The new public management paradigm and the search for democratic accountability

Can we permit empowered, responsive civil servants to make decisions and be innovative and still have democratic accountability? This important question haunts those who would advocate a “new public management.” The proponents of a new public management paradigm emphasize performance the ability of their strategy to produce results. But they cannot ignore the troubling question of political accountability. They must develop a process that not only permits public managers to produce better results but also provides accountability to a democratic electorate.     

Democratic Accountability in Decentralised Governance1

This article develops a conceptual framework for studying democratic accountability in decentralised governance, and discusses critical issues about democratic accountability from a citizen's perspective. First, the concept is discussed and adapted to make it useful for studying democratic accountability in different governance structures. Second, the article scrutinises conditions for democratic accountability in decentralised governance based on three models. Third, democratic accountability is discussed with reference to a case study of public reviewers operating in four municipalities in Sweden. The study indicates that municipal auditors and the local media have the greatest impact on municipal policy. On the whole, auditors improve local governments’ internal control and systems for steering and monitoring municipal policy, whereas the media sometimes alter the policy agenda without changing the policy. Auditors maintain and support an elitist democratic orientation of democratic accountability, and the media maintain this democratic orientation and in addition promote democratic dialogue. Viewed from a citizen's perspective, the traditional accountability system does not work satisfactorily. State inspectors and municipal auditors – two important public reviewers in the current system – could improve their work to make it more useful to citizens’ democratic control. Another way discussed to develop democratic accountability is to promote participatory policy and concrete means of accountability (e.g. on‐site visits, conducted tours and different forms of democratic dialogue). The formal way to improve democratic accountability implies more transparency, monitoring and control, which may also lead to distrust and scapegoat thinking (i.e. a surveillance society), whereas concrete modes of accountability, more associated with participatory and deliberative democracy, imply mutual responsibility and trust building. Strengthening participatory policy, active citizens, collective responsibility and democratic dialogue could be an alternative to the emerging audit society.     

Delimiting Democratic Accountability

This article discusses the concept of accountability in relation to those holding public office in democratic states. It argues that the concept of accountability requires careful specification and that it is frequently distorted when put to the service of theoretical models and normative principles. The article develops a definition of accountability and a range of distinctions between forms of accountability, asks what forms of accountability might be appropriate to modern democratic systems and argues that some combinations of democracy and accountability can have serious negative consequences for politics. The article concludes by discussing the types of accountability that are pertinent to recent claims that international institutions should be made more democratically accountable. In each case, the common tendency to inflate the concept of accountability is associated with demands for accountability that threaten both democratic consolidation and the distinctive character of accountability itself.     

The Market Turn in EU Governance—The Emergence of Public–Private Collaboration

The question asked here is how the horizontal relationship between public and private actors, with the overall aim of delivering public service, is squared with the requirement of democratic accountability according to the traditional model of command and control. Empirical analysis of the European satellite navigation program (Galileo), the European Investment Bank and health, and the European Financial market (the Lamfalussy model) shows that efficiency is at the forefront of the collaborations. Democratic accountability is assumed to take place because there is a formal chain of delegation. However, the private actors are not part of that chain and their accountability is never addressed. The market turn in European Union governance has opened up for private authority and emphasis of output legitimacy. It has not opened up for democratic reforms according to the very authority system of governance. We are dealing with a governance turn and yet it is still government.     

Limits of regulatory responsiveness: Democratic credentials of responsive regulation

Responsiveness and accountability constitute the process of democratic representation, reinforcing each other. Responsiveness asks elected representatives to adopt policies ex ante preferred by citizens, while accountability consists of the people's ex post sanctioning of the representatives based on policy outcomes. However, the regulatory literature tends to interpret responsiveness narrowly between a regulator and regulatees: the regulator is responsive to regulatees’ compliance without considering broader public needs and preferences. Democratic regulatory responsiveness requires that the regulator should be responsive to the people, not just regulatees. We address this theoretical gap by pointing out the perils of regulatory capture and advancing John Braithwaite's idea of tripartism as a remedy. We draw out two conditions of democratic regulatory responsiveness from Philip Selznick – comprehensiveness and proactiveness. We then propose overlapping networked responsiveness based on indirect reciprocity among various stakeholders. This mechanism is the key to connecting regulatory responsiveness with accountability.     

