Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Pan-European Expectations

After the dissolution of the USSR, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sought to contribute to the transformation of Russia into a democratic state abiding by the rule of law and by international law. The Yeltsin administration concurred and adopted a generally cooperative posture within the CSCE. However, when Moscow suggested (as a counter-move against NATO's enlargement projects) the elaboration of a legal pan-European security system, the CSCE—now rebaptised OSCE—responded by means of the Istanbul Charter for European Security (1999), an empty text by Russian standards. Feeling that its interests were no longer served, the Putin administration warned that without drastic reforms the Organisation would be ‘doomed to extinction’. In order to defuse the crisis, the OSCE adopted a number of reform measures. Overall, however, the reform process brought very little to a Russia whose obsession with equality of status is now better addressed through bilateral institutional channels with NATO and the EU. In the present circumstances, the fate of the OSCE depends on the political value that the West attaches to this organisation, as well as Russia's wisdom not to break the single European security organisation where its place and role are fully legitimate.     

Turning Counter-Terrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages Turkmenistan

Abstract

From the early days of Putin's presidency, Russia's energy policy towards Central Asia has been intertwined with the policy of counter-terrorism, which initially was aimed at exploiting the threat of the Taliban in order to cajole the post-Soviet regimes into closer cooperation with Moscow. The deployment of US and NATO forces in the region in autumn 2001 signified a serious shrinking of Russia's influence but it invested considerable effort in recovering its position. A series of setbacks from spring 2004 to spring 2005 culminating in the'orange revolution’ in Ukraine made this period a true annus horribilis for Russian foreign policy but the brutal crackdown on the uprising in Andijan, Uzbekistan in May 2005 was the turning point. It helped Russia to design a counter-revolutionary strategy according to which it would be ready to provide extensive support to the regimes that were ready to defend themselves with forceful means. In order to legitimize this support, Moscow decided to revive and strengthen several post-Soviet inter-state organizations that for many years had essentially been ‘paper structures’. Russia has achieved some success in instrumentalizing the counter-revolutionary momentum to advance its energy interests; in this sense, it certainly works much better than the tired counter-terrorism policy. Building on this success is going to be more difficult due to the pronounced anti-Western content of this strategy.     

Military professionalism in post‐communist Hungary and Poland: An analysis and assessment

Abstract

This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic ‘reset’, meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO–Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.     

The crisis of the state in Russia

President Dmitry Medvedev is neither a “liberal” nor a “puppet” of his mentor, Vladimir Putin. He is a capable politician, who appears genuinely to believe in the rule of law. Yet his formative policy experience has been overwhelmingly dirigiste, the approach that is unlikely to change fundamentally under his presidency. Medvedev's personal preferences in foreign policy are largely in line with the policies initiated by Putin, although his rhetoric and style will likely be more conciliatory. He will inherit a plethora of problems created by Russia's assertive policy, both in its near and far abroad. Moreover, the institutional constraints and informal rules within which Medvedev will have to operate make policy continuity more likely than policy reversal.     

The Svalbard Archipelago in Russian Security Policy: Overcoming the Legacy of Fear – or Reproducing It?

Abstract

Drawing on the constructivist concept of ‘securitisation’, this article analyses Russia's perceptions of, and responses to, Norway's Svalbard policy in the 1990s and 2000s. The analysis focuses on three policy issues which have figured prominently on Russia's arctic security agenda in recent years: (1) the establishment and use of civilian radars and satellite ground stations on the archipelago, (2) the adoption of the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act, and (3) the Norwegian Coast Guard's fishery enforcement measures in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone. The article concludes that despite the changes that have taken place in the Euro-Arctic region after the Cold War, Svalbard has not ceased to be a security concern for Russia.     

Russia as a ‘virtual great power’: Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security

Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia's domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid‐ and long‐term strategic trends and the consequences of Russia's decline for European and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long‐term socio‐economic decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a Great Power or even Superpower in the mid‐term future even of its economy and military power improve rapidly and substantially. Against this background, two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the EU and China will surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the coming decades with far‐reaching consequences for the international system and Russia's security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well a East Asia. In this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the Russian Federation, the future of Russia's military reform policies (including Russia's draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications for Russia's future foreign and security policies.     

Russia's Artificial Intelligence Strategy: The Role of State-Owned Firms

In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that whichever country becomes the leader in artificial intelligence (AI) “will become the ruler of the world.” Yet Russia lags competitors like China and the United States substantially in AI capabilities. What is Russia's strategy for boosting development of AI technologies, and what role do groups within the Russian elite play in shaping this strategy? Russia's AI development strategy is unique in that it is led not by the government, nor by the private sector, but by state-owned firms. The government's distrust of Russia's largest tech firm, Yandex, has sidelined the company from national AI planning. Meanwhile, Russia's defense conglomerate Rostec publicly appears to focus less on artificial intelligence than on other high-tech priorities. As a result, Russia's AI development has been left to a state-owned bank, Sberbank, which has taken the lead in devising plans for government-backed investment in AI.     

