Experimentalist interactions: Joining up the transnational timber legality regime

This paper analyzes the interactions between the separate components of the emerging transnational timber legality regime, both public and private. It examines how far, and through what institutional mechanisms, these interactions are producing a joined-up transnational regime, based on a shared normative commitment to combat illegal logging and cooperative efforts to implement and enforce it. The paper argues that the experimentalist architecture of the EU FLEGT initiative has fostered productive, mutually reinforcing interactions both with public timber legality regulation in other consumer countries and with private certification schemes. But this emerging regime remains highly polyarchic, with broad scope for autonomous initiatives by NGOs and private service providers, along with national governments, international organizations, and multi-donor partnerships. Hence horizontal integration and coordination within it depend on a series of institutional mechanisms, some of which are distinctively experimentalist, while others can also be found in more conventional regimes. These mechanisms include cross-referencing and reciprocal endorsement of rules and standards; recursive learning through information pooling and peer review of implementation experience; public oversight and joint assessment of private certification and legality verification schemes; and the “penalty default” effect of public legality regulation in consumer countries, which have pushed both exporting countries and transnational firms to comply with the norms and procedures of the emerging transnational regime. The paper's findings thus provide robust new evidence for the claim advanced in previous work that a joined-up transnational regime can be assembled piece by piece under polyarchic conditions through coordinated learning from decentralized experimentation, without a hegemonic power to impose common global rules.     

Inter-local-government partnership for urban management in decentralizing Indonesia: from below or above? Kartamantul (Greater Yogyakarta) and Jabodetabek (Greater Jakarta) compared

Under the new decentralization policy, local governments in Indonesia tend to be inward-looking in orientation. Many local governments have exploited the local resources even more intensively, and they are not concerned with the socio-economic conditions of the larger region of which they are part. Within the context of metropolitan areas, there has been almost no effective cooperation among the bordering districts and municipalities to promote the metropolitan development. Against this backdrop, the study examines and compares the institutional partnership and governance in two Indonesia's metropolitan areas, namely Kartamantul (Greater Yogyakarta) and Jabodetabek (Greater Jakarta).     

Continuing Controversies Over State and Local Foreign Policy Sanctions in the United States

Recent state and local government sanctions on business withBurma and certain Swiss banks renews a debate over foreign policypowers in federal systems that operate in an integrated globaleconomy. International business promotion has become an acceptedfunction of state and local governments. More controversialis the imposition of foreign policy sanctions, where economicinvolvement becomes a lever to pursue political goals ratherthan an objective in itself. When compared with past cases,including South Africa and the Arab boycott, recent state andlocal initiatives demonstrate both continuity and fresh departuresin federalism's evolving adjustment to the global economy. Thesedevelopments can be used to examine theoretical concepts suchas constituent and multilayered diplomacy. They also argue forimproved practical cooperation among the multiple and diverseactors engaged in foreign policy issues.     

Institutional Fragmentation, Institutional Engineering and the Development of Elderlycare and Childcare in Sweden

This article seeks to identify institutional causes behind policy-specific retrenchments in the Swedish welfare state. During the austerity period of the 1980s and 1990s, the Swedish welfare state simultaneously experienced retrenchments in some fields and stability or expansion in others. Elderlycare is an example of tremendous retrenchment and childcare one of continuous expansion. A comparison of both fields suggests that the divergent trends might be related to different policy-specific levels of institutional fragmentation in the implementation process. In elderlycare, implementation was strongly fragmented between the central and local government level, with the central government providing only weak overarching regulation and the local governments enjoying considerable local implementation discretion. As a consequence, in this field, local governments had enough discretion to impose local retrenchment measures in order to adapt to the conditions of austerity. In childcare, a similar development did not take place because in this field the municipal implementation autonomy was severely circumscribed by strong central state regulations. It is probable that the different institutional preconditions in both fields have been shaped intentionally by means of governmental institutional engineering. The decentralized decision-making structure in elderlycare might have allowed the central government to induce blame-avoidant retrenchments on the local government level.     

