The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence

Abstract

European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member states. This article challenges such conventional state-centered wisdom by analyzing the influence of the Brussels-based EU officials in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Using four case studies and data from 105 semi-structured interviews, it shows that EU officials are most influential in the agenda-setting phase and more influential in civilian than in military operations. Their prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by their central position in the policy process. This allows them to get early involved in the operations. The absence of strong control mechanisms and doctrine in civilian crisis management gives them opportunities to affect civilian missions. Finally, EU officials direct civilian operations from Brussels, whereas the command of military operations is with the member states and NATO.     

Between European and national role conceptions – the EU3 initiative regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme

This paper addresses whether Germany, France and the UK (the EU3) – with the EU in the background – can shape their own approach to a common Europeanised position or even a European role conception regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme. As the EU3 initiative appears situated between Europeanisation and national role conceptions, it seems that the EU3 members – after a coherent start – were finally inclined to readapt themselves to certain of their national role conceptions, resulting in a “mix” of national and European role patterns in the process leading up to 2016. Currently, this mix hints at still-prevailing hindrances involved in genuine European conflict management, although this outcome holds the promise of greater European coherence in the future.

Abbreviations: E3: Germany, France and UK (without formal support of the EU); EU: European Union; EU3: Germany, France, UK and the “High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union”; EU3?+?3: official designation of the contact group concerning the Iranian Nuclear Programme, consisting of the EU3, the USA, Russia and China; IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency; P5?+?1: informal designation of the contact group concerning the Iranian Nuclear Programme, consisting of the EU3, the USA, Russia and China (Permanent Security Council Members [P5] plus Germany); UK: United Kingdom; UNs: United Nations; UNSR: Security Council of the United Nations     

Understanding EU crisis diplomacy in the European neighbourhood: strategic narratives and perceptions of the EU in Ukraine,Israel and Palestine

ABSTRACT

This Special Issue seeks to better understand the role of communication and perception in EU crisis diplomacy. In a recent Special Issue in this journal, Catarina Kinnvall, Ian Manners and Jennifer Mitzen argue that, “?…?the greatest security challenge facing people across Europe is not physical, despite the threats of Putin and ISIS, but is a sense of fear and anxiety over their daily lives” [2018. Introduction to 2018 Special Issue of European Security: “Ontological (in)security in the European Union”. European security, 27 (3), 249–265]. We take an interdisciplinary approach to widen the scope of studies on European security and offer new avenues for further research into how citizens in the EU’s neighbourhood understand the security challenges they face and the role the EU plays in addressing these. Through this, we aim to bring theoretical and methodological innovation to understanding the role of the EU as an external actor.     

Explaining the European Parliament’s gains in the EU Constitution

The Constitutional Treaty, like each set of reforms since the Single European Act, would constitute another incremental increase in the European Parliament’s powers. But the Parliament did not get everything it wanted. What we do in this paper is investigate why the European Parliament tends to ‘win’ in some areas but not in others. We consider five possible explanations and test these theories by looking at the issues the Parliament promoted in the constitutional negotiations and the factors that determined whether the Parliament was successful or not in a particular area. We find that the Parliament gains power in areas where the governments delegate new powers to the EU and are uncertain about the consequences of this delegation. We also find that public support for the Parliament played a role in the extension of the Parliament’s powers in the Constitution.

The EU and the Global Order: Contingent Liberalism

Abstract

Politicians, diplomats and analysts commonly assume that commitment to multilateralism and liberal norms is part of the EU’s very DNA. Increasingly, however, the EU’s commitment to the liberal global order is more selective. We demonstrate the shift to a more contingent liberalism by examining the EU’s recent record in relation to four different challenges: international trade; US leadership; Russian actions in the eastern neighbourhood; and security in the Middle East. We speculate on what this may portend for the EU’s self-identity, European interests and the integrity of the prevailing global order.     

The European Parliament as an actor in EU border policies: its role,relations with other EU institutions,and impact

This contribution focuses on the European Parliament (EP) as an actor in European Union (EU) border policies. It situates the Parliament in the dynamics of the Schengen project and discusses the distinct role it plays therein, as well as its impact thereon. The article argues that the EP managed to establish itself, years before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, as a credible actor in border policies able to bring the citizens’ perspective into EU border policies. With its keen interest in the Schengen area as an area in which citizens can move freely without being subject to border controls, and with its focus on fundamental rights, it played, and continues to do so, a role in ensuring that “Schengen works”. The article presents its powers and the interplay with the other EU institutions, mainly on the basis of a number of key examples.     

The Eurafrique Initiative,Ernest Bevin and Anglo–French Relations in the Foreign Office, 1945–1950

This analysis examines the prevalence of Eurafrican thinking in the British Foreign Office throughout the late 1940s. Drawing on British and French diplomatic archives, it reveals the centricity of the Foreign Office, and British Embassy at Paris to a project largely confined to the mental map of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The financial stains facing Britain, often misinterpreted as “decline”, seemed a temporary phenomenon that “multilateral European cooperation” could rectify. Although shelved in 1949–1950, the Eurafrique initiative has seen few historians analyse its strategies across the corridors of power. This analysis reappraises British desires for Western European “co-operation” and a renewed faith in the Entente Cordiale as a geo-political counterweight to growing East–West bipolarity. Discussions of strategies to pool African possessions to recover the European economy were short-lived. Yet they challenged prospects of long-term economic dependence upon the United States in favour of an Anglo–French led European bloc.     

