Turning down the heat: Influences on conflict management in enduring rivalries

Enduring rivalries represent the most difficult challenges for policy makers seeking to promote international peace and security. Once in place, enduring rivalries account for a disproportionate number of crises, militarized disputes, as well as wars, and include conflicts that are more likely to escalate than those falling in other conflict contexts. Unfortunately, we know very little about conflict management in enduring rivalries from either a theoretical or policy perspective. This study seeks to account for why some rivalries are successfully managed while others persist at high and unabated levels of conflict In addressing these concerns, we explore 35 enduring rivalries over the period 1945–1992. We find that although enduring rivalries are quite resistant to influences that produce changes in their dynamics, both endogenous and contextual influences can exercise a significant impact upon the prospects for conflict management between enduring rivals.     

Israeli-Turkish Tensions and their International Ramifications

The deterioration of relations between Israel and Turkey, culminating in the “Gaza flotilla” affair of June 2010, are part of a reorientation in the Turkish foreign policy over the past several years: a move away from the West and toward Muslim states and non-state groups, including such radical actors as Iran, Hamas and Hizballah. This article reviews the rationale for the Israeli-Turkish strategic partnership in the 1990s and the early years of this century. It then documents deviations in Turkish foreign policy from Western patterns. Next it examines how changes in Turkey's twenty-first century strategic environment, as well as in the domestic arena, led to a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy and to current tensions in bilateral relations. And finally, it assesses the impact of the changes in Turkish foreign policy on the Greater Middle East and global politics.     

“These People Have an Irrevocable Right to Self-Government”: United States Policy and the Palestinian Question, 1977–1979

Upon entering office, Carter Administration officials placed a heavy emphasis on integrating human rights into United States foreign policy. They also sought to contain festering Arab–Israeli tensions in the Middle East. The intersection of these two issues was the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This article examines the Administration's attempts to solve that conflict and to bring peace to the region. It argues that policymakers developed a sincere dedication to safeguarding Palestinian rights, but that their understanding of those rights was limited in scope and defined through the lens of United States security and strategic interests. In spite of a good-faith effort to satisfy Palestinian desires while maintaining a constructive relationship with Israel, the Administration ultimately failed to alter the status quo because of regional developments. As Washington's strategic thinking changed, so did the urgency of Palestinian rights.     

Rules of military retaliation and their practice by the state of Israel

A major issue intriguing students of international relations is determining to what extent, if at all, do norms and standard operating procedures (SOPs) affect foreign policy. This question is addressed in this article in the case of Israel's policy of military retaliation. Alternative rules of conduct associated with this policy were deduced from strategic and normative arguments presented by Israeli decision‐makers in order to justify military reprisal attacks against Arab countries. These rules of conduct were then formulized into hypotheses and empirically tested with the aid of a database that contained daily accounts of Arab and Israeli acts of aggression towards each other between 1949 and 1982. In this manner it was possible to identify different decision rules that dominated Israel's reprisal policy at different periods of time.     

中阿友谊源远流长,前景广阔

早在伊斯兰教创立及大阿拉伯帝国形成之前,中国就同阿拉伯地区有友好往来。新中国成立后,中阿关系是中国外交工作的一个重点。自20世纪50年代起,中国同阿拉伯国家陆续建立正式外交关系后,双方关系不断拓展。相似的经历和共同目标使中国同阿拉伯各国结成深厚友谊,双方无重大利害冲突,更多的是友好合作。中国人民视阿拉伯人民为好朋友、好伙伴、好兄弟。展望未来,中阿友好关系定将持续、稳定、深入地向前发展。     

Resource nationalism in the foreign policy behavior of oil exporting countries (1947–1974)†

The authors examine the foreign policy behavior of petroleum exporting countries in the context of resource nationalism. A sequence of issues is posited and examined, preliminary results indicating that oil‐related international behavior is learned. This pattern of learning and behavior may be adopted by new entrants into the ranks of the energy exporting nations, thereby exacerbating attempts to ease the “energy crisis” by discovering new oil reserves in “friendly” countries. In addition to this policy implication the research indicates that the Arab‐Israeli conflict has a substantial impact on oil‐related activities, accelerating the intensity of interaction between importers and exporters.     

