Theorizing Criminal Law Reform

How are we to understand criminal law reform? The idea seems simple—the criminal law on the books is wrong: it should be changed. But 'wrong’ how? By what norms 'wrong’? As soon as one tries to answer those questions, the issue becomes more complex. One kind of answer is that the criminal law is substantively wrong: that is, we assume valid norms of background political morality, and we argue that doctrinally the criminal law on the books does not embody those norms. Another kind of answer is that the criminal law as it stands presupposes certain empirical facts, and yet those facts do not hold. Traditionally, criminal law reform has been informed by both these answers. Analytical theorists examine doctrine for its conceptual structure, and social scientists examine the actual workings of the criminal justice system. This tidy picture is, however, challenged by social constructivist accounts of the criminal law. They challenge the stability and conceptual purity of doctrine, and they challenge the objectivity of social science. On the basis of these challenges, they undermine the ambitions of traditional criminal law reform, and argue that the only reforms to the criminal law that matter are politicized ones—that criminal law reform is pointless unless it serves the interests of the marginalized and the dispossessed. It seems undeniable that in some sense our perceptions of crime in our society are indeed moulded by social forces, and that crime does not exist independently of the social structures and processes that help to define and control it. But why should those insights have the implications for our understanding of criminal law reform that they are alleged to have? How could it follow from those insights that criminal law reform either becomes radicalized or valueless? The aim of this paper is to show that what can legitimately be taken from the emphasis on the social constructedness of crime does not require wholesale abandonment of the traditional picture of criminal law reform, even though it may require some modifications of that picture.     

The Diffusion of Rights: From Law on the Books to Organizational Rights Practices

How does law change society? To gain new leverage on this long‐standing question, this article draws on two lines of research that often ignore each other: political science research on the mobilization of law, and sociological research on the diffusion of organizational practices. Our insights stem from six case studies of diverse organizations' responses to the accommodation provisions in the Americans with Disabilities Act and related state laws. We found that different modes of exposure to the law combined with organizational attributes to produce distinct “rights practices”—styles of standard operating procedures and informal routines that reflect the understanding of legal requirements within an organization. The diversity of the organizational responses challenges simple dichotomies between compliance/noncompliance, change through deterrence/change through norms, and mobilization/nonmobilization, and it underscores the importance of combining political science and sociological perspectives on law and social change.     

The Nature of Legal Philosophy

Abstract. Philosophy is general and systematic reflection about what there is, what ought to be done or is good, and how knowledge about both is possible. Legal philosophy raises these questions with respect to the law. In so doing, legal philosophy is engaged in reasoning about the nature of law. The arguments addressed to the question of the nature of law revolve around three problems. The first problem addresses the question: In what kinds of entities does the law consist, and how are these entities connected such that they form the overarching entity we call “law”? The answer is that law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. The second problem addresses the question of how norms as meaning contents are connected with the real world. This connection can be grasped by means of the concepts of authoritative issuance and social efficacy. The latter includes the concept of coercion or force. The third problem addresses the correctness or legitimacy of law, and, by this, the relationship between law and morality. To ask about the nature of law is to ask about necessary relations between the concepts of normative meaning, authoritative issuance as well as social efficacy, and correctness of content.     

Public Experiences of Police Violence and Corruption in Contemporary Russia: A Case of Predatory Policing?

“Predatory policing” occurs where police officers mainly use their authority to advance their own material interests rather than to fight crime or protect the interests of elites. These practices have the potential to seriously compromise the public's trust in the police and other legal institutions, such as courts. Using data from six surveys and nine focus groups conducted in Russia, we address four empirical questions: (1) How widespread are public encounters with police violence and police corruption in Russia? (2) To what extent does exposure to these two forms of police misconduct vary by social and economic characteristics? (3) How do Russians perceive the police, the courts, and the use of violent methods by the police? (4) How, if at all, do experiences of police misconduct affect these perceptions? Our results suggest that Russia conforms to a model of predatory policing. Despite substantial differences in its law enforcement institutions and cultural norms regarding the law, Russia resembles the United States in that direct experiences of police abuse reduce confidence in the police and in the legal system more generally. The prevalence of predatory policing in Russia has undermined Russia's democratic transition, which should call attention to the indispensable role of the police and other public institutions in the success of democratic reforms.     