A ‘Talent for Bureaucracy’: A.F. Davies and the Analysis of Government in Australia*

In an address in 2003, Senator Kim Carr cited A.F. Davies' much‐quoted observation that Australians have ‘a characteristic talent for bureaucracy’ (Carr 2003: 3). He referred to the achievements of bureaucrats like Nugget Coombs, then went on to discuss questions of accountability, values and political control in the Australian public service. How could the public service be responsive and responsible, and contribute to the maintenance of a democratic society, in today's world? Certainly, these were core concerns of Davies, as Walter argues in an insightful article (1999). Davies, Walter argues, ‘was concerned, throughout his career, with the links between bureaucracy and democracy’ (1999, 25), fearful that the life‐world is increasingly being structured by expertise, and in the domain of the experts, there is little room for individual voice, for passion, or for democratic control. Davies' concerns, and those of Carr and Walter, raise important questions about the way in which we understand the structure of government, the significance of our changing understanding for the democratic ideal, and the implications of these changes for social scientists.     

Better the Devil: A Response to Gus O'Donnell's ‘Better Government’

Gus O'Donnell's vision of ‘better government’ is presented as a critique of party politics, most specifically the short‐termism, selfishness and incompetence of elected politicians. There are few people better placed than O'Donnell to form such judgements. However, O'Donnell goes much further, by calling into question the legitimacy of the democratic system which gives rise to party politics. His article outlines several mechanisms by which the exercise of power by elected ministers could be constrained by a managerialist accountability framework, without addressing the question of who determines the appropriate framework for ministerial performance. The House of Commons is condemned as ‘too politicised’. O'Donnell also offers substantial praise for apparently ‘depoliticised’ policy‐making processes, overlooking the inherently political constitution of such processes. In doing so, O'Donnell claims to be challenging party politics on behalf of voters/taxpayers, but instead seeks to dismantle any possibility of the public expressing a collective will via the ballot box that might challenge the immutability of the market economy.     

Performance, Accountability, and the Debate over Rules

Does compliance with rules ensure better program performance and accountability? Since the 1980s, many scholars have answered no to this question, arguing that as managers attempt to comply with a growing thicket of rules, they often lose sight of the performance of their agencies and programs. Even the defenders of a rules‐based approach have tended to view it as a necessary, though inconvenient, means of ensuring that democratic values and public rights are protected in the functioning of government. But does compliance with rules inevitably result in a loss of efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of public projects? This essay presents a case study of a public works project and three additional case summaries to demonstrate a theoretical proposition that compliance with rules for contracting and competitive selection of contractors can be an essential element of both a project’s success and its accountability.     

责任政府：一个分析框架

从开放和相互依存的角度分析了责任政府的定义、责任的来源、责任履行的要素以及失职带来的后果。政府责任是国家职能的具体化。在现代民主政治中,民主授权和行政授权是政府责任的来源。而民主授权是权力的根本来源。随着全球化进程的推进,政府不仅要承担传统意义上的国内管理职能,还要承担国际义务。对于中国政府来说,责任的履行必须放在制度转型背景下考虑,处理好改革、发展和稳定是政府的核心责任。政府责任是由责任主体、责任客体(或责任对象)、责任实现形式以及责任实现的约束机制诸要素组成的,因此政府失职是这些要素间关系的失衡。要使政府责任得到有效履行,必须强化民主选举制度、明确政府内部各部门责权、扩大公民参与、完善监督机制,还要提高官员能力,树立公共责任意识和精神。从长远来看,建立一种公共责任文化更具有持久性。     

Need or Greed? Conditions for Collective Action against Corruption

This article calls into question one of the implicit assumptions linking democratic accountability to reduced corruption, namely, that citizens will expose institutions rife with venality and mobilize for better government. Instead, mobilization may be contingent on the type of corruption. The study develops a distinction between need and greed corruption and suggest that citizens are more likely to engage in the fight against corruption when corruption is needed to gain access to “fair” treatment (need corruption) as opposed to special illicit advantages (greed corruption). Using data from the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the study suggest that need corruption mobilizes citizens, in particular if they perceive that fellow citizens will also engage, while greed corruption leads to secrecy, demobilization, and a propensity to “free ride” on other citizens’ anticorruption efforts. The study thereby contributes to a better understanding of fundamental conditions for collective action against corruption and explaining why greed corruption persists in societies with well‐established institutions for accountability.     

