Dynamic Opinion Representation

Two models of opinion change in a representative democracy are subjected to an empirical test based on data from a series of surveys with voters and members of parliament in Sweden covering the period 1968–1994. An elite-driven opinion model proved to fit the data better than a mass-driven model. Voter opinions shifted more often in the direction of member opinions than vice versa. A run-from-above representation model is more valid for the Swedish case than an idealistic run-from-below model.     

From opinions to policies: Examining the links between citizens,representatives, and policy change

Recent studies show that policy changes appear to correspond primarily to the preferences of citizens with high socio-economic status. However, the mechanisms explaining this trend remain largely unexplored. In this paper, I look closer at the role of political representatives as the critical factor connecting citizens’ opinions and policy changes. While the link between public opinion and elite opinion as well as the link between public opinion and policy output is relatively well studied, few studies have looked at the entire relationship between public opinion, elite opinion, and policy output concerning social groups. This paper combines data from Swedish election studies, surveys with members of parliament, and a database of policy change. It shows that representatives’ opinions reflect advantaged groups better than disadvantaged groups. Similar biases are found in policy responsiveness; policy changes correspond more closely to the opinions of the advantaged groups.     

Priming Predispositions and Changing Policy Positions: An Account of When Mass Opinion Is Primed or Changed

Prior research provides limited insights into when political communications prime or change citizens’ underlying opinions. This article helps fill that void by putting forth an account of priming and opinion change. I argue that crystallized attitudes should often be primed by new information. An influx of attention to less crystallized preferences, however, should lead individuals to alter their underlying opinions in accordance with prior beliefs. Since predispositions acquired early in the life cycle—such as partisanship, religiosity, basic values, and group‐based affect/antagonisms—are more crystallized than mass opinion about public policy, media and campaign content will tend to prime citizens’ predispositions and change their policy positions. Both my review of previous priming research and original analyses presented in this study from five new cases strongly support the crystallization‐based account of when mass opinion is primed or changed. I conclude with a discussion of the article's potential political, methodological, and normative implications.     

“非虚构写作”在网络舆情事件中的情感动员功能与表达逻辑

社交媒体时代,舆论生态的“后真相时代”特征日益鲜明,情感与信念成为网络舆情事件的主要动力。“非虚构写作”作为将纪实报道与文学创作结合起来的写作手法,在网络舆情事件中发挥着强大的情感动员功能。通过将悲情叙事、身份标签、戏谑表达等传统的网络情感动员表达逻辑与“文史合一”、忧患意识等“非虚构写作”本土概念巧妙嫁接,“非虚构写作”引发了一系列重大网络舆情事件,呈现出社会学观察、原型叙事、文化冲突三种表达逻辑。“非虚构写作”在舆情表达、舆论监督、社会观察等方面发挥着积极作用。同时,带有深刻情感色彩的“非虚构写作”也蕴含着网络民粹主义、网络暴力、网络虚假信息等诸多风险因素。如何实现“非虚构写作”批判与建设、解构与建构、破与立等方面的平衡,这为互联网生态建设提出了新的内容和新的问题。     

Do Voters Follow? The Effect of Party Cues on Public Opinion During a Process of Policy Change

A large body of literature has demonstrated how citizens use party endorsements when shaping their policy opinions. However, recent studies question the centrality of party cues in shaping public opinion. This study advances the literature with a four‐wave panel survey design that measures citizens’ policy opinions before, during and after a controversial policy proposal to ban street begging was made by the Norwegian government in 2014. Two main findings inform previous work. First, voters are modestly affected by party cues as the proposition turns salient. Second, when a party shifts their policy position on a highly salient issue, voters do not automatically shift their opinions accordingly. Thus, the magnitude and direction of opinion change in the electorate indicate that party cue effects are modest and that instead of polarizing patterns across time parallel publics moving in the same direction independent of party cues are detected. These findings demonstrate that under some conditions, voters’ opinion formation is less dependent on partisan elites than much of the previous work indicates.     

