A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism

Neoclassical realism is often criticized by non-realists for being an ad hoc and theoretically degenerative effort to explain away anomalies for neorealism. In this paper, I argue instead that neoclassical realism is a logical extension and necessary part of advancing neorealism. Structural realism argues that the system constrains but does not determine state action and where foreign policy departs from what would be ideal behavior given a state's structural position, domestic politics and ideas are generally the cause. This focus on mistakes and maladaptive behavior, seen in such neoclassical realist concepts as over-or under-balancing, is necessary to avoid falling into the trap of merely using domestic politics and ideas to make neorealism more determinate and explain residual variance in foreign policy choice unaccounted for by structure. The article attempts to correct the mistaken presumption that particular paradigms own domestic politics and ideas, asserting instead that each paradigm has access to these variables but must make them their own.     

Hegemony, not anarchy: why China and Japan are not balancing US unipolar power

The United States today dominates the globe and many regionalgeographical subsystems in an unprecedented way, maintaininga hegemonic order that is in no way similar to the ‘anarchy’assumed in realist analyses. The global system today is notsimply unipolar; it is a hegemonic system that is increasinglyglobalized, in which the basic concepts of realism (anarchy,self-help and power balancing) provide little guidance or understandingin explaining state behavior. This paper describes the US hegemonicsystem, analyzes the roles of China and Japan within this system,and examines how the Bush administration's plans for missiledefense might transform the system. The conclusion points tosome critical implications from this analysis for realist interpretationsof international politics.     

The U.S. and third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations

Although scholars focused on Soviet–American relations during the Cold War, the greatest number of conflicts for the U.S. occurred in the Third World, and most of these were with revolutionary states. Could U.S. policies toward the new revolutionary states have prevented the almost universal collapse in relations? Two dominant explanations for this breakdown are (1) American hostility toward revolutionary change and (2) Stephen Walt's variant of the spiral model. Using the comparative case approach and selecting "hard cases," this article disputes these explanations and offers a new theory based on the externalization of domestic conflict in the revolutionary states. Given their ideological goals, the radicals externalized their domestic conflicts with the moderates, who had transnational ties with the U.S., by fomenting tensions with Washington. To demonstrate that this theory can be generalized, this article varies the dependent variable and shows through a critical case that its lack of conflict can best be explained by the absence of the conditions that lead to externalization. The foreign policies of both the U.S. and revolutionary states are explained by classical realism as opposed to Walt's structural realism, which fails to account for the foreign policies of Third World states.     

How Martin Luther King,Jr’s Pacifist Liberation Theology Makes Reinhold Niebuhr’s Political Realism Possible

Reinhold Niebuhr crafted a compelling theologically based theory of political realism, which became the basis for a withering critique of pacifism. Martin Luther King, Jr was influenced by Niebuhr’s Augustinian realism in his own political theology and practice. However, King lived and thought from a different perspective, had more apocalyptic expectations of divine intervention in history, and embraced pacifism. I argue that Niebuhr fell short of his own realist vision through his idealistic faith in US democracy, and that King’s political theology better enacts Niebuhrian realism. I suggest King achieves this largely because his theology is a liberation theology grounded in pacifist praxis in solidarity with the oppressed. By rejecting Niebuhr’s acceptance of American violence and basing his theology on lived confrontation with American violence, King makes Niebuhr’s political realism possible. This reading of King and Niebuhr illustrates the value of pacifism and theology for political theory and practice.     

In Search of Monsters: Realism and Progress in International Relations Theory after September 11

Whereas the end of the Cold War sparked debates within and among paradigms in the field, the response to September 11 has been comparatively muted. Some observers have questioned the significance of September 11, while others have cast doubt on the ability of realism to account for an outcome that falls outside of its emphasis on great-power conflict. Realism must not only address outside critics but also overcome internal resistance in the face of these changes. This resistance entails reluctance by theorists to address a novel phenomenon, as well as axiomatic impediments that lie in the hard core of the realist research program. The mechanism of “monster-adjustment,” discussed by Imre Lakatos, is offered as a way in which realism can extend its scope beyond centralized territorial states. This process subjects the underspecified assumption of the necessity of unit isomorphism in international systems to increased scrutiny, offering a way to extend the explanatory capacity of realist frameworks. With realism released from these constraints, opportunities for productive engagements with other paradigms may be realized.     

Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic–Level Variables

This article examines the deductive basis upon which domestic-level theorizing may be combined with liberal and realist systemic-level theory in order to account for international outcomes. It is particularly concerned with whether existing systemic theory can incorporate domestic-level variables in a causally consistent rather than ad hoc manner. In addressing such a concern, it confronts the widely held assumption in the IR theory literature that liberalism is more accommodating of domestic-level variables and their potential causal impact than is realism. When the deductive logic of systemic liberal and realist theory is examined, however, it becomes clear that domestic-level variables can be consistently causal in systemic realist theory, but are accorded little causal weight in systemic liberal theory. The article concludes that realism is actually more accommodating of domestic-level variables and theorizing than is liberalism. Given the common misconceptions within the field regarding the relationship between systemic theories and domestic-level theorizing, issues of theoretical causal compatibility must be considered if domestic-level variables are going to be incorporated in a rigorous rather than ad hoc manner.     

