Russian Economic Nationalism during the First World War: Moscow Merchants and Commercial Diasporas

While accounts of the end of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires have often stressed the rise of Turkish and German nationalisms, narratives of the Romanov collapse have generally not portrayed Russian nationalism as a key factor. In fact, scholars have either stressed the weaknesses of Russian national identity in the populace or the generally pragmatic approach of the government, which, as Hans Rogger classically phrased it, “opposed all autonomous expressions of nationalism, including the Russian.” In essence, many have argued, the regime was too conservative to embrace Russian nationalism, and it most often “subordinated all forms of the concept of nationalism to the categories of dynasty and empire.” Recently, two authors have challenged the predominantly pessimistic portrayals of the extent of Russian national identity in late imperial Russia, focusing on peasant responses to the First World War. Scott Seregny makes a strong case that while peasants may not have been full “Russians” by 1914, the spread of politics and literacy to the countryside through the zemstvos was rapidly integrating peasants into a broader civic identity. Josh Sanborn argues that even though responses were varied and in fact protest against the war quite frequent, the important thing is that both positive and negative responses were expressed within a single national political framework and discourse. In response, S. A. Smith grants that the war strengthened rather than weakened national identity, but thinks Sanborn and Seregny underestimate the degree to which nation, empire, and class pulled in different directions from 1916, concluding that “by the summer of 1917, politics had become polarized between an imperial language of nation, used mainly by the privileged and educated strata, an anti-imperial language, used mainly by the elites of the non-Russian nationalities, and a language of class, used mainly by the subaltern classes.”     

Partnerships in public management: rural enterprise alliances

This paper addresses public management implications of a certain form of network: the rural enterprise alliance, a formal nonmetropolitan partnership among producers, distributors, labor unions, employer associations, credit institutions, and government agencies. Six alliances are examined as examples of “postmodern” public organizing, as it fits into emergent “bottom up” approaches to economic development. Organizing locally for global competition is bringing on more decentralized, flexible, yet comprehensive public management approaches, emphasizing demand programming, self-management, incentives and information, leverage and engagement, and de-differentiated structuring. Public managers must increasingly deal with challenges like those related to the emergence of alliances.     

社会结构变迁与俄罗斯政治转型

俄罗斯自独立以来,虽然经济分层充分、阶级分化深入,但这种以纵向分化为主的社会宏观结构的变迁并未导致现代性社会结构的出现.这是俄罗斯民主化进程举步维艰、政治转型道路崎岖不平的结构性原因.     

Contemporary Russian nationalisms: the state,nationalist movements,and the shared space in between

For several years, various nationalist groups and the Russian state have been competing over nationalism as a political concept and for popular support to nationalist claims. This paper analyzes the relationship between the state and anti-government, ethnocentric nationalistic groups that gather annually in an event called “the Russian March.” Emphasis is on the change in that relationship that happened in 2014, when the state added efforts to channel and mobilize the nationalists to its previous repressive and controlling measures. The article conceptualizes the competition over the nationalist argument in contemporary Russia as a case of dissentful and consentful contention in hybrid regimes, and shows how the dissentful nationalists have been forced to make way for the more consentful ones. Until recently, the room for maneuver for the radical nationalists was relatively wide. The events in Ukraine, however, divided the nationalists, and since 2014 radical nationalists have faced increased state repression. At the same time, pro-government nationalist actors have strengthened, and new players have appeared in the field. These developments tell us not only about the Kremlin’s diminished tolerance for dissentful contention, but also about the importance of the nationalist argument in Russian politics today.     

War of words: the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's “News of the Week” show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the “fascist” and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a “television party” and an “Internet party” in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.     

China in the Russian mind today: Ambivalence and defeatism

This article describes the ambivalence of Russian attitudes toward China at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Russians of all strata combine a willingness to see China as a friendly neighbour with a high level of fear of the giant that could swallow much of the country whole, especially the Asian part. The article pays special attention to the split in Russian views of China among elites. While some elites, who have strong anti-American attitudes, see China as a major ally against the United States, others call on the government to treat the United States as the single force that can help Russia protect the integrity of its territory against China, whose people still do not recognise the existing borders between the two countries.     

Forms of Communication between Large-scale Farms and Local Administrative Authorities in Russian Villages: About Benefactors and Sponsors

This article investigates the forms of communication emerging between local administrative authorities and large-scale agricultural enterprises with regard to public service provision in two Russian villages. Using a systems theory approach and conceptualising Soviet society as an organisational society, privatisation and local government reform may be observed as attempts to disentangle former collective farms and local authorities and adjust them to the logics of functional differentiation. Empirical evidence from a former kolkhoz and an agro-holding shows that both react to the contradiction between global transformation imperatives and local expectations, using a specific combination of formality and informality as a condition of their reproduction in the villages.     

Divergence and dispersion in the Russian economy

While post-war economic development In market economies was characterised by geographical concentration of economic activity, this was not the case in the Soviet Union. Soviet economic development resulted in a highly dispersed economic landscape with mono-industrial towns scattered around the country. One plausible reason for this was low perceived transport costs as seen by Soviet planners. Another reason was that political and not only economic motives governed industrial location (Maurseth, 2001a). In addition to the sheer size of the country, these factors made the Soviet Union one of the most transport-intensive economies in the world. The post-Soviet Russian economic geography faces Russia with important challenges. Production, population and employment patterns are likely to change dramatically. There are at least four reasons for this hypothesis. The first is structural change in the Russian economy. Production patterns in Russia were highly distorted. In the future industrial production, and in particular heavy industry, will represent a smaller share of total production while consumer industry and services will probably experience relatively higher growth rates. The second reason to expect a changing economic geography is that transport costs are likely to increase. While the Soviet Union implicitly subsidised transport heavily, Russia now faces important challenges due to increasing transport prices. The third reason for expecting change is population changes. Recently, migration from the climatically least hospitable areas has been growing. In the future, these trends are likely to continue. Fourth, and partly as a consequence of the above-mentioned factors, market access will probably become more important for location of Russian industry. The Russian economic landscape is therefore likely to become more concentrated in the years to come.     

Re-scaling the debate on Russian economic growth: Regional restructuring and development asynchronies

This article provides a critique of the literature on Russian economic growth and argues that broadening the growth debate to include regional perspectives may cast new light on economic processes at work in the varied geographical context of Russia. The article shows that growth in Russia's regions is much more comprehensive than often realised in the West and is closely associated with rising levels of industrial production in the overwhelming majority of regions. This contradicts the perception that resource dependency is the only formula of success within Russia. The author also provides a close examination of Leningrad oblast', once declining but recently one of the fastest growing regions in the Russian Federation. However, although the general vector of development has changed radically, the case of Leningrad oblast' demonstrates that the growing economy perpetuates the landscape of unevenness. New technologically intensive loci of development have paralleled ‘underinvested’ areas—despite being situated within the same administrative and political context. Nevertheless, growth continues to trickle down to less advantageous areas, both buttressing and spurring national growth as a whole.