Red Patriots against White Patriots: Contesting Patriotism in the Civil War in North Russia

Abstract

This article uses the example of Arkhangel’sk province in North Russia to examine how the two main parties in the Russian Civil War—the Bolsheviks and the White armies—used elements of nationalism and xenophobia to delegitimise their enemies. It reveals the evolution of patriotic rhetoric, first used by the Whites to discredit the Bolsheviks as German agents, and then by the Reds to delegitimise the Whites as agents of the Entente. In the 1920s anti-Allied sentiments became the main trope in the memory of the civil war both among émigrés and in the Soviet North.     

Russian Economic Nationalism during the First World War: Moscow Merchants and Commercial Diasporas

While accounts of the end of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires have often stressed the rise of Turkish and German nationalisms, narratives of the Romanov collapse have generally not portrayed Russian nationalism as a key factor. In fact, scholars have either stressed the weaknesses of Russian national identity in the populace or the generally pragmatic approach of the government, which, as Hans Rogger classically phrased it, “opposed all autonomous expressions of nationalism, including the Russian.” In essence, many have argued, the regime was too conservative to embrace Russian nationalism, and it most often “subordinated all forms of the concept of nationalism to the categories of dynasty and empire.” Recently, two authors have challenged the predominantly pessimistic portrayals of the extent of Russian national identity in late imperial Russia, focusing on peasant responses to the First World War. Scott Seregny makes a strong case that while peasants may not have been full “Russians” by 1914, the spread of politics and literacy to the countryside through the zemstvos was rapidly integrating peasants into a broader civic identity. Josh Sanborn argues that even though responses were varied and in fact protest against the war quite frequent, the important thing is that both positive and negative responses were expressed within a single national political framework and discourse. In response, S. A. Smith grants that the war strengthened rather than weakened national identity, but thinks Sanborn and Seregny underestimate the degree to which nation, empire, and class pulled in different directions from 1916, concluding that “by the summer of 1917, politics had become polarized between an imperial language of nation, used mainly by the privileged and educated strata, an anti-imperial language, used mainly by the elites of the non-Russian nationalities, and a language of class, used mainly by the subaltern classes.”     

Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict

Fifth generation warfare has arrived and is irreversibly changing the character and nature of human conflict. It confronts the United States with the evolving strategic dilemma of not only dealing with the War on Terror, but of simultaneously crafting strategies that look beyond military preparedness for past wars and embrace the perspective of national preparedness for the spectrum of future conflicts. This article uses four essential elements of war—the new domains of conflict, the changing nature of adversaries, the changing nature of objectives, and the changing nature of force—to build a generational typology of war and conflict that informs the characteristics of fifth generation warfare. The resultant model produces two outcomes: First, it demonstrates how recent events such as the rise of computer hackers, the 2001 anthrax and the 2003–2004 ricin attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the emergence of Al Qaeda demonstrate characteristics of fifth generation warfare. Second, it illustrates the way in which these events are unique indicators of a future in which non-state entities are increasingly able to wage war on equal footing with nation-states. The article concludes that the United States must embrace fifth generation warfare if it is to successfully confront these threats that have taken on new and heretofore unimagined forms in the postmodern era of war.     

Counterterrorism as War: Identifying the Dangers,Risks, and Opportunity Costs of U.S. Strategy Toward Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates

The U.S. war on Al Qaeda is well into its second decade—why has this particular conflict been so difficult to end? This article argues it is not due to the strategic acumen of Al Qaeda, but because of the problems intrinsic to relying on war as the framework for U.S. counterterrorism policy. The normal means of ending wars are complicated with a terrorist enemy and at odds with strategies that have historically had success at the end stages of counterterror campaigns. Continuing along the current path risks an ongoing war the United States will likely neither win nor fully end.     