Theory as Thought: Britain and German Unification

Inspired by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein's call for analytic eclecticism and making use of newly available, previously classified archival documents, we distill the essential logics of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism and examine their role in shaping the debates amongst British policymakers in the context of German unification in 1989-90. We find that, although all the theoretical logics help shape the policymaking surrounding unification, none stands alone as a basis for understanding social reality. Indeed, all functioned together as British policymakers thought in terms of theory to make sense of German unification. The logic of realism clearly played an important role in shaping the perceptions of top British leadership, particularly Margaret Thatcher, of German unification as a problem. But realism did not determine the solution to the "problem." Instead, British policymakers drew on the logic embedded in neoliberal institutionalism, turning to institutions to manage the unification process. The reason for this can be found in the role of constructivist logics-particularly identity and rhetorical entrapment-that constrained British policymakers to cooperative policy options. By taking this approach, this article makes several important contributions. First, it sheds light on British policy during a critical historical moment. Second, it significantly improves understanding regarding Germany's historical and current place in Europe. Third, it ties major theoretical traditions together through a foreign policy analytical approach, and in the process suggests that many of the theoretical boundaries separating scholars are overdrawn. Finally, the article pushes international relations scholars to keep in mind the complex relationship between reality and theory. In the final analysis, bringing to bear these three perspectives highlights the complexity of the processes that produced British policy-and by extension those that shaped German unification-as well as the importance of breaking free of the strictures of the ideas versus materiality debate.     

Henry Kissinger: Realism,Domestic Politics,and the Struggle Against Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy

Henry Kissinger was the single most controversial diplomat of the 20th century. This article explores Kissinger's approach to the philosophy of realism in international affairs, his role in Vietnam policy making, and his most recent engagement in the debate over the Iraq War. It argues that Kissinger's realism, although philosophically consistent and having roots within his own life's experience, was always tempered by his desire to exercise influence within the American political system. Once in office under Richard Nixon and then Gerald Ford, Kissinger came to recognise how significantly domestic politics shaped American foreign policy. His involvement in the Vietnam War demonstrates this, and one lesson he took from that conflict was the hope that Americans could be persuaded to move away from their convictions about American exceptionalism and recognise the limits of American power.     

Small enough to fail: the structural irrelevance of the small state as cause of its elimination and proliferation since Westphalia

Since the Peace of Westphalia, few great powers have “died”, while the “death rate” and proliferation of small states has been dramatic at times. What causes these fluctuations? In this paper, I claim that the dominant reason for the extinction, emergence and proliferation of the small state over the last three and a half centuries is to be found at the system level. Ultimately, small state survival is determined by the particular set-up of the state system. I advance this argument from the perspective of international relations theory, integrating the relevant scholarship of the English School and realism, especially structural realism. The latter’s systemic perspective provides the basis for arguing that small states are structurally irrelevant. It is this feature of the small state, its irrelevance with regard to the power-based structure of the state system, which has caused the small state to “struggle for existence” in the past, and which has allowed small states to proliferate during the bipolar Cold War.     

The EU,Russia and the Manichean Trap

Conceptualizing the EU as a postmodern cooperative power that “transcends realism” provides ideological scaffolding for an exclusive conception of “Europe” and veils a zero-sum geopolitical project as “European integration”. Neoclassical realism considers assigning morally opposite political identities to the EU and Russia to be “rational” to the extent it strengthens internal cohesion and mobilizes resources to enhance security in accordance with the balance of power logic. Yet, the artificial binary construction can also produce a Manichean Trap when compromises required to enhance security are depicted as a betrayal of indispensable virtues and “Europe”. The ability to harmonize competing security interests diminishes as the conceptual space for comparing the EU and Russia is de-constructed. Competition is framed in uncompromising terms as “European integration” versus Russian “spheres of influence” and democracy versus authoritarianism.     

'Mirror, mirror, on the wall': misplaced polarities in the study of Southeast Asian security

Recent interpretative literature on Southeast Asian securityhas led to a polarized debate between realists and constructivists.This article argues that the differences between the two seeminglyirreconciliable approaches can be reconciled if the methodologiesunderlying the approaches are subjected to greater scrutiny.Generally, both approaches are sensitive to environmental conditions,both in terms of time and place. Additionally, realism is bettersuited to explain turbulence in Southeast Asian internationalrelations, while constructivism is better suited during timesof peace and prosperity.     

Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia

Realists agree that great powers balance the military power of rising powers, but there is little agreement regarding secondary-state responses to rising powers. First, there are differences regarding whether secondary states balance or accommodate rising powers. Second, there are differences among realists regarding the distinct roles of economic and military factors in secondary-state alignment policies. Third, some scholars argue that state alignments are not necessarily determined by realist variables, but can reflect preferences shaped by intentions, historical experiences, or cultural influences. This paper addresses these issues in balance-of-power theory. Its empirical focus is the impact of the rise of China on secondary-state alignments in East Asia. After examining the complex mix of China's military and economic reach in East Asia, it concludes that secondary-state behavior is sensitive to local variation in the great power capabilities and that secondary states tend to accommodate rather than balance rising powers. It further concludes that economic capabilities alone are insufficient to generate accommodation, so that the political-economy literature should reexamine cases of apparent secondary-state accommodation to economic dependency, sensitive to the presence of military vulnerability on the part these secondary states to proximate great powers. These conclusions suggest that there is nothing sui generis or culturally-determined in East Asian international politics and that realism can explain alignment behavior among East Asian states as well as it does among European states. Research on East Asia's response to China's rise that is sensitive to intra-regional variations in U.S. and Chinese military and economic capabilities also challenges assumptions of an emerging Chinese regional hegemony or of a costly region-wide U.S.-China competition.     

Pledges and Pious Wishes: The Constituent Assembly Debates and the Myth of a “Nehruvian Consensus”

The strategic worldview of India’s political elite is typically described as having evolved in linear fashion. At the time of Independence there was ostensibly a broad consensus on the ends and means of diplomacy, which included peaceful co-existence and anti-imperialism on the one side, and non-alignment and non-violence on the other. This consensus, crafted by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is depicted as having steadily weakened over subsequent decades, eventually collapsing when diplomatic isolation and near bankruptcy toward the end of the Cold War compelled the adoption of a more pragmatic approach to foreign relations. The evidence does not support this narrative, however. Drawing on debates in the Constituent Assembly, this essay shows that from the outset there were voices, even inside the Congress Party, calling for realism in the conduct of international relations. Though Nehru’s dominant position meant that these critical voices were brushed aside at the time, recollecting them reveals that the realism that is said to have recently seeped into Indian foreign policy discussions is not a new development but rather the fruition of a long-standing critique.     

Scientific Realism as a Meta-Theory of International Politics

The recent increase in interest in scientific realist foundations for international relations theory, spearheaded by Wendt in various works, most fully articulated in his Social Theory of International Politics , and supported by a number of other authors, has brought to the fore a set of related issues in the philosophy of the social sciences. The advocacy of scientific realism in the international relations literature has largely taken the form of attacks on various nonscientific realist foundational theories. Consequently, the success of the arguments for scientific realism depends in large measure on the accuracy of the characterizations of the competing views. This paper argues that Wendt and others have misrepresented the challengers and have thus overstated the superiority of scientific realism. The paper further considers the aims and purposes of providing meta-theoretical foundations for IR theories, and argues that when the alternative accounts are properly described, the purposes are better satisfied by the latter and, in particular, by a version of Duhemian conventionalism.     

Why “Conservative,” Not Liberal,Internationalism?

There is no broad literature defining conservative internationalism as there is for liberal internationalism and realism. Yet conservative internationalism differs from liberal internationalism and realism in four important ways. First, it seeks a world of limited government or separate sovereign nations not big international institutions. Second, it believes that national security is a function of ideological differences not just relative power or diplomatic misunderstandings. The democratic peace is a much safer world for America than the balance of power or United Nations. Third, it recognizes the need to use force during negotiations, not just after negotiations fail, because authoritarian states will not take negotiations seriously if they can achieve their objectives outside negotiations. And fourth, it advances democracy conservatively by prioritizing regions where strong democracies exist nearby (today Ukraine and Korea) and by using military leverage to reach timely compromises that weaken authoritarian states.     

Overlapping regionalism and cooperative hegemony: how China and India compete in South and Southeast Asia

This article examines the phenomenon of overlapping regionalism in South and Southeast Asia. Theoretically it rests on Thomas Pedersen’s ‘ideational-institutionalist realism’ approach. We argue that in the two sub-regions under study the proliferation of regional organizations has been greatly stimulated by hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamics involving Asia’s largest powers, China and India. We claim that sceptical world views highlighting vulnerability, victimization and national survival are deeply entrenched in the mental maps of the regions’ foreign policy elites. Regional institution building is thus informed by the tenets of realism. We trace how and why China and India seek to establish ‘cooperative hegemonies’ by building regional institutions for incorporating their neighbours into their sphere of influence while keeping rival powers at bay, and also show why smaller states in the region join these regional fora.     

美国东北亚政策的进攻性现实主义解读

以米尔斯海默为代表的进攻性现实主义是现实主义理论的最新发展,其从历史分析与理论论证的角度为美国的东北亚政策提出了"离岸平衡手"的解读与构想。然而朝核危机爆发后,美国的东北亚政策正朝着建立多边安全机制的方向发展,进攻性现实主义提出的"中国威胁论"也不攻自破。     

中国与东亚共同体建构

在探讨东亚地区主义时通常所运用的三种思维范式———现实主义、自由主义和建构主义的思维范式。按照这样的一些思维范式分析,90年代后期的区内外因素促成了东盟+3会议的召开和真正意义上的东亚地区主义的发生及东亚同盟体的建构所面临的挑战。中国和平崛起对于参与和推进东亚共同体的形成具有重要的作用。