Competitive Tendering in the Welfare State: Perceptions and Preferences among Local Politicians

Competitive tendering for public services has triggered a heated academic debate. In political economy, competition is claimed to improve efficiency. If this is true, why are most governments faithful to the monopoly model? Political economists suggest that public sector employees and unions influence the preferences of the elected politicians. In new institutional theory, competition is claimed to undermine democratic governance. If this is true, why do some elected governments make use of competitive tendering? In this tradition, organisational solutions are seen as expressions of autonomous values and perceptions about the outcomes of organisational solutions – not as manifestations of vote–maximising politicians subject to self–interested interest groups. When governments use competition, it is due to misconceived management fads that have temporarily penetrated long–established perceptions and value systems. These propositions have not been subjected to proper empirical testing. We have analysed extensive data about Norwegian local politicians, and found support for the notion that the perceptions of elected politicians affect their preferences for tendering for residential care services for elderly people and hospital services. But we found support for the political economy propositions as well. Party affiliation, interest group background and economic situation influence the perceptions and organisational preferences of elected politicians. Reform may be a question of political values and perceived consequences, but these values, perceptions and policy preferences are influenced by political self–interest and can be changed by exogenous economic shocks.     

Evaluation lokaler Verwaltungspolitik: Umsetzung und Wirksamkeit des Neuen Steuerungsmodells in den deutschen Kommunen

The article aims at an evaluation of the New Public Management-inspired reform in German local governments which under the heading of the “New Steering Model (NSM)” spread over the municipalities like a “bush fire”. Since the research on Public Sector Reforms has so far largely been concentrated on institutional and instrumental change in Public Administrations there is now as ever only little empirical evidence concerning the actual changes and results of reform initiatives. Against this background, in the following article the attempt will finally be made to focus on results and effects of the local governments’ reform activities which have been achieved after 10 years of NSM-modernization and, thus, to outline perspectives for institutional-ortiented evaluations in the future.     

Federal Dynamics in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland: How Substates' Internal Organization Affects Intergovernmental Relations

This article argues that internal substate dynamics can systematicallyaccount for the organization of intergovernmental relations(IGR) in dual federal systems. Whereas majoritarian executive-legislativerelations tend to weaken the institutionalization of intergovernmentalarrangements (IGAs), power-sharing executive-legislative relationstend to facilitate it. Two of the mechanisms at work serve toillustrate this point. Given one-party majority cabinets, completegovernment alternations strongly alter actors' interest constellationsover time, thereby increasing the costs of maintaining stablecross-boundary IGR. Moreover, the heavy impact of a potentialelectoral loss induces politicians to shift blame to other governments,thereby undermining cross-boundary cooperation. Majoritariandynamics also weaken integration between IGAs. Furthermore,integration is weakened by compulsory power-sharing structuresunbridged by party ties. In contrast to noncompulsory partycooperation, such internal constitutional divides easily underminethe setup of strong interorganizational linkages.     

The Political Foundations of Trust and Distrust: Reforms and Protests in France

This article argues that the high level of protest activity in France is, at least partly, the result of distrust between the government and the trade unions, and that such distrust is inevitable in a society where unions are sometimes strong enough to mobilise against the government but not confident in their own future strength. This trust problem can be overcome if governments are willing to make institutional changes that commit them to future policies, but such political engineering is costly and unstable, which explains why governments sometimes prefer open confrontation. The empirical part of the paper analyses four French social and labour market reform initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s, demonstrating that the ideas developed in this article help to explain important features of contemporary French policy-making.     

Institutional Collective Action and Economic Development Joint Ventures

There is high interest in economic development efforts involving cooperation or collaboration among metropolitan jurisdictions. To determine why some local governments engage in cooperative agreements while others do not, this paper investigates transaction obstacles, including bargaining, information, agency, enforcement, and division problems. The authors then advance an institutional collective action explanation for intergovernmental cooperation, focusing on the conditions under which these transactions costs are low. This work anticipates that the costs associated with interlocal cooperation are influenced by the demographic characteristics of communities, local political institutions, and the nature of regional government networks. Empirical analysis based on a national survey of local development officials provides support for several predictions from this model and identifies policy variables that, in turn, increase the prospects for cooperation, specifically through the development of informal policy networks.     

Power and changing modes of governance in the euro crisis

Which European Union actors are most powerful in the governance of the euro crisis? The euro crisis has reignited the classic debate between intergovernmentalists, who tend to stress the coercive power of dominant member states in the European Council, and supranationalists, who maintain that through the use of institutional power, the Commission, and the European Central Bank turned out the “winners” of the crisis. This article argues that euro crisis governance is best understood not just in terms of one form of power but instead as evolving through different constellations of coercive, institutional, and ideational power that favored different EU actors over the course of the crisis, from the initial fast‐burning phase (2010–2012), where the coercive and ideational power of Northern European member states in the European Council was strongest, to the slow‐burning phase (2012–2016), when greater influence was afforded supranational actors through the use of ideational and institutional power.     

