The Rebels' Resource Curse: A Theory of Insurgent–Civilian Dynamics

The relationship between armed rebels and local civilians is among the least understood aspects of insurgency. This article posits a novel theory, the rebels' resource curse, to argue that the interaction between rebel groups and local communities can be traced to the availability of revenue-generating resources. The theory is developed using a case study comparison approach to critically analyze how access to revenue-generating resources among the Naxalites in India and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia affect these insurgent-civilian interactions. The theory proposes that insurgents face a resource curse similar to that faced by states. Rather than resource wealth contributing to greater social engagement and fruitful insurgent–civilian interactions, it appears to precipitate isolationist, and even exploitative and violent relations between insurgents and local civilian populations. Conversely, resource scarcity predicts a greater degree of social integration and cohesion between civilians and insurgents. The framework of the rebels' resource curse can also be applied productively to other insurgent groups, enhancing our understanding of the social realities of insurgency.     

Financing War or Facilitating Peace? The Impact of Rebel Drug Trafficking on Peace Negotiations in Colombia and Myanmar

Rebel involvement in drug trafficking is broadly found to prolong and intensify civil wars. Being an illicit good with strong demand, high profit margins, limited barriers to entry, and few interdiction opportunities, narcotic drugs disproportionately benefit rebel groups as a source of funding in civil wars. Furthermore, drug trafficking is believed to prolong civil wars by creating war economies that benefit rebel groups, making them reluctant to engage in peace negotiations. However, recent peace agreements suggest that drug trafficking can in some cases be used to “buy off” rebel leaders, whereas other insurgents willingly relinquish this source of funding. This article compares attempts at conflict resolution in Colombia and Myanmar, focusing on the impact drug trafficking by Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and United Wa State Army has on contemporary peace negotiations.     

Repression,co-optation and insurgency: Pakistan’s FATA,Southern Thailand and Papua,Indonesia

Scholars have long identified state repression as playing a key role in the onset of insurgency. Violence by security forces increases anger against the state and assists with rebel recruitment. Yet scholars have also recognised that repression does not always lead to rebellion: in some cases it successfully quashes movements before they have begun. This study advances an argument for when and why repression leads to insurgency and sometimes does not. We contend that violence by state security forces can fail to trigger rebellion if local elites within the repressed community are simultaneously co-opted with political and economic opportunities. When elites are satisfied with local autonomy and patronage they deprive the dissident movement of local leadership and coordination. When the state uses repression against a community and at the same time abandons this mutually beneficial relationship, the insurgency has both the leadership and grassroots support it requires. We illustrate our argument by examining three cases of state violence in Asia. In two of our cases, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Southern Thailand, repression led directly to insurgency. In the third, Papua in Indonesia, ongoing co-optation of local elites has left the movement factionalised and weak.     

Critical barriers to joint production: datu politics and insurgent fragmentation in Southern Philippines

Abstract

In understanding how groups overcome collective action problems of mass mobilisation in civil wars, a joint-production explanation was put forth in the civil war literature. According to this explanation, collective action can be successful when leaders at the centre tie the public good – violence towards the overall goal of the movement – inextricably to private interests of actors at the peripheral levels of the conflict. It is through this logic of joint production that we can understand the failures of the Islamic insurgencies in Southern Philippines and the spiralling levels of violence. Where other movements cohered under a common identity, the Islamist insurgency in Southern Philippines saw high degrees of fragmentation. In this paper, I argue that cleavages of regionalism created by colonial disruptions of land and social relations became a critical barrier for insurgent joint production. Furthermore, interactions between these identities and the state can pose further collective action problems. In Southern Philippines, insurgent leaders are unable to cut across these cleavages, resulting in increasingly fragmented movements and protracted conflict. Therefore, I argue that a joint-production approach to understanding civil wars can be especially promising when culturally and historically situated to explain why collective action often fails in civil war.     

Becoming Patani Warriors: Individuals and the Insurgent Collective in Southern Thailand

Focusing on the case of Thailand's ongoing insurgency in its southern Malay Muslim majority region, this article examines the circumstances surrounding individual's choices to engage in violent revolt and their conformity and non-conformity with the norms and disciplines of the movement in which they operate. Insurgent-driven violence in Thailand's southern border provinces has attracted considerable attention, but little has been published about the people who become “Patani Warriors” (juwae). Based on the authors’ direct encounters with current and former insurgents and study of Thai official documentation and captured insurgent propaganda material, this article presents the most detailed information currently available on southern Thailand's shadowy fighters. We argue that there is no single type of Malay Muslim insurgent: this variegated reality defies the normative ideals projected in insurgent's indoctrination material while it also poses a challenge for the Thai authorities to define in simple terms those who oppose the state.     