Digital Hercules?

Is there a limit to what computers can do? In many areas, the facts of today put the sceptics of yesterday in the wrong. Who would have thought twenty years ago that a chess computer could ever beat the human world champion? With respect to computer programs for solving legal problems, the question is not whether they are possible, for they exist. In law, at least two important questions remain. First, whether such programs can eventually perform as good as, or better than humans. Second, whether the use of computers will alter the law and legal adjudication. These two questions are discussed in this article against the background of a comparison of chess and law. The answers give rise to certain premonitions. If the computer is used as an aid in legal decision making, it should be used in awareness of its limitations and idiosyncrasies.     

从命令到规则:哈特对奥斯丁的批判——读哈特《法律的概念》

哈特试图以法律的规则学说取代奥斯丁的法律命令理论,这一理论努力的背后所隐含的正是法律实证主义的某些深刻且基本的问题意识。通过分析哈特对奥斯丁的批判,我们比较了两种版本的法律实证主义在法律的存在方式以及检验法律的标准这两个问题上给出的不同回答,在此基础上提出,哈特的规则学说并没有能够真正地取代奥斯丁的命令理论,规则与命令所表明的可能是法律存在方式也即法律与社会生活方式联结的不同方面。     

Digging Up, Dismantling, and Redesigning the Criminal Law

The criminal law raises wonderfully thorny foundational questions. Some of these questions are conceptual: What is a plausible conception of crime? What is a plausible conception of criminal law? Some of these questions are genealogical: What are the historical and genealogical roots of the criminal law in a particular jurisdiction? Other questions are evaluative: What are the political and moral values on which a given conception of criminal law depends? What kind of rational reconstruction, if any, could the criminal law be given? And, finally, still other questions are exploratory and normative: Should parts of existing criminal law be abandoned? What new topics in criminal law theory need to be addressed in our globalised, technologically savvy world? The contributors to Antony Duff and Stuart P. Green’s collection Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law tackle these questions with zeal and independent spirit. They disagree markedly with each other about what the foundational questions are. And, they disagree about how those questions should be handled. This article charts their disagreements by situating the contributors within two taxonomies. The first groups them according to their approaches to the foundational questions; the second groups them according to their modes of theorising. This double taxonomy provides a useful frame within which to analyse these competing takes on the philosophically foundational work of criminal law theory.     

In-house or in court? Legal challenges to university decisions

Every day, decisions are made in universities that affect students. When a decision adversely affects a particular student, what means of redress does that student have? The circumstances in which a student has a legal claim against their university are generally unclear. Courts have traditionally tended to draw a distinction between ‘purely academic’ decisions and disciplinary decisions. There has been reluctance on the part of courts to intervene in non-disciplinary decisions which involve academic judgment, for example, the grade to be given to a student's work. On the other hand, where the decisions are purely disciplinary, for example, in relation to a student's behaviour towards others or towards university property, the courts have made it clear that there is essentially no difference between this and disciplinary matters within any other public institution or organization. However, disciplinary decisions that are connected with allegations of academic misconduct, for example, cheating and/or plagiarism, have been more problematic for the courts. Historically, the debate was whether any such decision was justiciable in public law. Recently the question has also been whether an aggrieved student may succeed in a private law action against a university. The legal issues raised by university decisions affecting students have not yet been clearly resolved in all jurisdictions. Indeed, in some cases, judges have raised many more questions than they have answered. This article will review the framework for legal challenges to university decisions against a background of recent judicial attitudes in Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US.     

儒家的自然法思想

中华法系深受儒家思想影响。儒家以天理为其评价社会规范的最高准则,并将自己的政治理想和社会理想融入其中,认为"礼治"是社会治理的最佳手段。这种"天理"观是自然法思想的表现。礼是自然法的现实化,而贯穿在这种社会治理思想中的是一种朴素的"民本主义"。虽然这种自然法思想的发展不能和西欧自然法思想的发展相提并论,但确实起到了抑制"人治"恣意的作用。     

The Continuing Problem of the Universal to Questions of Justice: A Feminist Reading of Lars von Trier’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dogville</Emphasis>