Conversations in Istanbul: An interview with Bulent Ecevit

Turkey, a strategically located but often unappreciated ally of the West, receives inadequate attention in Western media. It has served as a crucial element of Western defense during the cold war and is a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. The following interview with former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit examines the Turkish perspective on important Turkish foreign and domestic issues, specifically focusing on: Arab‐Israeli conflict, Turkish‐Greek dispute over Cyprus, Turkish relations with the Arabs, Turkish relations with the United States and West European countries, Arab relations with the West, and internal Turkish political affairs.     

Multipolarity and instability in the Middle East

Tensions have long been a feature of the international relations of the Middle East. After the 2011 Arab uprisings, regional instability is being driven by a confluence of three interrelated developments. First, the weakening role of the United States as a power balancer in the Middle East, combined with the larger global context, has provided assumptions about threats and new opportunities for local and other actors to pursue strategic and foreign policy objectives that have deepened tensions and regional competition. Second, there has been a juxtaposing of power multipolarity with ideological multipolarity, itself a source of increased instability, with two of the regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, fanning opposing sectarian flames to further their respective strategic objectives. Third, this strategic competition is being played out in several newly weakened or collapsing states such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Similarly, the regional powers’ competition in previously weakened states, such as Lebanon and Iraq, has intensified due to the acquisition of new, sectarian dimensions. These developments are likely to perpetuate instability and tensions in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.

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Evaluating Israel's Strategy of Low-Intensity Warfare, 1949–2006

This study examines the strategic and tactical logic of Israel's limited uses of force against Arab states and against substate actors. It evaluates the effectiveness of these policies, and their political and strategic ramifications. The study is based on a historical survey of these policies and on quantitative analysis of a dataset of the use of limited force by Israel over the 1949–2003 period. The findings suggest, first, that limited force strategies were occasionally used to foster escalation. In other cases, the mismanagement of limited engagements resulted in inadvertent escalation to full-blown wars. Second, domestic political and social considerations had important effects on the nature and intensity of Israeli uses of limited force. Third, Israeli reliance on offensive strategies has not only consistently failed, but produced adverse military and diplomatic side effects. Defensive and preventive measures have shown a much greater degree of success. The study concludes that a combination of military and diplomatic measures produces far more effective results than strictly military ones.     

Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council

The Arab Spring has fundamentally shifted the strategic balance in the Middle East. As all sides rush to ensure that their interests will be secured, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has emerged as a key battleground between those who would like to see a more democratic region, and those who would like to maintain economic stability. On one side of this debate is the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia, that views democratic reform as a threat to economic stability. On the other side are the forces of the Arab Spring, which have called for political reform in states such as Egypt, Syria, and Libya, even if these reforms come at the expense of stability. This article examines the various forces, both domestic and international, that are attempting to influence Jordan, and through it, the balance of power in the Arab World.     

Political competition and foreign policy power sharing

In this essay I examine the intersection of domestic and international politics in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. 1 develop a three‐actor model that allows us to specify the incentives for power sharing under different assumptions about the distribution of preferences and capabilities between a government, a domestic opposition, and a foreign state. The model generates several interesting hypotheses about the interaction of policy goals and the willingness of actors to share power. In particular, I show that under certain conditions there are important asymmetries whereby doves may be more willing to share power than hawks. Importantly, this willingness is endogenous to the model and comes from the alignment of preferences in the policy space, rather than from an a priori value for the democratization of foreign policy making. The model also suggests several hypotheses about the circumstances under which states have incentives to meddle in the foreign policy processes of other states.     

The EU and the Gulf monarchies: normative power Europe in search of a strategy for engagement

The Persian Gulf region is of strategic importance to the European Union (EU). Yet, different political realities of authoritarian government in the Gulf challenge crucial parts of EU foreign policy that are based on normative power Europe concepts. Cooperation with the ruling dynasties appears beneficial for EU decision-makers if one looks at the comprehensive agenda of common interests in the Gulf region. In 2004, the EU aimed to build a strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East; in this the EU emphasized its commitment to advancing its partnership with the Gulf countries. Yet, from the perspective of 2012 the results are bleak. Despite some signs of improvement in deepening the political, economic and security interactions with the region, there is still no concerted EU policy in the Gulf beyond the thriving bilateral activities of some EU member states. The events of the Arab Spring have increased the challenges even further. The EU, on the one hand, is trying to support forces of liberal and democratic reform in some neighbouring countries. On the other hand, it seeks close partnerships with authoritarian family dynasties in those Gulf countries in which a democratic opening is not around the corner. This article suggests an alternative explanation for this dichotomy. While there is an inherent tension between the EU's reformist agenda and its own interests, whether security or trade interests, this article argues that much of the EU's relationship with the Gulf countries can be explained through a misperception of the specific settings of government in the region. Despite a substantial agenda of interests on both sides in areas such as trade, energy, regional security, terrorism and irregular migration, the EU's foreign policy outputs remain rather limited.     

