Evaluating US defense posture in light of great power competition

This article seeks a debate on the future of the US defense posture in the Great Power Competition. It contains a robust list of defense initiatives to consider in improving the US defense posture. Since the United States is no longer in combat operations in CENTCOM, now is the time to focus on changing the US defense posture and program to meet the challenges of the emerging security environment. The article details where the United States stands and major changes that should be made, emphasizing both conventional and strategic nuclear forces.The US Navy’s fleet and end strength has been constrained for far too long and must be expanded to meet the geopolitical requirements of the Great Power Competition. The US Navy’s size deeply declined as a byproduct of the Cold War’s end and Department of Defense post-Cold War force design planning. The lesson learned here is simple and straightforward: navies can be reduced quickly but cannot be rebuilt quickly. The industrial, construction, and labor issues associated with shipbuilding require multi-year construction schedules, effective labor force management and dedicated, long-range management and executive planning.     

Hegemony,Force Posture,and the Provision of Public Goods: The Once and Future Role of Outside Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil

International relations theories emphasize the stabilizing role hegemons play in world politics. But little scholarship has examined the link connecting hegemony to its potentially positive returns in the security realm: force posture. We correct this deficit by developing and testing an argument about the consequences of different hegemonic force postures under varying threat conditions. We present a typology of force posture options and probe their effects through over-time analysis of how major powers have worked to provide one particularly important public good since 1945: access to Persian Gulf oil. Drawing on field work, we also explore the implications of our framework for current and future US force posture in the region. We conclude that hegemonic stability is a very real phenomenon in the Gulf, but it does not require the massive forward deployment of US forces that has characterized the past twenty years of US presence there.     

The Effect of Bargaining on US Economic Aid

This article is designed to explore the effect of bargaining power on the distribution of US economic aid. Conceptualizing US foreign assistance as the outcome of aid-for-policy transactions between the donor and its recipients, it shows why the bargaining issue is an integral part of US economic aid. A two-tiered stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is then developed to integrate the bargaining effect into our empirical analysis. Applying the model to US economic aid for the period of 1976–2011, I show empirical results that strongly support the bargaining approach. The results show that the bargaining effect explains a fundamental part of the cross-recipient difference in the level of US economic aid. On average, the donor US enjoys more bargaining power. However, a huge variation in bargaining capability on the recipient side is equally noteworthy. As for the contributors to the difference, the statistical results reveal that bargaining efficiency increases with higher per capita income, ongoing civil war, violations of personal integrity rights, and a more democratic regime, on the one hand. Importing heavily from and having an active defense pact with the US, on the other hand, affect bargaining efficiency negatively.     

Facing the Challenges of the 21 Century

America's strategy has become increasingly budget-driven in the face of ongoing cuts, culminating in the sequester. As a result, fewer funds are, and will be, available for critical operations, notably exercises and training with foreign forces that are the key both to strengthening alliances and partnerships and to deterring current and potential adversaries. That Washington continues to revise its defense strategy virtually on an annual basis has further undermined its credibility worldwide. Given its long-standing global interests, and uncertainty regarding when and where it might again have to commit forces to defend them, the United States must reinvigorate its efforts to streamline the Defense Department so as to maintain its global posture in the face of budget pressures. Measures to improve defense efficiency include reductions in the civilian and contractor work forces, overhaul of the military medical and retirement systems, and repeal of anachronistic laws that foster waste in defense acquisition.     

Geopolitical Implications of the US Unconventional Energy Revolution

The unconventional oil and gas revolution is certainly a game changer in the current international political setting, since it will bring the United States close to energy self-sufficiency. However, it seems unlikely that this new energy status will dramatically redefine US foreign policy and security priorities. In strategic regions such as the Middle East, US interests are expected to remain unchanged, while the new energy status will contribute only in part to modifying the US approach towards the EU’s energy posture vis-à-vis Russia. What the new American energy condition is likely to change are the tools and policy options available to Washington to cope with the strategic challenges – China’s power in primis – emerging in the multipolar international relations system.     

The birth of ANZUS: America's attempt to create a defense linkage between Northeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

This article discusses the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand andthe United States) security treaty negotiations, with specialemphasis on the 1951 Canberra talks, and examines why the USentered into a formal security alliance with Australia and NewZealand. It argues that the US concluded the security treatywith Australia and New Zealand in order to obtain their politicalsupport for a proposed American peace treaty with Japan, whichwould allow unconditional revitalization of Japanese militarypower. It is also the argument of this article that the US createdANZUS as a means of consolidating its own strategic positionin Northeast Asia by committing Australia and New Zealand tothe defense of US bases and forces stationed on the Japaneseislands.     

HAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES PUT ARMS CONTROL ON THE BACK BURNER?

The disarmament experienced during the last decade is over and the world seems poised for a new arms race. While the US government shows an open disinterest in negotiated arms control and bases its policy on a strong military posture, European governments also seem to have put arms control on the back burner. Governments and experts argue about the perceived gap in military capability between the US and Europe while in reality the actual important gap exists between NATO and the rest of the world. Several suggestions are made in this article how governments in Europe can take initiatives to foster disarmament and arms control.     