What do ESDP actors want? An exploratory analysis

Abstract

This paper analyzes the preferences of European defense actors vis-à-vis the European security and defense policy (ESDP) with a view to identifying the main ideational points of convergence and fault lines that structure this policy domain. In an exploratory analysis that relies on an original data-set compiled from systematic interviews conducted with 73 ESDP actors in France, the UK, Germany, and Brussels, we address two research questions. First, what do ESDP actors think about ESDP? Second, can we classify their preferences according to sociological factors that underpin the ESDP domain? To conceptualize the belief system of ESDP actors, we propose a typology that distinguishes (1) the social context in which ESDP actors are embedded and (2) the specific ESDP aspects about which preferences are shaped. Our results suggest that both national and occupational variables play an important role in explaining the preferences of ESDP actors.     

Missing the nuclear boat? British policy and French military nuclear ambitions during the EURATOM foundation negotiations, 1955–56

This paper examines the neglected nuclear dimension of the ‘relaunch’ of Europe at Messina. France favoured British membership of EURATOM and some interests in Britain saw the commercial and diplomatic advantages of Britain's leadership of the European nuclear industry. However, the possibility of a French military nuclear programme and European nuclear proliferation compounded Britain's established reluctance either to participate in European integration or to jeopardize the prospect of Anglo‐American nuclear weapons cooperation. Britain's aversion to using the hypothetical ‘nuclear card’ is a recurrent theme in Anglo‐French diplomacy.     

Who’s afraid of an EU tax and why?—revenue system preferences in the European Parliament

The current revenue system of the EU is still structured like that of an organization based on intergovernmental cooperation, although the EU is already far advanced in legislative and political integration. This antagonism gives reason to discuss whether or not the EU should be granted an autonomous tax source. Our contribution to this debate explores the factors which shape the acceptance of the EU tax option among European policy makers. A self-conducted survey among Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), which resulted in a response of some 150 of the representatives, offers us a unique database. Concerning MEPs’ revenue system preferences, our findings confirm an important impact of party ideology and individual characteristics while they indicate that country-specific factors also contribute to understand the attitudes towards an EU tax. In the light of our findings the status quo bias in the revenue system of the EU can be attributed to the persistent importance of national interests with respect to tax policy.

‘A question between empires’: the restriction of Japanese immigration in British Columbia and the reassessment of Japan's foreign policy, 1907–1908

Abstract

Great Britain was the first of the major Powers that revised its unequal treaty with Japan, recognizing the success of Japan's modernization and its growing role in the international arena. However, British Columbia perceived Japanese residents as a threat to ‘the British character’ of this regions' population profile. After the movement against Japanese residents in British Columbia peaked during the anti-Japanese riots in Vancouver in September of 1907, Canadian Minister of Labor Rodolphe Lemieux headed a diplomatic delegation to Tokyo to negotiate the restriction of Japanese immigration to Canada. The dispatch of this mission revealed some of the complexities in relations between the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London on the one hand and the Dominion's and British Columbian governments on the other. Based on previously unused primary sources, this article will examine the interplay between the policy towards Japanese migrants in the British Dominion of Canada and the British policy towards Japan as a nation.     

The High Representative and directoires in European foreign policy: the case of the nuclear negotiations with Iran

ABSTRACT

The negotiations with Iran about its nuclear programme have seen the most protracted involvement of the High Representatives of the European Union in a high-profile policy case. This article traces the evolution of the High Representatives’ participation in the negotiations, from the first contacts with the E3 (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) in 2003 to the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. It focuses on the institutional role the High Representatives played in relation with the directoires leading the talks with Iran – first the E3 and, since 2006, E3/EU. In this context, it examines the personal and organisational factors that affected the influence each of the three High Representatives (Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini) had in regard to the directoires. The analysis distinguishes specifically between the phases before and after the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The article shows how similar personal qualities of the three High Representatives in terms of problem-solving and trust-building gave them political capital that enabled them to adopt a fairly constant role as bridge-builders within the directoires and between the directoires and other actors. The reforms of the Lisbon Treaty had only a minor impact.     

Germany and European security governance: how well does the Birmingham model perform?

Abstract

The expansion of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War, propelled by the blowback of 11 September 2001, raises questions about the German ability and willingness to contribute to the regional and global security governance tasks facing Europe and Germany's continuing fidelity to its post-war European avocation. It also calls for a reconsideration of the Birmingham model of foreign policy analysis, particularly its emphasis on (and interpretation of) the ideational and institutional factors defining the German foreign policy agenda and shaping German foreign policy behaviour, at least with respect to the implementation (rather than formulation) of European Union security policies. Towards assessing the continuing utility of the Birmingham model, this article proceeds in three steps: the presentation of the Birmingham model and its restatement as six conjectures; a discussion of the security governance functions undertaken by the EU and the collective action problem facing Europe (and Germany) in executing them; and an empirical investigation of Germany's contribution to the EU as a security actor since 1990.     