Japan’s Middle East Policy, 1972–1974: Resources Diplomacy,Pro-American Policy,and New Left

Commentators generally accept that the Yom Kippur War and subsequent oil crisis crystallised Japan’s overtly pro-Arab stance. This analysis challenges that view—even after the oil embargo, Japan’s Middle Eastern policy was both discretely and, at times, blatantly pro-American. Admittedly, the Japanese government had a seemingly ambiguous attitude towards the Arab–Israeli conflict and on-going conflict between oil-producing countries and oil companies; however, responsible for formulating the Arab–Israeli policy, the Foreign Ministry preferred to follow American leadership in the region for reasons of national security and Cold War imperatives. The Foreign Ministry’s response to the 1972 Lod Airport Massacre, a radicalised Japanese New Left terrorist attack, revealed a determination to gain international credibility by more actively supporting the West. Lod buttressed the influence of the pro-American contingent in the government; and the 1973 Arab oil embargo did not undermine their position. Although the Cabinet eventually issued a public statement supporting the Arab cause to satisfy the Japanese public, the pro-American contingent succeeded surreptitiously in bringing the Cabinet together to uphold the American-led petroleum order as well as United States leadership in Cold War politics.     

Revisionism and Its Variants: Understanding State Reactions to Foreign Policy Failure

States respond to failure in different ways. In light of the phenomenon of revisionist states, it is particularly important to understand why some revisionist states revert to status quo pursuits in the face of policy failure, while others pursue revisionism even in the face of external developments that we might expect would push them toward moderation. Domestic structure, domestic politics, and elite ideology each contribute to an explanation of how revisionist states respond to policy failure, but none of these variables alone tells the full story. As is illustrated through case studies of Iranian, Israeli, and Iraqi foreign policy in the 1980s, domestic structure plays the launching role in the analysis of how a revisionist state will behave. Regime type structures the incentives facing leaders and determines whether domestic politics or elite ideology is determinative in predicting a revisionist state's reactions to failure.     

Israel and the Emerging Strategic Architecture in the Middle East

The Middle East has undergone significant changes in the past two decades. Most significantly, the region has experienced the dissolution of the post-1991 America-centric regional security complex as the United States reduces its forces and retools its center of effort toward the Indo-Pacific, and the creation of a new gas-centered sub-regional security complex in the Eastern Mediterranean. These changes have impacted Israel’s stature in its region and have led to significant changes in Israel’s foreign and national security policy. While in the past, Israel viewed itself as a “villa in the jungle”—not as an integral part of the region—it now sees itself as part of its surroundings and is pursuing a much more regional-centric policy. This change is clear in issue-specific alliances and collective security arrangements, as well as in long-range economic relationships. This article analyzes the regional changes and their impact in Israeli strategic thinking and policy.     

Systemic interaction opportunities and war behavior∗

State leaders must often address domestic and foreign-policy concerns simultane-ously, though doing so can be complicated and risky. One way in which leaders can seek to satisfy domestic demands and pursue foreign policy goals simultaneously is by implementing policies that complement one another; i.e., the implementation of one policy influences the ease with which the other policy can be implemented. For instance, one manner in which leaders can placate domestic audiences is via distributive policies such as social insurance payments that provide economic security to individuals. By providing economic security guarantees, leaders may gain greater discretion over other policy areas, including foreign policy. However, while the social insurance effort may satisfy an audience and enable a leader to take foreign- policy action, especially high payment levels may indicate that a leader must devote an inordinate portion of his budget to domestic concerns, making foreign policy more difficult to implement. Thus, guarantees of economic security might provide leaders with greater foreign policy latitude until domestic expenditures reach sufficient levels that foreign-affairs budgets are reduced. We employ zero-inflated event count models to estimate the relationship between social-insurance levels and the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes in which states engage. Our analyses include 69 states between 1975 and 1990. Our models support the hypothesis that lower levels of social insurance lead to greater numbers of disputes, but that, after a certain level of insurance effort is passed, dispute involvement declines. Our findings suggest a differential effect of social insurance on a leader's ability to act in the foreign policy arena and support the notion that leaders may employ the welfare state to enhance their foreign-policy capabilities, though they appear to meet with conditional and limited success.     

