Time Present and Time Past: Rivalry and the Duration of Interstate Wars, 1846-1985

This article sits at the intersection of the rivalry, war duration, and bargaining literatures, suggesting that histories of armed conflict between states increase war duration through their effects on the selectorate and the wartime bargaining process. I argue that the historical relationship between two states plays an integral role in the duration of future conflict. Specifically, historical conflict between states intensifies the preference of national selectorates for military victory and narrows the range of negotiated settlements that leaders might pursue while still maintaining domestic political support. I employ Bennett and Stam's (1996) ex ante data set and Crescenzi and Enterline's (2001) International Interaction Score to provide an empirical test of the ability to generalize appropriately coded historical interaction to the topic of war duration. Contradicting earlier studies, the results of this analysis show that a properly operationalized measure of rivalry has significant and positive effects on war duration.     

Sources of Leader Support and Interstate Rivalry

Since segments of the selectorate differently experience costs and benefits from rivalry, the foreign policy choices of leaders reflect these domestic preferences. As a result, shifts in the composition of the domestic coalition of support backing the leader provide a fundamental determinant of rivalry termination. While previous research sought to explore the relationship between domestic political turnover and rivalry termination using regime transitions as a proxy for turnover of the state’s domestic ruling group, in practice this measure exhibits significant disconnection with the quantity of interest. Further, there are alternative pathways through which regime transitions may lead to rivalry termination. I test the relationship using new data from the CHISOLS project, finding that when rivals undergo a change in the source of support that maintains the leader in office, the probability of rivalry termination rises dramatically. I further find that regime transitions have an effect on the probability of rivalry termination that is independent of the effect of ruling coalition turnover. This study thus both asserts the relationship between domestic political turnover and rivalry termination and clarifies the mechanism by which the relationship operates.     

Political Investment Cycles in Democracies and Autocracies

Extant research has shown considerable interest in whether host countries’ political uncertainty impedes foreign direct investment (FDI). Building upon the scholarly consensus on the adverse impact of political uncertainty on FDI, this article demonstrates that the extent to which investment climates are unpredictable varies cyclically, on the basis of election timing in democracies and leadership turnover in autocracies. The empirical results show that in presidential democracies, FDI tends to slowly increase after an executive election and then decline as the next executive election nears. However, I find that an electoral investment cycle is not found in parliamentary democracies where election timing is irregular, less predictable, and endogenous to domestic economic conditions. I also find that a similar political investment cycle exists in autocracies not through electoral cycle but through leadership tenure cycle. The level of FDI inflows tends to be relatively low early in autocrats’ tenure when political uncertainty is high and rise as autocratic leadership tenure increases over time but eventually wane again as autocratic leadership is destabilized in the late period of power transition. The findings indicate the existence of heterogeneous political investment cycles, depending on regime type.     

Ethnicity,political survival,and the exchange of nationalist foreign policy

How does leadership’s desire for political survival in ethnically heterogeneous democracies affect the probability of states exchanging nationalist foreign policy? I define nationalist foreign policy as foreign policy that aims to fulfill national self-governance using a civic or ethnic frame. I argue that civic-nationalist policy disputing the territoriality of one’s own state is more likely, while ethno-nationalist policy favoring the leadership’s foreign co-ethnics is less likely, when the size of the leadership’s ethnic group is small and the level of democracy is relatively high. This is because the leadership, under such domestic conditions, has to mobilize support from other ethnic groups in order to stay in power. Civic-nationalist policy allows the leadership to increase domestic solidarity across ethnic lines and mobilize support from other ethnic groups, whereas ethno-nationalist policy would risk other ethnic groups criticizing the leadership of being ethno-centrist. These hypotheses are supported by quantitative analysis using an original dataset.     

Post-civil war democratization: promotion of democracy in post-civil war states, 1946–2005

Post-civil war democratization is a critical element of building sustainable peace in post-civil war states. Yet studies of democratic transition and survival suggest that the post-civil war environment is not hospitable to either the transition toward or the survival of democracy. This inhospitality may be due to the fact that post-civil war environments are contentious. After a civil war, the former protagonists fear for their security and also want to protect their political and economic interests. The central argument of this study is that former rivals can agree to a transition toward democracy to the extent that a stable balance of power exists between the government and rebel groups; a balance that eliminates the sort of security dilemma that would encourage one or both parties to resume armed conflict. Such a balance should ensure access to political power and economic resources. This study identifies factors that contribute to the establishment of a balance of power between former protagonists and factors that affect its stability. The presence of these factors should affect the decision of former protagonists on whether or not they can achieve their political and economic interests if they agree to a transition toward democracy once the civil war ends. Based on this theoretical argument, I have derived empirically testable hypotheses. In the survival analysis performed, I find support for the theoretical arguments. The findings of this study have some policy implications.     

