(Why) should we require consent to participation in research?

It is widely accepted that informed consent is a requirement of ethical biomedical research. It is less clear why this is so. As an argumentative strategy the article asks whether it would be legitimate for the state to require people to participate in research. This article argues that the consent requirement cannot be defended by appeal to any simple principle, such as not treating people merely as a means, bodily integrity, and autonomy. As an argumentative strategy the article asks whether it would be legitimate for the state to require people to participate in research. I argue that while it would be legitimate and potentially justifiable to coerce people to participate in research as a matter of first-order moral principles, there are good reasons to adopt a general prohibition on coercive participation as a matter of second-order morality.     

When the butcher calls the hunter foul,and the muddied politics which follow: speciesism and the EU opposition to the Swedish wolf hunt

Abstract

Rarely does the death of animals cause conflict between governments. However, the killing of some animals, such as seals, wolves, and other exotic wildlife, can cause heated conflict over whether the act of killing is itself justifiable. This paper provides an overview of a recent disagreement along these lines: between the EU and Sweden over the management of wolves. It juxtaposes the recent politicalization of the wolf hunt with an overview of two very different moral frameworks that humans use to conceive of the value of animals. This paper argues that these two moral frameworks share in employing a human-centrism which consequently restricts how the issue of justice can be introduced into policy discussions regarding the treatment of animals. However, the primary assertion made here is that while these two frameworks are constituted by speciesism, they represent two different positions which as is illustrated by the debate surrounding the justifiability of the wolf hunt, provide very different points to which questions of justice are truncated or introduced. Therefore, the assertion made in this paper is that the conflict between the EU and Sweden, over the justifiability of the wolf hunt stems from competing speciesist positions.     

Why Should Justice Be Seen to Be Done?

A well-known maxim instructs that justice should be seen to be done. When “seen” is understood in the sense of “observed”, the maxim is easily defended: open court proceedings protect against arbitrary and partial decisions. However, when “seen” is understood in the sense of “seem,” the maxim is more puzzling, since it is not obvious why courts should concern themselves with people's perceptions that justice has been done. This article addresses this issue, with a particular focus on the social and other benefits that result when judges observe procedures that are widely regarded as fair, especially in criminal trials. The article draws on empirical studies in social psychology that show that when legal authorities treat people in ways that accord with “lay” procedural expectations, they are more likely to view the authorities as legitimate, to cooperate with them, and to obey the law out of an internalized sense of obligation. The article explores the moral significance of these empirical findings, arguing that it would be superficial to see them as a recipe for social stability. The deeper truth conveyed by the empirical research is that relating to people in ways that are widely perceived to be fair is a way for authorities to engage people's moral sentiments and to enliven their virtuous capacity to put aside considerations of self-interest so as to do what is right. This dynamic provides a sound moral foundation for courts to concern themselves with perceptions of justice.     

康德法哲学视野下的“动物权利论”批判

当代动物权利运动的主将汤姆·雷根提出的动物权利论遮蔽了道德共同体成员的理性和道德义务这两个道德理论中的核心概念,忽视了理性、义务在构建道德共同体中的必要性,也不能在逻辑上全面地说明动物与人类之间以及动物之间的关系。康德主义的道德哲学则仅通过“实践理性”这一标准,即可合理说明人与动物在道德上的不同地位,也能更好地解释和指导人类利用和保护动物的实践。     

动物法律地位刍议——私法视野下的分析

在动物法律地位问题上,存在"肯定论"和"否定论"两种观点。"肯定论"的观点在认识论上忽视了动物不可能具有道德判断能力的事实,在本体论上曲解了法律主体据以享有权利的"内在价值"的含义,在私法理论上带来一系列的难题,在法律制度上缺乏可操作性,故不足取。"否定论"中的"义务论"观点则认为,需要人类保护的动物乃是人类的保护义务的客体。"义务论"既可以达到"肯定论"拟保护动物的目的,又完全不与现有的法律理论和制度相冲突,还具有可操作性,所以是解决动物法律地位问题的最佳方案。     

The (Limited) Space for Justice in Social Animals

While differentialists deny that non-linguistic animals can have a sense of justice, assimilationists credit some animals with such an advanced moral attitude. We approach this debate from a philosophical perspective. First, we outline the history of the notion of justice in philosophy and how various facets of that notion play a role in contemporary empirical investigations of justice among humans. On this basis, we develop a scheme for the elements of justice-relevant situations and for criteria of justice that should be fruitful in studying both humans and animals. Furthermore, we investigate the conceptual connections between a sense of justice, on the one hand, and various other mental powers, on the other, and indicate which of the latter may be beyond the ken of animals. Next, we consider recent empirical research on justice-related phenomena in animals. We argue for an intermediate position: While animals can at least in principle satisfy some preconditions of justice (intentional action, rule-following), others are problematic, notably possessing a notion of desert. A space for justice in social animals exists, yet it is rather limited compared to the rich cultures of justice in humans. Finally, we reflect on some actual or alleged implications of research on animal justice. As regards justice in humans, one should avoid a simplistic image of ??natural justice?? as boiling down to equal allocation of goods. As regards justice for animals, one should be weary of the contractualist assumption that only those capable of justice themselves are deserving of ??just?? treatment.     