Undermining the transatlantic democracy agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia's counteracting democracy strategy

Saudi Arabian foreign policy is often declared to be countering the possible democratic transitions of the Arab Spring. As such, Saudi Arabia has been cast as a “counter-revolutionary” force in the Middle East and North Africa. This article explores the extent to which this has been the case in Egypt and Bahrain, and the extent to which Saudi foreign policy has challenged United States and European Union democracy promotion efforts in those countries. The article highlights how the transatlantic democracy promotion strategy is complicated by a conflict of interests problem, which leads them to promote democracy on an ad hoc and incremental basis. As a result, their efforts and larger strategic thinking are undermined by Saudi Arabia in Egypt. However, in Bahrain, transatlantic democracy promotion is itself muted by the strategic interest in containing Iran. As a result, Saudi Arabia can be seen as a regional countervailing power but this is implicitly in line with transatlantic policy. Tensions with Saudi foreign policy in Bahrain are over how best to manage the uprisings and maintain the status quo, rather than a conflict over political transition.     

Afghanistan's India–Pakistan dilemma: advocacy coalitions in weak states

This article seeks to examine the foreign policy behaviour of weak states in regions marked by politically turbulent geostrategic environments. An analysis of Afghanistan's foreign policy behaviour vis-à-vis Pakistan and India lends focus to this aim. India–Pakistan rivalry has gained traction as a key factor in determining Afghanistan's stability in the wake of the drawdown of Coalition forces. Missing from this debate, however, is consideration of Afghanistan's agency as a weak state with an independent set of policy preferences. Based on primary interviews with a diverse set of Afghan political actors the article outlines two competing policy advocacies: Pakistan friendly and Pakistan averse. The article argues that these advocacies are key to understanding Afghanistan's India–Pakistan dilemma. Departing from the ethnic lens used to explain Afghan politics and its regional linkages, this article shows that Kabul's relations with Islamabad determine its approach towards New Delhi regardless of ethnic rivalries. Understanding domestic Afghan narratives in this regional context is therefore imperative to adequately assess South Asia's prospective security calculus.     

The structure-identity nexus: Syria and Turkey’s collapse (2011)

The relation between Syria and Turkey transformed from enmity in the 1990s to détente in the early 2000s, grew into amity after the rise to power of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) in 2002, and reverted to enmity in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. This research suggests that a combination of structural and identity-based factors, at regional and domestic levels, induced the collapse of the decade-long amity. This paper builds on the notion of a “structure-identity nexus”; and determines the orientation of foreign policy outcomes from the 1990s until 2011. The discussion outlines the merits of a hybrid theoretical perspective by elaborating on Barkin’s idea of ‘realist constructivism’, which draws on two rival traditions, realism and constructivism. The structure-identity framework explains the double transformation in the relationship, considering the return to inter- and intra-state conflict in 2011. The research draws on extensive primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews carried out with key figures. In addition to the relationship between Syria and Turkey, the structure-identity nexus provides potential broader explanations that fuel the shift from amity to enmity in the complex network of states found in the Middle East.     

Why has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict

The India-Pakistan conflict is one of the most enduring rivalries of the post-World War era. Thus far, it has witnessed four wars and a number of serious interstate crises. The literature on enduring rivalries suggests that the India-Pakistan dyad contains factors such as unsettled territorial issues, political incompatibility, irreconcilable positions on national identity, and the absence of significant economic and trade relations between the two states, all cause the rivalry to persist. In this article I present a crucial neglected structural factor that explains the endurance of the rivalry. I argue that the peculiar power asymmetry that has prevailed between the two antagonists for over half a century has made full termination of the rivalry difficult in the near-term. Truncated power asymmetry is a causal factor in this rivalry's persistence, as rivalries between a status quo power and a challenger state that are relatively equal in their capabilities at the local level are the most intractable and nearly impossible to resolve quickly. The duration of many other asymmetric rivalries can also be explained using a framework of global superiority versus local parity in power capabilities that exist between the antagonists.