Conflict diamonds and the Angolan Civil War (1992–2002)

Abstract

In the early 1990s several rebel groups turned to natural resource extraction to pay for war. A key form of this is rebel diamond production, commonly referred to as conflict diamonds, which is widely perceived as being highly beneficial to insurgent organisations. Yet in the Angolan Civil War (1992–2002), the use of conflict diamonds by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) resulted in a decisive insurgent defeat. How can this outcome be explained? Offering a nuanced understanding of how conflict diamonds affect civil war, this article shows that although diamonds generated considerable revenue for UNITA, they were not an effective method for them to take on the Angolan government. This was for two reasons: internally, the rebels greatly struggled to convert their diamond proceeds into sufficient goods and services; and externally, it left the group highly vulnerable to international countermeasures in the form of United Nations Security Council sanctions. Natural resource extraction may therefore not be as useful to rebel groups as is frequently believed.     

Rebels in Northern Uganda after their return to civilian life: between a strong we-image and experiences of isolation and discrimination

This article is based on biographical interviews and field research carried out in two adjacent regions of northern Uganda on local peace and post-war processes. It focuses on the situation of former rebel fighters following their return to civilian life. In the case of Acholiland, these are primarily former “child soldiers” of the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army who were recruited by violent abduction; in West Nile they are primarily men who more or less voluntarily joined local rebel groups as adults. The following questions were investigated: How do rebels who have returned from the “bush” speak about their past and their present? What discourses do they confront within the groupings, or we-groups, to which they are regarded as belonging and whose collective knowledge they refer to? What is the nature of their present situation and how can it be socio- and psychogenetically explained and interpreted?     

Regulating religious authority for political gains: al-Sisi’s manipulation of al-Azhar in Egypt

The shedding of blood is a serious matter in Islamic law; disregard for human life negates the very essence of just rule. By standing by General al-Sisi as he suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood, the popular legitimacy of al-Azhar – the oldest seat of Islamic learning – was called into question. This article shows how the al-Sisi government skilfully deployed the two other state-controlled religious establishments, the Ministry of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) and Dar-ul-Ifta, to boost al-Azhar’s popular legitimacy in this context. Existing scholarship highlights the importance of competition within the Egyptian religious sphere to explain how the Egyptian state co-opts the al-Azhari official establishment. This article instead shows how the state, equally skilfully, uses state institutions to boost al-Azhar’s popular legitimacy – albeit to ensure that it remains useful for the purposes of political legitimisation. Political authority and religious authority in Egypt thus remain closely entangled.     

Militarisation of governance after conflict: beyond the rebel-to-ruler frame – the case of Rwanda

In this article, we develop and expand the rebel-to-ruler literature to go beyond ‘rebel transformations’, in order to examine the transformation and militarisation of the entire post-genocide society in Rwanda. Through a historical and socio-political analysis of the military’s influence in post-genocide Rwanda, we argue that the adoption of military norms and ethos, drawn from an idealised and reconstructed pre-colonial history rather than simply an insurgent past, motivates the military’s centrality and penetration of all society’s sectors, economically, politically and socially, with the ultimate aim of retaining power in the hands of the rebels turned rulers. As such, the case demonstrates the need for an expansion of the rebel-to-ruler literature (1) beyond its concern with parties and regime type to a broader palette of governance effects and (2) beyond its singular focus on insurgent past and towards a longue-durée understanding of complementary causes.     

Political Evangelism

In 2000, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 called for the increased participation of women in formal political processes surrounding violent conflict. However, worldwide, women continue to be a minority in formal politics, particularly in situations of armed violence. Contrary to this trend, women have played an influential role in the Casamance peace process in southern Senegal, where a rebel movement has been fighting for independence since 1982. This article assesses the methodology, constraints and, most importantly, the gendered opportunity structures surrounding the women's peace movement in Casamance. It demonstrates how women participate in the politics of war and peace through an astute manipulation of gendered platforms and a judicious reading of political context, thus propelling their voices into the formal political arena. This case study highlights practical and local approaches to political participation that may be relevant to women around the world.     