Counting the Soviet Union’s War Dead: Still 26–27 Million

Abstract

How many Soviet citizens died because of World War II? A new estimate of the Soviet war dead is 42 million. This figure, from Russian historian Igor’ Ivlev, is at least 15 million more than the 26–27 million previously estimated by Russian demographers Andreev, Darskii and Khar’kova and widely accepted for a quarter of a century. I consider the implications of the two estimates for the Soviet demographic accounts, contrast their sources and methods, and conclude that the new figure lacks substantial foundations. On existing knowledge, the best estimate of Soviet war dead remains 26–27 million.     

Who Fought the Algerian War? Political Identity and Conflict in French-Ruled Algeria

Why did settlers, natives, and metropolitan agents fight each other as “French” and “Algerian” during the famously brutal Algerian War of the 1950s? While scholars identify key factors in launching and escalating the war, they take for granted that it was fought between “the French” and “the Algerians” when evidence shows that those terms were also a source of struggle among the parties involved in the war. Drawing on insights from the fields of colonial studies and collective action, along with archival sources, the article explains why this particular set of terms framed the war, in other words, why the categories “French” and “Algerian” predominated in the political discourse, and why they were so opposed to each other. It contends that punctuated political conflicts among state authorities and social-movement organizations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, rather than indigenous cultural or social structural factors, played a key role in constructing this identity framework. The article concludes by challenging our basic definitions of the war and the prevailing theories about its course and outcomes.     

Propaganda and the Question of Criminal Intent; the Semantics of the Zachistka

This article seeks to explore the origins and evolution of zachistka (‘cleansing’) and the particular role it played in the second Chechen war of 1999–2005. It argues that zachistka has become part of state, military and media representations of violence, building a psychological environment in favour of war. The article seeks to understand how the propaganda of the Russian Ministry of Defence might have contributed to the perpetuation of war crimes or incitement to atrocity crimes in the region.     

Russia's air war in Chechnya

The Russian Air Force experienced its first trial by fire during the 1994— 1995 fighting in Chechnya. Considering its diminished assets retained in the wake of the USSR's collapse, its airlift arm performed well. However, as the war unfolded and stresses mounted due to weather complications, its ground attack performance was spotty at best, starkly revealing the effects of three years of consistently underfunded training. The extent to which it was strapped in fulfilling its tasking in a relatively low intensity local flareup indicated that, as long as it remains financially deprived, it will constitute only a regional air arm with little sustainability or capacity for high technology combat.     

European Reactions to the 2008 Georgian–Russian War: Assessing the Impact of Gas Dependence

Western observers and policymakers have voiced anxiety about Europe’s increasing dependence on Russian natural gas fueling Russian imperial ambitions. In 2008, speculation appeared to become reality, as war broke out between Russia and its post-Soviet, but Western-leaning neighbor, Georgia. But did a country’s dependence on Russian natural gas influence its politicians’ responses to the Georgian–Russian war? An analysis of the voting behavior in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe provides insight into conventional claims that a reliance on Russian energy dampens the willingness of European states to publicly criticize Russia.     

Two post-war paths: popular violence in the Bohemian lands and in Austria in the aftermath of World War I

The study explores the phenomenon of popular violence in the first months and years after the end of World War I on the basis of a comparison between the Bohemian lands, forming the central part of the newly established Czechoslovakia, and Austria, as another successor state to the former Habsburg monarchy. Aside from the continuities, new forms of violence increasingly emerged in the first years after the end of the war, and also the “language” of violence was transformed. While in Czechoslovakia, the framework within which people were learning to understand the new world was shaped by the national and republican discourse oriented to the future, in Austria the collective identities and mentalities were being formed along the lines of particular party political blocks. In both cases, the nationalization and politicization of violence respectively contributed to the emergence of new forms of popular violence; but at the same time they could also be used for its de-escalation, necessary for the re-integration of society disrupted by the wartime experience. However, even if both countries went out from the war on different paths, the violence stayed part of their political culture and it could be mobilized again.     