EU and NATO Enlargement: Russia's Expectations,Responses and Options for the Future1

Abstract

For Russian policymakers no events in the post-Cold War period have had more momentous consequences or received greater public commentary, both before and after they occurred, than the almost simultaneous enlargement of NATO and the EU that took place in 2004. The most sensitive aspect of this ‘dual enlargement’ for the Russian Federation was the extension of these two organisations into the Baltic States, which had been part of the Soviet Union itself. Despite some uneasiness, Moscow anticipated that the extension of the EU into the former Soviet sphere, even into the former Soviet Union itself, would constitute a generally positive development, while NATO penetration of that sphere would be extremely harmful. Accordingly, Russia voiced little opposition to the EU's plans and made only limited efforts to insure that its major interests would be protected, while it actively sought to forestall the NATO project, especially with regard to the Baltics. As it turned out, however, most of Russia's expectations regarding the impact of these processes were mistaken, and Russia's interests were poorly served by its prior and subsequent responses.     

Does Russia need a general staff?

The institutional arrangements and mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts will determine the future of European security and the balance of power in a wider Europe. Russian policy and Russia‐NATO relations are anaylsed within the context of the ongoing changes at Russia's southern periphery. The embryos of three distinct security systems are developing ‐ a Russia‐led, a NATO‐led and one led by the international community. The article suggests that instability in the southern periphery in the future will require security cooperation and a joint approach by Russia and NATO countries.     

Studying a negative external actor: Russia's management of stability and instability in the ‘Near Abroad’

The literature on transition and democratization was for long dominated by internal explanatory factors such as economic performance, civil society, institutions, etc. Only recently have external actors' democratizing efforts – like those of the US and the EU – been systematically incorporated. But the perspective remains too constrained, since only ‘positive’ external actors are considered, while possible ‘negative’ actors are left aside. This article attempts to rectify some of the imbalance. First, an analytical framework that can be used to analyse both positive and negative external actors is proposed. Then, the framework is put into use through an analysis of the negative effects of Russia's foreign policy in the so-called ‘Near Abroad’. It is argued that two general effects take shape: the ‘policy of managed stability’ and the ‘policy of managed instability’. Both are weakening the democratic perspectives in the post-Soviet area, so I argue that Russia's foreign policy in the ‘Near Abroad’ is a, hitherto, underestimated and badly understood ‘negative’ factor in the literature on transition and democratization in the post-Soviet space.     

Rights vs. Effectiveness? The Autonomy Thesis in EU Internal Security Cooperation1

Abstract

In the EU's internal security policy-making, parliamentary power remains—de jure and de facto—patchy. This situation has been (unofficially) justified by reference to the idea that the liberal constraints on executive power typically introduced by parliaments mark an irresponsible challenge to the effectiveness of policy. This essay tests this apologia, examining three cases where the retention of liberal values would actually be conducive to effectiveness: the EU-US ‘Passenger Name Register Agreement’, the elaboration of common data protection standards and the ‘Returns Directive’ on the expulsion of illegal immigrants. It suggests that the posited ‘rights/effectiveness’ incompatibility in fact masks a search for autonomy by executive participants.     

Eastern Enlargements and EU Defence Ambitions

ABSTRACT

Despite their common history, Central Europeans have never had a coordinated or consistent position on the issue of European defence and are now, in fact, drifting further apart. Today, some states consider themselves exposed to a threat from Russia while others do not have the same perception and are even moving towards closer cooperation with Moscow. However, the most important factor shaping the positions of Central Europeans is the current, still very loose state of the European Union’s defence policy. As long as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) remains focused on providing security and stability to other parts of the world and weak on defending the EU area, Central Europeans will refrain from truly committing to it.     

Supporters’ responses to contested trade negotiations: the European Commission’s rhetoric on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership*

Abstract

Negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) commenced in 2013, and soon became the most controversial bilateral trade agreement negotiations ever attempted by the European Union (EU). When trying to understand the escalating debate over the proposed agreement, most analyses have highlighted opposition to the deal, especially from civil society organizations. However, a full understanding of the debate surrounding TTIP requires analysis of supporters’ responses, as these changed in response to strategies used by opponents of the agreement. This article uses a novel approach in trade policy scholarship—rhetorical analysis—to focus on the European Commission Trade Directorate’s response to contestation over TTIP. Drawing on work on the ‘rhetoric of reaction’, this article identifies the rhetorical strategies used by EU trade commissioners from 2013 to 2016. It outlines the evolution of the rhetoric and accompanying changes in process and policy, providing insights on the impact of TTIP politicization on the guiding principles of the EU’s trade policy.     

