Political knowledge,the decision calculus,and proximity voting

This paper employs an online voting simulation to examine how the vote decision process affects the vote choice. We focus on proximity voting, an empirically powerful but informationally demanding model of voter behavior. Holding contextual factors constant, we find that more politically knowledgeable individuals engage in a deeper and broader decision process prior to casting their ballot, and, in turn, a more detailed decision process boosts the likelihood that one will vote proximately. In addition, we find that detailed decision processes have a stronger link with proximity voting among the most knowledgeable individuals, who are able to skillfully engage with new information.     

Contextual influences on the decision calculus: A cross-national examination of proximity voting

It is generally held that individuals vote for the party that most closely aligns with their preferences, yet previous research identifies numerous factors which lead individuals to stray from the proximity logic. To shed light on this phenomenon, I examine proximity voting from a comparative perspective. Results from a multilevel model indicate that several individual- and election-level factors affect the likelihood of a proximity vote. I also find proximity voting to occur less in countries where political variation is not well-captured by a single dimension. These findings shed light on the bases of proximity voting and add to the general understanding of the nature of voting behavior.     

Cost and the calculus of voting

Downs's (1957) theory of voting maintains that individuals balance the costs of voting against anticipated benefits in deciding whether to vote. However, most empirical tests of his theory have concluded that costs play little role in individuals' decisions to vote or abstain, and that benefits are the determining factor. Unfortunately, the existing empirical tests of the theory have been inadequate, especially in regard to the measurement of the cost of voting. Using data from the Comparative State Elections Project, we develop an improved indicator of the cost of voting. When this measure of cost is used in a test of Down's theory, we find, contrary to most earlier research, that the cost of voting seems to be a more important determinant of participation than the factors associated with voting benefits in Downs's model.The authors shared equally in the research reported; the order in which they are listed was determined randomly.     

The voter's paradox and the homegeneity of individual preference orders

Errata Sheet

The voter's paradox and the homegeneity of individual preference orders     

The calculus of voting: An empirical test

Abstract. According to the rational choice model, the calculus of voting takes the form of the equation R = BP − C, where the net rewards for voting (R) are a function of the instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome compared to others (B) and the probability (P) of casting the decisive vote that secures these benefits, minus the costs of becoming informed and going to the polls (C). Here, we provide a systematic test of this model. The analysis relies on two surveys, conducted during the 1995 Quebec referendum and the 1996 British Columbia provincial election, in which very specific questions measured each element of the model. As well, this study incorporates two other factors that can affect the propensity to vote — Respondents' level of political interest and their sense of duty. We find that B, P, and C each matter, but only among those with a relatively weak sense of duty. The feeling that one has a moral obligation to vote is the most powerful motivation to go to the polls. We conclude that the rational choice model is useful, but only in explaining behaviour at the margins of this important norm.     

Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency: an experimental investigation into voting behavior

This article reports results from an economic experiment that investigates the extent to which voters punish corruption and waste in elections. While both are responsible for reductions in voters’ welfare, they are not necessarily perceived as equally immoral. The empirical literature in political agency has not yet dealt with these two dimensions of voters’ choice calculus. Our results suggest that morality and norms are indeed crucial for a superior voting equilibrium in systems with heterogeneous politicians: while corruption always is punished, self-interest alone—in the absence of norms—leads to the acceptance and perpetuation of waste and social losses.     

The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting

The Electoral College has a measurable effect on the propensity of the rational voter to vote for the candidate he most prefers. The ‘slippage’ between the individual's articulated preference ordering and his actual vote is analyzed (using 1968 data) with respect to the strategic position of the voter in his state. The direction of the findings support the theoretically-derived propositions. Nevertheless, the low overall incidence of shifts and the reluctance of voters to shift from nationally-viable candidates demonstrates the overwhelming influence of the national electoral environment.     

Influences shaping members' decision making: Congressional voting on the Persian Gulf War

In this paper I examine what influences members viewed as shaping their voting decisions on U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf in January 1991. Rather than focusing on predictors of votes and the outcomes of members' decision-making processes (the yea or nay votes as in roll-call analyses), I focus on the predominant considerations that members perceived as swaying voting choices. More specifically, drawing on data gathered from interviews with 365 congressional staff people, I show that three influences in particular stand out as significant in the decision-making process on this crisis policy: members' own policy views, supportive constituents, and (for certain groups of members) the president. Thus, while the analysis confirms, in part, the conventional view of legislators' personal policy assessments as the critical influence on foreign and defense policy votes, it also underscores that this influence does not operate in a vacuum.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1993 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.     

Mr. Smith and the economy: the influence of economic conditions on individual legislator voting

This paper estimates the influence of macroeconomic conditions on individual legislator voting over time. Previous work shows legislator voting to be stable over careers. In this paper, voting on an ideological issue space (ADA scores) and a fiscal issue space (NTU scores), from 1976 to 2002, exhibits significant short-term cyclicality with economic conditions. Individual legislators polarize by party in response to rising unemployment, and converge in response to rising inflation. As legislators accumulate tenure, they become more ideologically conservative but more fiscally liberal. Results are also reported on presidential party, divided government, and region. All results are weaker in the Senate than in the House.     

An application of the multicandidate calculus of voting to the 1972 and 1976 German federal elections

Two important assumptions underlying the Riker-McKelvey-Ordeshook, expected-utility-based, multicandidate calculus of voting are that citizens decide whether or not and for whom to vote in a single-member district (SMD), plurality-winner electoral system and that they ignore aggregate outcomes, that is, how citizens in other districts may vote. Aranson modifies this calculus by investigating citizens' decisions in proportional-representation (PR) systems and/or situations in which aggregate outcomes require parties to form parliamentary coalitions to govern. This study operationalizes and applies the probability and utility components of this modified calculus to data on the 1972 and 1976 West German federal elections, which combine features of SMD and PR systems and of which coalition politics is an integral part. Expected-utility calculations used to predict reported voting decisions achieve reasonably good levels of aggregate accuracy. Further analysis reveals that gradations in respondents' expected utilities, as well as in their utilities and surrogate measures of the subjective probabilities of electoral outcomes, relate significantly to reported voting decisions. Also, variables that model coalition considerations are commonly the most significant.     

Cycles in senatorial voting behavior: implications for the optimal frequency of elections

The effect that the length of electoral periods has on the behavior of elected officials is examined. The hypothesis is that the longer the period between elections the less responsible or the more independent representatives will behave relative to the desires of their polity. The hypothesis is tested by examining the behavior of U.S. Senators. It is found that their independence follows a cyclical behavior which conforms to the electoral period. As a result it is by no means clear that decreasing the frequency of elections reduces the cost of elections. The effect of this independence cost on the optimal frequency of elections is discussed.     

Less is more: The paradox of choice in voting behavior

How does the number of candidates competing in an election affect voting behavior? In theory, as the number of candidates running for office increase, citizens’ utility from voting also increases. With more candidates, voters are more likely to have candidates that are close to their ideal points. Practically, however, more candidates also means a higher cognitive burden for voters who must learn more during campaigns in order to find their “ideal” candidate. In this paper, we examine how choice set size affects voting behavior. Using a survey experiment, we show that subjects presented with many options learn less about candidates, are more likely to vote based on meaningless heuristics, and are more likely to commit voting errors, when compared with subjects who choose between only a few candidates.