Authoritarian Regimes and Pro-Democracy Semi-Oppositions: The End of the Portuguese Dictatorship (1968–1974) in Comparative Perspective

This article discusses the conditions of failure and success of pro-democracy semi-oppositions to authoritarian regimes through a comparative study of the last phase of the Portuguese authoritarian regime (1968–1974). It specifies and reformulates Juan Linz's concept of semi-opposition. In Portugal, contrary to Linz's argument, the moderate pro-democracy semi-oppositions participated in the regime's electoral moments and tended to take the greatest possible advantage of these periods so as to discredit the regime and to demonstrate that it could not be transformed from within. In order to make sense of this paradox, scholars should look at the institutional legacies and frameworks of authoritarian regimes. Specifically, we argue that the Portuguese semi-opposition failed because the institutional heritage of the Estado Novo, at the moment of the leadership succession, provided no opportunities for a reformist democratizing coalition to assert itself and promoted instead the radicalization of the semi-opposition. Paradoxically, it was the more liberal institutional framework of the regime that made a political change guided by the democratic semi-opposition impracticable.     

Right‐wing terrorism in a comparative perspective: The case of split delegitimization

The purpose of this article is to identify the distinctive features of right‐wing terrorism and to develop an analytical typology of particularistic terrorist organizations. The article is based on the conceptual framework of the process of delegitimization developed earlier by this author. It argues that right‐wing radicals usually reach terrorism through a trajectory of split delegitimization, which implies a primary conflict with an ‘inferior’ community and a secondary conflict with the government. Six sub‐types of right‐wing terrorism are identified: revolutionary terrorism, reactive terrorism, vigilante terrorism, racist terrorism, millenarian terrorism and youth counterculture terrorism.     

Richard Nixon and Economic Nationalism in Latin America: The Problem of Expropriations, 1969–1974

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Nixon administration confronted the problem of how best to protect US economic interests in Latin America during a period of rising economic nationalism. After extensive debate, the president approved a policy designed to deter expropriations and rein in nationalist economic sentiment by threatening to terminate US and international financial assistance to countries that expropriated American holdings without prompt and adequate compensation. As it turned out, however, this policy was little short of a disaster. Nixon's stance heightened American unpopularity during a period when US credibility in Latin America was already on the wane, and failed to have any restraining effect on either the number of expropriations by Latin American countries or the strength of economic nationalism in the area. Informed by domestic and bureaucratic pressures and the same ideological proclivities that have long characterized American relations with the underdeveloped world, Nixon's policy on the expropriations issue ultimately proved ineffective and even pernicious to US interests in Latin America.     

Italian neo‐fascist terrorism: A comparative perspective

Right‐wing violence in Italy has displayed characteristics that set it apart from the violent operations of rightist groups active in the other Western democracies. In the Italian case the violence has been protracted, stretching from the immediate postwar period to our own time. For the most part, it has been aimed at Communists and other leftists rather than racial or ethnic minorities. And it has appeared in a variety of forms, ranging from street‐corner brawling to terrorist bombing campaigns to schemes designed to achieve a coup d'état. In addition to offering a detailed account of neo‐Fascist violence in Italy over the past four decades, this study places the phenomenon in the general context of Italian politics and seeks to explain the violence by reference to the Cold War‐based objectives of various anti‐communist organizations.     

Growth–volatility tradeoff in the face of financial openness: a perspective of developing economies

This paper analyses optimal tradeoffs between economic growth and economic volatility given the risk of open capital markets in developing countries due to their financial vulnerability to unfettered capital flows. It is argued that free policy choices are efficiently superior to free capital mobility and that a developing country can be open to higher growth and lower volatility only if its financial system is substantially strengthened.     

Arbitrator in a World of Wars: The League of Nations and The Mosul Dispute, 1924–1925

The League of Nations is primarily remembered for its failures in the 1930s. Indeed, the established perception of its history usually emphasizes weaknesses. Failing to settle the question of which Power should possess the former Ottoman province of Mosul after the First World War, Turkey saw the dispute addressed to the League in summer 1924. Within a short time, a multi-leveled negotiation process that involved a large number of politicians, diplomats, and lawyers was put in motion. Sixteen months and many crises later, the League Council awarded the entire Mosul province to Iraq. The arbitration had been based upon data collected by two enquiry commissions comprising representatives from eight different Powers, the work of both numerous mediators, and a Council sub-committee. Though certainly not perfect, the League's role averted war and renewed disaster.     