Professor Waldron Goes to Washington

In Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House Jeremy Waldron asks how moral philosophy can illuminate real life political problems. He argues that moral philosophers should remind politicians of the importance of adhering to moral principle, and he also argues that some moral principles are absolute and exceptionless. Thus, he is very critical of those philosophers who, post 9/11, were willing to condone the use of torture. In this article I discuss and criticize Waldron’s absolutism. In particular, I claim that the arguments he offers in support of it are either dependent on religious conviction or support only rule utilitarianism, not absolutism. Additionally, I argue that the character of politics is such that it is both undesirable and morally irresponsible for politicians to adopt the absolutist approach favoured by Waldron. We have reason to be glad that Professor Waldron does not go to Washington.     

Beyond the ‘Natasha’ story – a review and critique of current research on sex trafficking

A review of literature on sex trafficking since 2000 reveals that numerous articles have been published in scholarly journals but few are based on systematic primary data collection. Much of our current knowledge, including statistical estimates and characteristics of the trafficking business, derives from a handful reports issued by government and non-government agencies. With few empirical studies available, imagination seems to have filled the gaps of our knowledge. The problem was further complicated by a manifest (sometimes subtle) moral crusading agenda aimed at a deep-rooted and hotly debated social practice.

Also noticeable in the literature is an increasing number of authors who have begun to challenge the empirical premises claimed by these published reports. These sceptical authors find that many articles of questionable quality have been published in peer-reviewed journals, and claim that the current discourse on human trafficking is driven by mythology rather than empirical research.

Rather than dwelling on gaps in our knowledge or concerns over the moral overtone in academic research, this paper seeks to raise specific research questions and explore possible field strategies that can advance our knowledge on this topic. Regardless of one's moral compass, the future of research on sex trafficking cannot become credible without a solid empirical foundation.     

Psychopathy and Culpability: How Responsible Is the Psychopath for Criminal Wrongdoing?

Recent research into the psychological and neurobiological underpinnings of psychopathy has raised the question of whether, or to what degree, psychopaths should be considered morally and criminally responsible for their actions. In this article, we review the current empirical literature on psychopathy, focusing particularly on deficits in moral reasoning, and consider several potential conclusions that could be drawn based on this evidence. Our analysis of the empirical evidence on psychopathy suggests that while psychopaths do not meet the criteria for full criminal responsibility, they nonetheless retain some criminal responsibility. We conclude, by introducing the notion of rights as correlative, that even if psychopaths were to be fully nonresponsible, imposing some form of civil commitment would still be warranted.     

Remorse, Reform and the Real World: Reply to Lippke

This article replies to some of Richard Lippke’s criticisms of my earlier article on the issue of whether remorse should mitigate sentence. I query whether remorse-based mitigation must always wait for signs of moral reform, and re-affirm that remorse is worthy of recognition in itself and not just for the moral reform it may bring. I also argue that, where delayed mitigation is appropriate, the task of ascertaining moral reform is not as dubious, practically or in principle, as Lippke maintains. I then confirm that my defence of the principle that remorse should mitigate sentence is not necessarily a defence of current practice.     

Doing Equitable Work in Inequitable Conditions: an Introduction to a Special Issue on Transformative Research Methods in Gender-Based Violence

The purpose of this special issue is to explore how researchers, evaluators, and practitioners use community-based, participatory research (CBPR) approaches to prevent gender-based violence, support survivors, and transform communities and systems. In this introduction, the editors define gender-based violence (GBV) and briefly discuss how systemic inequities exacerbate the prevalence of GBV. The authors featured in this special issue aim to dismantle these inequities by engaging in research approaches that center those who are most impacted by the social issue, ensure that community members guide the research process, build community capacity, and aim to transform oppressive conditions. The issue includes six empirical studies across the United States that cover the process and outcomes of conducting transformative CBPR. It also contains six commentaries from GBV adult practitioners and young people who provide pertinent insights on their experiences working with academic researchers and/or engaging in participatory research. The articles in this special issue cover the major themes of defining community, working in inequitable conditions, and transforming individuals and communities.     

Crime Reduction and the Length of Prison Sentences

The issue discussed is whether policies of imposing increasingly lengthy prison sentences on serious criminal offenders reduce crime. The empirical evidence for the deterrence and incapacitation effects of incarceration is first examined and found to be of limited help in answering the question whether lengthy prison sentences reduce crime. Conceptual and normative analysis of deterrence and incapacitation suggest that we have little reason to believe that the general use of lengthy prison terms produces more good than harm for society, especially if the burdens of and alternatives to such prison terms are taken into account.     