The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis

The "new" institutionalisms" in rational choice and historical analysis are being applied with increasing sophistication and accuracy to the study of European Community governance. The basic premise of such institutional approaches is that EC institutions, once created, "take on a life of their own," acting as independent or intervening variables between the preferences and power of the member governments on the one hand, and the ultimate policy outputs of EC governance on the other. The challenge for institutionalist theory consists in constructing a precise analytical tool-box that will allow us to make specific predictions about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, EC institutions may exert such an independent causal influence. EC institutions matter, I suggest, insofar as they: lend stability to an existing institutional structure; shape any subsequent amendment of those institutions; allow individual member governments to be outvoted by qualified majority; cause member states to lose control of events through lock-ins; and subject member governments to the actions of supranational agents whose behavior they can control only imperfectly.     

Dysfunctional institutions? Toward a New Agenda in Governance Studies

There is a wide‐spread perception among academics and commentators that institutional dysfunction has become increasingly common in important social, political, and economics arenas. Opinion polls show a decline in trust and confidence in major actors and institutions, including inter‐governmental organizations, governments, firms, NGOs, and religious organizations. For some, the core of the problem is that the hitherto well‐functioning states have become less effective in aggregating and acting upon citizens' preferences. Many policy initiatives of the 1990s – deregulation, privatization, new public management, private regulation, regional integration, civil society, and so on – seemed to have failed to meet expectations. This symposium seeks to identify important theoretical and empirical questions about institutional failure, such as why do institutions fail, why are they not self‐correcting, what might be a clear evaluative yardstick and analytic approach by which to measure performance, and to what extent contemporary theories of institutional evolution and design are useful in examining institutional restructuring and institutional renewal? Symposium essays by leading social science scholars offer important insights to inform future work on institutional performance and outline an agenda for institutional renewal and change.     

FIGHTING CORRUPTION WITH SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS' POTENTIAL TO REDUCE CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Given the poor track record of traditional anti‐corruption initiatives, donors and governments are increasingly looking at how civil society can fight corruption in public administration. Social accountability mechanisms intend to perform this role by holding officials directly accountable through citizen engagement. However, this article argues that social accountability mechanisms are only capable of reducing corruption systemically if they activate horizontal accountability and sustain it through the sanctioning mechanisms of electoral accountability. A comparative case study analysis using the cases of the Ugandan Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and the Bangalore Citizen Report Card is applied to test this hypothesis. The Tanzanian Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and an example of citizen engagement in Mumbai are employed as shadow cases to provide additional evidence for the hypothesis. The results indicate that social accountability mechanisms must be inclusive, broad, with public effect and embedded in other accountability relationships to fight corruption effectively. Electoral accountability is key, and support to social accountability mechanisms should therefore always be well placed within a broader agenda aimed at strengthening democratic governance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

论流域政府间横向协调机制——流域水资源消费负外部性治理的视阈

当前,流域水资源消费负外部性问题愈益尖锐,现实症结应在于流域政府纷纷实施了地方保护的策略选择,体现为一种政府外部性,其衍生的根由则在于流域政府权力产权界定不清导致了相互间正交易成本的出现.根据新制度经济学相关启示,须建构流域政府间横向协调机制,从而规范流域政府各自权力产权,降低因相互摩擦所引发的交易成本,由此即可以减少或消除此种政府外部性,最终求解流域水资源消费负外部性问题.由于反复博弈模型和制度主义的援证,公民退出选择与呼吁力量的驱动以及流域公共利益观念凸显和官员的理性自觉,流域政府间横向协调机制之建构成为可能.而其主要类型的界分则同样可以受新制度经济学启发并吻合治理的行动逻辑,进而区分为科层机制、市场机制和府际治理机制等三种,它们相互存在替代性但更应实现有机的结合.     

DIFFERENCES IN LEARNING PRACTICES AND VALUES IN NORTH–SOUTH CITY PARTNERSHIPS: TOWARDS A BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF MUTUALITY

This article addresses twinning between local governments in North and South, contributing to the past decade's discourse on institutional twinning in this journal. Local governments have increasingly become recognised as relevant actors in international development cooperation through city‐to‐city cooperation structures, which have been praised as an effective mechanism for local government capacity building. This article discusses the learning practices and the extent to which new knowledge is valued and adopted by twinning participants in both North and South and moreover whether learning benefits are mutual. In a study of three partnerships between Dutch municipalities and partner cities in Peru, South Africa and Nicaragua, 36 participants were interviewed. The findings reveal that learning in city‐to‐city partnerships is not mutual between North and South and that the benefits of ‘shared learning’—a rhetoric commonly used in the twinning discourse—are limited. Instead, other opportunities for mutuality arise for Northern municipalities from political and strategic benefits, such as staff loyalty and motivation. Mutuality in twinning hence deserves a broader interpretation than learning alone so that twinning benefits can be identified and maximised for both North and South, keeping cities interested and motivated. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Moderating Role of Top-Down Supports in Horizontal Innovation Diffusion