Managing the “Helsinki Spirit” in the Balkans: The Greek Initiative for Balkan Co-operation, 1975–1976

The analysis examines the origins and implementation of the Greek diplomatic initiative for multilateral co-operation amongst the Balkan states in the aftermath of the Helsinki Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Notwithstanding pressing domestic and security concerns, détente and, in particular, the spirit of the CSCE process significantly influenced Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis’ decision to instigate Balkan co-operation on a multilateral and not just on a bilateral level. The “Helsinki spirit” opened a window of opportunity for regional Powers from different blocs to come together. Despite its limited results, the political significance of the Athens Conference lay in the fact that it took place at all in view of Cold War realities and inter-Balkan rivalries.     

The Arab League in Lebanon: 2005–2008

Contrary to expectations, the Arab League has emerged as an active player in the Middle East region over the past decade. The League's roles in negotiations to end the 2006 Israel–Lebanon War and in the brokering of the 2008 Doha Agreement between warring Lebanese factions present two instances of ‘partial’ and ‘direct’ contributions to success in resolving major extra-systemic and minor internal conflicts. These developments are part of a global trend of the regionalization or decentralization of security in the post-Cold-War context.     

The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975

This article explores United States–Peruvian relations during the rule of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975). Velasco pursued a sharply nationalistic foreign policy, leading to repeated diplomatic dust-ups with the United States. Peruvian officials generally acquitted themselves quite well in these episodes, in part because of their own diplomatic acumen, and in part because broader geopolitical trends of the period undermined traditional sources of United States leverage in Latin America. The United States would ultimately have to wait for a change of government to recoup some of the influence it had lost in Peru under Velasco.     

Nuclear Weapons in Britain's Policy towards France, 1960–1974

This article will attempt to draw attention to the Anglo–French nuclear weapons negotiations that ran alongside the British applications to join the EEC during the years 1960–1974. It suggests that the prospect of an entente nucléaire was an issue that played a unique role in the UK's negotiating strategy. It will argue that three successive Prime Minister's—Macmillan, Wilson and Heath—attempted to forge an agreement in the hope of overcoming French objections to Britain's entry, albeit for different reasons. All three were hampered by the “special nuclear relationship” with the Americans and this eventually precluded a mutually beneficial resolution.     

Resource nationalism in the foreign policy behavior of oil exporting countries (1947–1974)†

The authors examine the foreign policy behavior of petroleum exporting countries in the context of resource nationalism. A sequence of issues is posited and examined, preliminary results indicating that oil‐related international behavior is learned. This pattern of learning and behavior may be adopted by new entrants into the ranks of the energy exporting nations, thereby exacerbating attempts to ease the “energy crisis” by discovering new oil reserves in “friendly” countries. In addition to this policy implication the research indicates that the Arab‐Israeli conflict has a substantial impact on oil‐related activities, accelerating the intensity of interaction between importers and exporters.     

The United States–EURATOM Agreement of 1958: The Cold War Impact

Drawing on declassified sources, this analysis examines how the Cold War influenced United States policy towards the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM]. In the 1950s, “the peaceful atom” became a crucial sector of the Cold War. To maintain American nuclear leadership, the Dwight Eisenhower Administration invited Western Europeans to enter into an active collaboration with the United States on peaceful uses of atomic energy. The United States encouraged the creation of EURATOM by promising that the Community would obtain more assistance in the nuclear field than any individual state. The Soviet launch of Sputnik provided additional impetus to the signing of the United States–EURATOM agreement, having strengthened American interest in a joint programme with EURATOM that would bring together American and Western European scientific and technical resources to counter the Soviet Union. The exegesis contributes to recent studies on the interaction between the Cold War and European integration.     

Edward Heath and Anglo–American Relations 1970–1974: A Reappraisal

As British Prime Minister, Edward Heath is generally believed to have presided over a distinct cooling in Anglo– American relations. His frosty personality, use of the term “natural”—instead of “special”—relationship, and determination to re-orient British foreign policy towards the European Community are felt to have deliberately foreclosed a more intimate partnership with the administration of Richard Nixon. This interpretation is captured most vividly in the writings of the President's National Security Adviser, and later Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. In contrast to such views, this article argues that despite considerable challenges, Anglo– American relations during Heath's premiership were not fundamentally weakened. Nor can Heath be considered “anti-American.” Moreover, the frictions experienced were often the result of American actions rather than anything which happened in London. A new understanding of Heath's actions and the circumstances of the time are needed when assessing the “special relationship” in this period.