Adaptation and the foreign policy bureaucracy: The experience of federal states

Members of the Commonwealth do not use the title ‘ambassador’ for the heads of diplomatic missions which they send to one another. Instead, they use the title ‘high commissioner’. This article firstly examines how the office of high commissioner emerged to meet the representational needs of states owing allegiance to a common sovereign. Secondly, it explains why the office survived the transformation of the British empire into the modern Commonwealth of sovereign states. Thirdly, the article considers the factors that continue to make the office appealing to its holders and a diplomatic asset to their states.     

The politics of naval aid: the foreign office, the admiralty, and Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation, 1936-37

This article examines the interdepartmental friction caused by Soviet requests for technical naval assistance from Britain between 1936 and 1937. With an eye to the deteriorating global situation, the Admiralry remained wedded to the view that any help leading to the strengthening of the Soviet navy would only wreck Germanys commitment to crucial qualitative and quantitative naval restrictions. Adopting a different tack, the Foreign Office welcomed the opportuniry to accommodate Soviet fleet requirements as a means of forging Anglo-Soviet amiry and a European balance of power. Ultimately however, the fate of Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation was determined by the exigencies of British rearmament.     

法德关系的新发展

作为在欧洲一体化进程中扮演“领头羊”角色和起“发动机”作用的欧盟核心国家,法国和德国在第二次世界大战后的欧洲发展史中占有举足轻重的地位。今年1月22日正值《法德合作条约》(又称《爱丽舍宫条约》)签署40周年,以此为契机,法德关系明显提升,取得令人瞩目的实质性新进展。     

Power, sovereignty, and the great republic: Anglo-American diplomatic relations in the era of the Civil War

Historians have tended to view the American Civil War (1861-65) as a milestone in Anglo-American relations. It marked the transfer of dominance from Great Britain to the United States in the Western Hemisphere. As Great Britain backed the losing side overwhelming American power brought about a British withdrawal. This article argues that this is a very oversimplified interpretation of their relations in this period. Britain did not intervene in the Civil War because it was not good policy; throughout the British relied on deterrence because, save for the war years, American power could not be translated into military power. The British secured most of their policy objectives thanks to a combination of prudent and conciliatory conduct, and a desire to avoid war, but also due to calm resolution that belied belligerent and sometimes outlandish public statements. British leaders have often been criticized for hypocrisy and double standards, but such criticisms seem unfair. Their belief that the Civil War was futile resulted from a humanitarian desire to halt the killing. It should be remembered that although the nineteenth century witnessed many local conflicts, great wars seem to have disappeared. It therefore appeared to be a laudable objective to attempt to arbitrate in what turned out to be the greatest war after 1815. It is also important to recall that Europeans were less interested in this conflict than the Americans themselves, and that preoccupation with affairs closer to home led to hasty and erroneous judgements.     

The black chamber in the Dutch republic and the seven years' war, 1751-63

Using mainly primary sources, this article looks first at the complicated framework of the Dutch state and its foreign policy during the period under investigation, tracing the roots of the Black Chamber and its first results with regard to the Prussian codes. It then attempts to explain how and why the first French codes were broken and shows under what conditions the Black Chamber acquired permanent status. Finally the article investigates the scope and limits of its success.     

'Almost a law of nature'? Sir Edward Grey, the foreign office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905-12

This article considers the concept of the balance of power as it was applied by the British Foreign Office before the First World War, focusing on 1905-12. The place of the balance of power in British thinking is discussed, focusing on the ideas of the small number of individuals that shaped British foreign policy in this period. The balance of power in the years before the war was a product of more than the military balance sheet but also of the diplomatic dynamics.     

Eisenhower, the British and the security of Hong Kong, 1953-60

This article is an examination of Hong Kong's importance within British-American security arrangements in the Far East during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Archival evidence indicates that the Eisenhower Administration accepted a greater deal of commitment to the defence of Hong Kong during the 1950s — a period of significant hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. To understand this policy evolution in the broader context, this study evaluates the differences in British and American attitudes towards China during the 1950s and the effect of this on US policy towards Hong Kong.     

'The limits of international leadership': The Eisenhower administration, East-West trade and the cold war, 1953-54

This article examines the Eisenhower administration's trade policy towards the Soviet Union in 1953-54. It argues, contrary to previous scholarship on the subject, that the liberalization of East-West trade controls in August 1954 cannot be attributed solely to the presidential leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Instead, whilst Eisenhower played a significant role in changing American embargo policy, it was the Churchill government which provided the impetus required for the revision of the international export control lists. Despite conflict and confrontation over the shape and contents of the new embargo between Washington and London, the two governments forged a compromise in the summer of 1954.     

The anatomy of disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration in the republic of Congo1

This analysis begins with a general account of the political and humanitarian context of the Republic of Congo (RoC) before and after the signing of the Ceasefire Accords in 1999. In laying out the general context of the violence, it also briefly describes a number of interventions undertaken by the Government of Congo (GoC) and the international community to promote and ensure security. It reflects on the considerable confusion among stakeholders over the definitions, objectives and sequencing of each phase, from disarmament and demobilisation to reintegration (DDR)—a challenge not unique to actors in the RoC. This article offers a tentative glossary of terms to inform future efforts in the domain of DDR and closes with a consideration of the impacts and roles of key stakeholders in the DDR continuum, and some of the challenges they might face in the future.