企业合并行为的竞争法分析

对企业合并进行控制是竞争法的基本内容,而其中最核心的问题,是评价企业合并行为所依据的实体标准。基本内容包括对合并行为的反竞争影响,及其产生的积极效果。由于企业合并主要是通过改变市场结构而影响竞争,因而在对其进行分析时,一般首先分析合并行为对所在市场集中度产生的影响,这主要通过赫芬达尔指数来反映,对于发生在指数较低的市场上,或发生在集中度较高的市场上,但并未导致指数大幅度提高的企业合并行为,认定其不会产生严重的反竞争效果,可以批准。其他的合并行为则要由竞争主管机关进一步分析,主要考察该行为的反竞争效果,包括单边效果与协调效果;然后再考察存在哪些抵消因素。经过比较后,如果积极效果大于消极效果,则予以批准。     

论单方开发行为在国际司法程序中的法律效果

由于按照《联合国海洋法公约》相关规定作出“实际性临时安排”存在诸多困难，国际社会在争议海域存在大量单方开发行为。通过实证分析发现，从1978年国际法院审理的爱琴海大陆架案到2017年国际海洋法法庭审理的科特迪瓦诉加纳案，对于主权国家的单方开发行为，包括单方勘探和单方实施油气资源开发等行为，国际司法机构在审理过程中并没有给予否定性的评价，没有要求相关当事方停止或取缔已经实施的单方开发活动。在个别案件中，国际司法机构甚至给予单方开发行为以积极评价，认为相关国家的单方开发行为在未来划界中可能产生积极效果。     

法制环境与市场发育

一法制环境对市场发育是多方面的,从最一般的意义上来讲,它可以通过以下几种方式来影响市场发育: 一是通过对市场主体自主权的赋予来影响市场发育。市场是否发育,首先要看主体能否到位。承认社会主义经济是市场经济,就应该承认企业是市场的主体,而市场主体——企业的经济主体资格有赖于法制环境的认可,企业自主经营、自负盈亏、自我发展、自我约束的权利只有在法律认可后才具有独立的法律意义,企业只有被赋予相应的“四自”权利才谈得上行使“四自”权利。二是通过对市场经营活动的导向来影响市场发育。市场主体一旦获得了相应的自主经营权利,就会主动参与市场交换,形成一系列的市场经营活动。由于市场主体素质的     

相对优势地位理论质疑

相对优势地位理论强调了企业之间的相互力量对比,并认为当交易方在一定情况下具有类似在市场中处于垄断地位的企业的市场力量时,会使得交易相对方“依赖于”该企业,从而引起竞争法上的效果。依据对资产专用性理论,从沉没成本引起的利益判断、进入障碍和市场划分的关系的分析,以及对相对优势地位理论的相关判例的解析,可以看出该理论存在重大的缺陷,其实施不仅无法规范市场竞争秩序,还会造成理论和实务上的混乱。     

浅谈企业合并中的反垄断控制

一、概述 通常认为,企业的合并是具有积极影响的。小企业之间的合并可以实现一定的必要规模,从而有利于同占市场支配地位的企业相互竞争;在不同市场上开展经营活动的企业间的合并可以使新的竞争者进入市场,促进市场的开放;企业合并可以提高企业的效率,有利于企业筹集资金,改善经营管理或实现规模经济。此外,企业合并还可以使合并企业获得一些紧张的资源,如专利权、工程专有技术;被合并企业的市场、客户、产品上的知名商标和商业秘密等。然而,企业在合并的过程中,     

企业横向合并规制的个案豁免制度

我国的反垄断法刚刚颁布，其中尚有一些细节有待深入研究，而企业横向合并规制的豁免制度就是其中的一个理论重点。企业横向合并个案豁免的具体事由在欧美的已有相关制度。而企业并购“资产剥离”问题则辩证的强调反垄断的执行力，是法律执行过程中的重要内容。     

国内外对公共政策评估的研究综述

政府在进行国家管理活动时会利用政策来调整、组织社会生产和社会生活。公共政策的实施必然会产生一定的影响和后果。有了政策就必然要对政策进行评估。政策制定者只有通过科学的政策评估活动,才能够准确判断某一项公共政策本身的价值,从而决定政策的延续,革新和终结。因此公共政策评估对国家的管理活动非常重要,本文梳理了国内外对公共政策评估的研究,希望能对以后的公共政策的评估工作有所帮助。     

知识产权评估基础理论解析

知识产权评估“价值说”与“价格说”之间在评估的表征层面是可以通约的，但应紧紧抓住使用价值这一条主线。知识不是商品，知识产权评估对象是知识的支配、利用和控制权。从知识作为产品的层面来说，创造不属于劳动价值理论中创造价值的劳动。知识产权是通过“知识的产出”而体现其价值的，但知识产权的价值来源不能脱离于产品和服务之外而独立存在。知识产权评估结论只能是建立在相关市场运营的仿真结果上。     