Civilian Defense Forces,State Capacity,and Government Victory in Counterinsurgency Wars

Given the onset of a violent rebellion by an armed non-state group, how do states re-establish intra-state peace and hence fulfill their basic function as providers of internal security? In this article I argue that one way governments perform this core function is by recruiting non-combatants into local self-defense units called civilian defense forces (CDFs). By providing for local security, leveraging their superior local knowledge, and provoking insurgent reprisals against civilians, CDF units facilitate the influx of tactical intelligence as well as isolate insurgents from non-combatant populations physically as well as politically. Consistent with the argument, statistical analyses of two different cross-national data sets of insurgencies from 1944 to 2006 reveal that a state is 53 percent more likely to vanquish a guerrilla threat if the incumbent deploys CDFs. The analyses also cast doubt on a recent claim in the literature that incumbent force mechanization adversely affects the states’ ability to counter insurgent threats. Given that CDF deployment is a more easily manipulable variable than most other elements of state power, CDFs appear to be an effective instrument of counterinsurgency deserving of further academic and policy attention.     

Is the shining path the “New Khmer rouge”?

This article assesses the claim that Peru's Shining Path insurgency is the “new Khmer Rouge,” a reincarnation of the brutal communist movement responsible for the death of more than one million Cambodians during the 1975–1979 “Democratic Kampuchea” era. Although Shining Path is unlikely to seize power in Peru the analogy is still worth evaluating, given its prominence in public debates over the nature of the insurgency. On the basis of Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports, party statements, and other primary and secondary sources, two major characteristics of these organizations are compared: ideology and prerevolution behavior in their respective “liberated zones.” While acknowledging that the Shining Path and the Khmer Rouge share a number of important features, the article concludes that a Shining Path regime would be less extreme than Democratic Kampuchea, and that it is an overstatement to call the insurgency the new Khmer Rouge.     

Rebels-Turned-Narcos? The FARC-EP’s Political Involvement in Colombia’s Cocaine Economy

Abstract

According to the ‘rebels-turned-narcos’ premise, increasing involvement in the illicit drug industry causes insurgent groups to lose sight of their political aims, as they shift their focus to profit-making. The (former) Colombian rebel group, the FARC-EP, became a paragon for this idea. Drawing on primary research, we argue that the FARC-EP’s involvement in the illicit drug economy was itself political. Their involvement included governance activities, which are by their very nature political. Furthermore, these activities formed part of the FARC-EP’s political project, aimed at ensuring the reproduction of the peasant smallholder economy. Our argument challenges the rebels-turned-narcos premise more broadly by showing why involvement in the illicit drug economy, on its own, is insufficient evidence to posit the depoliticization of an insurgent group.     

Informing Grassroots Development: The 1994–1995 Peacebuilding Experience in Northern Ghana

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) focused on poverty alleviation play a central role in responding to conflict situations and initiating peacebuilding activities. Following the 1994–1995 conflict in Northern Ghana, development NGOs coordinated a largely effective grassroots peacebuilding effort. However, insights gained from peacebuilding activities have not informed ongoing development efforts, which continue to propose ‘top-down’ strategies. By examining the strengths and limitations of the peace process in Ghana, this article suggests development NGOs apply the grassroots strategies they used for peacebuilding to their ongoing development activities. This analysis is based on data drawn from archival research as well as field interviews with 21 representatives of the state and NGOs, and community and religious leaders.     

Post-Islamism and fields of contention after the Arab Spring: feminism,Salafism and the revolutionary youth

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, conflicts in Egypt and Tunisia over the authority to rule and the role of religion in society raised questions about these societies’ capacity for reconciling differences. In retrospect, the conflicts also raise questions about the theoretical tools used to analyse regional developments. In particular, the ‘post-Islamism’ thesis has significantly changed the debates on ‘Islam and democracy’ by bringing to light the changing opportunity structures, and changed goals, of Islamist movements. However, this paper argues that the theory underestimates differences within post-Islamist societies. Drawing on field theory, the paper shows how the actual content of post-Islamism is contingent on political struggle. It focuses on three fields whose political roles have been underestimated or misrepresented by post-Islamist theorists: Islamic feminism, Salafist-jihadism and the revolutionary youth. Their respective forms of capital – sources of legitimacy and social recognition – give important clues for understanding the stakes of the conflicts after the Arab Spring.     

