The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992–95: The Capabilities–Expectations Gap at the Heart of EU Foreign Policy

Abstract

Using the empirically driven case study of the European Union's response to the Bosnian civil war 1992–95 this article assesses the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), through Christopher Hill's ‘capabilities–expectations gap framework’. In assessing effectiveness it explores both the expectations placed on the EU and the capabilities the Union was able to deploy. Moreover, this research suggests that the EU was ineffective in responding to the Bosnian crisis. The EU pursued a rigid strategy of diplomatic and economic foreign policy, failing to generate the political will to attempt alternative approaches. This research argues that the capabilities–expectations gap framework is a useful tool for conceptualising the EU's effectiveness but that it under-specifies the importance of the end result of the policy.     

EU Security Strategy

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) comprises an important part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The aim of ESDP is to strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management. In December 2003, the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy (ESS). Ever since then, the implementation of the ESS has been regarded as one of the biggest challenges for the EU in CFSP/ESDP matters. Although much progress has been made in its independent security and defence-building process, EU still faces serious problems and difficulties in this policy area. This paper tries to examine these recent developments, assess their impacts in regional-global security, and analyze existing problems and future trends. Finally, the author also examines EU-China engagements in recent years and explores possibilities for their future cooperation in the area of international security.     

The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran

Abstract

This paper explores EU policy towards Iran to challenge the common implicit or explicit notion that the EU's ‘actorness’ in the international system rests primarily, or solely, on its Pillar I external relations. Utilising criteria developed to examine the ‘actorness’ of the EU, the article explores this policy area to demonstrate that the EU's ‘actorness’ resulted not only from the ‘Community’ aspects of foreign policy, but also from its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).     

The European External Action Service,Counterterrorism and the Imperative of Coherence

ABSTRACT

The European External Action Service (EEAS), specifically mandated with enhancing coherence between the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and non-CFSP bodies on the one hand, and the European Union and member states on the other hand, has the potential to increase CFSP’s contribution to the fight against terrorism and diminish the boundaries between CFSP and other policies. Several of the EEAS’ cooperation and coordination duties, as well as the inclusive composition of the Service, allow for a more coherent approach to counterterrorism policymaking. In practice, coherence is unfolding in diplomatic cooperation with third countries and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, as CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs actors seem to build on one another’s strengths. The picture is more nuanced in the area of intelligence, where the activities of the EU intelligence centre, transferred from the Council of the European Union to the EEAS, are conditional upon member states’ willingness to exchange information. Ultimately, current efforts towards coherence remain subject to a somewhat paradoxical two-speed process: one that encourages the meshing together of institutional actors and policy cultures, while deferring access to justice to national law, thereby yielding a system of protection of individuals à géométrie variable.     

‘Old’ un peacekeeping principles and ‘new’ conflicts: Some ideas to reduce the troubles of post‐cold war peace missions

The European Union (EU) has declared its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational. It has put the institutional structures in place to manage the political aspects of security and defence policy and the member-states have pledged a range of military capabilities, which the EU may call upon. However there are significant issues that need to be resolved for the ESDP to be a truly effective and credible policy. On the whole, these issues revolve around military capabilities, defence spending and a strategic concept. Without investing in critical military capabilities and without a clear direction, ESDP will become a policy without substance.     

Either with us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/Ukraine

Since the mid-1990s, selected neighbours have in impressive numbers aligned with European Union (EU) foreign policy sanctions. However, much more than for any other sanctions case, neighbours have declined joining recent measures against Russia/Ukraine. This article uses freshly gathered data from the entire period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to analyse how the practice of alignment influences international relations in Europe. Thereby, the article demonstrates that: (1) sanctions are not a two-party game, but an instrument that impacts broadly on relations with third countries; (2) alignment with sanctions not only articulates similarity, but contributes to normative polarization in wider Europe; (3) for a high-salience case such as Russia sanctions, neighbours are reluctant to be instrumentalized for EU foreign policy purposes.     

EU Foreign Policy in the Italian Parliament: The Debates on China and Iran

Governments have always been more reluctant to accept parliamentary oversight in foreign policy than in any other domestic policy field. This examination of the recent performance of the Italian Parliament in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) scrutiny and control in the two case studies of the EU's arms embargo against China and negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program shows that institutional arrangements concerning parliamentary control in this field have significant shortcomings. Although limited, the reforms under discussion in the new intergovernmental conference could contribute to improving the performance of parliaments and to creating a common awareness of the problem of democratic deficit in CFSP among the parliamentarians of EU member states.     

Are European Union sanctions “targeted”?