论信用证“软条款”的法律性质及对策

由于信用证的独立抽象理论以及相关立法的不完善．使得信用证在使用过程中出现了各种问题，“软条款”信用证就是其中的一种。信用证中的“软条款”使得受益人根本无法依据信用证规定交付单据．或者银行有权单方解除其第一位的付款责任。可以说，信用证“软条款”的存在大大地破坏了信用证的“信用付款”作用．影响了信用证在国际贸易结算中的地位。本文拟对信用证“软条款”进行分类，剖析其产生的原因．界定其在法律上的性质．探讨相关当事人的责任，并在此基础上提出应对措施。 一、信用证“软条款”的类型 信用证从根本上讲是一种单据买…     

可口可乐并购汇源案的反垄断分析

在经济全球化的背景下,许多企业为了稳住自己在国际市场上的宝座抑或为了开阔更大的市场,从而在全球掀起了一股合并或并购之风,以争夺剩余权。在新的企业合并浪潮中,跨国公司纷纷实行新的价格和生产战略,加强资本集中,以牟取高额的垄断利益。而可口可乐并购汇源一案是否构成对中国相关饮料市场的垄断引起了人们的热议,而该案也将是对我国刚出台不久的《反垄断法》的一个巨大考验。     

Hospital mergers and antitrust: an economic analysis

The hospital industry has recently experienced substantial merger activity. This paper examines several actual and proposed hospital mergers to determine the extent of competition in the affected markets and the effect these mergers may have on competition. Our focus is on mergers between hospitals in the same market. We define the relevant product and geographic market for hospitals, then develop criteria for evaluating hospital mergers and analyze several merger cases using these criteria. We conclude that these mergers threaten the competition that exists in most of the markets discussed, and that the claimed efficiency justification for mergers is not convincing.     

The Evanston initial decision: is there a future for patient flow analysis?

This Article analyzes the October 2005 Initial Decision of the Federal Trade Commission Administrative Law Judge ordering Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation to divest Highland Park Hospital on the grounds that the January 2000 merger of the entities violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In particular, this Article focuses on the ALJ's discussion of the use of patient flow analysis and the Elzinga-Hogarty test in defining relevant markets in hospital merger cases. Despite the ALJ's explicit rejection of the Elzinga-Hogarty Test and patient flow analysis as irrelevant and inappropriate in defining markets in the highly differentiated Hospital market, the author concludes that the ALJ's rejection of patient flow analysis likely was a response to misplaced and over-reliance on patient flow analysis by a number of courts in past prospective government challenges to hospital mergers as evidenced by the fact that the ALJ's analysis of competition and competitive effects relied upon, and thereby implicity endorsed, the use of patient flow analysis for certain purposes. Finally, the author concludes that patient flowanalysis, when used appropriately, should continue to be used as a preliminary step in geographic market definition and competitive effects analysis.     

Applying antitrust concepts to the acute care hospital industry: defining the relevant market for hospital services

In considering the possible antitrust implications of a merger of two or more competing hospitals, the courts have generally found that hospitals provide a cluster of services which have significant peculiar characteristics that allow them to be considered a single product market. Spurred by changes in their environments, hospitals during the last decade have become markedly less homogeneous in their range of products and geographic markets. As a result, the impact of hospital mergers in the future may need to be assessed in multiple, more narrowly defined relevant markets, for which several possible definitional bases are suggested in this paper. The increased precision associated with such multidimensional antitrust analysis should permit a more effective consideration of the trade-offs between increases in hospitals' market power and advances in their relative operating efficiency and/or quality of services.     

USING COUNTY-BASED MARKETS TO SUPPORT AND FEDERAL RESERVE MARKETS TO IMPLEMENT BANK MERGER POLICY

In this paper, we consider three issues raised by the apparentinconsistency between the current research practice of usingcounty-based markets (Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)and non-MSA counties) to investigate the validity of the theoreticalunderpinnings of bank merger policy and the current regulatorypractice of using Federal Reserve (FR) banking markets, whichoften do not follow county lines, to implement that policy.Using a national sample of bank and thrift branch deposit data,we find that county-based areas cannot simply substitute forFR markets in the implementation of bank merger policy. Forexample, numerous potential mergers would raise competitiveissues in county-based areas, but not in FR markets, and viceversa. We also conclude that, because of the relative difficultyof assembling demographic data for non-county-based areas, itis impractical to consistently use FR markets in bank mergerpolicy research. However, we do find that, despite the inconsistenciesbetween the two types of markets, analysis that uses county-basedareas is relevant for bank merger policy that is implementedwith FR markets. For example, we find that profitability regressionresults using variables based on FR markets are similar to thosefound using variables based on MSAs and non-MSA counties.     

