Third world neutralism and British Cold War strategy, 1960–62

European decolonization appeared to the Western powers to open up fresh areas of the globe to Cold War competition. Concerned by the coincidence of Afro-Asian and Sovier pressure on the European colonial powers, and preoccupied with the redefinition of Britain's global role in the wake of decolonization, the British Foreign Office was convinced, despite much evidence to the contrary, that the West needed to champion ‘neutralism’ in order to prevent the Afro-Asian states from orienting towards the Soviet sphere. This article argues that this policy was determined more by their anxieties about Anglo-American relations in the wake of decolonization than by a deeply held conviction of the imminence of the extension of the communist world.     

中国共产党与拉美共产党关系的曲折发展

1949年中华人民共和国成立,拉美各国人民特别是这些国家的进步力量和共产党受到极大鼓舞。20世纪50年代和60年代初,中共与拉美各国共产党的关系比较密切。到1960年,拉美22个共产党和工人党中,有18个党与中共建立和发展了友好关系。60年代初期,拉美共产党虽然与中共有分歧和争论,但仍与中共维持着正常往来。1965年至70年代后期,由于拉美大多数共产党在国际共运大论战中支持苏共立场,中共与拉美多数共产党的关系恶化和中断。与此同时,从拉美老共产党分裂出来的新党陆续与中共建立起党际关系。中国“文化大革命”结束和改革开放开始之后,大多数拉美共产党与中共恢复和发展关系,中共也调整了与拉美新党的关系。无论是与拉美老党还是与拉美新党的关系,中共都遵循中共十二大确立的“独立自主,完全平等,相互尊重,互不干涉内部事务”党际关系四项原则。此后,中共在党际关系方面,又突破了主要与共产党交往的传统,开始尝试与拉美民族民主等各类政党开展交往并取得重大突破,党际交往逐步由外延向内涵转变。     

Third world neutralism and British Cold War strategy, 1960-62

European decolonization appeared to the Western powers to open up fresh areas of the globe to Cold War competition. Concerned by the coincidence of Afro-Asian and Sovier pressure on the European colonial powers, and preoccupied with the redefinition of Britain's global role in the wake of decolonization, the British Foreign Office was convinced, despite much evidence to the contrary, that the West needed to champion 'neutralism' in order to prevent the Afro-Asian states from orienting towards the Soviet sphere. This article argues that this policy was determined more by their anxieties about Anglo-American relations in the wake of decolonization than by a deeply held conviction of the imminence of the extension of the communist world.     

The “New Look” of German Diplomacy: The West German Foreign Service after the Second World War

When established in 1951, the West German Foreign Office resembled its pre-1945 Berlin Ministry predecessor in many ways. Notably, about 45 percent of Bonn’s diplomats came from the old service. Such continuities raised concerns about a restoration of old diplomatic traditions and attitudes. However, significant changes in German diplomacy—its West German variant—soon became evident, not least in terms of diplomatic style and methods. This analysis explores how the Foreign Office’s staff adopted, promoted, or rejected such changes. It assesses institutional processes of transformation and examines why diplomats were willing to “re-learn” diplomacy after the Second World War. Likewise evaluated are the problems and limits of re-orientation. By focussing on (dis)continuities within the Foreign Service in the 1950s and 1960s, the analysis contributes to the general field of research on processes of transition in West Germany after the end of the Third Reich.     

The UK response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: proposals for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, 1980–1981

Although not unexpected, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was still largely a shock to the West. It was the first time since the Second World War that the Soviets had directly intervened in a country outside the Warsaw Pact. Despite the intervention eventually being seen as Moscow's ‘Vietnam’ the West was initially unsure about what the invasion meant for stability in the region or the future conduct of East–West relations. In response to the crisis the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) proposed that Afghanistan revert to a neutral and non-aligned status in an attempt to create the basis for a viable political settlement, one that would allow the Soviet Union to withdraw troops without losing face. It launched the proposal in early 1980, lobbying other countries to support and champion the idea, culminating in a visit to Moscow by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in July 1981. In this early phase of Soviet intervention the British proposals were premature but not without merit. They anticipated the strategy the Soviets would eventually adopt in their attempt to achieve an orderly withdrawal.     

Ethnos,demos and democratization: A comparison of the Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland

With the collapse of European communism, Western observers and leaders fostered new expectations about the relative likelihood for post‐communist nations to ‘join the West’. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were seen as least problematic candidates, sponsored especially by the German leadership. A troubling issue however is the emerging pattern of ethnos‐politics, identity politics based on blood ties, as opposed to demos‐politics, civic politics based on universal territorial citizenship. In the Czech Republic this ethnos‐politics appears most clearly as anti‐Romany racism and governmental discrimination. In Poland and Hungary, centre‐right parties have developed a politics of ethnic patriotism which labels opponents as traitors and foreign elements. In these nations, political liberalism has been too weak and often too opportunist to offer a viable demos‐politics as a counterweight. Instead, the ex‐communist successor parties in Poland and Hungary have re‐emerged as the mass base for a non‐nationalist demos‐politics. The West has yet to take seriously the new ethnos‐politics, prefering to give priority to economic and foreign‐policy compatibility. The admission of these nations into the European Union or North Atlantic Treaty Organization would give new legitimacy to ethnos within the West, and reinforce the ethnos‐politics of Austria's Haider and France's LePen.     

