Knight v. Beverly Health Care Center: in the Supreme Court of Alabama

HELD: Before tube feeding may be withdrawn from a person who is unconscious, pursuant to the directives of a living will, there must be a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is in a "persistent vegetative state" as defined in her living will, or in a "permanent unconscious state" as defined by state statute.     

Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court

Analyzing strategic aspects of judicial decisionmaking is an important element in understanding how law develops. In this article, we examine sophisticated voting on the U.S. Supreme Court by empirically modeling justices' decisions to pass when it is their turn to vote during conference discussions. We argue that, due to the opinion assignment norm, the chief justice may pass when one of the key conditions necessary for sophisticated voting—certainty about the views held by other justices and the agenda—is lacking. By passing, the chief can view his colleagues' votes in order to determine which vote will allow him to assign the majority opinion and, ultimately, forward his policy preferences. Using data from Justice Lewis F. Powell's conference notes, we show that the chief passes for this purpose, and that doing so is an effective strategy. In addition, we show that the senior associate justice in a case, who has a nontrivial chance of assigning the majority opinion, also passes for strategic reasons. As we expect, the data indicate that the remaining associates seem not to pass for strategic purposes.     

Executive Branch Socialization and Deference on the U.S. Supreme Court

Are Supreme Court justices with prior experience in the executive branch more likely to defer to the president in separation of powers cases? While previous research has suggested that such background may signal judicial policy preferences but does not shape them, I argue here that institutional socialization may indeed increase future judicial deference to the president. Using an original data set of executive power cases decided between 1942 and 2007, I model justice‐votes to test this hypothesis. I uncover three noteworthy findings: (1) a clear correlation between prior executive branch experience and support for the executive branch, (2) the degree of this support intensifies as executive branch tenure increases, a finding congruent with a socialization hypothesis, and (3) contrary to received wisdom, executive powers cases possess a clear ideological dimension, in line with the expectations of the attitudinal model.     

The Use of Rhetorical Sources by the U.S. Supreme Court

This study considers whether U.S. Supreme Court justices use opinion content strategically, to enhance the legitimacy of case outcomes. This hypothesis is tested by examining the Court's use of rhetorical sources, which are references to esteemed figures and texts that corroborate the justices' views. The data are consistent with the position that justices use rhetorical sources strategically, citing them when the legitimacy of their actions is lowest, such as when they are overturning precedent, invalidating state or federal law, or issuing directives from a divided bench. The study also tests several other explanations for the use of these sources, such as legal considerations, the justices' ideologies, and efficiency concerns.     

多数主义的法院:美国联邦最高法院司法审查的性质

长期以来,美国联邦最高法院的司法审查虽被视为法治和人权的捍卫者,却被作为民主的对立面.结果,它在理论上陷入难以自拔的合法性困境,或者说"反多数难题".本文结合法律和政治学者的讨论,考察美国司法审查的现实图景,指出它具有很强的"多数主义"性质.具体表现为,多数司法判决符合当下多数公众的意见,最高法院这一机构和司法审查这一制度获得多数民众的持久认同;不但如此,司法审查能够在一定程度上回应公众意见,从而在较长时段与主流意见的变迁保持一致.这种"多数主义"的性质,是由法官自身对公众意见的关注和尊重、其他部门和公众对宪法含义的争夺以及法官任命体制等外在制衡,共同促成和保障的.美国联邦最高法院在与其他机构的竞争合作中动态地表达民意,它受制于民主过程,也塑造民主过程.在此意义上,司法审查是美国民主体制的一部分,具有民主合法性.对于"反多数难题"的讨论而言,真正的问题不是司法审查是否符合"民主",而是现有的民主理论是否符合政治现实.     

On the need for a philosophical investigation of capital punishment by the U.S. Supreme Court

The Supreme Court needs to clearly articulate the legal-political philosophy underlying its decisions so that consistency can be sought. Decisions involving life-and-death issued, such as capital punishment, should be based on sound, articulated philosophy rather than public opinion polls and the perceived mood of the public. Supreme Court justices, like everyone else, bring their own biases to their decisionmaking, but too often cases appear to be decided on “technical” due process issues rather than philosophic grounds. Of course, the “due process” interpretations used actually reflect inarticulated political philosophy.     

U.S. Supreme Court Affirms Potentially Responsible Parties' Right of Action for Cost Recovery

In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Aviall—that potentially responsible parties (PRPs) are not permitted to seek contribution from other PRPs under CERCLA unless they have been sued or otherwise settled their CERCLA liability—PRPs and the courts have struggled to identify a remedy for those that voluntarily undertake cleanup of contaminated sites. The Atlantic Research decision resolves a conflict among the circuits and clarifies that PRPs voluntarily incurring cleanup costs pursuant to CERCLA, can maintain an action for cost recovery against other PRPs. The authors discuss the current legal landscape regarding actions for cost recovery as presented in Atlantic Research.     

Birth Order,Preferences, and Norms on the U.S. Supreme Court

The members of the U.S. Supreme Court have different ideas about what constitutes good judicial policy as well as how best to achieve that policy. From where do these ideas originate? Evolutionary psychology suggests that an answer may lie in early life experiences in which siblings assume roles that affect an adult's likely acceptance of changes in the established order. According to this view, older siblings take on responsibilities that make them more conservative and rule‐bound, while younger ones adopt roles that promote liberalism and greater rebelliousness. Applying this theory to the Court, I show that these childhood roles manifest themselves in later life in the decisions of the justices. Birth order explains not only the justices’ policy preferences but also their acceptance of one important norm of judicial decisionmaking, specifically their willingness to exercise judicial review.     

Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions

Legal clarity is important to understand and measure because of its connection to the rule of law. We provide the first systematic examination of the clarity of Supreme Court opinions and discover five important results. First, certain justices systematically craft clearer opinions than others. Justices Scalia and Breyer write the clearest opinions, while Justice Ginsburg consistently writes the most complex opinions. Second, ideology does not predict clarity in majority or concurring opinions. Third, all justices write clearer dissents than majority opinions, while minimum winning coalitions produce the clearest majority opinions. Fourth, justices across the board write clearer opinions in criminal procedure cases than in any other issue area. Finally, opinions that formally alter Court precedent render less clear law, potentially leading to a cycle of legal ambiguity.