Competing bureaus and politicians: A compliance approach to the diversion of public funds

This article analyzes the effects of the compliance relationship between the governing party and two competing bureaus producing differentiated goods. We assume that the three players simultaneously and independently take their decision in terms of production and rents with perfect knowledge of each others strategies. Unlike Niskanen's competitive results, which are invariant with respect to the monopoly solution and only depend on the characteristics of the review process, here the budgetary equilibrium changes depending on the nature of the goods supplied by the competing bureaus and is affected both by their demand and cost conditions and by the resources available to the governing party.     

The mutuality of risk and community: the adjudication of community notification statutes

Although it has drawn significant attention in the legal literature, the adjudication of community notification statutes (often referred to as 'Megan's Law' in the United States) demonstrates a centrality of both risk and community that deserves attention from a governance perspective. In this paper, I focus on the ways in which concepts of risk and community are mutually constitutive, and how the adjudication of community notification statutes relies on particular visions of 'community' to engage particular ways of conceiving of 'risk', much of which relies on a rejection of expertise and a focus on 'common sense'. This focus on 'common sense', opens up new problematics of government: courts adjudicating community notification cases are working to define the particular mechanics of a state-civil society partnership, and thereby operationalize the preventive state without rendering the state redundant or obsolete, and without opening the state to new forms of legal and political accountability. While providing a case study in the move to advanced liberal governance in the area of criminal law, this adjudication also reveals the contingent nature of risk, and the ways in which judicial invocation of 'risk' and its management can constitute liberal subjects who continue to rely on the state, while no longer expecting the state to be accountable for crime or its control.     

Participation and voting in committees: Evidence from the ILO

Although many international organisations are formally built on the principle of ‘one country–one vote’, the lack of representativeness in decision-making may give a subgroup of members disproportionate influence. Using data on participation and voting in 51 decision-making committees of the International Labour Organization (ILO), we do find a bias in voting outcomes due to committee composition. Recent theoretical research has argued that voters with extreme preferences may self-select into committees. A procedure is proposed to test for this prediction. There is no indication that governments with extreme preferences are drawn disproportionately into ILO committees.     

Balancing constituency and congruence: How constituency involvement affects positional congruence between organized interests and the general public

This article asks to what extent and under which conditions interest groups are congruent with public opinion. We argue that interest groups can be caught in a balancing act between engaging with their constituency on the one hand and aligning their position with the broader public on the other hand. We contribute to previous studies by arguing that the effect of interest group type on congruence is moderated by the degree to which constituencies are involved in advocacy processes and the salience of policy issues. We test these expectations by analyzing 314 media claims made by Belgian interest groups regarding 58 policy issues. The results demonstrate that citizen groups with formal members are more prone to share the position of the broader public compared to concentrated interest groups such as business associations, especially if they involve their members in advocacy activities and when issues are salient in the media.     

Industrialists and farmers: British interests and the European community

The ‘Europeanisation’ of domestic public policies has been among the key themes in recent reforms in EU member states. This article employs the analytical concept of ‘isomorphism’ to come to a better understanding of ‘Europeanisation’. Various mechanisms which might lead to isomorphic change are being identified and applied to the reforms in German competition and public procurement law. The application of the isomorphism framework suggests that ‘Europeanisation’ has multiple sources and cannot be understood as a uniform process nor as leading to uniform outcomes.     

Democracy and the demand for government redistribution: A survey analysis

This article uses survey data to study the impact of democracy on the demand by poor citizens for government redistribution. Taking the well‐known Meltzer‐Richard theory as the point of departure, three arguments are presented as to why such a demand should be stronger in democracies than in autocracies: in democracies low‐income groups are: (1) exposed to elections that can make a policy difference: (2) better informed about the income distribution; and (3) better equipped to process such information. The argument receives empirical support in a Bayesian multilevel analysis which combines 188 World Values Surveys with cross‐sectional and longitudinal macro data from 80 countries.     

Passions and interests revisited: the psychological foundations of economics and politics

Homo Politicus, Homo Oeconomicus. Can these two abstract human types meaningfully be distinguished? Is there a characteristic set of motivations that drive human beings in so far as they are political actors and a different set that drive their economic lives? What are the psychological foundations of economics and politics? The answers to these questions have significant implications both for the study and the practice of economics and politics. If homo politicus is essentially identical to homo oeconomicus, it is safe to generalize from the study of economic behavior to political phenomena. If not, such a procedure will distort our understanding of politics. Similarly, if we design political institutions and public policies assuming that people will behave as they do when they confront economic choices, we may find our intentions thwarted if we have neglected the distinctive motivations characteristic of political action.     

The paradox of the region: economic regulation and the representation of interests

This article deals with the relationship between economic regulation and interes-group representation at the regional level in advanced capitalist societies. The importance of an ‘intermediate government’ of economic development at the regional level has increased in recent years within such societies as a result of the crisis of the Keynesian wlfare state and the decline of Fordism. At the same time, however, the growing need for regional regulation does not necessarily call into being an explicit demand for and supply of efficient regional government within the existing institutional framework. This ‘paradox fo the region’ is explored int he context of the Italian case, characterized by strong local but weak regional identities organizations of business and labour for an effective intermediate government of the economy, an proposes a strategy for reinforcing such organizatons at this level through the reform of regional government administration and the supervised delegation of public powers to them.     

Congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays

The literature on the organization of the United States Congress has been dominated by “distributive” and “informational” theory. One important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork-barrel activities. Here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork-barrel is alive and well in the contemporary United States Congress. We focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts. Finding strong and systematic evidence of pork-barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization.     

Organized interests and administrative rulemaking: the state of Wisconsin's lobbyists and coalitions

This study examines interest groups undertaking lobbying activity focused on administrative rulemaking. The analysis utilizes a dataset composed of observations made during the 2009–2010 Wisconsin Legislative Session, including the entire population of groups lobbying during this time period. This research examines the participants, efforts, and coalitions utilized when groups engaged in lobbying activity related to rulemaking. Although scholars have examined interest group activity focused on rulemaking at the federal level, little work has focused on this behavior in the states. This study aims to further the understanding of this activity. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

国有资本收益分配体制改革:在公平与发展之间权衡

在启动国有企业改革相当长的一段时期内,国有资本收益政策性地留存于国有企业或拥有国有资本的非国有企业,这不仅损害了市场经济条件下市场主体公平竞争的原则,而且对于社会主义国家的经济发展也产生了一定的负面影响.本文从公平竞争的角度论述了推动国有资本收益分配体制改革的必要性,并对国有资本收益分配与社会主义市场经济发展的内在联系进行了辩证的分析,最后提出了兼顾公平与发展目标的改革建议.     

Urban amenities,demand revelation,and the free-rider problem: A partial solution

This paper suggests a practical mechanism to mitigate problems of demand revelation and free riding that arise when efforts are made to create urban amenities such as parks or nature preserves through voluntary private purchase. Building on the work of earlier writers, the model provides a potential way to increase voluntary donations for local public goods, holding constant the incentive to free ride, while simultaneously introducing a mechanism — the refundable trust — that reduces the incentive to free ride. A case involving implementation of this mechanism is described.