Postwar (West) German–Romanian Relations: Expanding Brubaker's Analytic Triad

This article revisits Rogers Brubaker's well-known triadic nexus, consisting of national minority, nationalizing state, and kin-state, and interrogates its applicability to the study of German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe since the second half of the 20th century. It does that by looking at German–Romanian relations after the Second World War, arguing that the migration of Romanian Germans to (West) Germany led to the transformation of Brubaker's triadic nexus into a quadratic nexus. More precisely, the field of Romanian Germans in (West) Germany has to be added to the three already existing fields. Furthermore, the extension of Brubaker's model allows in effect for a more comprehensive analysis of postwar West German–Eastern European relationships.     

Lord Home and Anglo–American Relations, 1961–1963

This article focuses on the role of Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, in the conduct of Anglo–American relations between 1961 and 1963. It studies three controversial policy areas: the newly independent states of Laos and the Congo, along with the debate over the decolonization of British Guiana; the key Cold War issues of Berlin and Cuba; and a variety of nuclear weapons–related matters. It is argued that Home, in constantly striving to maintain the alliance, was more pro-American than Macmillan. He exercised an important restraining and calming influence on the Prime Minister, preventing him from pursuing potentially damaging initiatives. However, the relationship between the two men was strong. Home’s diplomacy usually complimented Macmillan’s interventions and they often worked together.     

Domestic politics,news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya

The European Union member states split over the military intervention in Libya with France, Germany and the UK voting differently in the United Nations Security Council. This article compares news media in France and Germany to better understand the foreign policy decisions of these key actors. Using a newspaper analysis of 334 articles, it shows that the German domestic debate started very late and was much less stable than the French debate. This supports arguments that Germany's decision-making was erratic. The analysis, however, also shows that the German debate was comprehensive and included an extensive discussion of the legitimacy of intervention. This fits in well with the traditional reluctance of German foreign policy elites to support military action.     

Pre-war Post-war Planning: The Phoney War,the Roosevelt Administration,and the Case of the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations

The Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations (ACPFR) of Franklin D. Roosevelt's State Department first met in late December 1939 and operated until early Summer 1940. Its previously overlooked deliberations, chaired by the dynamic Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, are important in three related areas. First, the ACPFR was an early marker of the Administration's later post-war planning, notably the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. Second, a remarkable swath of issues were discussed surrounding the ongoing conflict, prospects for its end, and the shape of the post-war world, particularly regarding Europe and the consequences of a German victory. The third area of ACPFR importance is in illuminating our understanding of the Roosevelt Administration's thinking on the conflict during the complex atmosphere of the Phoney War. The analysis concludes that although the fruits of Committee's effort would be indirect, they were nonetheless important in later post-war planning efforts that contemplated a breadth of options for the post-war world before American lives were put in harm's way.     

Lord Home and Anglo-American Relations, 1961-1963

This article focuses on the role of Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, in the conduct of Anglo-American relations between 1961 and 1963. It studies three controversial policy areas: the newly independent states of Laos and the Congo, along with the debate over the decolonization of British Guiana; the key Cold War issues of Berlin and Cuba; and a variety of nuclear weapons-related matters. It is argued that Home, in constantly striving to maintain the alliance, was more pro-American than Macmillan. He exercised an important restraining and calming influence on the Prime Minister, preventing him from pursuing potentially damaging initiatives. However, the relationship between the two men was strong. Home's diplomacy usually complimented Macmillan's interventions and they often worked together.     

Collective memory in Germany and the great foreign policy debate: the case of the European refugee crisis

Abstract

Embedded within the wider normalization–continuity debate about the nature of Germany’s actorness, this article assesses the impact of collective memory on German foreign policy during the European refugee crisis. The Federal Republic’s open-door policy in autumn 2015 bewildered many observers who saw it as a self-harming act of charity. Based on a three-stage empirical framework, the article argues that Germany’s initial behaviour cannot be understood without accounting for the influence that collective memory still exerts in Germany today. The open-door policy was irreconcilable with Germany’s immediate material interests, but instead shaped by collective memory-inspired humanitarian and European principles. This conclusion challenges the growing consensus among students of German foreign policy that Germany is becoming a normal actor which has freed itself from the constraints of the past and behaves in congruence with its material interests. This article seeks to make a timely contribution to the knowledge about collective memory in international relations, Germany’s foreign policy in the specific as well as wider context, and the dynamics of the European refugee crisis.     