Deterrence by Presence to Effective Response: Japan's Shift Southward

Over the past fifteen years, a quiet strategic shift has occurred in Japan. During the cold war era, Japan's defense was oriented towards the Soviet threat north of Hokkaido. However, under the very real threat of North Korean aggression, the less tangible threat of terrorism, and the perceived need to participate more fully in international peacekeeping activities, Japan has changed the characteristics of its armed forces. Additionally, an increasingly self-confident China is testing Japan's resolve in the waters surrounding Japan, simultaneously speaking of cooperative development while laying claim to a swathe of Japanese territory and waters. An apparently ambivalent United States, in relative decline, watches these proceedings. Japan has reoriented its defense posture to face south, towards the East China Sea, trying to shape Chinese behavior and hedge against future Chinese adventurism. However, with a tangible recommitment of American attention to East Asia and a firm, public, American stand on behalf of Japan's territorial integrity, future conflict can be deterred.     

竞争时代日本多维度联合防卫力战略构建及其影响

日本新防卫战略把日本的防卫力量从传统的海陆空领域扩展至多维度的太空、网络以及电磁波等新领域,重视各领域之间的彼此融合防卫。作为一个综合性防卫战略,它强调从平时到"有事"各阶段之间、自主防卫与日美同盟及多层次安保合作之间、"前方战场"和"后方体制"之间的综合防卫。为实现"跨领域作战",日本提出了优先项目和强化重点,侧重在太空、网络、电磁波等新领域内获得并强化相关防卫能力。同时日本也加强提升传统领域内的海空能力、导弹防御及防区外打击能力,并对自卫队的体制进行相应调整。新防卫战略与"印太构想"融合,进一步深化了日本立体跨域防卫体系。日本"多维度联合防卫力量"新战略具有深刻的竞争时代背景,为配合美国军事战略调整并强化日美同盟、对竞争时代安全情势的判断与主动应对、积极加入全球军事变革下新领域内的激烈竞争、更好地应对岛屿争端及加强海洋防卫等现实问题,这是日本谋求构建新防卫战略的深刻动因。该日本新防卫战略产生的影响包括:日本的防卫自主或更难实现、进一步改变战后日本的安全战略基点、在新安全领域引发竞争及不利于构建良好的中日建设性安全关系等。对此,中国需进一步增强本国综合性实力,积极推动日本对华安全释疑,扩大中日防卫交流与安全对话,增进两国的安全互信。     

The International Politics of the Chinese Arms Embargo Issue

The Chinese arms embargo issue has gone beyond Sino-European bilateral relations to become a matter of significance – and concern – for East Asian and US policymakers. Thus, an eventual solution depends not only on the interplay between EU and Chinese policymakers’ interests and considerations, but is now interconnected with China's domestic developments and regional posture, the security concerns of China's neighbours (especially Japan and Taiwan), the evolution of US-China relations and transatlantic relations.     

美国关键矿产安全的脆弱性识别与韧性操作逻辑

关键矿产安全是满足国防工业基础建设、助推清洁能源产业转型以及实现诸多高新技术研发与落地等国家安全需要的核心要素。供应链的安全则是关键矿产安全的核心,而生产与开发能力、回收技术发展、地缘政治竞争等因素皆会影响供应链的稳定性。存在严重对外依赖的现实使得美国为摆脱关键矿产安全的脆弱性,开始追求关键矿产的安全韧性。但在全球实力和地位相对下降的背景下,美国将地缘政治竞争视为影响供应安全的最重要因素。因此,美国在关键矿产安全领域表现出双重叙事：一方面,美国秉持生存叙事,力图通过减少关键矿产供应链的脆弱性,增强韧性,以保障国家安全的基本需求;另一方面,美国又主张权力叙事,将关键矿产安全韧性视为操作工具,以谋求全球控制和主导地位。在双重叙事的交织下,美国通过政治化关键矿产评估、构建排他性供应链等策略,意图在国际舞台上塑造有利于己的格局。而此种刻意制造安全焦虑、拉动“小圈子”、分割全球发展力量的举措给全球安全韧性带来严重冲击,威胁全人类的福祉,中国要高度警觉其进一步的举措,并积极进行应对。     

普京时代的俄罗斯外交与俄美关系

未来一个时期内,为振兴国内经济,俄罗斯将继续与西方国家,尤其是欧盟缓和关系、减少摩擦、避免对抗,以引进外部资金与技术;继续推行东西兼顾的欧亚平衡战略,推进亚太外交;继续把独联体外交作为"绝对优势"课题,全力保卫这一安全屏障和战略空间;继续反对美国和西方的挤压与进逼,但适当做出让步,避免正面对抗,以维护国家安全利益。     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

Selling the 'Decent interval': kissinger, triangular diplomacy, and the end of the Vietnam war, 1971-73

With the help of recently declassified documents, this article examines the link between triangular diplomacy and the Vietnam War. It argues that from the summer of 1971 to the conclusion of the Paris Agreements in January 1973 Kissinger tried to 'sell' a peace agreement to his Soviet and Chinese inter locutors by stressing the American willingness to accept a 'decent interval' solution: that is, the United States would not reenter the war provided that the collapse of the South Vietnamese goverment did not occur immediately after the last US ground troops returned home. While such a posture played a significant role in increasing Sino-Soviet pressure towards a negotiated settlement, Kissinger's policy also served to bolster the subsequent competition between Moscow and Beijing over influence in Indochina.     

