun to move towards membership. At the popular level, on the evidence of national surveys in 2004 and 2005, NATO continues to be perceived as a significant threat, but in Russia and Ukraine it comes behind the United States (in Belarus the numbers are similar). There are few socioeconomic predictors of support for NATO membership that are significant across all three countries, but there are wide differences by region, and by attitudinal variables such as support for a market economy and for EU membership. The relationship between popular attitudes and foreign policy is normally a distant one; but in Ukraine NATO membership will require public support in a referendum, and in all three cases public attitudes on foreign policy issues can influence foreign policy in other ways, including the composition of parliamentary committees. In newly independent states whose international allegiances are still evolving, the associations between public opinion and foreign and security policy may often be closer than in the established democracies.