What are the terms of evaluation that seem relevant in deciding whether a film is feminist or anti-feminist? Which critical practices should be engaged in such an evaluation? In recent and contemporary critical feminist practices, feminist arguments are no longer based on a stable subject category of “woman” and there is no longer any particular methodology upon which feminist theorists rely. The category of “woman” has been revealed to be not an ahistorical, stable category but an effect of material and representational practices. Further, feminist methodologies have been concerned to contextualize the framing of the questions they ask, as well as their place in the methodologies they employ. In addition to the refusal of an essentialized female subject, feminists have called into question the idea that it is possible to produce a “feminist method” based on the standpoint of a female subjectivity, even where this subjectivity is admitted as a construct, arguing that this extrapolation to the general from a particular point of view produces political, and frequently racist, effects. In this essay, I consider Lars von Trier’s controversial film Dogville (2003) as a case study to explore the relation of practices of representation to questions of feminist justice. I argue that the film does a lot of good critical work in showing the ways in which certain practices of representation can be mobilized to produce a collectivity (or “sovereignty”) that is seen to emanate from “the people” and to thereby instantiate authority, while simultaneously disguising the material and political effects of its subjugation of “others.” However, in doing this work the film produces its own problematic construction of universality and particularity. Further, the film instrumentalises representations of sexual violence and subjection in order to prove its point, and as productive as these tactics are to illuminating questions of social justice, I argue that this representational practice produces effects that need to be read as anti-feminist.     

什么是法学研究——民法学习的一点体会

研究生学习阶段的学习目标最为重要的是什么呢 ?我认为就是“研究” ,就是要把法律的概念、原则甚至体系拿来研讨 ,区别它的科学与谬误、正义与非正义 ,因此 ,这个阶段的学习不是当收音机 ,不只是接收他人的观点 ,而是要自主分析、积极讨论 ,提出自己的观点 ,其核心就是“研究”。     

STEREOTYPES AND DISPOSITIONS FOR CRIMINAL HOMICIDE

There exists disagreement in the existing literature with respect to the origins of differential police practices. Based upon observation of police work with traffic law violators, the present paper advances an organizationally sensitive analysis of police decision making. The essential interpretation is that police decision making in the context of traffic law violations is a function of relations between organizational norms and employee concerns with autonomy.     

Economic analysis of pension fund’s laws for female heirs: case of Iran’s civil servants pension fund (CSPF)

The key twin objectives of pension and retirement system are income security and consumption smoothing for members and their family (heirs). Accordingly, pension funds worldwide devise laws that preserve and improve these key objectives. Laws that failed to take into account these objectives not only impose extra financial burden on the pension system, but also may pose undesirable social and economic effects. In this respect, economic analysis of pension laws would help lawmakers to make workable and implementable laws. Generally, economic analysis of law seeks to answer two basic questions regarding legal rules: what are the effects of legal rules on the behavior of relevant actors? And are these effects socially desirable? This paper examines the pension law of Iran’s civil servant pension fund (CSPF) for female heirs in light of the afore-mentioned key objectives of pension system, and from social justice point of view. The results from the analysis reveal that this does not only adhere to social justice and pension system’s main purpose, but also it imposes economic and social costs. The weak side of the law also creates financial burden on the pension fund, the young generation (paying pension benefits to the considered heirs from its contribution) and the public at large. The study also shows that life time payment of pensions to heirs by CSPF encourages late or informal marriages hence defecting acceptable social norms and may increase informal labor supply, creating a further problem in the labor market. The study thus recommends the need for reforming the existing law and rules of CSPF for female heirs.     

Epinomia: Plato and the First Legal Theory

Abstract. In comparison to Aristotle, Plato's general understanding of law receives little attention in legal theory, due in part to ongoing perceptions of him as a mystic or a totalitarian. However, some of the critical or communitarian themes that have guided theorists since Aristotle find strong expression in Plato's work. More than any thinker until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Plato rejects the rank individualism and self‐interest which, in his view, emerge from democratic legal culture. He rejects schisms between legal norms and community values, institutional separation of law from morals, intricate regimes of legislation and adjudication, and a culture of rampant litigation. He rejects the alienation of individuals, from each other and from their communities, that is so easily bred within highly complex political and legal systems. An understanding of his approach to some of the classic questions of legal theory provides insight not only into some central ideas of his own thought, but also into the roots of critical and communitarian critiques of law.     