A Unified Theory of Value-Based Reasoning and U.S. Public Opinion

Public opinion research shows that American citizens utilize domain-specific political values to guide opinion formation in the key issue areas that comprise the American political agenda. One set of political values operates on economic welfare opinions, a different set of values applies to cultural issue positions, a third set shapes foreign policy preferences, and so on in other policy domains. Drawing on Shalom Schwartz’s theory of basic human values, this paper argues that two socially focused values—self-transcendence and conservation—guide opinion formation across all major policy domains. By contrast, the personally focused values of self-enhancement and openness-to-change should play a more limited role in preference formation. These hypotheses are tested using data from a novel 2011 national survey and the 2012 General Social Survey. The statistical results affirm expectations. We show that self-transcendence and conservation values predict scores on symbolic ideology, economic conservatism, racial conservatism, cultural conservatism, civil liberties, and foreign policy opinions. Self-enhancement and openness-to-change values play a modest role in shaping preferences.     

A model for disaggregating political change

We present a model for identifying the components of aggregate change in an electorate between two points in time. When the electorate is constant in size, change in the mean opinion disaggregates into two components: conversion among those who continue to participate in the electorate (Stayers), and replacement of those who drop out of the electorate at Time₁ (Dropouts) by Newcomers to the electorate at Time₂. We add to this simple formulation the possibility of variation in the size of the electorate. When an electorate expands, the model includes a mobilization term to accommodate the fact that there are more Newcomers at Time₂ than Dropouts at Time₁. When an electorate shrinks in size, the demobilization term reflects the fact that Newcomers as a group are smaller than Dropouts. The model includes appropriate weights for each component so that the change in opinion (or any other aggregate characteristic in the electorate) can be allocated across the three components. We apply the model to Iowa caucus attenders in both parties between 1984 and 1988, and we suggest that the model can be also productively applied to a variety of contexts besides nomination politics, where fluctuations in the size of electorates are significant.Ronald B. Rapoport. College of William and Mary.     

Political Awareness, Opinion Constraint and the Stability of Ideological Positions

Some studies of public opinion suggest that most people are ignorant about the detail of politics and are simply unable to arrive at a considered vote. They hold that voters are ignorant about the ideological substance of politics, since their opinions do not appear to be constrained by ideas and are unstable over time. However, other studies cast doubt on both the definition of ideology employed in these studies and their operational measures. It is suggested that, once allowance is made for measurement error, the opinions of most voters are constrained and highly stable. This article demonstrates that differences in political awareness result in considerable heterogeneity among the electorate. The opinions of more aware voters are subject to greater constraint and are more stable over time than those of less aware voters. It is therefore suggested that issue-voting models must be applied with caution to less aware voters.     

Locating Supreme Court Opinions in Doctrine Space

We develop a scaling model to estimate U.S. Supreme Court opinion locations and justice ideal points along a common spatial dimension using data derived from the citations between opinions. Citations from new opinions to precedent opinions usually apply and endorse the doctrine of the precedent opinion; however, sometimes they implicitly or explicitly dispute the precedent opinion. We collect original datasets classifying citations from search and seizure and freedom of religion opinions written between 1953 and 2006 into these different types and develop a model relating the similarity of the doctrine embodied in the citing and cited opinions to the relative probability of these different types of citations. The resulting spatial estimates of opinion location are used to evaluate theories of Supreme Court bargaining and opinion writing. We find empirical support for theoretical models that predict the majority opinion will fall at the ideal point of the median member of the majority coalition. Given the centrality of theories of judicial policymaking to various substantive problems in political science, the method of scaling opinions developed in this article can facilitate a range of future research.     

Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?

Conventional arguments identify either the median justice or the opinion author as the most influential justices in shaping the content of Supreme Court opinions. We develop a model of judicial decision making that suggests that opinions are likely to reflect the views of the median justice in the majority coalition. This result derives from two features of judicial decision making that have received little attention in previous models. The first is that in deciding a case, justices must resolve a concrete dispute, and that they may have preferences over which party wins the specific case confronting them. The second is that justices who are dissatisfied with an opinion are free to write concurrences (and dissents). We demonstrate that both features undermine the bargaining power of the Court's median and shift influence towards the coalition median. An empirical analysis of concurrence behavior provides significant support for the model.     