How do governments respond to multiple types of external pressures under limited resources? Are the effects of different types of diffusional pressures complementary or substitutive? This article approaches these questions by examining how top-down supports modify the effects of horizontal pressures on local innovation adoption. Top-down supports may complement or substitute the effects of horizontal pressures given the former's potential influence on perceived innovation advantage and visibility, organizational autonomy, and environmental uncertainty. The empirical analysis based on China's municipal-level one-stop governments (administrative licensing centers, or ALCs) from 1997 to 2012 shows that increases in central and provincial supportive policy signals reduce the effects of neighboring municipality adoption on a municipal government's creation of an ALC. Results affirm that the effects of different types of diffusional pressures can be conditional on one another—that is, increases in top-down policy supports may substitute the effects of horizontal pressures.     

Of paradigms and power: British economic policy making since Thatcher

How do ruling policy paradigms persist over time and why do they often undergo significant internal ideational changes? While the impact of Peter Hall's approach to policy paradigms on the study of governance has been immense, there is a burgeoning consensus that a “Kuhnian” understanding of paradigms makes punctuated equilibrium style shifts the only game in town. While Hall's approach can account for inter‐paradigm change with reference to exogenous shocks, it does not allow for significant ideational shifts to occur intra‐paradigm. To remedy this, we place ideational power dynamics at the heart of the study of policy paradigms. We demonstrate the general applicability of our approach by examining the evolution of British macroeconomic policy‐making since 1990. We show how key policy‐makers were able to employ their institutional and ideational power to reinterpret and redefine the dominant neoliberal understanding of the economy to match their own specific ideas and policy priorities.     

The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies

Lawmaking is a challenge for coalition governments because it inherently demands cooperation and compromise by parties with divergent policy goals. The jurisdictional system of cabinet government exacerbates the problem by providing parties the means to undermine the coalition bargain in the pursuit of their own policy interests. In this article, I explore whether arrangements that allow partners to police one another induce compromise on one of the most important decisions taken by a government—the organization of the policy agenda. In an analysis of original data on the timing and policy content of over 800 government bills from four European democracies, I show that coalition governments pursue a largely "accommodative" agenda. Policy initiatives dealing with issues that are more attractive to all partners in the coalition are likely to be given priority on the agenda, while those dealing with relatively unattractive issues are likely to be postponed .     

问责性与跨域治理之条件检视与体制建构——PAM与IAD观点

地方政府间为达到资源优势的共享和资源劣势的互补，应形成一水平的合作治理关系，然却因本位主义、政党立场及缺乏信任而成效有限。笔者参考欧美公共事务相关课题领域之区域分析、项目分析、政策分析及1991至1998年于台湾高雄推动都市营销之经验等，及对应个体（个人）认知本质的判断与决策理论等，从多元社会观点切入对于个体认知及群体行为之观察，并涵盖载体存量之影响而成的PAM（Public Affairs Management）整合架构，此与Ostrom教授等发展之IAD（Institutional Analysis and Development）架构应可人体对应，本研究结合二者探讨台湾的问责性与跨域治理之条件检视与体制建构。     

Policy decisiveness and responses to speculative attacks in developed countries

Why are some countries able to defend their currencies when there are speculative attacks, while others fail to do so and devalue their currencies? This article suggests that intragovernment factors as well as government‐legislature relations should be considered because many of the policy responses to speculative attacks do not require legislative acquiescence, so that intragovernment attributes will have more substantial effects on the policy responses than those of government‐legislature relations. This article suggests that cleavages within government and its instability have a negative effect on decisiveness. Data regarding speculative attacks in developed countries from the 1970s to the 1990s and the Heckman selection model show that governments with many veto players and with less durability have had difficulty in defending their currencies in the face of speculative attacks. The article also finds that governmental institutional effects can be constrained by central bank independence. The effects become substantially smaller and statistically insignificant when central banks are very independent. The overall results imply that policy indecisiveness induced by some political factors makes governments less able to adopt a new policy equilibrium that is necessary to respond to an exogenous shock such as speculative attack.