Democratic Order,Autonomy, and Accountability

Accountability is a principle for organizing relations between rulers and ruled, and making public officials accountable is a democratic achievement. There are, however, competing claims about what is involved in demanding, rendering, assessing, and responding to accounts; what are effective accountability institutions; and how accountability regimes emerge and change. This article provides a frame for thinking about institutional aspects of accountability regimes and their cognitive, normative, and power foundations. A distinction is made between accountability within an established regime with stable power relations and role expectations and accountability as (re)structuring processes in less institutionalized contexts and in transformation periods. A huge literature is concerned with the first issue. There is less attention to accountability as (re)structuring processes. The article, therefore, calls attention to how democracies search for, and struggle over, what are legitimate accountability regimes and political orders.     

Managerialism, Accountability and Democracy: A Victorian Case Study

Managerialism has made a substantial contribution to providing a more cost conscious, efficient and effective public service. But the Victorian case also raises concerns about whether managerialist techniques will be pursued within a wider constitutional, political and legal framework which recognises the need for discussion, debate and accountability in democratic policy-making.     

From managerial reform to democratic reformation: Towards a deliverative public administration

In the State of Victoria, Australia the Kennett government implemented a radical public sector reforms matched perhaps only in Britain and New Zealand. Responding to fiscal crisis, the Government balanced the budget, attracted new investment and capital projects, and instilled new economic confidence. However, the revolution had its costs. This article examines the effects of managerial reform on accountability and democracy. The structures, systems and methodologies of the Government eliminated real deliberation over options, benefits and costs. The quality of public discourse between government and constitutents about the democratic process was stifled. An economic and fiscal perspective replaced a political and legal understanding of public bureaucracy. The article provides a case study of Victorian reforms, and a theoretical examination of the case, suggesting that public administration should be reconceptualized in more pluralistic and democratic terms.     

The challenge of accountability in complex regulatory networks: The case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill

A puzzle that faces public administrators within regulatory governance networks is how to balance the need for democratic accountability while increasingly facing demands from elected officials to optimize oversight of industry by utilizing the expertise of the private sector in developing risk‐based standards for compliance. The shift from traditional command and control oversight to process oriented regulatory regimes has been most pronounced in highly complex industries, such as aviation and deepwater oil drilling, where the intricate and technical nature of operations necessitates risk‐based regulatory networks based largely on voluntary compliance with mutually agreed upon standards. The question addressed in this paper is how the shift to process oriented regimes affects the trade‐offs between democratic, market, and administrative accountability frames, and what factors determine the dominant accountability frame within the network. Using post‐incident document analysis, this paper provides a case study of regulatory oversight of the deepwater oil drilling industry prior to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico, to explore how the shift to a more networked risk‐based regulatory regime affects the trade‐offs and dominant accountability frames within the network. The results of this study indicate that a reliance on market‐based accountability mechanisms, along with the lack of a fully implemented process‐oriented regulatory regime, led to the largest oil spill in US history.     

Rough days in democracies: Comparing protests in democracies

Abstract.  Democratic political institutions are generally designed to channel public opinion; yet citizens often take to the streets in protest. Why would citizens, provided with formal mechanisms to affect the policy process, resort to extraordinary means? This article argues that the strength of representative institutions influences the likelihood of protest. The democratic institution literature does not address the issue of protest and in the protest literature effects of the democratic governmental structure have been largely underestimated. However, the diversity in government formats across democratic states and the corresponding variation in amount of protests leads one to question the relationship between them. This article identifies the variation in the scale of protests among democratic regimes in Western European countries using the European Protest and Coercion Data and explains protest using variation in the forms of government. Protesters in democratic countries with a weak legislature find it difficult to deliver their demands to government due to the institutional environment. Therefore, they are more inclined to protest than citizens in countries with a strong legislature. This argument is tested along with other structural variables and supported by results from testing models using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors.     