Democracy,Regional Security Institutions,and Rivalry Mitigation: Evidence From Europe,South America,and Asia

The fact that democracies maintain peaceful relations with each other is regarded as one of the few law-like correlations in international relations, but the causes of this empirical phenomenon remain contested. This paper tries to fill this theoretical gap by attributing the remarkable stability between democracies to inter-democratic institutions. At the same time, it contributes to the debate on the need to differentiate among international organizations in order to assess their peace-building effects. We identify transnational and trans-governmental linkages as crucial features that distinguish inter-democratic from traditional institutions with non-democratic or mixed membership. In order to explain these institutions’ peace-building effect, we analyze the impact of international institutions on rivalry mitigation with a view to five pairs of states: France-Germany, Greece-Turkey, Argentina-Brazil, Indonesia-Malaysia, and Japan-South Korea. Those dyads all look back at a history of rivalry, conflict, and mutual threat perceptions, and they are located in highly institutionalized regional settings but vary with regard to their political regime type. The controlled comparison of cases demonstrates that the embeddedness of international institutions in transnational and trans-governmental linkages corresponds to each member's regime type and that these institutional differences are responsible for the varying extent of rivalry mitigation.     

State Capacity,Regime Type,and Sustaining the Peace after Civil War

About half of the nations that experience civil war eventually relapse into renewed conflict within a few years after the original war ends. This observation has motivated a stream of research into the factors that affect the risk of peace failure in the aftermath of civil war. While the outcome of the previous civil war—for example, military victory versus peace agreement—structures the post-war environment in ways that affect the risk of peace failure, the capacity of the post-war state to enact and implement policies that affect the incentives for and capacity of groups to undertake armed violence as a means of advancing their interests should also affect the risks of peace failure. Using Geddes’ categories of nondemocratic regime types, we will present a theory of how different regime types have varying capacities to repress and/or implement accommodative policies that affect the risk of peace failure. We test propositions derived from this theory with a series of event history models. Our findings suggest that while peace agreements significantly increase the duration of post-civil war peace, peace agreements involving some types of nondemocratic regimes actually increase the risk of post-civil war peace failure.     

Unfinished business: The united states and Franco's Spain, 1944-47

'Unfinished Business' examines American and British postwar policy toward the regime of Francisco Franco in Spain. Although the emergence of the cold war eventually altered that policy from one of strenuous opposition to one of grudging acceptance, the continuing desire of the Western allies to alter or remove the Franco regime illustrates the persistent influence of anti-fascism after World War II. In retrospect, the eventual alignment of Franco with the West seems a foregone conclusion, but in the fluid context of the years immediately after World War II policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic struggled to determine their interests in a world no longer defined by the war and not yet in the grip of the cold war.     

Regime Change and War: Domestic Politics and the Escalation of the Ethiopia--Eritrea Conflict

The 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to defy rationalist explanations. This paper contends that the escalation of the war, from an isolated border clash to the largest conventional war of the past decade, has its roots in the domestic politics of each of the two states. Quasi-democratisation in both countries created environments in which political elites were able to bolster their popular legitimacy by utilising nationalist and aggressive foreign policy rhetoric. The Eritrean leadership believed that a rapid escalation of the border clash to full-scale war would undermine domestic popular support and topple the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime. War escalation had the opposite effect, strengthening the EPRDF domestically and provoking a massive Ethiopian retaliation. War thus served nation- and state-building goals in both countries. This paper provides a theory of the domestic political roots of international conflict in transitional regimes and applies this theory to explain the escalation of a localised border conflict into a highly destructive, full-scale war.     

Domestic politics,regional integration,and human rights: interactions among Myanmar,ASEAN, and EU

This paper tries to explain the evolving relations between the recent domestic political changes in Myanmar and the role of regional integration as they affect human rights in Myanmar. I posit that the two most important causes of the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar are the survival of the authoritarian regime and ethnic-religious conflicts. Those causes differ in nature and their political interactions with the ASEAN regional integration. This paper first examines the relationship between authoritarian regime survival and the humanitarian crisis/efforts during the 2008 natural disaster of cyclone Nargis and the resultant flooding. Second, I investigate the political dynamics of the human rights violations of ethnic and religious minorities, especially the Rohingya Muslim minority in the Rakhine State, during Myanmar’s recent democratic transition. This study approaches the aforementioned questions from both the EU and ASEAN perspectives and also deals with these two regional organizations’ interactions regarding Myanmar’s human rights.     