中美不对称核稳定与美国战略机会主义论析

中美两国安全关系在两国总体关系中扮演着重要的角色,研究中美之间的战略稳定关系,对于维护两国安全关系的稳定具有重要意义。中国的核威慑实力弱于美国,中美之间呈现出不同于传统战略稳定关系的不对称核稳定态势。中国对美国存在一定的核威慑能力,但有效性仍有差距和不足。这一差距容易使美国产生压制和削弱中国核报复能力的机会主义思想。实施限制损伤战略、发展导弹防御能力、进行战略反潜是美国对中国实施战略机会主义的主要行动。美国谋求削弱中国核报复能力、打破中美不对称核稳定的企图,与中国努力维持核威慑能力、维持中美不对称核稳定的行为形成了两股力量相持的态势。中国应重点提升核武器的质量,提高威慑信号的传递效能,以可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力打消美国战略机会主义心态,维持两国间的战略稳定,特别是危机稳定性,筑牢遏制战争爆发的基础。     

俄罗斯对美国战略认知的演变及其政策效应

俄罗斯对美国战略认知的演变过程分为友好合作、竞争凸显和激烈对抗三个阶段。俄罗斯的强势外交和安全政策,表现为俄罗斯对美国和北约的强硬战略姿态以及追求超出自身相对实力的外交和安全目标。俄罗斯战略认知的演变与俄美两国的利益冲突之间有着相互塑造的关系,但是俄罗斯战略认知的变化并不仅仅取决于利益考量。俄罗斯之所以把北约东扩、乌克兰走向、叙利亚局势等看得如此重要,不惜投入大量资源,这是与塑造俄罗斯战略认知的历史和心理因素是分不开的。美国采取的许多对俄政策和行为,正是因为忽略了这些因素,才被俄罗斯看作是“侮辱性”和“威胁性”的,从而导致了双方敌意的螺旋式上升。由于俄罗斯独特的历史记忆和大国情结,俄罗斯对俄美两国的利益冲突作出了激烈的回应,这些回应虽然不利于俄罗斯的国家实力和整体利益,但却是可以理解的。随着俄罗斯对美战略认知的逐步定型,俄美关系在短期内很难实现所谓的“重启”。从俄罗斯对美战略认知的案例分析可以看出,战略认知自身有其相对的独立性,在受到利益冲突影响的同时,也受到社会文化因素的深刻影响,从而使得国家的外交与安全政策未必完全遵循理性主义的路径。     

论当前中美俄三边关系新特征和新趋舅

国际金融危机以来,中美俄三边关系进入以合作为主的新阶段。在普京重新出任总统后,美俄能否在欧洲反导问题上形成共识,将成为影响美俄关系发展的重要因素。未来,中美俄三边关系将会是各国在争取自身战略利益的过程中不断寻求妥协,将彼此间的竞争控制在规则允许的范围内。基于美国实力相对衰弱、俄中实力上升、解决全球性和地区问题上需要合作等因素,三国关系仍可能以继续保持建设性合作的基本态势向前发展。     

Selling the 'Decent interval': Kissinger,triangular diplomacy,and the end of the Vietnam war, 1971-73

With the help of recently declassified documents, this article examines the link between triangular diplomacy and the Vietnam War. It argues that from the summer of 1971 to the conclusion of the Paris Agreements in January 1973 Kissinger tried to 'sell' a peace agreement to his Soviet and Chinese inter locutors by stressing the American willingness to accept a 'decent interval' solution: that is, the United States would not reenter the war provided that the collapse of the South Vietnamese goverment did not occur immediately after the last US ground troops returned home. While such a posture played a significant role in increasing Sino-Soviet pressure towards a negotiated settlement, Kissinger's policy also served to bolster the subsequent competition between Moscow and Beijing over influence in Indochina.     

The Cuban Missile Crisis after Sixty Years

The sixtieth anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis is an appropriate time to review the events—arguably the closest the world has come to nuclear war—from the perspective of 2022. Growing tensions between Moscow and Washington and increasing Cuba emphasis in US domestic politics preceded the confrontation. Analysts differ on motives for placing long-range missiles in Cuba; Soviet officials consistently emphasized the defense of the island. We know now that nuclear war was even closer than realized at the time. This article is a revision of one that appeared in the Winter 2013 issue.