Democratic ‘freedom’ in Myanmar

In Robert Dahl’s work on ‘polyarchy’, democratic ‘freedom’ is liberty from the abuses of the state and freedom for citizens to formulate and express their preferences. This meaning of freedom is central to contemporary scholarship on democratization. At the same time, freedom has also been a key concept for activists and leaders involved in Myanmar’s long democratic struggles. Yet, when freedom is referred to by Burmese activists and democratic leaders, does this entail support for liberty or freedom of the type outlined by Dahl? This article argues that Berlin’s distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedoms can help to clarify overlaps and divergence in notions of freedom. When exploring ‘negative’ democratic freedoms, such as freedom from government restrictions on speech or association, there is considerable overlap between the visions of Burmese activists and democratic leaders and the key elements of Dahl’s democratic freedom. In considering ‘positive’ freedoms, however, there is more divergence. Amongst activists and democratic leaders in Myanmar, there is a focus not on freedom as the exercising of own entitlements but rather on freedom for moral conduct; freedom to bear to the responsibilities and discipline of democracy.     

Museums for peace: agents and instruments of peace education

Although museums for peace claim peace education to be a primary mission, their definitions of ‘peace’ and their aims and practices for peace education vary widely. In this article, we draw from the field of critical museology and the knowledge construction perspective to understand the role of museums for peace in the service of peace education. From the constructivist viewpoint, the museums’ narratives are not objective or historical truths. Rather they are the museum designers’ constructed interpretations of the events, people, and places that are memorialized. The museums’ exhibits, narratives, and programs reflect a wide range of definitions of peace including some which conflict and contradict each other. The variations in defining peace contribute to differences in how the museums view and exercise their role in educating for peace. From this analysis, we observe how contemporary museums for peace can play a significant role in peace education by raising awareness about multiple definitions of peace and by enabling audiences to reflect on, discuss and participate in deliberated paths toward personal peace and cultures of peace.     

State Power and Its Implications for Civil War Colombia

The following article examines the relationship between state power and civil war in Colombia. It presents three key findings. First, state weakness has provided armed groups with the political opportunity for rebellion. In this respect, most rebel consolidation takes place in areas of Colombia that lack a strong state presence. Second, the growth and evolution of Colombia's armed groups are directly related to their ability to loot exportable natural resource commodities. In stateless areas of Colombia, rebel consolidation tends to take place in areas where the drug trade is also present. Third, the conditions of civil war have led insurgent groups to mimic some of the basic functions and attributes of statehood. Colombia's conflict is more than just a manifestation of popular frustration; indeed, this article shows that civil war is also a form of state-building.     

PERFORMING AUTHORITY: DISCURSIVE POLITICS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF THEO VAN GOGH

In November 2004, the assassination of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by an Islamic extremist shocked The Netherlands. Critics of multiculturalism quickly linked the murder to the perceived failure of ‘soft’ integration policies and questioned the authority and legitimacy of Amsterdam’s political leadership. This article studies the response of political leaders to those challenges from a performative perspective. Analysing governance as performance illuminates the importance of actively enacting political leadership in non‐parliamentary settings such as talk shows, mosques and other religious meeting places, and improvised mass meetings in times of crisis. The authors distinguish different discursive means of performing authority, make suggestions for dealing with crisis events in ethnically and culturally diverse cities and draw some lessons from this approach as well as for methods of studying public administration.     

From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the ‘War on Terror’ exacerbated the conflict in Somalia

Abstract

External intervention has frustrated and continues to frustrate peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and Somalia, adding various adverse layers to an already complicated and complex conflict. The level of forceful military engagement intended for regional domination has profoundly affected negatively the efforts of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia. This article examines how the earlier Ethiopian policies towards Somalia has reshaped the (post)-Cold War politics of the Horn. In doing so, it traces the roots of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia vis-à-vis new non-state armed groups to chart the changing political dynamics of the conflict in Somalia. By using historical approach, the article argues that Ethiopia’s agenda is central to understanding why the ‘War on Terror’ has strengthened and subsequently midwifed armed militant movements (e.g. new insurgency groups) in Somalia, starting from Al-Itihaad to today’s Al-Shabaab. In focusing upon various regional actors and groups, the article moves from the emphasis of internal systems to external power structures, considering the wider historical and political factors in the region that must be closely examined if the regional and local conflicts are to be deeply understood. While it is a context-specific study, the article aims to contribute fresh perspectives and insights to ongoing discussions on the consequences of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.