Privacy,CCTV, and School Surveillance in the Shadow of Imagined Law

How do managers make decisions that affect human rights of other people? The article examines one such case: the decision‐making process of Israeli school principals in installing Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) systems in schools. One unexpected source that principals relied on was that of imagined law: they wrongly assumed that there was a law that guided them in the matter. The deployment of CCTV systems in Israeli schools is relatively new and takes place at an accelerated pace. School principals are the ones that make the decision about introducing such systems into their schools. The study traced and explored this process. Based on semi‐structured interviews, the findings portray a picture of partial isomorphism among schools. We frame the findings within institutional theory, which differentiates between exogenous and endogenous sources of decision‐making. Most school principals relied on endogenous sources that were shaped by practical considerations and their own perceptions as to security, privacy, and education. Yet, the interviews indicate an additional and surprising source of organizational decision‐making: imagined law. Some of the principals assumed the existence of specific legal rules. The principals did not search for professional guidance, and did not consult others. Instead, they filled the imagined law with endogenous sources, namely, their own perceptions.     

Integrating Environmental Protection and EU Competition Law: Why Competition Isn't Special

One of the biggest challenges facing environmental policy makers at present is that of integrating environmental protection goals into economic policy areas. Unless this is genuinely achieved, it is clear that environmental degradation will continue apace. Though one of the EU's most important areas of economic competence is competition policy, many policy makers and commentators reject the notion that environmental concerns should play a significant role in EU competition analysis. In that light, this article addresses two key questions. First, should this approach apply? Second, if not, what are the principles that govern how environmental protection requirements should be taken into account by decision makers applying EU competition law? In answering these questions, the article puts forward three theoretical arguments as to why, and how, the environmental benefits and damage flowing from goods and services should be taken into account by EU competition decision makers, based, respectively, on legal systematic, governance and economic reasoning.     

Rehabilitating Retributivism

This review essay of Victor Tadros’s new book, “The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law,” responds to Tadros’s energetic and sophisticated attacks on retributivist justifications for criminal punishment. I argue, in a nutshell, that those attacks fail. In defending retributivism, however, I also sketch original views on two questions that retributivism must address but that many or most retributivists have skated past. First, what do wrongdoers deserve – to suffer? to be punished? something else? Second, what does it mean for them to deserve it? That is, what is the normative force or significance of valid desert claims, either with respect to retributivist desert in particular or with respect to all forms of desert? Because the answers that this essay offers are preliminary, the essay also serves as a partial blueprint for further work by criminal law theorists with retributivist sympathies.     

‘Should I Stay or Should I Go ?’—A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU

This article seeks to answer one of the key questions facing the EU in the future: what effect will the new right to withdraw have on the EU? Will it lead to a gradual fragmentation of what was supposed to be ‘an ever closer union of unlimited duration’? Or will it even mark the beginning of the end of the Union? In order to answer these complex questions, this article first briefly analyses the pre‐Lisbon situation regarding withdrawal. It then critically examines the newly inserted Article 50, which codifies the right to withdraw. Having done so, it will then examine whether non‐legal considerations, such as political and economic reasons, will render withdrawal a theoretical rather than realistic option.     

Frustration: The mold of judicial philosophy

Abstract

The Framers understood the Constitution to be the fundamental expression of the rule of law over against the arbitrary, intemperate, and unjust “rule of men” that all too frequently existed in the political world, unfortunately both democratic as well as monarchical. Accordingly, the rule of law requires a well functioning political and legal system that includes legislative checks and balances, the separation of power between the President and Congress, an independent judiciary, federalism, etc. What happens when this “Madisonian” constitutional system, designed to express “the deliberate sense of the community,” runs into a Judicial branch that, in effect, claims we live under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what we say it is. Must the Judiciary itself be subject to the rule of law, and the decisions of a constitutional majority, or does their “independence” extend to being independent of the constraints of the rule of law and, thus, decent majority rule? How did the original John Marshall Court answer these questions, and what light do the leading cases and controversies shed on the relationship between the Marshall Court and the Madisonian System? Are we facing a situation of Marshall v. Madison?