Polarization and Issue Consistency Over Time

The polarization of the political and social environment over the past four decades has provided citizens with clearer cues about how their core political predispositions (e.g., group interests, core values, and party identification) relate to their issue opinions. A robust and ongoing scholarly debate has involved the different ways in which the more polarized environment affects mass opinion. Using heteroskedastic regression, this paper examines the effect of the increasingly polarized environment on the variability of citizens’ policy opinions. We find that citizens today base their policy preferences more closely upon their core political predispositions than in the past. In addition, the predicted error variances also allow us to directly compare two types of mass polarization—issue distance versus issue consistency—to determine the independent effects each has on changes in the distribution of mass opinion.     

The rise and fall of decentralization: A comparative analysis of arguments and practices in European countries

This paper addresses the arguments in favour of both the decentralization and centralization of public policy making. It points out that the same arguments are sometimes used to advance either claim and that in different countries opposite arguments are used to support the same claim. Clearly, the inherent features of centralization and decentralization are far from obvious. A closer look at the attention given to the issue by political parties at the national level in four European countries reveals that decentralization becomes an issue in these countries at different periods and as a cause of different arguments, which rather reflect the dominant values in the political culture than refer to inherent properties of decentralization itself. An analysis of opinions of local elites points at the relation between their opinion on decentralizing responsibilities in a specific field and the support for existing institutional arrangements, their own influence in the policy field and the predisposition towards decentralization tendencies. This results in the conclusion that the support for decentralization tendencies is more closely related to existing specific institutional arrangements, and to the degree to which it is expected to influence one's own position, than to its inherent merits.     

The rise and fall of decentralization: A comparative analysis of arguments and practices in European countries

Abstract This paper addresses the arguments in favour of both the decentralization and centralization of public policy making. It points out that the same arguments are sometimes used to advance either claim and that in different countries opposite arguments are used to support the same claim. Clearly, the inherent features of centralization and decentralization are far from obvious. A closer look at the attention given to the issue by political parties at the national level in four European countries reveals that decentralization becomes an issue in these countries at different periods and as a cause of different arguments, which rather reflect the dominant values in the political culture than refer to inherent properties of decentralization itself. An analysis of opinions of local elites points at the relation between their opinion on decentralizing responsibilities in a specific field and the support for existing institutional arrangements, their own influence in the policy field and the predisposition towards decentralization tendencies. This results in the conclusion that the support for decentralization tendencies is more closely related to existing specific institutional arrangements, and to the degree to which it is expected to influence one's own position, than to its inherent merits.     

Is anyone listening? Mass and elite opinion cueing in the EU

The paper analyses the connections between elite and mass opinion in the European Union. It considers both the ways in which mass publics use heuristics supplied by political elites to form their EU opinions, and the ways in which political elites respond to the opinions of the mass publics they represent. The paper employs data from simultaneously-conducted elite and mass surveys carried out in sixteen European countries in 2007. The results show that masses and elites in Europe do appear to take cues from one another in forming their EU opinions. Political elites base their individual-level opinions on the average position taken by their respective (national) party supporters. Mass respondents base their opinions on the average position taken by elite members of the (national) party with which they identify.     

Media Coverage and EPA Pesticide Decisions

In this paper, we analyze the effect of media coverageon EPA pesticide decisions. We hypothesize that mediacoverage influences the distribution of opinions inthe general public and that EPA decision makersrespond to these opinions. We develop a revealedpreference model that includes media coverage andpublic opinion. We test the model by extending theanalysis of Cropper et al. (1992) to include mediacoverage. We find that the media coverage ofpesticides has a non-linear effect on EPA pesticidedecisions.     