The emergence of targeted sanctions in the mid-1990s was due to the humanitarian impact of embargoes, which were deemed unacceptable and compelled senders to shift to measures designed to affect only wrongdoers. Twenty years on, the present paper considers the extent to which autonomous sanctions are designed to affect those individuals and elites responsible for the behaviour the EU aims to condemn. How faithful has the EU remained to this concept in its sanctions policy? The enquiry scrutinizes diverse practices in three established sanctions strands of the EU, development aid suspensions, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions and Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) withdrawals. It shows that it has been more faithfully implemented in some strands of EU sanctions than in others. Specifically in the flagship CFSP sanctions practice, the due process motivated court challenges of its blacklists have led the EU to modify selection criteria in a way that renders them potentially less targeted.     

Differing member state approaches to the development of the EU Battlegroup Concept: implications for CSDP

Abstract

This article will analyse the challenges facing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) through an evaluation of the impact that differing member state strategic cultures have on the EU Battlegroup Concept, highlighted through the examples of Germany and Poland. The concept was initiated to give the EU an increased rapid reaction capacity. However, as emphasised through the cases of Germany and Poland, divergences in EU member states' strategic cultures remain, including when, where and how force is used. When this is combined with the cost of plugging military capabilities' gaps, the political willingness to deploy a Battlegroup can be affected. Whilst the article highlights that the role that member states want to play within CSDP as well as international expectations can override constraining factors, the Battlegroups rely on a rotation system. As some member states are more willing to deploy the Battlegroups than others, the concept risks becoming a declaratory policy thus undermining CSDP.     

EU–Russia Security Relations and the Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy: One Year On

Abstract

The Kremlin's change of leadership on 7 May 2008 and growing international fears of Russia's resurgence, especially in the aftermath of the Georgian conflict, make this an interesting time to reflect upon EU–Russia security relations. This article does so by examining closely the Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy and, one year on from its approval, drawing upon subsequent developments as preliminary corollary or otherwise of its bearing on policy. On balance, it seems that the Kremlin's evolving perception of Russia and international relations has encouraged revised priorities and objectives and a more forceful foreign policy that not only slow progress in filling the Common Spaces, but also increase the likelihood of Russia–EU competition especially in their shared neighbourhood.     

Eastern Enlargements and EU Defence Ambitions

ABSTRACT

Despite their common history, Central Europeans have never had a coordinated or consistent position on the issue of European defence and are now, in fact, drifting further apart. Today, some states consider themselves exposed to a threat from Russia while others do not have the same perception and are even moving towards closer cooperation with Moscow. However, the most important factor shaping the positions of Central Europeans is the current, still very loose state of the European Union’s defence policy. As long as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) remains focused on providing security and stability to other parts of the world and weak on defending the EU area, Central Europeans will refrain from truly committing to it.     

Towards a relationship with the Mediterranean countries

Fifteen years ago, the European Union (EU) launched a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Since then, the CSDP has been the focus of a growing body of political and scholarly evaluations. While most commentators have acknowledged shortfalls in European military capabilities, many remain cautiously optimistic about the CSDP’s future. This article uses economic alliance theory to explain why EU member states have failed, so far, to create a potent common defence policy and to evaluate the policy’s future prospects. It demonstrates, through theoretical, case study-based and statistical analysis, that CSDP is more prone to collective action problems than relevant institutional alternatives, and concludes that the best option for Europeans is to refocus attention fully on cooperation within a NATO framework.     

The European union as a diplomatic actor: internal, traditional, and structural diplomacy

An investigation into EU diplomacy naturally requires an analysis of the diplomacy developed within the framework of the Common Foreign and Securiry Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU). But equally important is the 'internal diplomacy' focusing on the settlement of mutual relationships among member states and particularly the 'structural diplomacy' based on EU strategies and partnerships with other regions in the world, which is aimed at promoting structural long-term changes in these regions.     

From “partnership” to “principled pragmatism”: tracing the discursive practices of the High Representatives in the EU’s relations with the Southern Mediterranean

ABSTRACT

The EU’s relations with countries in the Southern Mediterranean have a long history as the region is of great strategic importance for the Union and its member states. The High Representatives of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have been highly involved in shaping these relations, and this role has been officially strengthened with institutional changes brought about with the Lisbon Treaty. This article analyses the role of the HR/VPs in shaping the EU's foreign and security policy towards the region with an analytical focus on discursive practice. Drawing on insights from practice theory in IR and EU studies, the analysis traces continuity and change in how the Southern Mediterranean is described in the drafting of key strategic documents. The main finding is that EU foreign and security policy towards the Southern Mediterranean shows a high degree of continuity despite several crises and institutional changes, although the discursive practices have evolved. The article ends by highlighting a conundrum that the EU can be said to implicitly acknowledge: if authoritarian states in the Southern Mediterranean are inherently unstable, yet stable enough to quench the democratic aspirations of their people, then what should be the basis for EU actions?     

