威权政治与经济成长的关系——以威权体制时期的台湾为例

战后实行威权政治之国家或地区的不同发展绩效,所反映的是与经济发展密切相关的制度结构的不同.威权体制下台湾的发展经验表明,在非民主体制下要达成经济现代化的目标,某些结构性前提条件是必不可少的,包括经济和政治的结构分离、经济理性主义、以私有制为基础的企业制度、市场经济导向、经济决策系统的专业化和"非政治化".威权政体在推动现代化经济发展的同时,也创造了推动自身变化的条件.     

Local Institutions and the Politics of Urban Growth

This article uses a political market framework to analyze how the structure of local political institutions affects the relative political influence of development and environmental interests in the context of urban growth. Using panel data from 406 Florida cities from 1998 to 2003, the empirical analysis finds important interaction effects between the structure of city executive branch institutions and interest group variables. The economic and political forces driving urban growth do not operate identically in all cities—they vary as a function of institutional context. Institutional structure helps determine which interest groups have their preferences reflected in local land-use changes and development patterns. The resulting patterns suggest a "sustainability paradox" wherein richer, environmental interests push for the preservation of environmental amenities while at the same time accelerating the number of residential units built in a community.     

Efficiency in Politics: Competing Economic Approaches

The article reviews four recent economic books on efficiency in democracy. Special emphasis is given to two ambitious competing approaches: Mancur Olson's theory of encompassing interests and Donald Wittman's Myth of Democratic Failure . It is argued that the thesis that democracy should generally be presumed to be efficient is problematic in several respects. Sweeping conclusions are reached by virtue of a superficial application of economic analogies, which abstracts away many crucial characteristics of democratic politics, such as information imperfections, weak incentive structures, and collective action failures. The basic explanation for efficient outcomes may have more to do with the size of rulers' stakes in the economy than with voluntary Coasean bargaining.     

Economic Growth and Social Capital

Recent interdisciplinary theoretical work has suggested that social capital, or the interpersonal trust of citizens, plays an important role in explaining both the efficiency of political institutions, and in the economic performance of contemporary societies. This paper examines the relationship between social capital and economic growth in a sample of thirty-four countries over the period 1970 to 1992, within the framework of a modified neo-classical model of economic growth. The findings suggest that social capital has an impact on growth which is at least as strong as that of human capital or education, which has been the focus of much of the recent work on endogenous growth theory. It appears to have about the same impact on growth as catch-up or the ability of poorer nations to adopt technological innovations pioneered by their richer counterparts.     

The OBR and the March 2023 Budget: The Travails of UK Economic Growth and the Politics of Technocratic Fiscal Governance

This article places the Office for Budget Responsibility's commentary on the March 2023 UK Budget in political context. It explores how increased independent expert input has transformed the UK economic policy regime, focussing on the complex relationship between rules-based economic governance, independent oversight and fiscal discipline. The technocratic veneer that enshrines the UK fiscal watchdog obscures the inevitable politics of rules-based fiscal governance. The recent budget revealed OBR scepticism about how far budget measures can address the UK economy's long-term structural weaknesses. This underlined the key role for judgment inherent within technocratic fiscal oversight.     

How Politics Shapes the Growth of Rules

This article examines the impact of politics on governmental rule production. Traditionally, explanations of rule dynamics have focused on nonpolitical factors such as the self‐evolvement of rules, environmental factors, and decision maker attributes. This article develops a set of hypotheses about when, why, and how political factors shape changes in the stock of rules. Furthermore, we test these hypotheses on a unique, new data set based on all Danish primary legislation and administrative rules from 1989 to 2011 categorized into 20 different policy domains. The analysis shows that the traditional Weberian “rules breed rules” explanations must be supplemented with political explanations that take party ideology and changes in the political agenda into account. Moreover, the effect of political factors is indistinguishable across changes in primary laws and changes in administrative rules, a result that challenges the depiction of the latter rule‐making process as more or less disconnected from the political domain.     

中国的经济发展与制度变迁论纲

本文通过对制度变迁理论的分析,简要阐明了制度变迁理论的一般含义,并通过对中国经济体制改革实践的回顾,论证了制度变迁作为一个重要因素将在经济增长和经济体制的变革中起到重要作用.     

Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis

Despite a sizeable theoretical and empirical literature, no firm conclusions have been drawn regarding the impact of political democracy on economic growth. This article challenges the consensus of an inconclusive relationship through a quantitative assessment of the democracy-growth literature. It applies meta-regression analysis to the population of 483 estimates derived from 84 studies on democracy and growth. Using traditional meta-analysis estimators, the bootstrap, and Fixed and Random Effects meta-regression models, it derives several robust conclusions. Taking all the available published evidence together, it concludes that democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth. However, democracy has robust, significant, and positive indirect effects through higher human capital, lower inflation, lower political instability, and higher levels of economic freedom. Democracies may also be associated with larger governments and less free international trade. There also appear to be country- and region-specific democracy-growth effects. Overall, democracy's net effect on the economy does not seem to be detrimental.     

Polarization,Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth

We argue that social polarization reduces the security ofproperty and contract rights and, through this channel,reduces growth. The first hypothesis is supported by cross-country evidence indicating that polarization in the form ofincome inequality, land inequality, and ethnic tensions isinversely related to a commonly-used index of the security ofcontractual and property rights. When the security of propertyrights is controlled for in cross-country growth regressions,the relationship between inequality and growth diminishesconsiderably. This and other evidence provides support for oursecond hypothesis, that inequality reduces growth in partthrough its effect on the security of property rights.     

Politics, Economic Development, and Second-Generation Strain in India's Federal System

Since the late 1960s, India's federal system has experiencedsevere strain in center-state relations. Such strain was almostnonexistent during the first generation of Indian federalism(1950–1966). During the second generation, which followedthe death of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966, therise of a powerful leader of the ruling Congress party, IndiraGandhi, and the emergence of dissent inside the party led toa greater emphasis on centralization and regimentation withinthe party and, thereby, the federal system as well. At the sametime, economic development had helped to produce new politicalelites from rural areas who benefited from the "green revolution"of the 1960s. These new elites challenged the professional andindustrial elites who had long controlled the Congress party,the national government, and many state governments. Feelingfrustrated in their efforts to influence national economic policyin a significant way, these new elites have formulated demandsthat call for substantial decentralization, greater state autonomy,and more tolerance for opposition parties whose electoral supportis mainly state-based.     

Economic Freedom,Government Policy and the Trade-Off Between Equity and Economic Growth

This study investigates the role that economicfreedom plays in economic growth and in the distribution in marketincome, the role of government policy in advancingeconomic progress and in promoting income equality, and the effectthat the rate of economic progress has on thedistribution of market income. Structural and reduced formmodels are estimated that reveal that economic freedompromotes both economic growth and equity, and that there is apositive but relatively small trade-off between growth andincome inequality.     

Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion

This article quantifies the impact of civil wars on economic growth at home and in nearby countries. Three alternative measures of nearness—contiguity, length of contiguous borders, and distance of closest approach—are used to capture the spatial dispersion of civil war consequences. We present short-run panel estimates (at five-year intervals) and long-run (1961–95) panel estimates for the world. Generally, the distance measures, novel to this study, and not contiguity provides the most accurate measure of the diffusion of the negative economic consequences of civil wars on other countries. Unlike earlier studies, we also investigate the temporal influence of civil wars on growth at home and in nearby countries. Both the duration and the timing of civil wars have an economic impact.     

北京信息化与经济增长——基于ICT资本存量和Ubiquitous指数的分析

信息化对经济增长的影响主要表现在信息化投资和信息化资源利用两个方面,在核算ICT资本存量和建立Ubiquitous指数的基础上,需要将ICT投资和信息化的普及与应用纳入一个统一的框架进行分析.利用ICT增长模型对ICT投资贡献度以及网络外部性的计量分析表明,ICT投资对北京经济增长发挥了重要作用,ICT投资与普及应用之间的交互作用产生了明显的溢出效应和网络效应,从而进一步增强了ICT对经济增长的影响力.软件投资与硬件投资相比较,软件投资的作用更为显著,对北京经济增长的影响更大.     

Political Institutions, Public Policy and Economic Growth

The argument of the Rise and Decline of Nulions (RADON) opens up a new area of important social science research: to understand the social and political setting of economic growth. The paper tests the argument that institutionalization leads fo the decline of nafions slowing down the rate of economic growth. Employing several indicators on economic growth and controlling for a number of factors the finding with regard to the OECD-nations is that the Olson emphasis on institutionalization is confirmed.