The Sophisticated Public: The Effect of Competing Frames on Public Opinion

Deliberation is the current buzzword among democratic thinkers. Deliberative democracy assumes that deliberation has an effect on the people engaging in the deliberative process. Several studies have demonstrated that this is indeed the case: deliberation increases political knowledge and opinion consistency, as well as mutual understanding and broader tolerance among citizens. In order to verify the findings from these studies and to confront the problems of internal and external validity in the previous studies of deliberation, alternative methodological designs must be applied. Applying an experimental split-sample design using CATI on the Danish electorate reveals how arguments and frames influence public opinion. Across various frames and arguments and political issues, positive (negative) arguments tend to push opinions in a positive (negative) direction. When competing frames are presented to the public, people submit to neither ambivalence nor non-attitudes. Quite to the contrary, people tend to follow their predisposition and provide more consistent opinions. Thus, deliberation composed of various competing frames and arguments facilitates – rather than distorts – sophisticated and considered public opinion.     

Deservingness versus values in public opinion on welfare: The automaticity of the deservingness heuristic

Public attitudes towards welfare policy are often explained by political values and perceptions of deservingness of welfare recipients. This article addresses how the impact of values and perceptions varies depending on the contextual information that citizens have available when forming welfare opinions. It is argued that whenever citizens face deservingness‐relevant cues in public debate or the media, a psychological ‘deservingness heuristic’ is triggered prompting individuals spontaneously to think about welfare policy in terms of who deserves help. This is an automatic process, equally influential among the least and the most politically sophisticated. Moreover, when clear deservingness cues are present, the impact of values on opinions vanishes. These arguments are supported by data from two novel experimental studies embedded in separate nationwide opinion surveys. The findings revise conventional wisdom of how values and heuristics influence public opinion and have major implications for understanding dynamics in aggregate welfare opinion and attempts from political elites to manipulate public opinion.     

Unanimity, Discord, and the Communication of Public Opinion

This article is concerned with the political communication of opinion that occurs through networks of associated citizens. Its primary attention focuses on opinion variance within populations and networks and how such variance affects communication among and between individuals. Particularly in the context of ambiguous or infrequent communication, people may experience difficulty in forming judgments regarding the opinions of others. In such situations, environmental priors become useful devices for reaching these judgments, but a problem arises related to the utility of these environmental priors when discord rather than unanimity characterizes the contextual distribution of opinion. The article's argument is that dyadic discussions between two citizens are most enlightening, and environmental priors least enlightening, when surrounding opinion is marked by higher levels of disagreement. The analyses are based on data taken from the 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis study .     

Partisan change in the Mountain West

During the 1980s partisanship in the Mountain West shifted dramatically toward the Republican Party. This change was the result of issue-based conversion rather than group mobilization. Specifically, we trace this surge to Reagan's transformation of the issues connected with the Republican Party. Previous discussions of issue-based conversion have assumed that this force influences all voters equally. One of the issues behind the Mountain West's changed partisanship follows this pattern: Individualism (or limiting government influence on the individual) was behind both the Mountain West surge (and decline) in Republicanism and the nationwide growth in that party. But the second issue did not follow this pattern: Abortion influenced the Mountain West selectively. We conclude that partisan change can be the result of uniform influence of issue change, but that it can also be the result of issue changes that influence different groups of voters differentially.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago.     

The Dynamics of Public Opinion on Cultural Policy Issues in the U.S., 1972–2010

This study investigates the dynamics of public opinion on cultural policy issues over the past four decades. We find collective opinions on many such issues follow the same path over time, driven by an underlying cultural policy mood (CPM). We use more than 2,000 survey marginals, nested in more than 200 time series, that reflect aggregate opinions in 16 cultural policy domains, across 38 years. Using a dynamic principal components method, the results show that since the early 1970s, CPM has moved steadily and consistently in a liberal direction. Over this period, changes in CPM have been tightly linked to changes in aggregate religiosity. Opinion on two notable cultural issues—the death penalty and abortion—do not follow CPM. While public opinion has grown increasingly anti-death-penalty for more than a decade, over roughly the same period it has become as pro-life on abortion as at any time since Roe v. Wade. The measurement of CPM provides evidence of a macro construct of cultural issues that includes opinion toward many, but not all, morality policies.