FIGHTING CORRUPTION WITH SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS' POTENTIAL TO REDUCE CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Given the poor track record of traditional anti‐corruption initiatives, donors and governments are increasingly looking at how civil society can fight corruption in public administration. Social accountability mechanisms intend to perform this role by holding officials directly accountable through citizen engagement. However, this article argues that social accountability mechanisms are only capable of reducing corruption systemically if they activate horizontal accountability and sustain it through the sanctioning mechanisms of electoral accountability. A comparative case study analysis using the cases of the Ugandan Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and the Bangalore Citizen Report Card is applied to test this hypothesis. The Tanzanian Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and an example of citizen engagement in Mumbai are employed as shadow cases to provide additional evidence for the hypothesis. The results indicate that social accountability mechanisms must be inclusive, broad, with public effect and embedded in other accountability relationships to fight corruption effectively. Electoral accountability is key, and support to social accountability mechanisms should therefore always be well placed within a broader agenda aimed at strengthening democratic governance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

New regionalism in five Swiss metropolitan areas: An assessment of inclusiveness, deliberation and democratic accountability

Abstract.  Focusing on area-wide policy coordination in metropolitan areas, this article examines the democratic consequences of the supposed shift 'from government to governance'. In the first, theoretical, part it draws upon the debate on old and new routes towards regionalism in order to identify four different types of metropolitan governance. It then develops two working hypotheses – an optimistic and a pessimistic one – in order to analyse the implications of various types of metropolitan governance on inclusiveness, modes of decision making and democratic accountability. In the second part, these hypotheses are tested on the basis of comparative case studies on twenty schemes of area-wide policy coordination in five Swiss metropolitan areas in the fields of water supply, public transport, social services for drug users and cultural amenities. The results suggest that 'governance' is superior to 'government' in terms of inclusiveness, that it cannot be seen as significantly linked to the fostering of deliberative decision making, and that it can present serious flaws in terms of accountability. It is noted, however, that a shift 'from government to governance' does not intrinsically imply democratic drawbacks. Contextual factors play a strong conditioning role.     

More than Writing on a Wall: Evaluating the Role that Codes of Ethics Play in Securing Accountability of Public Sector Decision‐Makers

This article argues that the essential factors of a public service code of ethics can be divided into five categories. These categories or principles are fairness, transparency, responsibility, efficiency and conflict of interest. These principles are identified in this article as being the basic elements of democratic accountability in relation to public sector decision‐making. The issues explored are not only the obstacles that the public service decision‐maker faces in internalising these principles but, also, the challenges for a pro‐active management in fostering such internalisation.     

Does E‐Government Promote Accountability? A Comparative Analysis of Website Openness and Government Accountability

Under the global pressure of information technology, the adoption of web-based technologies in public administration has created a new government-and-citizen interface. However, whether e-government will unambiguously lead to a more transparent, interactive, open and hence, accountable, government remains a central question. Applying a framework of global pressure effects on bureaucratic change, this paper conducts an empirical study on website openness and accountability in fourteen countries. Even when overall accountability levels rise, the accountability gap between different national bureaucracies often remains intact as web-based technologies typically maintain or reinforce the existing practices. The question of whether e-government promotes accountability depends on what kind of bureaucracy one is referring to in the first place. In the current debate about global convergence and national divergence on the effect of globalization on public bureaucracies, the spread of e-government provides a case of convergence in practice rather than in results.     

Local Government and Governance in Norway: Stretched Accountability in Network Politics

This article is concerned with the democratic quality of network governance in a local context; in particular, the interplay between traditional local government and the emerging network structures. What forms of interplay can be observed between traditional local government and emerging network structures? Of particular interest in this respect is the role of local councillors. As elected representatives, councillors embody the special commitment of authorities towards the public. However, involvement in networks implies a danger of capture, and if network decisions are not open to public scrutiny, democratic control is difficult to achieve even if local councillors are represented. This article therefore discusses networks and accountability: In what ways and to what degree are networks held accountable? Empirically, it explores three local policy networks, all involving the city of Kristiansand. One group of networks – neighbourhood networks – is internally initiated and maintained by the municipality of Kristiansand. Another network is an intermunicipal collaboration involving Kristiansand and five surrounding municipalities. The third network is an example of a public‐private partnership that includes the municipality of Kristiansand, as well as several other actors. The case studies show that the actual presence of local government representatives in networks is not enough to ensure accountability. Lines of popular accountability are stretched, either because the networks are deemed irrelevant by the city councillors, or because networks develop decision‐making styles that shield them from external political control, or because local councillors deliberately deprive themselves of influence over important policy fields.