Russia and the role of the OSCE in European security: a ‘Forum’ for dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of interests?

Abstract

This essay explores Russia's Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) policy, by focusing on two questions. First of all, analysts have noted Russia's disinterest and obstructive policies towards the Organization. Thus, the question is what – if anything – does the Russian Federation still want from the OSCE? Secondly, does the OSCE still serve as a forum for dialog? These two issues are studied on the basis of rational institutionalism and realism. The essay demonstrates that Russia is still interested in the OSCE, but its policy has become more pragmatic, selective and instrumentalist. It includes obstructive and constructive strategies. At the same time, today the Russian Federation ascribes less significance to the Organization in European security. This is predetermined not only by its inability to push its interests through the OSCE, but also by the declining interest of other participating States in the Organization. The differences between OSCE participants have turned it into a battlefield of interests in many areas.     

The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992–95: The Capabilities–Expectations Gap at the Heart of EU Foreign Policy

Abstract

Using the empirically driven case study of the European Union's response to the Bosnian civil war 1992–95 this article assesses the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), through Christopher Hill's ‘capabilities–expectations gap framework’. In assessing effectiveness it explores both the expectations placed on the EU and the capabilities the Union was able to deploy. Moreover, this research suggests that the EU was ineffective in responding to the Bosnian crisis. The EU pursued a rigid strategy of diplomatic and economic foreign policy, failing to generate the political will to attempt alternative approaches. This research argues that the capabilities–expectations gap framework is a useful tool for conceptualising the EU's effectiveness but that it under-specifies the importance of the end result of the policy.     

The politics of deep integration*

Abstract

Efforts to pursue ‘deep integration’—agreeing to international rules governing domestic policies to mitigate their adverse trade effects—have been pivotal to the politicization of trade policy. The contributions to this special issue focus on different political dynamics associated with recent high-profile efforts at deep integration. Collectively, they analyse the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and the Japan–European Union Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) negotiations. The special issue, therefore, focuses on extreme examples of deep integration in order to illuminate new political dynamics. This introductory article introduces the concept of ‘deep integration’ and explores how it has been pursued in historical and contemporary trade negotiations. It also relates recent attempts at deep integration to the rise of populist anti-globalization movements. In light of these discussions, this article introduces the contributions to the issue. It concludes by considering whether the politics associated with TTIP and CETA in Europe represent the future of trade policy.     

The Security Council and Counterterrorism: Global and Regional Approaches to an Elusive Public Good

ABSTRACT

This paper explores contemporary counterterrorism efforts as an instrument for attaining peace as a ‘global public good’. It notes the lack of an agreed definition of terrorism, the distinction between freedom-fighting and terrorism, and the issue of ‘excessive use of force’ by the state. It assessed the extent to which US counter-terrorism policy has influenced policy in the UN Security Council, and the shortcomings in Council policy that require redress. The paper concludes that counterterrorism will be successful only when a ‘global law enforcement’ approach prevails over the national security-driven ‘war-on-terror’ and when genuine efforts are undertaken to address the root causes of terrorism, including the forward basing of US forces in the Arab world.     

Russia's changing security role in Central Asia

The paper explores Russia's role in security in Central Asia, which analysts interpreted as projection of hegemony. It argues that this role is changing and is shaped by a variety of factors, sometimes acting in contradiction to one another. Domestic agenda is influenced by the danger discourse on drugs and anti-migrant sentiment and urges to detach from Central Asia. Moscow maintains a military presence in the region but is uncertain if it has serious enough stakes to justify a robust approach to security. Refusal to intervene in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 serves as a potent case. Regional organisations echo the non-intervention stance. As a ‘cost-benefit’ approach to security gains momentum, the paper asks if a policy of selective engagement is emerging when only the issues threatening Russia directly will be addressed. The implication can be a security vacuum in the region, affected by ethnic conflict, inter-state disputes and the consequences of withdrawal from Afghanistan.     

The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran

Abstract

This paper explores EU policy towards Iran to challenge the common implicit or explicit notion that the EU's ‘actorness’ in the international system rests primarily, or solely, on its Pillar I external relations. Utilising criteria developed to examine the ‘actorness’ of the EU, the article explores this policy area to demonstrate that the EU's ‘actorness’ resulted not only from the ‘Community’ aspects of foreign policy, but also from its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).