Credible Commitments and the Early American Supreme Court

Conventional wisdom holds that the role of the U.S. federal judiciary was underspecified and undefined until the era of Chief Justice John Marshall. In contrast, I argue that prior to the Marshall era, the Supreme Court had the specific institutional role of providing an administrative remedy to aggrieved nations to deprive potentially hostile nations of any excuse for belligerence. Specifically, concern among the Framers about this nascent country's absence of dispute resolution mechanisms in the areas of trade and admiralty was critical in the institutional design of the judiciary. Original jurisdiction was designed primarily to remedy trade disputes. The independent judiciary made trade commitments more credible and self-help by the aggrieved less likely. By providing this administrative remedy and lowering the uncertainty associated with trading with revolutionaries, the Framers claimed a seat for the new country at the table of nations. Moreover, enhanced commercial credibility that the administrative avenue for redress provided was instrumental in the early economic development of the United States.     

The Problem of Emergency in the American Supreme Court

Sixty years before Carl Schmitt wrote his Political Theology, and more than a 100 years before President Bush announced a ‘war on terrorism’ the American Supreme Court grappled with the difficult issue of emergency powers in connection with issues arising out of the American Civil War (1861–1865). The question confronting the Court in a set of cases named the Prize Cases was whether President Lincoln’s decision to respond to acts of aggression by the secessionist Southern states with measures of war was lawful. The legal problem was that Lincoln had made this decision unilaterally although the American Constitution specifically allocates the power to declare war to Congress. The Court solved the dilemma by arguing that in cases where no war has been declared, the decision whether the country is in a state of war is ultimately ‘a question to be decided by him [the President], and [the Supreme] Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted’ (Prize, p. 669). The precedent, which the Court thereby laid down, has since played out as an important leverage for the Bush government’s legal arguments in connection with the war on terrorism. This article engages the theoretical framework of Locke, Schmitt and Agamben in order to come to a better understanding of this important set of cases.     

美国最高法院关于专利纠纷的一项最新决定

2002年5月28日,美国最高法院就FESTO一案做出决定。此案涉及等同原则(Doctrine of Equivalents)和禁止反悔原则(Prosecution History Estoppel)。 一、案情简介 上诉人FESTO公司拥有两项工业设备专利,其中一个专利在审查过程中被美国专利商标局审查员基于美国《专利法》第112条驳回。申请人对其权利要求进行了进一步限定,即限定该设备含有两个单向密封环,其外套筒用可磁化材料制造。另一个专利在复审程序(Reexamination)中也进行了修改,加入了上述密封环限定。     

Fourth Amendment update: the Supreme Court and strip searches: Safford Unified School District No. 1 v Redding

In light of the dramatic increase in the presence of weapons, violence, drugs, and other contraband in schools, school officials in the United States and England face significant challenges as they seek to maintain safe and orderly learning environments. Almost twenty five years after the United States Supreme Court's 1985 ruling in New Jersey v. T.L.O. allowed educational officials to search student lockers and property in order to keep schools safe, the Justices addressed the more delicate matter of strip searches for contraband such as drugs. In Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding (Redding), the Court invalidated the strip search of a student for drugs but left the door open for the possibility of allowing searches for weapons under some circumstances. In light of remaining unanswered questions after Redding, this article reviews the background on the Fourth Amendment, earlier cases on student searches in American public schools, Redding in detail, and reflects on unanswered questions in its wake in the hope of shedding light on the propriety of strip searches of students.     

Of Mice and Men: God and the Canadian Supreme Court

Abstract. In a recent 5‐to‐4 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada denied to Harvard University a patent on a genetically modified mouse. In their reasoning, the majority Justices, concerned obviously about the implications of granting the patent for the human case, argue that higher organisms (mammals) are not “compositions of matter” in the sense intended by the Canadian Patent Act. But if a mouse is not a composition of matter, what—indeed, what on earth—is it? As the minority Justices complain, the majority decision smacks of dubious metaphysics and theology. Appealing to a quite unlikely source, the Bible, I show that the distinction between mice and men can be defended without introducing problematic metaphysical and question‐begging theological materials. I also show, en route, that the biblical position on the special status of men and women is not inconsistent with evolutionary theory. Granting a patent on the mouse (as was done in the U.S.A.) is compatible with denying it to human organisms.