A social theory of war: Clausewitz and war reconsidered

This article presents a new theory of war that is grounded in the insights of Clausewitz on the social nature of conflict. Clausewitz had argued that war is a political process; he therefore distinguished between ‘war’—understood in political terms—and warfare—understood as fighting. He then created a typology covering a spectrum of war ranging from total to limited, the political stakes of a conflict determining where it would fall on the spectrum. I develop and modify this basic framework by arguing that the social organization of the actors has a determining role in predicting the stakes of war. I then show how this framework helps us understand some key problems in the political science literature on war and conflict. I attempt to show two main things: (1) that there are different types of wars (and that these differences are not necessarily related to the standing of the actors, i.e. the presence or absence of sovereignty); and (2) that how war and warfare are related is more complicated than previously understood and that this has implications for the political science literature on order, conflict and violence.     

Unfinished business: The united states and Franco's Spain, 1944–47

‘Unfinished Business’ examines American and British postwar policy toward the regime of Francisco Franco in Spain. Although the emergence of the cold war eventually altered that policy from one of strenuous opposition to one of grudging acceptance, the continuing desire of the Western allies to alter or remove the Franco regime illustrates the persistent influence of anti‐fascism after World War II. In retrospect, the eventual alignment of Franco with the West seems a foregone conclusion, but in the fluid context of the years immediately after World War II policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic struggled to determine their interests in a world no longer defined by the war and not yet in the grip of the cold war.     

Domestic politics and interstate disputes: Examining US mid involvement and reciprocation, 1870–1992

Increasingly scholars have become interested in conflict behavior that falls short of war. Chan (1997), for example, has insisted that a concern for less intense engagements is crucial for fully understanding the conflict‐proneness of different regimes. Chan (1997) furthermore noted that scholars have generally failed to account for whether a state was the initiator or target of a dispute. Such a distinction, however, is crucial for discriminating the pacific effects of democratic culture and institutions. In this paper, I investigate the domestic determinants of US MID involvement and reciprocation from 1870 to 1992. I find that politics does not stop at the water's edge. Unlike Gowa (1998) who found no relationship between the use of force and dissatisfaction with the status quo, I uncover an association between US domestic conditions and whether the US was an initiator or target of a MID. Not only is the US more likely to be targeted during periods of domestic political weakness, but Democratic administrations also appear to be challenged to a greater extent than their Republican counterparts. Furthermore, when targeted, the US is much more likely to reciprocate when the initiating state is a non‐democracy suggesting that regime type continues to play an important role in conflict propensity even after a demand has been made.     

Wars of Succession

I analyze a model of bargaining, war, and endogenous leadership turnover in which (1) leader attributes affect war outcomes and (2) war can insulate settlements from renegotiation. Shifts in bargaining power caused by leadership turnover are endogenous and discontinuous, but sufficiently decisive war outcomes can solve the associated commitment problem. In contrast to other models where the shadow cast by a hawkish successor encourages moderation toward a dovish incumbent, the foreign state attacks instead—despite a dovish incumbent’s known preference for peace—using war to lock in a settlement that would otherwise be lost to future leadership turnover. I discuss the theory’s implications for widening the empirical scope of the commitment problem explanation for war to limited wars over relatively lower stakes and for integrating the politics of leadership turnover with the study of strategic rivalries.     

Threats at Home,Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of Coups and Revolutions

I analyze a two-level game in which a leader bargains over the spoils of international bargaining with a domestic opposition that can threaten her with a coup or revolution. While fighting an international war shrinks the domestic pie, it also alters the distribution of domestic power. This has three main implications. First, if war will undermine the opposition, fighting may be so attractive that leaders demand more for peace than foreign states are willing to give, leading to war. Second, if war will bolster the opposition, leaders accept harsh terms to avoid fighting—strategic selection that has implications for the observed relationship between war and political survival. Finally, prospective shifts in the distribution of domestic power caused by war can reduce the effects of international asymmetric information, though the result may be to increase or decrease the chances of war.     