Assessing Market Power: The Trade-off Between Market Concentration and Multi-Market Participation

This analysis reveals that traditional market power measuresare biased under the conditions of multi-market participationand demand interdependence. Specifically, when complementary(substitutable) demands dominate, traditional market power measuresare biased upward (downward). A similar bias carries over tothe evaluation of mergers. To wit, mergers that simultaneouslyincrease market concentration and multi-market participationcan result in lower prices even in the absence of merger economies.It follows that merger guidelines that place undue emphasison market concentration can lead policymakers to block (approve)mergers that enhance (diminish) consumer welfare.     

平台扼杀式并购的反垄断法规制

全球大型数字平台通过"复制、收购与扼杀"的策略扼杀并购了大量初创企业,引发了创新赛道垄断的顾虑。初创企业并购通常不会引起显著的市场结构变化,但随着时间推移,平台"切香肠式"的扼杀式并购,在扼杀潜在竞争对手、强化自身市场支配地位的同时,更会扭曲长期创新供给,致使未来市场可竞争性丧失。而并购效率改进收益的消亡、创业者奖励作用的证伪与动态竞争约束工具的全面失灵,进一步要求反垄断执法机构应摒弃目前普遍不作为的监管做法,及时识别与规制平台扼杀式并购。对此,有必要引入内部文档调查、并购价格组成分析等并购动机过滤机制,识别出那些出于消除未来竞争威胁或扼杀潜在迭代式创新目的的初创企业并购;同时,通过引入补充性的申报门槛、设定更具针对性的审查补救措施与授权必要的事后调查,将能有效地遏制平台资本的无序扩张,为初创企业创造一个不受主导平台扼杀式并购威胁的现代化营商环境。     

Mergers and difference-in-difference estimator: Why firms do not increase prices?

Difference-in-difference methods are being increasingly used to analyze the impact of mergers on pricing and other market equilibrium outcomes. Using evidence from an exogenous merger between two retail gasoline companies in a specific market in Spain, this paper shows how concentration did not lead to a price increase. In fact, the conjectural variation model concludes that the existence of a collusive agreement before and after the merger accounts for this result, rather than the existence of efficient gains. This result may explain empirical evidence reported in the literature according to which mergers between firms do not have significant effects on prices.     

Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties

When a bidding corporation succeeds in obtaining voting control of a target corporation through a hostile tender offer, many commentators argue that it is unfair to allow the bidder to exercise its voting power to set the price terms of a second-step takeout merger in which the bidder purchases the shares of the remaining target shareholders. This concern is inappropriate because it treats a unitary acquisition between adversaries as if it were two separate transactions–the second of which involves abuse of power by fiduciaries–and also because it assumes that shareholders of the target corporation are incapable of protecting themselves from the power of a successful bidder. Moreover, imposition of fiduciary rules may impose either prohibitive costs or absolute barriers to some takeovers, even if such transactions would be wealth producing. While there is a risk that some takeovers may exploit the “prisoner's dilemma” facing target shareholders threatened with an unattractive takeout threat, target shareholders are capable of responding to that threat with devices to coordinate their response. So-called “shark repellent” amendments that raise the proportion of votes required to approve second-step mergers or that limit the terms of such mergers can function as coordination devices to alleviate the prisoner's dilemma. Commentators' fears that such devices may unduly burden the market for corporate control appear to depend to a large extent on unfounded assumptions that all takeovers are wealth producing and that takeovers are never motivated by potential gains flowing from exploitation of the lack of coordination among target shareholders. However, empirical studies indicate that adoption of such coordination rules can benefit target shareholders and that it is unlikely that shareholders will approve voting rules so restrictive that they would preclude wealth-creating acquisitions. The usual notions of shareholder apathy are simply inapplicable to takeout mergers.     

THE CHURCH REPORT'S ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: A REPLY TO COOPER, FROEB, O'BRIEN, AND VITA

I respond to concerns raised by James Cooper, Luke Froeb, DanO'Brien, and Michael Vita regarding the analysis of verticaland conglomerate mergers contained in my report to the EuropeanCommission. I address their arguments that the raising rivals'costs literature does not support an aggressive stance on verticalmergers; that market power is a necessary, but not a sufficient,condition for a non-horizontal merger to raise antitrust concerns;and that efficiencies intrinsic to a non-horizontal merger shouldbe treated in the second step of the proposed structured ruleof reason framework.