The logic underpinning EU crisis management operations

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) epitomises the EU's aspirations to be a key actor in global security. The logic underlying the policy, however, remains contentious. In order to elucidate the latter, this article compares the plausibility of different theoretical frameworks. It suggests that liberal IR theory offers considerable explanatory power in this respect, and argues that the decisive forces behind CSDP operations are governmental interests as defined by domestic expectations. European governments’ shared interest lies in being perceived to effectively further national interests and domestically held values. Yet, this preoccupation with domestic politics also entails and explains CSDP's often-noted inconsistencies and constraints.     

Rapid response or evasive action? Regional organization responses to peace operation demands

Abstract

Scholars have largely overlooked a critical influence on the effectiveness of organizations in their conduct of peace operations: response duration. The consequences of prolonging the time between the demand and supply of a peace operation often include a rise in the death toll on the ground and a fall in the operation's legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. This paper aims to present and explain surprising variation among regional organizations' response rates – a critical influence on operations' prospects for success. The evidence that I have collected shows that despite its relative superior capacity, the European Union responds more slowly than the African Union and other less affluent regional organizations conducting similar peace operations. Applying theories of international organization pathologies, the paper argues that institutional design problems of bureaucratic dysfunction hinder organizations' abilities to rapidly respond.     

Linking Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Russia

ABSTRACT

Empirical studies in democracies have revealed some degree of causal relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. A look at the relationship between the evolution of Russian foreign policy priorities, as evidenced in the Foreign Policy Concepts (2000, 2008, 2013 and 2016), and public opinion regarding foreign policy measured from 1997 to 2018 shows significant shifts in perceptions of the nation’s international image. The amity/enmity feelings towards others can be explained as responses to key international events, endorsing the thesis of a rational and reactive public. Overall, public opinion and the official policy line in Russia move in the same direction.     

Altiero Spinelli's European Federal Odyssey

Spinelli became committed to the federal idea in 1940–41 when, towards the end of his sixteen years as a political prisoner, he read books by British federalist authors which convinced him that federalism could resolve the crises of nation-states in a democratic, liberal way. He initiated draft treaties for largely federal European constitutions in the 1950s and the 1980s. The first, for a European Political Community (EPC), was inspired by his insistence that the proposed European army must be responsible to a federal government. But when France abandoned the European Defence Community, the EPC went down too. In the 1980s, as a member of the European Parliament, he led it in producing, and approving by a big majority, a Draft Treaty establishing the European Union. It attracted impressive support, led by French President Mitterrand. The outcome was the more modest Single European Act which, however, led on to major reforms in subsequent treaties. Both occasions demonstrated the synergy between Spinelli's federal vision and Monnet's method of federal steps.     

Cyber insecurity as a national threat: overreaction from Germany,France and the UK?

Abstract

This article analyses the development of the European Union (EU) as a global actor in the area of climate security. Building on this, it explicitly draws on constructivist concepts such as norm entrepreneurship and epistemic communities. To this end, it adopts the framework of epistemic communities, as developed by Peter Haas, in order to suggest that there is a group of EU officials, EU member states and think-tank activists, who drive the climate security agenda of the EU. Thus, it examines the precise actors involved in this EU epistemic community for climate security. This group promotes a reason for action at the global level, resulting in the attempt to diffuse this norm: climate change has consequences for international security; thus, it requires the development of appropriate policies and capabilities within the EU and globally. This article suggests that the epistemic community on climate security has been effective at diffusing this norm at both levels, albeit with differences.     

A Review of: “Brynjar Lia. Architect of Global Jihad: The life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri.”

During the quarter century before the First World War, anarchist terrorism was often blamed on the impact of anarchist agitators on naïve immigrants. This article seeks to investigate the truth of this claim, focusing particularly on Italian emigrants, but also looking at some examples of Spanish, French, and Russian emigrants. My conclusion is that, with a few exceptions, radicals emigrated, but emigration did not create radical terrorists. A particularly good example of this can be found by examining the large Italian emigration to Argentina. At most, the emigrant experience may have heightened a pre-existing radicalism or given more precise configuration to its violent expression.     

Purpose and behaviour: The Cuban missile conflict revisited

Fairly strong theoretical arguments posit that the use of force to achieve foreign policy objectives and the milita’ rization of society are part of a self‐amplifying feedback process. In spite of the rather coherent reasoning linking these two factors, little empirical work has attempted to demonstrate the strength of this postulated relationship. This analysis uses a system of equations to model this hypothesized feedback in the US and British societies during the 20th century. The findings presented below lend tentative support for the hypothesized feedback, though suggests that further verification might be facilitated through refinements in the operational indicators of violent foreign policy. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that systemic level variables contribute significantly to the propensity of the US and Great Britain to employ violence as a tool of foreign policy.