The European Union’s common foreign and security policy reforms and its implications for Northeast Asia

The European Union (EU) is at a turning point. With the bipolar order of the Cold War fast becoming a distant memory, the European Union must quickly establish itself on the global stage before it loses the opportunity to do so. With Northeast Asia fast emerging as a new economic giant and political center for world affairs, the EU must reform its Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to develop a reputation and image as a global actor of soft power, based on its long-standing values and peaceful diplomacy. However, despite major reforms in the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the EU has not been able to form cohesion amongst its members, thus hindering its progress in achieving such international recognition. This paper therefore analyses the reforms taken place so far and suggests further reforms that will build a strong foundation for a united and cohesive foreign policy. It will then look at how the reformed framework will allow the EU to establish itself as a global actor in political affairs, in particular in Northeast Asia.     

The European union as a diplomatic actor: internal,traditional, and structural diplomacy

An investigation into EU diplomacy naturally requires an analysis of the diplomacy developed within the framework of the Common Foreign and Securiry Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU). But equally important is the ‘internal diplomacy’ focusing on the settlement of mutual relationships among member states and particularly the ‘structural diplomacy’ based on EU strategies and partnerships with other regions in the world, which is aimed at promoting structural long-term changes in these regions.     

The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence

Abstract

European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member states. This article challenges such conventional state-centered wisdom by analyzing the influence of the Brussels-based EU officials in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Using four case studies and data from 105 semi-structured interviews, it shows that EU officials are most influential in the agenda-setting phase and more influential in civilian than in military operations. Their prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by their central position in the policy process. This allows them to get early involved in the operations. The absence of strong control mechanisms and doctrine in civilian crisis management gives them opportunities to affect civilian missions. Finally, EU officials direct civilian operations from Brussels, whereas the command of military operations is with the member states and NATO.     

Re‐setting the Euro‐Mediterranean security agenda

The EU’s reaction is slow; the EU is divided; the EU is unable to deliver: time and time again, newspapers depict the image of an incoherent and uncoordinated EU foreign policy. This time, the topic under discussion was the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis. Many have compared the EU’s internal divisions over Libya with those over the Iraq war, an often used example to illustrate the limits of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This article aims to assess the coherence of the EU’s short- to medium-term response to the Libyan crisis. It distinguishes between the horizontal, inter-institutional, vertical and multilateral dimensions of EU coherence. The analysis shows that unilateral actions or inactions of the member states mainly account for the EU's incoherent response. The post-Lisbon institutional structure has done little to compensate for these internal divisions. While the EU cannot change the course of national foreign policies, it should increase its ‘leadership for coherence’, Europeanise its crisis response in the medium term and aim at preventing incoherence in the longer term.     

Shaping the European External Action Service and its post-Lisbon crisis management structures: an assessment of the EU High Representatives’ political leadership

ABSTRACT

This article assesses the role, influence and core aspects of the EU High Representatives’ (HR/VPs) “political leadership” in the context of their efforts to advance the institutionalisation of the EEAS and its crisis management structures in the post-Lisbon era. By combining analytical lenses from the literature on “European political leadership”, foreign policy analysis (FPA) and political psychology with insights from a wide range of semi-structured interviews and primary sources, the article analyses how the leadership approaches of Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini were influenced by core aspects, such as institutional setting, situational factors and “personal qualities”. By examining how both HR/VPs and their chosen advisors sought to shape the EU’s EEAS and crisis management institutions, scholars can gain important insights about how “personal qualities” and prior foreign policy experience can influence the HR/VPs strategic choices and their impact within and across the EEAS. Finally, the article considers the differing effects between “maverick” and “orthodox” leadership and approaches and concludes that whilst outside perspectives can bring fresh ideas and institutional innovations, they will fail to be of lasting significance and permanence if not accompanied by sufficient support from the dominant foreign and security policy conventions.     

Defense planning in the fog of peace: the transatlantic currency conversion conundrum

ABSTRACT

Resource allocation to and within defense budgets is grand strategy. NATO and the EU coordinate defense planning and encourage fair burden-sharing among their members. We analyze the effect of agreed planning processes, namely the “NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP)” on the conversion of political will to resources and then to capabilities development across the transatlantic security community. In a “fog of peace” featuring diverse threats, and in which allies may disagree on strategic rivals and sources of risk, national and regional political economies shape strategy, not the other way around.