“The Human Factor”: French–West German Bilateralism and the “Logic of Appropriateness” in the European Crisis of the Mid-1960s

This analysis reviews a crucial moment in the contemporary political and constitutional history of Western Europe. Prior to the “empty chair crisis” in 1965–1966, an important Franco–West German summit had failed and allowed the French president, Charles De Gaulle, to jeopardise negotiations in the European Economic Community. This analysis not only illustrates the overwhelming importance of Franco–West German bilateralism in the prelude to the crisis, but also analyses the negotiating behaviours of De Gaulle and West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard at the summit of 11–12 June 1965. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Erhard, rather than the allegedly anti-European De Gaulle, doomed the negotiations. Furthermore, this study draws pragmatically on social institutionalism and constructivism to shed light on Erhard’s mental map and identify the relevant considerations in his decision-making and bargaining. Rational choice approaches fail to explain the “human factor” in Erhard’s negotiating behaviour and the mysterious breakdown of Franco–West German entente in summer 1965.     

From “partnership” to “principled pragmatism”: tracing the discursive practices of the High Representatives in the EU’s relations with the Southern Mediterranean

ABSTRACT

The EU’s relations with countries in the Southern Mediterranean have a long history as the region is of great strategic importance for the Union and its member states. The High Representatives of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have been highly involved in shaping these relations, and this role has been officially strengthened with institutional changes brought about with the Lisbon Treaty. This article analyses the role of the HR/VPs in shaping the EU's foreign and security policy towards the region with an analytical focus on discursive practice. Drawing on insights from practice theory in IR and EU studies, the analysis traces continuity and change in how the Southern Mediterranean is described in the drafting of key strategic documents. The main finding is that EU foreign and security policy towards the Southern Mediterranean shows a high degree of continuity despite several crises and institutional changes, although the discursive practices have evolved. The article ends by highlighting a conundrum that the EU can be said to implicitly acknowledge: if authoritarian states in the Southern Mediterranean are inherently unstable, yet stable enough to quench the democratic aspirations of their people, then what should be the basis for EU actions?     

Ukraine's relations with the west: disinterest,partnership, disillusionment

Ukraine's relations with the West have gone through three periods of development since 1992. When relations with Ukraine have improved this has tended to be at the same time as relations between the West and Russia declined, and vice-versa. The first period is disinterest during 1992–94 when the West prioritised relations with a reformist Russia. The second period was 1995–99 when Ukraine and the West developed a strategic partnership. From 2000, Ukraine's relations with the West are best described as disillusionment due to the growing gap between official rhetoric of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and Eurasian domestic policies.     

The making of a diplomat: the case of the French Diplomatic and Consular Institute as an identity workspace

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the creation of the Diplomatic and Consular Institute by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and conceptualises this new professional school of diplomacy as an “identity workspace” following the analysis of a cohort’s learning experience. This article aims to spark a debate from a practice perspective on diplomatic training as offered by Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Europe.     

Biting the Land that Feeds You: North Korea and the United States in the Cold War and Beyond

Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to understand the principles that underlay North Korean behavior in the international arena. In the post-Korean War years, American policymakers saw Pyongyang as simply a communist puppet, a servile pawn directed by Moscow and Peking. That framework was shattered when the Cold War ended but American officials still sought simplistic answers to explain DPRK behavior, usually concluding that their leaders were deranged, evil, and simply incomprehensible. However, newly released communist materials suggest that there is more than irrationality at work in Pyongyang. Instead, one can discern a basic pattern at the heart of DPRK policy, one that has internal developments at its core. Put simply, this interpretation suggests that North Korean behavior towards the West becomes more provocative when the nation is at its weakest in certain domestic areas, primarily economic development and political stability, and attributes this correlation to the dominant role of the ideology of juche (self-reliance) that virtually defines this society. Understanding this relationship between internal dynamics, ideological paradigms, and DPRK foreign relations would be a beneficial step in formulating policy towards North Korea; instead, however, American policymakers have clung to interpretations that, while easily comprehensible and politically appealing, have hindered their diplomatic efforts towards the nation since the 1950s.     

Biting the Land that Feeds You: North Korea and the United States in the Cold War and Beyond

Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to understand the principles that underlay North Korean behavior in the international arena. In the post-Korean War years, American policymakers saw Pyongyang as simply a communist puppet, a servile pawn directed by Moscow and Peking. That framework was shattered when the Cold War ended but American officials still sought simplistic answers to explain DPRK behavior, usually concluding that their leaders were deranged, evil, and simply incomprehensible. However, newly released communist materials suggest that there is more than irrationality at work in Pyongyang. Instead, one can discern a basic pattern at the heart of DPRK policy, one that has internal developments at its core. Put simply, this interpretation suggests that North Korean behavior towards the West becomes more provocative when the nation is at its weakest in certain domestic areas, primarily economic development and political stability, and attributes this correlation to the dominant role of the ideology of juche (self-reliance) that virtually defines this society. Understanding this relationship between internal dynamics, ideological paradigms, and DPRK foreign relations would be a beneficial step in formulating policy towards North Korea; instead, however, American policymakers have clung to interpretations that, while easily comprehensible and politically appealing, have hindered their diplomatic efforts towards the nation since the 1950s.