The Effect of Security Alliances on Exchange-Rate Regime Choices

Because an exchange-rate arrangement by nature involves more than one country and because it has various economic and political implications, it is affected inevitably by interstate political relations. Most previous research explains the exchange-rate regime choice as a function of individual country attributes, ignoring the role of interstate political relations and the anchor-currency choice. In this paper, I examine how security alliances influence a country's choices over the flexible-fixed regime and the anchor currency. Alliances increase the ex ante attractiveness of pegging to one's ally, because security ties can reduce concerns over relative gains, motivate active collaboration by the anchor-currency ally to defend the regime, and signal to the currency market the durability of the regime. Hence, a country is biased toward pegging to its ally, relative to either pegging to a nonally or choosing the flexible regime. I test the argument for both the Bretton Woods and the post- Bretton Woods periods. I find that alliance ties affect both the anchor currency and the flexible-fixed regime choices, as expected. But these effects appear to function through the defense-pact alliance alone and are most pronounced for the developing countries.     

Military Structure,Civil Disobedience,and Military Violence

In this article, I argue that factors inherent to the structure of a military organization and their relationship with the political leadership play a role in the organization's tendency to perpetrate violence against civilians during civil disobedience campaigns. To examine this hypothesis, I conducted a three-phased statistical analysis on a database containing 97 campaigns that took place between 1972 and 2012. In the first phase, I examined the relationship between military centric factors and violent crackdowns. In the second phase, I examined the relationship between military centric factors and mass killing. In the third stage, I examined the relationship between two specific types of discrimination in the military and mass killing. I found strong evidence supporting the hypothesis mentioned above. High-risk militaries that served a militarized regime, contained loosely regulated or indoctrinated paramilitaries, and discriminated against the protesting group, were much more likely to perpetrate violence against civilians during civil disobedience campaigns than low-risk militaries. The conclusions of this study suggest that further examination of the military's role in perpetrating violence against civilians during protests and conflict may provide some novel findings.     

Britain,France, and Mesopotamian Oil, 1916–1920

This analysis centres on British and French policies concerning Mesopotamian oil between 1916 and 1920. Both Powers already had some degree of interest in oil matters before the war, but these concerns did not leave a particularly strong imprint on the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. During the First World War, both Britain and France became aware of their lack of oil and identified Mesopotamian oil as a key war aim. Both Powers developed close relations with Royal Dutch-Shell to further their oil policies. After the war, the struggle for oil proved inseparable from the territorial settlement in the Middle East and relations with oil companies. All actors did not initially recognise this fact, and it was only during 1919–1920 that an increasing awareness developed that oil and territorial issues were inseparable. Combined with changes in political leadership, it made possible a “silent compromise” at San Remo in April 1920.     

Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War: Space, Position, and Contiguity in the Major Power Subsystem

Vasquez's (1996) rivalry escalation theory stressed territorial disputes as the principal focus for a two-path explanation of war. Neighbors fight over adjacent space and non-neighbors sometimes join ongoing wars between neighbors. But major powers are also much concerned with positional issues. Expanding the war motivation focus to encompass both spatial and positional issues facilitates the development of a new, more elaborate theory from which several new hypotheses can be derived, in addition to the older ones. Testing of the new theory can also proceed with rivalry data not based on dispute density measures, different types of contiguity can be assessed, and the presence of spatial-positional issues can be measured directly, as opposed to relying on a proximity proxy. The empirical outcome strongly supports the two-path, two-issue theory. In the major power subsystem, noncontiguous rivals outnumber contiguous rivals, dyadic wars are scarce, and war joining has been the norm. Spatial issues alone would have a hard time accounting for this pattern. Variable mixes of spatial and positional issues are able to account for it and a number of derived hypotheses reasonably well. This is not the last word on rivalry escalation to war but it appears to be an additional step in the right direction.     

Civil wars,party politics and the consolidation of regimes in twentieth century Europe

The present article explores how winners' and losers' strategies for competition influence the possibility of democratization after civil war. Civil wars have been pivotal events in many states, but there has been little analysis of how they affect democratization. Since most have been won by the political right in twentieth century Europe one expects a correlation between civil war and the imposition of authoritarian solution to political conflicts. However, an analysis of five civil wars shows a wide variety in the patterns of political dominance achieved by the winners, ranging from total clampdown in Spain to the winners relinquishing power, as in Ireland. In between, Finland, Greece and Hungary combined various degrees of open competition with restrictions on the losers. In effect democratization can be as likely an outcome of civil war as regression to authoritarianism. Explaining the variation in outcomes of the five cases is the objective of this article.