New Labour’s communitarianism,supporting families and the ‘rationality mistake’: Part II

In Part I of this study, we argued that New Labour is keen to use legislation to promote what it sees as desirable family forms and to discourage other, less-favoured family practices. The codification of this approach in the 1998 Green Paper Supporting Families - and, in particular, the 'New Deal for Lone Parents' - was compared with recent empirical research on how people make decisions about their moral economies. We concluded that the government's approach is subject to a 'rationality mistake' - people do not make decisions in the way the government assumes and hence legislation can be inefficient or even oppressive. Here, we examine this contention further, this time focusing on chapter 4 of the Green Paper, indicatively entitled 'Strengthening marriage'. Using recent empirical research on mothers' views on marriage and cohabitation, we find further evidence of the 'rationality mistake', where the government has misunderstood the ways in which people make decisions about partnering and hence misplaces the role of family law. We conclude that supportive and flexible legislative frameworks are needed that recognize the varying ways in which people take moral economic decisions.     

Retributivism and Legal Moralism

This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though weak moralism has some plausibility, it does not follow from weak retributivism if legitimate state functions are limited in certain ways.     

Moore’s Truths About Causation and Responsibility: A Reply to Alexander and Ferzan

In this response to the review of Moore, Causation and Responsibility, by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan, previously published in this journal, two issues are discussed. The first is whether causation, counterfactual dependence, moral blame, and culpability, are all scalar properties or relations, that is, matters of more-or-less rather than either-or. The second issue discussed is whether deontological moral obligation is best described as a prohibition against using another as a means, or rather, as a prohibition on an agent strongly causing a prohibited result that was not about to happen anyway while intending to do so.     

Open Stakeholder Consultations at the European Level—Voice of the Citizens?

The European Commission's open consultations of stakeholders are a central mechanism of the attempt to practice participatory governance at the European level and to open the political process to contributions from the societal sphere. This paper analyses the current practice of open consultations as one important operationalisation of participatory governance and as an implementation of Article 11 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). It asks whether consultations can be a means to give voice to the citizens and to increase the legitimacy of European institutions. The paper presents an empirical analysis of the field of participants in the consultations. A main finding is that business and industry organisations dominate the consultative process while the participation of citizens and not‐for‐profit organisations is generally weak. The paper explores to which extent the consultations can, considering the empirical findings, be seen as a suitable way for direct or representative citizen participation.     

Toward a Theory of Prisoners' Rights

This paper explores the issue of prisoners' rights. The conditions of incarcerated people in jails and prisons include psychological and physical deterioration brought on by their condition of confinement. The one sanction that has been debated extensively in the United States is the death penalty. Yet there are numerous losses or deprivations short of death that we might impose on legal offenders. In addition to broader issues such as the nature of rights and the basic moral rights possessed by individuals, issues specific to the rights of serious legal offenders are distinguished and discussed. The latter issues include whether offenders forfeit all or some of their moral rights, whether their retained rights are less stringent, whether the state has any obligation to facilitate exercise of their retained rights, and what specific rights prisoners retain or acquire.     

Indirect Crimes

Both law and morality routinely distinguish between direct wrongs of causing harm oneself and indirect wrongs of contributing to another’s harmful actions. This article asks whether this distinction matters for the purposes of a theory of criminalisation. It argues that, in some respects, the distinction matters less than is often supposed: generally, the potential future actions of others have at least some relevance to what we ought to do. However, it is morally significant that criminal liability for indirect wrongdoing can make our freedom to do valuable things contingent upon others’ failure to comply with their moral obligations. This raises substantial concerns of autonomy and fairness that tell against the creation of some – but by no means all – indirect crimes.     

Blind Spots: The Effects of Information and Stakes on Fairness Bias and Dispersion

Mounting empirical research provides evidence of fairness bias and its economic and social effects, where fairness bias refers here to a deviation of claims from unbiased justice due to a personal stake. A far less appreciated issue is dispersion of fairness views and claims, which is also important for its effects on disagreements, empirical analysis, and philosophical theories. This study undertakes a systematic analysis of the effects on fairness bias and dispersion of two variables: stakes and information. Most philosophical and social science analyses related to justice and bias associate heightened bias with increased information and, conversely, impartiality with the elimination of certain information. Less attention has been paid to the opposing impact of information, which is to supply the facts needed to achieve justice more reliably. An important open question is whether, on balance, increased information helps agents to achieve fairer outcomes or whether biased use of such information contributes to less fair outcomes. This study focuses on a set of previously reported experiments that share certain features and subjects them to a new analysis. The results of this analysis suggest that, although information is often used in a self-serving way, increased information can, under certain conditions, contribute to fairness claims becoming less biased and less dispersed, both for stakeholders as well as impartial spectators.     

Understanding Acts of Consent: Using Speech Act Theory to Help Resolve Moral Dilemmas and Legal Disputes

Understanding what it means toconsent is of considerable importance sincesignificant moral issues depend on how this actis defined. For instance, determining whetherconsent has occurred is the deciding factor insexual assault cases; its proper occurrence isa necessary condition for federally fundedhuman subject research. Even though mosttheorists recognize the legal and moralimportance of consent, there is still littleagreement concerning how consent should bedefined, or whether different domains involvingconsent demand context-specific definitions.Understanding what it means to consent isfurther complicated by the fact that currentlegal conceptions are not necessarily groundedin argument; they typically depend on appealsto authority and precedent. The purpose ofthis paper is to use speech act theory toprovide a theoretically grounded conception ofconsent; such a conception can aid in the justresolution of legal and moral disputes thathinge on whether an act of consent occurred.