Russian banks’ profit strategies: the evidence from various types of banks

This paper offers an analysis of profit strategies pursued by Russian banks depending on their ownership type, including federal state banks, banks of mixed ownership, banks connected to enterprises producing for the final consumers, and regional pocket banks owned by one particular business group or enterprise. The paper outlines a set of factors that capture a range of potential hindrances on the way to banks’ involvement in Russian economy. It traces how the characteristics of the state regulation and peculiarities of the economic sectors affect the proliferation of certain type of banks—pocket banks—at the expense of others. It looks into how the various types of banks function under the given set of political and economic constraints, and how these constraints shape the banking system in Russia and its relationships with the enterprises and sectors.     

War of words: the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's “News of the Week” show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the “fascist” and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a “television party” and an “Internet party” in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.     

Empty Spaces and the Value of Symbols: Estonia's ‘War of Monuments’ from Another Angle

Taking as its point of departure the recent heightened discussion surrounding publicly sited monuments in Estonia, this article investigates the issue from the perspective of the country's eastern border city of Narva, focusing especially upon the restoration in 2000 of a ‘Swedish Lion’ monument to mark the 300th anniversary of Sweden's victory over Russia at the first Battle of Narva. This commemoration is characterised here as a successful local negotiation of a potentially divisive past, as are subsequent commemorations of the Russian conquest of Narva in 1704. A recent proposal to erect a statue of Peter the Great in the city, however, briefly threatened to open a new front in Estonia's ongoing ‘war of monuments’. Through a discussion of these episodes, the article seeks to link the Narva case to broader conceptual issues of identity politics, nationalism and post-communist transition.     

Ethnofederalism and ethnonationalism in the separatist politics of chechnya and tatarstan: sources or resources?

Common explanations of the recent war in Chechnya add up to an astonishingly overdetermined picture. The conflict between Russia's central government and its separatist ethnic autonomy was blamed on several grand factors: oil interests, resurgent Islam, imperial collapse, international terrorism, organized crime. Superficially, Chechnya shares most of these features with Tatarstan — another defiant republic of the Russian Federation which has oil, notorious gangsters, and a native population of Islamic heritage. A more detailed account shows, however, that the two state entities have little in common except the Soviet-made institutional framework. Tatarstan is a rare example of an ethnically non-Russian republic within the very urban industrial core of the former USSR, while Chechnya was patently peripheral. Differences in historical legacies and present-day social compositions conditioned very different outcomes of multifaceted political struggles that accompanied the demise of Soviet empire. In Tatarstan, local ethnically-colored nomenklatura exploited the chaotic transition to claim property rights over the local economy. The new rhetoric of national revival which the nationally-minded wing of Tatar intelligentsia advanced during Gorbachev's relaxation of censorship, was used by the Tatar nomenklatura to justify its struggle for economic property rights and exclusive political jurisdiction in its territory. By contrast, the Communist patronage network which ruled Chechnya until 1991 was too dependent on the central government for subsidies and coercive resources to follow the Tatarstan example. In the aftermath of August 1991 hardliner coup, when the Chechen apparatchiks misplaced their bets in Moscow's politics and momentarily lost support of the central government, they were swept away by the social movement of rural masses and urban marginal intellectuals. In its turn revolution, the only such outcome among the republics of the Russian Federation (but not the USSR), created an inherently unstable regime in Chechnya which could legitimate itself only with the idea of national independence and, once Moscow attempted to destabilize it, through the patriotic war.     

The Russian March: Investigating the Symbolic Dimension of Political Performance in Modern Russia

In this study I analyse the Russian March—a political performance which emerged in 2005 and which has developed from a protest ritual into one of the most important public and visible events organised by the Russian ultranationalist movement. The focus of the current analysis is the symbolic structure of the march, which is examined at three levels—cognitive, emotive and archetypal. The case study of the development of the Russian March highlights the paradoxes of the politics of performativity in Russia as well as the interaction between ideological codes and discursive frames in the Russian nationalist movement.     

