Fencing in Warfare: Threats,Punishment, and Intra-war Deterrence in Counterterrorism

New theoretical approaches have been developed that apply deterrence and coercion to counterterrorism. Critics have suggested, however, that in the particular case of deterring terrorism by threats of punishment, a mismatch exists between deterrent goals and counterterrorism intentions: the twin aims of destroying and deterring a single opponent is logically and theoretically incompatible. These criticisms, however, neglect to take two important factors into consideration. First, threats of punishment in counterterrorism can be applied against a wide assortment of actors involved in and associated with terrorism and political violence. Second, the concept of “intra-war deterrence” suggests ways in which a state can deter certain behavior or a specific form of warfare while engaging in open conflict with that same adversary. In exploring both factors, this article posits that states can gain coercive leverage over different actors involved in terrorism, including organizations with which they are actively hoping to defeat.     

Financial Warfare

This paper brings together the key dimensions of financial warfare and places them in a larger policy framework. Its major conclusions are that financial warfare will be a much more important issue because of the astounding growth in international finance itself. In addition, financial warfare allows for more precise targeting than conventional economic warfare. Much like “precision strike” technology in arms, it gives more control over sanctions, but by no means perfect control. Finally, financial warfare's larger policy framework should draw on escalation and de-escalation theory because it is likely to be most effective when combined with other forms of pressure. This article does not “advocate” financial warfare. But it does argue that, since this type of conflict is emerging as an increasingly likely possibility, it needs to be thought through carefully. The worst outcome is to use it, without thinking about it, which, the author argues is where we are today.     

信息化战争的特点及其要求

"战争是独立的政体(国家)或政治团体之间有组织地使用武力的一种行为和现象,战争的目的主要是为了解决那些无法通过和平的外交方式解决的问题和冲突。"有史以来,战争就与人类如影随形,战争的形态也随着人类社会生产力水平的提高和科学技术的进步而不断演变。20世纪90年代以来,计算机技术飞速发展并取得了广泛应用,互联网     

Postcolonial Nation-Making: Warfare,Jihad, Subjectivity,and Compassion in the Region of Kashmir

This is a review essay on Body of Victim, Body of Warrior: Refugee Families and the Making of Kashmiri Jihadists by Cabeiri Debergh Robinson and Counterinsurgency, Democracy, and the Politics of Identity in India: From Warfare to Welfare? by Mona Bhan. This review contains a succinct overview of the two books, followed by a discussion of the emergent subjectivities and incorporation of humanitarianism into militarism and jihad in the region of Kashmir.     

信息化战争的新境界——太空战

人类对太空的探索经历了认识太空、进入太空和利用太空三个阶段。前两个阶段中，人类处于探索和寻求突破太空束缚的状态。发展到第三个阶段，人类发现太空在通信、导航、气象以及地质勘探等领域具有重要意义，也注意到将太空技术用于情报搜集、指挥通信、武器导引等方面的潜在价值和巨大优势。因此，拥有先进太空技术的国家开始将太空列为国家发展战略的重要内容，人类也进入了以控制太空为目的的新阶段。在研究如何控制太空的过程中，以美国和俄罗斯为代表的军事强国提出了太空战理论，从而将争夺太空控制权的斗争具体化。     

Major Combat Operations and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Plan Challe in Algeria, 1959–1960

In 1959–60, the French Army in Algeria achieved a major tactical and operational military success under the command of General Maurice Challe, in which the French destroyed half of the combat capability of the Algerian insurgency. Rather than adopting a population-centric, or “hearts and minds,” approach to coin, the French Army created an innovative method for military success based on the use of major combat operations against the military power of the insurgency. The success of major combat operations in Plan Challe is omitted or dismissed in most of the Algerian War historiography, which focuses instead on French pacification. An analysis of Plan Challe, however, provides lessons and examples for the conduct of a successful sustained counterguerrilla campaign, a coercive method seldom discussed in current debates over coin warfare.     

Irregular Warfare and Tactical Changes: The Case of Somali Piracy

The aim of this article is to analyze the tactical behavior of Somali pirates, international naval forces, and the shipping community operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. To what extent has tactical behavior changed over time and can this process be understood in more theoretical terms? Our theoretical framework centers around some concepts often used in naval doctrine, discussing tactical change in terms of command and control, force, mobility, protection, intelligence, and endurance. We also evaluate this change using two tactical concepts—tactical adaptation and tactical development. The empirical data is based on statistics from the International Criminal Court-International Maritime Bureau and the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, as well as interviews. We conclude that Somali piracy has unquestionably adapted their tactics to circumstances, while naval forces have increased their capacity to capture pirates and shipping to avoid pirates.     

Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs

At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Washington was embarking on a defense transformation emphasizing missile defense, space assets, precision weaponry, and information technology. This transformation proved irrelevant to the national security threats we now face, with the emergence of nontraditional adversaries pursuing “complex irregular warfare.” U.S. forces will have to assume a much more expeditionary character to successfully deal with Islamists’ complex irregular warfare. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy provides a balance to the longstanding American military emphasis on major-theater war, but it remains to be seen whether the military's new interest in operations other than conventional, major-combat operations will last or if it will diminish as soon as a new peer competitor rises, allowing the Pentagon to return to its more familiar paradigm.     

Terrorism in an Era of Unconventional Warfare

Academic studies of terrorism and mass political violence have developed largely independently of one another. Insurgents, in contrast, have tended to incorporate terrorism tactics along with other types of unconventional warfare in their repertoire of action. This tendency has become more apparent among insurgents engaging in armed confrontations in the twenty-first century. In order to take account of this development, scholars and others interested in contemporary warfare need to incorporate terrorism studies within the broader subject of insurgencies and “small wars”—political violence, in other words.     

Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare

American foreign policy analysts have generally viewed World War II as the most important of the six wars the country fought in the twentieth century. By entering this war, so the argument goes, the United States prevented the gravest geopolitical threat to its security—German and Japanese hegemonies in Eurasia—from materializing. Careful reexamination of the best case for U.S. entry into World War II, made by Nicholas Spykman in 1942, demonstrates that the traditional view is misplaced: the United States could have remained secure over the long term had it not entered the war and had it allowed Germany and Japan to win. Its standard of living and its way of life, however, would most likely have suffered. Avoidance of those two outcomes was the real reason to have entered the war. The implications of this analysis for balance of power theory and current American grand strategy are spelled out.     

Separatists and Spoilers: The UAE’s Way of Proxy Warfare

This article examines the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE’s) involvement in proxy warfare in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. The UAE’s security posture in these volatile regions has evolved remarkably over the last two decades and set the Emirates apart from many of its rivals, peers, and neighbors, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Most countries have intervened in conflicts in order to affect politics in the center, either by backing pro-government militias or center-seeking rebel groups. The UAE, in contrast, has constructed a portfolio of proxy relationships mostly with separatist groups. Such groups operate in far flung peripheral territories of countries like Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Somalia. They do not seek to seize the state, but to break away from it. This approach to proxy warfare has granted the UAE unique negative control at relatively little cost. Through its proxy networks, the UAE can impede adversaries from consolidating control across the Indian Ocean littoral and maintain influence in the key maritime passages to Europe and Asia.     

论国际资源争夺中的金融战

随着金融资本的扩张、金融全球化的发展,以美国为主导的西方国家金融寡头势力空前膨胀,并以新的形式出现,成为国际垄断资本,操控资源市场,加紧对国际资源的争夺。国际资源争夺的历史轨迹与内在逻辑清晰表明:在经济全球化的大潮下,一国金融实力的大小直接决定其国际资源利用水平的高低,国际资源争夺的实质是金融战。这对于西方资源消费国尤其是美国具有深远的战略意义,对于面临“资源困局”与“金融窘境”的东亚更有着重要启示。     

The Practice and Impacts of Russian-style Hybrid Warfare

The term hybrid warfare was first coined by US military scholars and later widely adopted in the West to refer to Russian military operations in the Ukrainian and Syrian crises.In Russia,it is called "Gerasimovism".Russia adapted the idea of hybrid warfare for its military operations in Ukraine and Syria into a Russian-style hybrid warfare that has seen successful results so far.This model is likely to impact future military developments.     

“数据链”在信息化战争中的作用

未来的战争将是信息化战争。那么,战争中的信息化主要表现在哪些方面呢?仅仅将过去的电话线换成光缆,将手工操作换成计算机控制并不能代表信息化。真正的信息化是以通信网络为纽带,以信息处理为核心,将遍布陆、海、空、天的战场感知系统、指挥控制系统、火力打击系统和信息攻击系统等作战要素集合成为一个有机整体,使整个作战体系实现全维态势感知、实时信息传输和智能数据处理,为联合作战提供一体化的信息支持,这就是享有数字化战场中枢神经之称的数据链。