Black Tigers,Bronze Lotus: The Evolution and Dynamics of Sri Lanka's Strategies of Dirty War

Although much has been written on the Sri Lankan state's civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), less has been said about how the conflict's dynamics evolved. How did the parties come to utilize the methods they did? Why did the war become so brutal, characterized by a predisposition toward extreme violence on both sides? Using the typology of “dirty war,” this investigation seeks to address such questions, demonstrating how the strategic choices of the main belligerents shaped the conflict. The analysis shows that while the conflict emerged out of deep-rooted social and ethnic divisions, these factors do not account for how the war came to be defined so comprehensively by the methods of dirty war. It finds that dirty war developed from a sporadic tactic to advance political goals to dominant military practice by a reciprocal process of escalation that eventually internalized dirty war as the accepted mode of strategic communication.     

Russia and the Caucasus

Russia began moving toward the Caucasus at the end of the 16th Century. In the early 19th Century, the Tsars consolidated control over Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, but had to fight a 35‐year war against the North Caucasian mountaineers to secure control of the entire area The three Transcaucasian republics declared their independence before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but have been hard pressed to consolidate it because of Russian interference. In the North Caucasus, the Chechens declared their independence as well. Erratic Russian policies and freebooting by elements of the Russian military have resulted in disruptive intervention in all three of the Transcaucasian countries. In December 1994, Russia launched a military offensive to subdue the Chechens. The Chechens have fought back furiously, and Russia's war against them has become a domestic Afghanistan. Russia has yet to define its national interests in the Caucasus and adopt coherent policies toward the region. Until it does the area will continue to be unstable.     

Educational Attainment and Attitudes Towards War in Muslim Countries Contemplating War: The Cases of Jordan,Lebanon, Pakistan,and Turkey

This study addresses the little understood relationship between educational attainment and public attitudes towards war in four predominantly Muslim countries contemplating war: Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey. The multivariate analysis using public opinion data suggests that the educational attainment of respondents has no statistically significant association with believing that war is necessary for obtaining justice. In a separate analysis, there is no statistically significant association between educational attainment and believing that UN approval is necessary before using military force to deal with an international threat. This study suggests that there is some validity to concerns raised by the UK's Department for International Development and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) that education may not be contributing to peaceful conflict resolution.     

War of textbooks: History education in Russia and Ukraine

Many scholars stress that teaching about the shared past plays a major role in the formation of national, ethnic, religious, and regional identities, in addition to influencing intergroup perceptions and relations. Through the analysis of historic narratives in history textbooks this paper shows how the governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine uses state-controlled history education to define their national identity and to present themselves in relations to each other. For example, history education in Ukraine portrays Russia as oppressive and aggressive enemy and emphasizes the idea of own victimhood as a core of national identity. History education in the Russian Federation condemns Ukrainian nationalism and proclaims commonality and unity of history and culture with Russian dominance over “younger brother, Ukraine”. An exploration of the mechanisms that state-controlled history education employs to define social identities in secondary school textbooks can provide an early warning of potential problems being created between the two states.     

‘Mimicking’ the West? Russia's legitimization discourse from Georgia war to the annexation of Crimea

The 2008 Georgia war represented a turning point in Russian foreign policy. It was for the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union when Moscow invaded an independent country and for the first time when two members of the Council of Europe fought against each other. A premiere for Russian post-Soviet foreign policy was registered in 2014 too. The annexation of Crimea represented the first incorporation of foreign territories by Moscow since World War II. These two events generated the West's protest and blatantly contradict Russia's proclaimed foreign policy discourse centered around the respect for states' sovereignty and equality of actors in the international system. Starting from the assertion that the formulation of Russia's foreign policy is determined by the West's international behavior – Moscow looking whether to emulate or to find alternatives to it; the present paper will compare Russia's legitimization arguments for the 2008 war and the 2014 annexation of Crimea trying to assess how Moscow answers Western criticism and whether there is a continuity in Russian official legitimization narratives.